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Preface
Beyond the high institutional heterogeneity that characterizes Latin 
Am erica, during the past decades the countries in the region have increas­
ingly reallocated responsibilities from central levels o f  governm ent to inter­
m ediate and local levels. Similarly to the rest o f  the world, m ost countries 
o f  the region have experienced a clear trend towards increasing decentrali­
zation o f  spending responsibilities. These decentralization processes have 
occurred in both federal countries as well as in unitary and/or centralized 
countries, however, through different institutional and legal instruments. 
Therefore, sub-national governments participate m ore and m ore actively in 
the m anagem ent o f  a substantial part o f  the public budget.
Despite the potential advantages frequently referred to in order to justify  
these reallocations, it is im portant to note that these decentralization  
processes and their results have not been uniform . The systems o f  inter­
governmental relations and their impact in terms o f  efficiency and equity  
in the provision o f  decentralized goods and services (health, education and 
infrastructure) continue to be very heterogeneous.
Evidently the expected benefits o f  decentralization must be evaluated 
with a view o f  the conditions in which the reform processes are orches­
trated. Thereby it is essential to recognize a series o f  specific characteristics 
o f Latin America: high inequality in incom e distribution, high level o f  
urbanization, territorial inequality within countries, and lim its to public 
policy im posed by low  levels o f  taxation both at the central and the sub­
national government level. M oreover the developm ent o f  decentralization  
processes together with the recovery and strengthening o f  dem ocratic 
institutions must be stressed. In addition, in several countries o f  the region  
the strategic im portance o f  natural resources has m ade the allocation  
and distribution o f  revenues and royalties from these sectors to becom e 
one o f  the m ost active part o f  the decentralization process and realloca­
tion o f  functions. H ence it becom es very im portant to check whether and 
how local institutions have worked in these contexts and to see how their 
actions can be improved.
The rapid devolution o f  spending responsibilities was not mirrored on  
the revenue side. A s is well docum ented in this volume, this asymmetry  
between revenues and expenditure in decentralization is quite com m on
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around the world, but it is especially relevant in Latin Am erica, reflecting 
a number o f  econom ic, political and institutional factors that affect the 
process and its outcomes.
In order to address the im pact o f  the decentralization process in the 
region, the E conom ic Com m ission for Latin Am erica and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), with the financial support o f  D eutsche Gesellschaft fur 
Internationale Zusam menarbeit (GIZ) G m bH  and the Federal M inistry 
for Econom ic C ooperation and D evelopm ent (BM Z), has carried out two 
projects on decentralization and governance. As part o f  these projects 
a series o f  seminars and workshops were held with fiscal authorities 
and experts to evaluate the state o f  intergovernmental relations in Latin 
America and the im pact o f  the reassignment process in terms o f  equity 
and macro fiscal sustainability.
A s a result o f  these multiple activities ECLAC and G IZ present this 
volum e with the purpose to contribute to the knowledge about the decen­
tralization process in the region, em phasizing the intergovernmental 
relations system s and the public policies im plem ented to reduce multiple 
forms o f  inequality in the region. We consider that the topics analyzed in 
this book have a strong im portance for the debate about public policies in 
Latin America.
The objective o f  this book requires the consideration o f  various sub­
jects, ranging from those linked to the relationship between econom ic  
developm ent and decentralization to those related to the m acroeconom ic 
impact o f  the reassignm ent o f  functions and the resulting system o f  inter­
governmental relationships. Furthermore, the book addresses social and  
infrastructure spending, social cohesion, and financing o f  sub-national 
expenditure.
Decentralization remains one o f  the biggest challenges in the region, 
presenting as m any opportunities as risks. As described in this volume, 
the process involves m any m ultidim ensional factors that require a con ­
stant effort to learn and rethink the kind o f  interventions needed to take 
advantage o f  the opportunities and overcom e the challenges.
We are sure that Decentralization and Reform in Latin Am erica: 
Improving Intergovernmental Relations will be o f  interest to the many 
scholars and practitioners working in this field and will serve to stimulate 
debate on the governance o f  intergovernmental relations in Latin Am erica.
Alicia Barcena 
Executive Secretary, E C L A C
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1. Introduction: approaching 
recent transform ations o f 
intergovernm ental relations from  
m ultiple profiles
Giorgio Brosio and Juan Pablo Jiménez
1 SPECIFICITIES OF THE EVOLUTION OF 
DECENTRALIZED ARRANGEMENTS IN LATIN 
AMERICA
In m ost Latin Am erican countries, since colonial independence, the 
shaping o f  intergovernm ental relations has been a crucial com ponent o f  
the debate on the institutional structure o f  governm ent and constitutional 
design. In the region, political reform and federalization/decentralization  
intersect in the political and intellectual debate with an intensity that, 
possibly, is not observable in other continents.
This is not w idely recognized outside Latin Am erica (LA), possibly  
because the offences by authoritarian rulers and regimes to the federal and  
decentralized arrangements have been m ore prom inent than the peculiar 
characteristics and the innovations introduced to them  by dem ocratic 
governm ents.
There are com m on  characteristics o f  the decentralization processes 
w orldw ide that are w orth analyzing from  a general and not just a Latin  
A m erican perspective. A t the sam e time, Latin Am erican countries 
show  som e specificities that trace their roots, as to be expected, to the 
original features o f  the constitutional and political institutions o f  the 
continent.
Decentralization reform has been rapid and intense over the past three 
decades. Like the rest o f  the world, m ost countries in LA  have expe­
rienced a clear trend towards increasing decentralization o f  spending  
responsibilities. A s a result, subnational spending rose sharply between  
1985 and 2010, both as a ratio to G D P  and as a share o f  overall public 
sector spending. Subnational governm ents (SN G s) are m anaging a much
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larger share o f  the public sector budget than they did before, although it 
is not as large as that prevailing in m ost industrial countries. S N G  m an­
agem ent is also m ore active, since m ost heads o f  the executive are selected  
by popular vote due to political decentralization. Follow ing Treisman  
(2002), LA has one o f  the highest levels o f  electoral, that is, political, 
decentralization.
Decentralization has been especially prom inent in health and education  
expenditures. These two sectors on average account for approxim ately 40 
percent o f  total subnational spending in the region. In countries such as 
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, and Colom bia, SN G s 
are responsible for over 70 percent o f  total public spending on education, 
and for 50 percent or m ore on health. This fact highlights the social im pli­
cations o f  a substantial portion o f  subnational spending in m any Latin  
American countries.
The rapid devolution o f  spending responsibilities was not mirrored on  
the revenue side. W ith the exception o f  Brazil and, to a m uch lesser extent, 
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and C olom bia, subnational 
ow n revenues in L A  account for small, and broadly constant over time, 
shares o f  total tax revenues, and for less than 2 percent o f  G D P , giving rise 
to large vertical im balances.
2 ASYMMETRY BETWEEN DEVOLUTION OF 
EXPENDITURE AND DEVOLUTION OF TAXING 
RESPONSIBILITIES
It is well docum ented in the relevant literature that this asymmetric trend 
in decentralization is quite com m on around the world, but it is especially  
relevant in LA, and reflects a number o f  factors (see A m brosanio and 
Bordignon, 2006; Ter M inassian and Fedelino, 2010; G óm ez Sabaini and 
Jiménez, ch. 6 in this volume).
First, political econom y incentives for both the central governm ent 
(CG) and m ost SN G s tend to work in favor o f  revenue centralization: CGs 
prefer to m aintain control o f  m ost revenue bases, and to  provide resources 
to SN G s through transfers and, for their part, SN G s tend to prefer avoid­
ing the political costs o f  raising resources from their ow n constituents, and 
blam ing the CG  for any shortfall o f  such resources.
Second, the scope for decentralization o f  taxing powers is also con ­
strained by econom ic factors, m ost notably the higher m obility o f  goods  
and factors o f  production within than outside a national territory. This 
tends to limit subnational tax handles m ainly to property taxes.
Third, with taxing capacities typically being unequally distributed
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Sources: ECLAC and OECD.
Figure 1.1 Transfer ratio ( average 2000-2006) (%  o f  G D P)
across the national territory (especially in resource-rich countries), signifi­
cant vertical im balances need to be m aintained between levels o f  govern­
m ent, to facilitate horizontal redistribution through equalization-type 
transfers.
In that sense, the growing vertical im balance is covered by intergovern­
m ental transfers. O ne im portant characteristic o f  LA is the im portance o f  
these transfers, w hich am ount to an average o f  21 percent -  alm ost double 
the O E CD  average (11 percent) (Figure 1.1).
A n  additional characteristic o f  the intergovernmental transfer system in 
L A  is the significance o f  revenue-sharing m echanism s and poorly designed  
equalization transfer programs (see ch. 9 in this volume).
Finally, subnational tax adm inistrations generally (albeit not always) 
are less effective than national ones. This is especially evident in LA  in the 
administration o f  local property taxes, with outdated cadastres (property 
registers) and infrequent reassessm ents o f  property values. A s a result, 
the ratio o f  property taxes to G D P  is equivalent to approxim ately 20 
percent o f  the corresponding ratio in O E CD  countries (G óm ez Sabaini 
and Jiménez, ch. 6 and Sepulveda and M artinez-Vazquez, ch. 7 in this 
volum e).
These stylized facts are the results o f  a long process o f  reforms during 
the last three decades that have attracted a lot o f  analytical attention and  
have been the focus o f  considerable academ ic and expert research in m ost 
countries.
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3 STAGES OF DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS 
AND THEIR RATIONALE
In the first period (until the m id-1990s) the leading idea was that decen­
tralization w ould stim ulate more-efficient provision o f  public goods, and 
w ould im prove dem ocratic and popular participation and thus account­
ability. W e are referring, in particular, to the constitutional reform in 
Brazil (1988), to the Coparticipation Law in Argentina (1988), to the 
decentralization o f  the health and education law in Argentina (1994) and 
to the constitutional reform o f  C olom bia (1991).
A ccording to Rezende and V eloso (ch. 8 in this volum e) this wave
which gained impetus in the late 1980s, was accompanied by a widespread 
defense of the virtues of familiarizing governments with their constituencies, 
so as to improve efficiency in managing public resources, achieve efficacy by 
adjusting the provision of public services to local priorities, and allowing for 
the accountability of the governmental authorities. This should also enhance 
democracy following the demise of authoritarian regimes in some parts of Latin 
America.
T o a large extent the norm ative theory o f  fiscal federalism  was the 
intellectual support o f  these reforms.
A t the same time the W orld Bank -  the international organization m ost 
active in the support o f  those reforms -  em phasized in a 1988 report:
Decentralization promotes efficiency by allowing a close correspondence 
between public services and individual preferences, favoring responsibility and 
equity through a clear relationship between service benefits and costs. This 
is the justification for the establishment of provincial and local governments 
sensitive to the wishes of its citizens, and not simply instruments of the central 
government. (World Bank, 1988, pp. 182-3; see also 1993, pp. 12-13)
Starting from  the m id-1990s, and related to som e events such as the 
default in M inas Gerais (Brazil) and the fiscal crisis o f  Argentina, the 
process was reoriented. Som e governments, experts and international 
organizations started to worry about the extent o f  decentralization, and 
particularly about the increase o f  subnational debt. The reforms o f  those 
days were oriented towards coordinating and controlling subnational 
borrowing. M ost o f  the fiscal responsibility laws o f  the region1 were 
form ulated in those years to control subnational borrowing.
Questions also started to emerge about the effectiveness o f  decentraliza­
tion. In the W orld D evelopm ent R eport (1997), the W orld Bank pointed  
out that decentralization generates significant benefits in different parts 
o f  the world, including LA. In particular, it can im prove the quality o f
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governance and achieve a better representation o f  citizens. C om petition  
between provinces, cities and localities can spur the developm ent o f  more- 
effective policies and programs. However, the W orld Bank acknowledges 
three big potential pitfalls o f  decentralization: greater inequality, macro  
instability and subm ission o f  local governm ents to interest groups. The 
existence o f  such dangers, then, shows that the role o f  central govern­
m ents is vital for the preservation o f  development: ‘The problem  is finding 
the appropriate division o f  responsibilities between the central and other 
levels o f  governm ent’ (ibid., p. 13).
4 PECULIARITIES OF LATIN AMERICAN 
SOCIETIES AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS ON 
DECENTRALIZATION
A s m entioned above, the crucial sectors affected by decentralization have 
been health, education and basic infrastructure. These sectors im pact 
directly on living conditions, particularly o f  the poor, and have submitted  
the merits o f  decentralization to a crucial test. There are som e peculiarities 
o f  Latin Am erican societies, such as the high inequality in incom e distri­
bution and territorial disparities which could be considered as a limit or 
as a justification for the disappointing results noted in som e countries. 
H ence, it becom es very im portant to check whether and how  local institu­
tions have worked in these contexts and to see how their actions can be 
im proved.
A s a response to  this need, there is a growing branch o f  the literature 
that studies the effectiveness o f  decentralization in terms o f  service provi­
sion. Part o f  this literature refers specifically to LA  (Faguet, 2004; Faguet 
and Sánchez, 2006). Latin American countries are also included in large 
sectional studies that analyze the outcom es o f  decentralization across the 
w orld (R obalino et al., 2001; Arze del G ranado et ah, 2005). According  
to this literature, there is evidence that substantiates the claims m ade by 
the theory that decentralization im proves governance by ensuring better 
preference-m atching and allocation efficiency. These findings are partially 
contradicted by the observation o f  an increase o f  poverty and inequality 
in som e Latin A m erican countries in the last part o f  the 1990s. To a great 
extent these results have to be assigned to the econom ic and financial 
crisis o f  the end o f  the decade. They have also im pacted on  decentralized 
arrangements. In som e countries the need to give a quick response to the 
deteriorated conditions o f  the poorest segments o f  the population has 
induced the governm ent to introduce new social programs that channel 
resources directly from  the center in a targeted way (Progresa  in Mexico;
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Bolsa Fam ilia  in Brazil; and the Jefas  and Jefes  Program in Argentina, 
am ong others) (D iaz-Cayeros and M agaloni, 2009).
Institutional changes for social policies are in line w ith the concom itant 
and im portant changes in the econom ic literature on fiscal federalism  
with the advent o f  the so-called ‘second generation’. This new literature 
(Lockw ood, 2006; R odden, 2006; W eingast, 2006) follow s the typical 
political econom y approach by replacing the benevolent governm ent 
assum ptions with the m ore realistic one o f  self-serving officials and politi­
cians, and stresses the critical role o f  institutions in determining the effects 
o f  centralized or decentralized governm ent.
5 GROWING MACRO-FINANCIAL CONCERNS 
ASSOCIATED WITH DECENTRALIZATION
A  growing branch o f  this recent political econom y-based literature focuses 
on fiscal m anagem ent. This is not by chance. A n  increasing number 
o f  S N G  fiscal crises have ended in m ost cases with the CG  bailout o f  
defaulted units. M acroeconom ic policy also constitutes an area where the 
incentive-based approach to local governance finds an ideal ground for 
application. Since local governments have little electoral responsibility for 
m acroeconom ic performance and since fiscal sovereignty has been con ­
centrated in the hands o f  the CG, intergovernmental fiscal relations have 
becom e a political game where local governm ents tend to overspend and 
then ask the CG  for financial help once they have exhausted their borrow ­
ing capacity. On the other hand, the CG  tries to abstain from  intervention, 
but with a limited credibility deriving from  its increased fiscal sovereignty. 
Quite paradoxically, but not too  much in the m icroeconom ic sphere, 
political incentives increase the efficiency o f  decentralized governm ent by 
stim ulating com petition, while in the m acroeconom ic sphere they may 
com plicate fiscal and m onetary m anagement.
To im prove the m acroeconom ic perform ance o f  local governm ents, 
the bulk o f  the literature points to the im portance o f  fiscal institutions, 
particularly to reliance on taxation instead o f  C G  transfers. W hile 
higher reliance on taxation im proves local accountability and hence 
has a positive, m icroeconom ic, im pact on the behavior o f  SN G s, from  
a m acroeconom ic point view things m ay look  different. A  high level o f  
fiscal decentralization reached in som e countries in the Latin Am erican  
region is often considered as a factor o f  fiscal fragility and o f  am plifica­
tion o f  m acroeconom ic shocks. A t the same time, one has to consider that 
these problem s do not necessarily originate in decentralization per se, but 
rather in underestim ation o f  the need to insert coordination  m echanism s
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within the system  o f  intergovernm ental relations and o f  increasing SN G  
reliance on  own taxes.
A ll these evolutions suggest the need to give new and m ore emphasis 
to a wide-spectrum  analysis o f  the working o f  subnational governance. 
Studies should range from  the empirical analysis o f  the effective outcom es 
o f  decentralization, to  the im pact o f  decentralization reforms on equity 
and poverty and to  the m acro-financial consequences o f  devolution o f  
powers and finance.
6 OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME
The aim o f  the initial seminar that gave birth to  the present volum e was 
exactly in line with the exigencies m entioned above. The key issue is not to 
evaluate the pros and cons o f  decentralization, but to assess the working  
o f  decentralized arrangements and institutions with a view to  suggest­
ing corrections and reforms where they are not working according to 
expectations.
Consideration has been given here to  a large set o f  issues, ranging from  
the im pact o f  decentralization on social cohesion, to the observable link 
between decentralization and spending for the social sectors and infra­
structure and to the financing o f  subnational spending responsibilities 
through taxes, transfers and debt. Special consideration m ust also be given 
to m acro-financial issues and fiscal rules in view o f  their relevance in the 
Latin American context. A dditionally, in several countries in the region, 
the intergovernmental allocation o f  revenue from  natural resources has 
becom e one o f  the m ost debated issues o f  the processes o f  decentralization, 
bringing the need for careful and m ultifaceted analysis.
The first topic discussed in this volum e is the link between constitutional 
reform and decentralization. Gargarella and Arballo (ch. 2) describe 
the context in which constitutional issues have been debated in LA. The 
authors provide an overview o f  the present scenario as defined in the 
latest constitutional reforms in the region, taking into account generally 
established trends and those just em erging in the area o f political and fiscal 
decentralization. They distinguish between the m ain federal m odels that 
have prevailed in L A  and point to a recent process o f  convergence between  
them. However, convergence is still lim ited and refers m ore to formal than 
to substantial issues, however important. The authors point out that m any  
crucial issues, such as revenue assignm ent, are om itted from  constitutional 
texts. This is a reasonable strategy in view o f  the rapid and changing  
responses that states have to give to the fast evolution o f  their socioeco­
nom ic and political context im pacting on intergovernmental relations. On
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the other hand, this strategy also reflects an uneasiness in m aking critical 
choices and m ay be a source o f  uncertainty and instability.
Cetràngolo and G oldschm it (ch. 3) take a critical look  at decentraliza­
tion policies in LA  that m ay have had an adverse impact in terms o f  social 
cohesion. Based on the existing literature, they evaluate the effects on  
social cohesion o f  public policies on decentralization and contem plate the 
types o f  reforms needed to achieve greater social cohesion within a decen­
tralized policy environm ent. Their analysis highlights the im portance o f  
taking into account the com plex web o f  interrelated policy objectives, and 
focuses on a new wave o f  reforms based on the redefinition o f  the relevant 
sector policies. The discussion begins with a brief overview o f  the way in 
which decentralization has taken place in LA, the inroads that have been  
m ade and the reasons why these processes have been undertaken. The 
chapter then addresses the tensions and constraints in terms o f  greater 
social cohesion that are associated with these reforms, given their effects 
on fiscal correspondence and solvency. After exploring a few options for 
easing these tensions, the authors evaluate their im pact and provide a 
number o f  policy recom m endations.
A fonso, D ain , A lm eida, Castro and Faveret (ch. 4) focus on the issue 
o f  social policies. They exam ine the evolution and the assignm ent o f  social 
spending in LA, focusing on the perspectives and the m ain approaches in 
the current debate on the decentralization o f  social spending in the region  
and on the potentiality o f  fiscal decentralization as an instrument to foster 
social spending. They note a general increase in social spending in the 
region and a less general attempt to provide social services on a universal 
basis. Differences between individual countries are still im portant and are 
dom inated to a large extent by the level o f  econom ic developm ent.
D e M ello (ch. 5) analyzes investm ent in infrastructure -  a crucial com ­
ponent o f  subnational spending -  and provides empirical evidence on the 
effects o f  decentralization on investm ent with reference to a panel o f  coun­
tries for which data on this investm ent are available. The analysis suggests 
that decentralization discourages Latin Am erican SN G s from  investing 
(acquiring fixed assets) and that lower subnational spending on invest­
m ent is associated with lower econom y-wide gross fixed capital form ation. 
This finding challenges som e conclusions o f  the existing literature stress­
ing the positive im pact o f  decentralization on investm ent expenditure. 
According to de M ello, Latin American countries will therefore need to  
face the double challenge o f  having to revisit the current arrangements for 
decentralized provision that discourage S N G  investm ent, while making 
the m ost o f  decentralization as a policy lever to raise private investm ent.
G óm ez Sabaini and Jiménez (ch. 6) exam ine the assignm ent o f  revenue 
to SN G s and illustrate the m ain characteristics o f  financing system s, such
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as vertical im balance and the prevalence o f  coparticipation schemes. They  
analyze the working o f  S N G  financing system s, giving particular attention  
to the distinct com ponents o f  subnational own resources. The authors 
also exam ine the range o f  borrowing options available to lower levels o f  
governm ent, as a com plem ent to the ‘above-the-line’ revenues. The study 
o f  specific cases is designed to spotlight the different own-revenue options  
open to these jurisdictions (intermediate and/or local governm ents) -  
despite the predom inance o f  C G  transfers -  as well as the main courses o f  
action that could be taken to strengthen subnational financial autonom y.
In their first contribution to this volum e, Sepulveda and M artinez- 
V azquez (ch. 7) focus on the property tax, the m ost im portant source 
o f  own revenues for local governm ents around the world. A n  increasing 
number o f  countries that have recently em barked on a decentraliza­
tion process also look  to the property tax as the m ain vehicle to provide 
their SN G s with revenue autonom y. In the case o f  LA, in particular, the 
property tax continues to be a predom inant policy concern am ong policy  
makers. H owever, w ith very few exceptions, Latin Am erican countries 
have not been able to develop revenue-productive property tax systems. 
The region has been identified in the econom ics literature generally as one 
with relatively low  general tax effort, and with a level o f  tax performance 
that is even lower than other developing and transition countries. The 
issues o f  low effort and revenue performance are especially acute and chal­
lenging in the case o f  the property tax. The authors analyze the causes o f  
the poor tax perform ance o f  the property tax in LA  and identify policies 
that could help with the current impasse
Intergovernmental transfers are the focus o f  two distinct chapters. 
R ezende and V eloso’s contribution (ch. 8) illustrates the m ain character­
istics exhibited by the transfer regimes o f  eight Latin Am erican countries, 
highlighting the changes provoked by reactions to the econom ic crisis o f  
the 1990s and pointing out their m ain flaws. They point to the need to  
im prove the efficiency and equity content o f  the present transfers system  
and advance a num ber o f  propositions concerning the reform o f  these 
system s with a view to rem oving their flaws and m aking them  com patible 
with both m icroeconom ic and m acroeconom ic concerns. M ore specifi­
cally, transfer system s have to be m ore equitable and efficient. A t the same 
time, they have to be flexible to accom m odate changes in fiscal policies 
that can be necessitated by the short-term evolution  o f  m acroeconom ic 
conditions.
In their second contribution to this volum e, M artinez-Vazquez and 
Sepulveda (ch. 9) focus on the equalization im pact on and the capacity  
to stim ulate own revenue in the present transfer system in nine Latin 
Am erican countries. Their analysis shows that on both counts substantial
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improvem ents are needed. Countries in LA  m ight achieve great benefits 
by reducing their reliance on revenue-sharing schemes and im proving the 
design o f  equalization transfer programs, with a view to reducing fiscal 
disparities, and at the same time providing SN G s w ith the right incentives 
to expand own revenues and to develop their own tax collection capacity.
Brosio and Jiménez (ch. 10) analyze the allocation o f  rents from  n on ­
renewable natural resources, hydrocarbons and m inerals, am ong levels 
o f  governm ent in LA. This is a crucial issue not only from  the point o f  
view o f  ensuring good governance at the subnational level, but also from  
the necessity o f  avoiding political conflict and strains on national unity. 
Bearing that in m ind, the authors first explore the issues connected to the 
sharing o f  rents from  natural resources am ong levels o f  governm ent. This 
analytical, but policy-oriented section provides a num ber o f  policy indica­
tions on how to  share the rents that are based on the econom ic theory o f  
factor production remuneration. Second, the authors analyze empirically 
the issue o f  intergovernm ental sharing in eight Latin Am erican countries 
endowed with oil, gas and minerals.
The decentralization o f  spending responsibilities has created growing 
challenges for m acro-fiscal management. On the one hand, it has becom e 
m ore im portant and m ore difficult to ensure that S N G s do not accum u­
late unsustainable debts; on the other, the traditional fiscal federalism ’s 
view that short-term m acroeconom ic stabilization should be the exclusive 
purview o f  the C G  is becom ing increasingly unrealistic.
Jiménez and Ter-M inassian (ch. 11) contribute to this debate on how  
fiscal decentralization affects m acroeconom ic m anagem ent in the main  
Latin American countries and on the selection o f  reforms in the existing  
intergovernmental fiscal systems o f  those countries that could help to 
strengthen their fiscal sustainability, minimize the risk o f  pro-cyclicality at 
all levels o f  governm ent, and create ‘fiscal space’ for active countercyclical 
responses to econom ic shocks.
Grembi and M anoel (ch. 12) provide a critical review o f the fiscal rules 
at the subnational level for Argentina, Brazil, C olom bia, and M exico. 
Innovating on this topic, they provide disaggregated evidence for a sample 
o f  countries. This evidence allows some elements to be addressed that 
deserve further investigation. For instance, in som e cases there seems to 
be no difference between those SN G s that did adopt fiscal rules and those 
that did not adopt them, whereas in other cases the im position o f  the rules 
from the C G  appears to generate com pliance, but not change in the fiscal 
outcom es. W hether the ineffectiveness o f  the rules is due to their character­
istics rather than a weak definition o f  the decentralization system remains 
an open issue. A lthough it is not possible to evaluate the causal im pact o f  
the introduction o f  fiscal rules at the subnational level in the countries o f
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reference, the analysis o f  descriptive statistics shows that a unique indicator 
o f  com pliance m ight be a m isleading indicator o f  fiscal rules at that level.
Finally, Ahm ad (ch. 13) analyzes the intergovernmental reforms in LA, 
establishing som e stim ulating links with ‘A sian transplants’ and focusing  
on the role played by international and donor agencies. The chapter dis­
tinguishes, in particular, between the norm ative and the political econom y  
approaches to decentralization, and suggests how  excessive reliance on the 
former had led to inconsistencies in the form ulation o f  policy recom m en­
dations by international organizations and the donor com m unity. The 
chapter also refers to the m ain recent developm ents in  theoretical litera­
ture, singling out the steps that are needed to ensure that the objectives o f  
constitutional reforms are met efficiently. '
The editors are confident that the topics analyzed in this b ook  and the 
issues they raise will have an im portant impact on the political, social 
and intellectual life in LA, and contribute to  the debate on the reform o f  
intergovernm ental relations systems.
NOTE
1. Usually accompanied by a subnational restructuring debt (Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia).
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2. Federalism  and fiscal federalism: 
the emergence and d istortion  of 
the centro-federalist constitu tional 
m odel in its political and fiscal 
m anifestations
Roberto Gargarella and Gustavo Arballo
1 INTRODUCTION
The question o f  federalism in general, and o f  fiscal federalism in particular, 
has been a central them e o f  Latin American constitutional history from  its 
beginnings. Placing the issue in the context o f  Latin Am erican constitu­
tional history can help us recognize that the debate over federalism and 
the duties o f  the national state has been a feature o f  constitutionalism  
since its inception, and involves different ways o f  designing constitutional 
arrangements. This has always been a central point o f  a dispute that is 
still far from  being resolved, whether in theoretical or in practical terms. 
The dispute, in turn, reflects differing views as to how  best to assemble the 
various pieces o f  the constitutional puzzle.
In other words: the still-unresolved debate over the scope o f  federalism  
and its arrangements is not merely the result o f  the relative ‘backwardness’ 
o f  our societies, a shortage o f  resources, recurrent econom ic crises, or the 
failure to consolidate and strengthen our institutions. The debate over 
federalism is in fact part o f  a broader dispute, also unresolved, over the 
constitutional m odel that should guide the organization o f  our societies.
Section 2 describes the context in which constitutional issues have been 
debated and settled in Latin Am erica (LA). W e consider here som e specific 
points o f  constitutional topology that involve the regulatory and fiscal 
powers o f  states and how  they have been correlated with conflicting p oliti­
cal and legal concepts, generating instability and pressures for change.
Section 3 provides an overview o f the m ost recent scenario, as defined in 
the latest constitutional reforms in the region, taking into account gener­
ally established trends and those just em erging in the area o f  political and
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fiscal decentralization. Finally, in Section 4 we attempt to place in context 
the conclusions o f  the com parative study, and we identify som e prob­
lems, uncertainties and challenges relating to constitutional tensions and 
changes in LA  regarding issues that have an impact on fiscal federalism.
2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY ERA: 
THE RISE OF THE CENTRO-FEDERALIST 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
In this section we look  at the different constitutional m odels that have 
existed in LA  since its origins, and consider their stances in relation to the 
federalist-centralist debate.
A s a first step, to take account o f  the contents o f  these different under­
takings, we m ust recognize that a constitution -  basically any known  
constitution -  com prises two main parts, which in turn involve various 
ramifications and subdivisions. The two parts o f  any constitution involve 
the organization o f  governm ent (normally, into three branches: executive, 
legislative and judicial), and the organization o f  rights (which includes a 
‘bill o f  rights’ accom panied by guidelines or norm s and indications as to  
the extent and scope o f  those rights).
Since the time o f  independence, Latin Am erican history has know n at 
least three, very different m odels or proposals for organizing these differ­
ent parts o f  the constitution. Each o f  those m odels included, crucially, 
specific references for dealing with the question o f  federalism. The three 
m ain constitutional concepts that we can recognize from the earliest days 
o f independence are (to use a term inology com m on to historical studies 
o f  that period) those associated with conservatism , republicanism, and 
liberalism.
The first m odel, the conservative one, was o f  decisive im portance 
in the region’s constitutional history, and (with som e exceptions) was 
clearly the m ost hostile to ideals o f  federalism. That stance has consist­
ently been translated into constitutions that, regarding organization o f  
power, have centralized authority politically and territorially and have 
m ade rights dependent on a concept that was politically elitist and m orally 
perfectionist.1
The radical or republican constitutional stance can be defined by its 
com m itm ent to majority rule and its populist take on rights. The ideal o f  
radicalism was ‘self-governm ent’ which, in terms o f  constitutional design, 
was norm ally expressed through adoption o f  an organization based on the 
premise o f ‘popular sovereignty’, together with a system  o f  rights placed at 
the service of, and dependent on, the political majority. In contrast to the
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centralist and authoritarian tenets o f  conservatism , the radicals tended to 
defend federal ideals and a m ore dispersed power structure.
Finally, constitutional liberalism can be described as a stance concerned  
with m axim izing the scope o f  individual liberty. It has sought to differenti­
ate itself both from  conservatism  and from republicanism. Its proposal to 
confront the twin evils o f  tyranny and anarchy m ust be read in this sense: 
it seeks to guard both against the abuses o f  concentrated authority and 
against the predictable excesses o f  unfettered m ajority rule. Norm ally, lib­
eralism has viewed federalism as a natural consequence o f  its com m itm ent 
to the ideals o f  individual autonom y and freedom  o f  choice.
The Conservative Constitutional M odel
The conservative m odel was present in LA  from the very first post­
revolutionary years. It sought to concentrate political power in a few  
hands, so as to facilitate the swift reconstruction o f  society. These ideas 
were based on an elitist conception o f  politics, according to which it was 
neither helpful nor desirable to involve the bulk o f  the population in 
debating and deciding the great public issues that society had to resolve: 
that responsibility, it was assum ed, should lie in the hands o f  the m ost 
illustrious m inority o f  the com m unity. Consistent with that approach, 
conservative constitutions were distinguished essentially by the presence 
o f  very strong executive branches, endowed with exceptional powers that 
could be called into play in situations o f  ‘internal or external crisis’.2 The 
battle waged by conservatives on behalf o f  centralism was undoubtedly  
one o f  the m ost im portant contests o f  the nineteenth century. A t least in 
its declaration, the anti-federalist cause always occupied a central place 
am ong the conservatives’ political initiatives, and was one o f  the principles 
invoked to justify their m ost violent acts.
In Chile, the conservatives claim ed that the federalist constitution o f  
1828 had thrown the country into chaos and anarchy, and that the rudder 
had to be tilted sharply away from  decentralization. A s Andrés Bello 
(1997) saw it, the 1828 C onstitution had granted so much power to local 
authorities that it had converted the executive into a toothless body.3 The 
1833 Constitution, then, seemed especially designed to repair that source 
o f  weakness.
The struggle against federalism also occupied pride o f  place am ong  
the proposals o f  M exican conservatism  during the entire period under 
review here. Lucas Alarnan spoke o f  federalism as ‘the m ost powerful and 
destructive instrument im aginable’ (Stevens, 1991: 31-2). In Argentina, all 
the significant constitutional docum ents issued during the first half o f  the 
century were clearly centralist (in particular the constitutions o f  1819 and
1 6 D ecentralization  and reform  in L atin  A m erica
1826). It was not until 1853, with approval o f  the new constitution fo llow ­
ing the overthrow o f  Juan M anuel de R osas, that the country adopted its 
federal form o f  governm ent.
In Venezuela, the 1830 C onstitution, through which José A ntonio  Páez 
controlled power for decades, established a ‘centro-federalist’ form o f  
governm ent that represented a reaction to the federalist spirit o f  the 1811 
Constitution. The cause o f  centralism, present throughout the century 
and responsible for b loody battles during that time, found constitutional 
expression again during the governm ent o f  General José Tadeo M onagas 
in the 1857 docum ent. That constitution, the m ost centralist in history, 
and also the shortest-lived, was replaced in 1858 by another that was more 
open to federalism. Yet the seeds o f  the ‘federal war’ had been sown, and 
w ould end up exploding in that same year, whereupon debate over feder­
alism was put back on the negotiating table, in the m idst o f  a frightening 
and violent situation.
The Alternative: The Republican Constitutional M odel
In sharp contrast to the conservative m odel, the republican constitutional 
m odel m ade little practical headway in the Am ericas. H owever, it did 
becom e a significant point o f  reference in political debates o f  the time. For 
som e, the republican m odel was an ideal to be pursued, while for many  
others it was the m ost serious institutional threat, to be firmly resisted.
In the United States the radical republican m odel found support am ong  
som e opponents o f  the federal constitution o f  1787. The stance o f  those 
critics was finally defeated -  both in the C onstitutional C onvention and 
in intellectual debate o f  the day -  but it remained an im portant influence 
to the point where it can still explain som e o f the peculiar institutional 
arrangements that were finally incorporated into the U S  Constitution. In 
LA, republicanism had less o f  an institutional impact: it was never clearly 
distilled into any concrete constitutional arrangements in that region. Yet, 
som e claim to see traces o f  that ideal m odel in the radicalized phraseol­
ogy o f  the region’s first constitutions: note the classic radical slogans o f  
the ‘sovereignty o f  the people’, the ‘popular will’, the ‘social contract’, 
‘equality’, ‘universal principles’, and the ‘rights o f  m an’ which marked 
constitutional texts and debates in Chile, N ueva Granada, Venezuela and 
the Banda Oriental between 1811 and 1812. Toward the m iddle o f  the 
century, from 1848 onward, there was a certain resurgence o f  collectivism  
in the region, but in m ost cases it remained an ephem eral m ovem ent with  
relatively little influence.
T o describe republican constitutionalism  we may say that its basic objec­
tive is to achieve a self-governing com m unity. It holds that the com m unity
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itself must define its objectives and the m eans for achieving them. Thus, 
it is not surprising that one o f  the principal cries raised by republicans 
throughout the continent was to federalize the new nations, by deconcen- 
trating political power and decentralizing territorial organization.
In fact, republicans in their great majority were inclined to prom ote a 
federal type o f  government. This promised better representation and better 
protection for the interests o f  the citizenry. Thus the federalist cause quickly 
becam e one o f  the m ain sources o f  conflict throughout the Americas -  in the 
U S, because (according to its critics) federalist extremism meant keeping 
the country disorganized and allowing rights to be trampled, and in LA  
(again, according to the critics o f  federalism) because it not only threatened 
the rights o f  the m inorities but also conspired against the consolidation o f  
independence (which apparently required a concentrated and firm author­
ity). Radicals such as Ezequiel Zam ora in Venezuela, Lorenzo de Zavala  
in M exico, or José Gervasio Artigas in the Banda Oriental were staunch  
defenders o f  the federalist cause, which they saw as a m agic solution to the 
problem s afflicting their respective com m unities. Zam ora believed that the 
Federation had the power to remedy all the ills o f  the country. His faith in 
the virtues o f  federalism was boundless. That system, he added, would not 
merely resolve such problem s but ‘m ake them  im possible’.
The Liberal Constitutional M odel
The liberal constitutional m odel can be seen as a direct reaction to the 
constitutional ideals described above. Liberalism held that the state must 
above all respect the rights o f  individuals and consequently the m ost basic 
convictions and interests o f  each person. In this respect, the state m ust not 
undertake to defend any particular religion, philosophy or political ideol­
ogy. A s the first constitutional liberalists m aintained, a ‘wall o f  separation  
between Church and state’ must be erected to prevent the state’s capture, 
for exam ple, by the defenders o f  any particular religion. Those w ho took  
this stance considered that the state must remain neutral in the face o f  the 
different conceptions o f  the public good adopted by the citizens: a state 
that subsidized a given religion or that prevented the partisans o f  a given 
ideology from expressing them selves was considered a non-neutral state, 
a state that w rongly took  sides with certain ideals o f  the good. In its pro­
claim ed neutrality, individualistic liberalism thus stood in direct contrast 
to the two alternative conceptions exam ined above: all individuals must 
be free to choose their own way forward in life, even if  this conflicted with 
the values traditionally held by their com m unity (as perfectionism  would  
m aintain) or the values defended by a circumstantial m ajority or required 
as a way o f  upholding that majority will (as populism  m ight argue).
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Just as in questions o f  ‘personal ethics’, individualism  insists that each 
person is the master o f  his/her own destiny and that, when it com es to 
organizing the com m unity’s political life, each society m ust in principle 
govern itself as its ow n members decide. N ow  o f  course on this point 
again, liberalism differs sharply from alternative conceptions such as 
those exam ined above. A gainst the threats inherent in the concentration  
o f  power cham pioned by conservatives, and the predictable risks o f  del­
egating power to the majority, liberals proposed an extensive system o f  
institutional controls and restrictions on absolute power. Typically, the 
liberals proclaim ed the need not only to divide and deconcentrate power 
but also to establish a system o f ‘checks and balances’. N either majorities 
nor m inorities (represented -  if  only in theory -  in the executive branch or 
in the Senate) should be given the power to oppress its opponents: both  
groups m ust have power, so that they w ould find them selves m utually  
constrained.
This is the reason why the m ajority o f  liberal constitutions included  
‘counterm ajoritarian’ m echanism s such as a bicam eral legislature, presi­
dential veto power and judicial review o f  constitutionality, that is, m echa­
nism s designed to constrain the power o f  the m ajority (a power that was 
seen as a threat to social peace and order). We m ay cite as exam ples m any  
o f  the principal liberal constitutions proclaim ed in the region during 
those years: Chile (1828), C olom bia (1853), or Peru (1823, 1834, 1856 and  
1860).
In this respect, and from its beginnings, liberalism has deem ed state 
interventionism  unacceptable, for it sees in such intervention a serious 
threat, an undesirable and unjustified intrusion that can only distort the 
free will o f  the citizens.
Fusion Constitutionalism and the Creation o f Centro-federalist Republics
After decades o f  b loody confrontations that afflicted all o f  LA during the 
founding years o f  constitutional states, a majority o f  countries began to  
consolidate their constitutional structures and to give a more stable and 
definitive profile to their organization. O f the three m odels discussed, only  
two were o f  much importance: conservatism  and liberalism. Thus, the 
extraordinary succession o f  constitutions that the region witnessed during 
its founding essentially involved oscillation between constitutions that 
concentrated political and territorial authority and enshrined a certain 
concept o f  the com m on good (conservative constitutions) and constitu­
tions adopted in reaction to those conservative' constitutions and that 
sought to im pose limits on them, preserving greater space for personal 
and social freedom. From  this com bination, as we shall see, emerged
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constitutions that were neither openly federalist nor strictly centralist but 
rather ‘centro-federalist’ in nature.
In the face o f  those alternatives, the radical republican m ovem ent, 
which made som e headway in the original constitutional debates in the 
U S, never won m any converts in LA , and it was prom ptly displaced by 
the other two alternatives. In fact, from the m iddle o f  the century, and 
after the ‘battle to the death’ that they waged for so long, liberals and 
conservatives tended to reconcile their positions around the negotiating  
table, from  which they thought about renewed constitutional solutions 
for their respective countries. In Argentina, the federal convention o f  1853 
brought together confirm ed unitary and federal proponents determined  
to adopt com m on rules. Som ething similar happened in M exico, with the 
Constituent A ssem bly o f  1857. In Chile, the harsh conservative constitu­
tionalism  cham pioned and protected by D iego Portales follow ing adop­
tion o f  the 1833 C onstitution began to lose force and becom e more liberal 
towards the end o f  the nineteenth century. In C olom bia, the process was 
reversed, but it had a similar outcom e. In the last case, it was extreme 
liberalism dom inant in the second half o f  the century, which ceded power 
to a gradual resurgence o f  conservatism  that was finally victorious with 
the 1886 C onstitution. In Ecuador there was a gradual merge between  
conservative and liberal forces, in a process that can be appreciated in 
the wording o f  the successive constitutions o f  1878, 1884, 1897 and 1906. 
Similar m ovem ents occurred in Peru and Venezuela, especially after the 
era o f  the ‘federal war’.
The ‘fusion’ constitutionalism  that tended to emerge in the region, then, 
com bined things that at the time seemed irreconcilable, that is, features o f  
liberal constitutionalism  with other distinctive conservative initiatives. We 
can identify three specific features o f  that process o f  convergence:
1. A distribution o f  pow ers skew ed in favor o f  the executive branch The 
first consequence o f  this process o f  armistice and constitutional 
pact between liberals and conservatives can be seen in the structure 
o f  governm ental power design. Under pressure from  conservative 
forces, the liberals agreed to set aside the purer ideal o f  ‘checks and 
balances’, which called for m aintaining strict equilibrium between the 
three branches o f  governm ent -  executive, legislative and judicial -  by 
giving each equivalent powers o f  oversight and veto over the others. 
Instead, a system  o f ‘weighted checks and balances’ was adopted, 
where the executive power becam e prim us inter pares, thus putting at 
risk the entire structure o f  governm ent and posing the threat (which  
repeatedly m aterialized over the course o f  the region’s history) o f  
growing presidential primacy. Typically, the new constitutions that
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emerged from  this fusion process gave the executive branch capaci­
ties and powers that had been specifically denied it in the traditional 
checks and balances systems. A m ong those additional powers we 
may cite, for exam ple, the right o f  the president to  declare a state o f  
siege and to restrict freedom s in those extreme situations; the power 
to appoint and rem ove members o f  the governm ent at will; powers 
o f  legislative initiative; and (decisively for purposes o f  this chapter) 
powers o f  federal intervention.
2. Tolerant and  religious sta tes  One o f  the clearest exam ples o f  the 
‘constitutional fusion’ between liberals and conservatives that tended 
to dom inate from  the m id-nineteenth century in L A  is what was rec­
ognized in the moral sphere. Liberal constitutionalism  had hoisted  
moral neutrality as one o f  its main banners. A t the constitutional 
level, that neutrality im plied, above all, adherence to the principle 
o f  religious tolerance. Follow ing the liberal-conservative pact, that 
principle tended to give way to different principles, which expressed 
this process o f  negotiation between the two currents. The exam ples 
o f  the Argentine constitution o f  1853 and the M exican one o f  1857 
are certainly different, but both illustrate clearly the im plications o f  
this new posture. In the Argentine case, the constitution  enshrined  
religious tolerance in its m ost im portant article on  rights -  Article 
14 -  while in Article 2 it affirmed a special state com m itm ent to the 
Catholic religion (declaring, with intentional am biguity, that ‘the 
state shall sustain’ a C atholic, apostolic, R om an religion). M eanwhile 
in M exico, reflecting the difficulty in finding a form ula satisfactory to 
both sides, the 1857 C onstitution chose to remain silent on religion. 
A lthough different, both negotiated form ulas show  the extent to 
which liberals and conservatives were able to p oo l their efforts and 
secure approval o f  a com m on constitutional text.
3. C entro-federalist republics The last expression o f  the ‘convergence 
constitutionalism ’ we are speaking o f  is obviously the m ost im portant 
for purposes o f  this chapter, and it relates to the question o f  federal­
ism. A s we shall see, conservatives and liberals tended to support 
directly opposing positions on this point: conservatives proclaimed  
the need to concentrate national power territorially in order to  enforce 
their ideas o f  ‘m orality and order’, while the liberals, on the contrary, 
insisted that the different regions must be free to organize themselves 
with as m uch autonom y as possible. The new constitutions prepared 
under the influence o f  these two groups cam e to  reflect negotiated  
form ulas that implied the establishm ent o f  centro-federalist arrange­
ments. The new constitutions explicitly affirmed federalist com m it­
m ents that were soon contradicted or set aside, in practice and in the
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wording o f  constitutions, with the growing clout o f  the respective 
capital cities. In turn, the dynam ics im posed by the new organization  
o f  power, which as we shall see often gave the president authority to 
intervene in wayward provinces, ended by vitiating everything that 
had been proclaim ed about federalism.
The Dispute over S tate Regulations and Its Impact on Federalism
In the context o f  the new Latin American societies, federalism appeared as 
a protective shield against abuse o f  the authority concentrated in the state. 
T o this ‘negative’ justification another ‘positive’ one was added, marked  
by the virtues inherent in collective self-government. U nder the idea that 
federalism represents the best possible form in which each com m unity can  
becom e master o f  its own destiny, decentralization should therefore be a 
way o f  upholding the com m itm ent to the ideal o f  ‘popular sovereignty’, 
extending and affirming the dem ocratic nature o f  society.
These two defenses o f  federalism were in due course challenged by 
another proposal, o f  conservative origin, that advocated the im position  
o f  a distinctly centralist logic on new societies. Conservatives insisted that 
order was a prerequisite for social existence, especially in societies that 
were still inchoate and torn -  as it was said -  by centrifugal and anarchic 
tendencies. Hence conservatism  viewed federalism  with great mistrust, 
and called for a state that could ‘take the reins’ o f  national organization.
During the heyday o f  liberalism the federal solution appeared syn­
onym ous with abstinence on the part o f  the state: respect for autonom y  
m ust m ean, then, a lim ited federal state, one that refrained from  action, 
one that chose n ot to regulate collective life, one that did not im pose its 
authority against the will o f  individual parties to the social contract. As if 
in a continuum , local authority was obliged to respect individual decisions 
and choices, just as the national authority had to refrain from  im posing its 
authority on the states or provinces, and even abstain from  interfering in 
or regulating interstate com m erce.
In the U S  and in m uch o f  the W estern world, however, the anti-statism  
era came to an end with the Great D epression o f  the 1930s and the adop­
tion o f  national reconstruction programs based on intense econom ic activ­
ism  by the state. The N ew  D eal in the U S represents perhaps the zenith, 
visible and very influential, o f  that trend. It was upheld by the courts (but 
not w ithout a prolonged political battle in which President Franklin D . 
R oosevelt intervened actively) through a series o f  landmark rulings that 
included the fam ous Butler case and a number o f  others such as West 
Coast H otel Co. v. Parrish  (300 U S 379, 1937); United S tatus  v. Carolene 
Products (304 U S  144, 1938); Williamson v. L ee O ptical o f  Oklahoma (348
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U S 483, 1955); and Ferguson v. Skrup ta  (372 U S 726, 1963). This tendency 
then spread swiftly and decisively through all o f  LA, as can be seen in the 
growth o f  the new regulator state, accom panied by social m ovem ents, 
court decisions and doctrinal papers welcom ing the (perhaps tardy) arrival 
o f  state salvation.
Just as the anti-statism  era had its roots and its theoretical underpin­
nings in liberal theory, the N ew  D eal era found its backing in a differ­
ent constitutional tradition, which has less to do with the conservative 
H am iltonian tradition (a tradition that was to som e extent authoritarian, 
and consistently hostile to any notions o f  social rights) than with the 
old republican tradition which defended federalism, but in ways and for 
reasons that were very different from those o f  liberalism (Sandel, 1996). 
In this case, federalism  was not prom oted because o f  w hat it m ight do for 
personal choices and contractual relations am ong individuals. Rather, 
federalism was recognized as an appropriate way to honor com m itments 
o f another kind, related to dem ocracy and local self-governm ent, and 
which in particular included welfare measures that could  offer basic social 
guarantees for all the nation’s inhabitants.
W ithin this scheme, local states or provinces gain the authority to regu­
late the political and econom ic life o f  their respective societies, just as the 
national state recovers the power to regulate the basic aspects o f  national 
life. This latter point, in particular, constitutes a new and decisive factor, 
and is perhaps one o f  the m ost characteristic features o f  the twentieth  
century: that new century is one in which there is an extraordinary increase 
in regulation and in spending by the federal governm ent, accom panied  
by a concom itant decrease in the powers o f  local governm ents. In this 
renewed world o f  state interventionism, national governm ents recover 
their full capacity to take action, and to back that action through an 
increase in federal resources derived from  higher taxes levied across the 
country (Hetherington, 1958; M cCloskey, 1962).
3 THE ERA OF REFORMS: ADAPTATIONS AND  
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CENTRO-FEDERALIST 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
It was the ‘fusion’ phenom enon described above that gave rise to m ost o f  
the constitutions o f  m odern LA. We have also seen that regional consti­
tutionalism , while m ore firmly rooted, continued to  undergo successive 
m odifications in the early twentieth century, and indeed it is still open to  
changes in the present day.
The liberal-conservative constitutionalism  forged in the nineteenth
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century underwent profound reforms at the beginning o f  the twentieth. 
T hose reforms represented a deliberate attem pt to incorporate into con ­
stitutions som e o f  the features o f  the republican constitutionalism  that 
had been drastically circumscribed in its initial days. The first wave o f  
reforms cam e during the social crisis o f  the 1930s, and can be consid ­
ered a political response to  a new surge o f  social radicalism , as a way  
o f  avoiding w hat was happening in Europe with the spread o f  socialist 
ideology and dem ands. These constitutional reform s follow ed in succes­
sion after adoption  o f  the M exican constitution issued in 1917 during 
the R evolution, and the 1919 C onstitution o f  the W eimar Republic. This 
period also saw the creation o f  the International Labour Organization  
and the steady growth o f  the so-called welfare state and K eynesian  
econom ics.
In the W estern Hem isphere, the first constitutions to incorporate social 
dem ands o f  this kind were -  together with that o f  M exico in 1917 -  those o f  
Brazil in 1937, Bolivia in 1938, Cuba in 1940, Ecuador in 1945, Argentina  
in 1949, and C osta Rica in the same year. Those docum ents variously 
enshrined workers’ rights and provisions governing working conditions; 
social safety-nets; governm ent com m itm ents in the areas o f  housing, 
health and education; protection o f  the family; the right to paid down-tim e 
and vacations; the rights o f  children and the elderly; labor union rights; 
the right to strike, collective bargaining agreements; protection against 
arbitrary dismissal; unem ploym ent insurance; and other matters.
The second major wave o f  reforms cam e towards the end o f  the twenti­
eth century, and once again involved many o f  the region’s constitutions. 
Ecuador saw reforms in 1978; Chile and Peru in 1989; C olom bia in 1991; 
Paraguay in 1992; Peru and Bolivia in 1993; Argentina, G uatem ala and 
N icaragua in 1994. These reforms had m any objectives, am ong which two 
stand out in particular: the first was to take up again som e o f  the causes 
that radicalism had cham pioned in its day (for exam ple, fostering political 
participation); the second was restore to constitutions (especially by re­
establishing the system  o f  checks and balances) som e o f  the liberalism  that 
had been stripped away by the dictatorships o f  the 1970s.
The constitutionalism  that emerged in the nineteenth century, then, 
underwent significant adjustm ents in the twentieth. A m ong the many  
things that have not been done, and which the old  republican constitu­
tionalism  in particular is still dem anding, is to m ake changes that will 
strengthen the federal character o f  Latin Am erican countries. Reform s 
o f  this kind were postponed for decades, and they were not on the list o f  
priorities that the reformers pursued from the beginning o f  the twentieth  
century. Y et it is clear that in recent decades the region has experienced  
renewed pressures to m ove on to new federalist and regionalist horizons.
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The Context and M eaning o f the Latest Constitutional Reforms in the 
Region
These recent changes constitute a new framework for decentralization. 
A  survey o f  the landscape shows that the last round o f  constitutional 
reforms has tended to ‘localize’ public m anagem ent and establish greater 
scope for political autonom y at the subnational levels, giving them the 
powers or prerogatives needed to support their new institutional profiles. 
The ‘centro-federalist’ m odel implies various arrangements for the vertical 
distribution o f  powers that, it has been suggested, will appear redefined  in 
the new profile o f  som e o f  the region’s constitutions. These reforms are o f  
a m ixed nature: while in constitutional terms they include variations or 
nuances in the centralist paradigm, they also represent, in part, an accept­
ance or recognition o f  pre-existing practices o f  decentralization at the sub­
constitutional level. Thus we now find various m echanism s or principles 
intended to com pensate for existing inequalities between the local subunits 
and to secure equal degrees o f  econom ic developm ent and the equal award 
o f  rights. W e m ust also consider that m any o f  these tensions have not been  
translated into constitutional reforms, and thus remain unresolved.
It must be recognized, o f  course, that constitutional am bitions m ay be 
quite different from  the actual outcom e with respect to the powers consti­
tuted in practice -  a country m ay decentralize itself while its constitution  
remains unchanged, or it m ay keep its centralized structure intact despite 
the reforms enshrined in its constitution. We can in fact identify trends 
in judicial interpretation that we may call ‘counter-original’ in various 
federal systems. In Canada and India, where the original intent o f  consti­
tutional arrangements was to limit subnational powers, jurisprudence has 
over time interpreted them m ore generously, at the expense o f  the central 
power (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 284). But as m ost federal systems origi­
nally had the inverse thrust (a ‘lim ited’ central power), it is understandable 
that the judicial bias has in effect been a centralizing one (Shapiro, 1981: 
55; Bdzera, 1993: 1).
In this section we offer a schematic survey o f  these alternatives, cover­
ing the period o f  relatively ‘contem porary’ constitutional reforms in the 
region, that is, the last 30 years.
A gain  from  the legal viewpoint, and although this is not the objec­
tive o f  our com parative survey, we should note that m any principles not 
specifically set forth in national constitutions can have an im pact on the 
dynamics o f  the public finances. These include the various approaches to  
protecting national assets, provisions for social advancem ent or protec­
tion, rules governing state intervention in the econom y, standards and  
guidelines for the provision and delivery o f  governm ent services such as
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education and health care, and the type and scope o f  the pension system, 
which can have a decisive im pact on the national accounts.
To these cautionary notes we m ust add that the m acroeconom ic regula­
tory variables in each country (exchange rate, m onetary authority, trade 
policy, external debt and so on) are the legal preserve o f  central govern­
m ents and that decisions taken in these areas (and o f  course the conse­
quences o f  those decisions) will have a non-neutral im pact on the public 
finances o f  local states or provinces (for example, an increase in a country’s 
sovereign risk premium can preclude access to public borrowing by a sub­
national entity, even though it is legally entitled to resort to such financing).
The Latest Cycle o f Reforms: Political Decentralization versus Fiscal 
Decentralization
W e shall now look  at a cross-section o f  constitutions in the region in order 
to appreciate the specific forms o f  decentralization that emerge from  their 
wording. The com parison will involve three issues: (a) the extent to which  
constitutions resemble each other; (b) how  they have evolved in the last 30 
years (a period that em braces the latest round o f  reforms for consolidating  
dem ocracy in LA); and (c) how  political decentralization correlates with  
fiscal decentralization, the m ost decisive interface in arrangements for the 
vertical distribution o f  powers.
This last paragraph requires som e additional explanation. The politi­
cal and functional responsibilities norm ally assigned to a state or a ter­
ritorial subdivision can in practice be negated or severely lim ited unless 
guaranteed provision is m ade to cover the costs inherent in those respon­
sibilities, either through raising direct revenue or through transfers. In this 
respect, the taxing power and the spending power cannot be considered  
in isolation: they m ust be exam ined in relation to the flow o f  tasks and 
responsibilities assigned to each territorial unit.
It is from  this view point that we have sought to survey constitutional law  
in 12 countries and to structure two indices to com pare across the region, 
with a schematic and num erical weighting restricted to certain character­
istics o f  the constitutions o f  a specific set o f  countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, C olom bia, Ecuador, G uatem ala, M exico, Paraguay, Peru, 
U ruguay and Venezuela4). These indices relate to two separate dim ensions 
o f  constitutional decentralization:
•  political decentralization, where we group together all constitutional 
arrangements that p er se imply greater powers o f  self-governm ent 
for local bodies; and
•  fiscal decentralization, where we consider all constitutional
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provisions concerning fiscal self-m anagement by local bodies, in 
terms o f  providing them with resources and decision-m aking power 
over revenues and expenditures.
In the course o f  this exercise we shall look  for trends to see how  consti­
tutions have evolved in recent decades, bearing in m ind the succession o f  
reforms and am endm ents. Taking the year 1980 as the baseline -  a plau­
sible one for defining ‘recent’ changes -  we shall identify from  the survey 
tables those items that in each case were the subject o f  pro-decentralization  
changes, and this will allow  us to plum b the m eaning o f  the legislative 
changes o f  the last three decades.
In com puting these items, and recognizing that there m ay be headings 
where the survey fell short, we shall accept an interm ediate possibility: the 
rule will assign one point for each characteristic that appears fully devel­
oped and plausibly operational, and h alf a point for each item the consti­
tutional specification o f  which is relative, conditioned or restricted. The 
resulting score will have a m aximum  o f 12 points, and it will be standard­
ized to a scale that is m ore intuitive for the reader, running from 0 to 100.
O f course, the resulting scores in each dim ension o f  decentralization  
are merely indicative, and they do not take account o f  term inological or 
program m atic changes that are not apparent with the items used for the 
com parison. In any case, we believe that they will provide a general idea o f  
the m ost relevant points for dem onstrating the spectrum o f  configurations 
o f  fiscal federalism.
Political Decentralization
In measuring the degree o f  constitutionally ordained political decentraliza­
tion we shall look at the structure o f  local government in terms o f  the ‘classic’ 
branches (executive and legislative) that are constitutionally recognized at 
that level. We shall then examine the possibility o f  a second-tier constituent 
power (allowing state or provincial governments to adopt local constitu­
tions), and that o f the municipal government level, with degrees o f  autonomy.
For weighting ‘local responsibilities’ we have defined two levels: ‘Level 
I’ covers shared or concurrent responsibilities, under which local govern­
m ents can legislate at their discretion and assume responsibility for certain 
basic public services (but excluding those that are ‘national’ in nature or 
scale), while ‘Level II’ relates to regulatory, land-use planning and devel­
opm ent matters that concern subnational territorial jurisdictions and their 
administrative structures.5
The resulting scores for political decentralization, by country and item, 
appear in Table 2.1, ranked against a ‘perfect score’ o f  100.
T a b le  2 .1  P o li t ic a l  d e c e n tra liza tio n  in 12  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s
Country Local powers Local responsibilities Political 
decentralization score
Executive Legislative Constituent Municipal Level I Level II 1980 2010
Brazil • • • • • • 100 100
Argentina • o • • • • 92 92
Colombia 0 o • o • 58 58
Ecuador • 0 • o • 67 67
Mexico ♦ • • • 0 • 92 92
Uruguay • 0 □ 0 • 50 58
Bolivia (Plurinational • o • 0 • 67 67
State of)
Venezuela (Bolivarian 0 0 • • 0 • 75 75
Republic of)
Chile □ 0 □ o 17 33
Paraguay • • 33 33
Peru 0 o • o • 58 58
Guatemala • • 33 33
Note: Items that appeared in constitutions in force in 1980 and that have not subsequently been significantly amended are indicated as circles
(with V  for items of full specification and ‘o’ for items of limited specification). Items that have undergone amendments since 1980 are indicated as 
squares (with V  for items of full specification and for items of limited specification).
Source: Comparative constitutional survey conducted for this research by the authors.
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Fiscal Decentralization
In our exam ination o f  fiscal decentralization we take into account six 
attributes. Three correspond to basic issues o f  fiscal m anagement: budget 
(the capacity o f  local governm ents to decide their own expenditures and  
investm ents), taxes (local governm ent powers to establish taxes o f  any 
kind), and contributions (local governm ent powers to exact payments 
to cover the cost o f  public works and services). The right o f  local states 
or provinces to levy royalties and fees for the exploitation o f  natural 
resources within their territory we treat as a separate item. These items 
together cover the spectrum o f  resources within local jurisdiction.
W hen it com es to resources from other jurisdictions, the analysis is 
divided into two aspects. U nder ‘coparticipation’ we exam ine the constitu­
tional provisions whereby local governm ents are entitled to regular funds 
from the federal state for inclusion in their budget. U nder distributional 
guidelines we consider whether, regardless o f  any coparticipation right, 
the constitution establishes the am ounts or concepts either as primary 
guidelines (the way in which resources are distributed between the federal 
governm ent and the subnational level as a whole) or secondary guidelines 
(for distributing resources am ong various subnational governm ents).
The resulting scores for fiscal decentralization, by country and item, 
appear in Table 2.2, ranked against a ‘perfect score’ o f  100.
These data allow  us to com pare the constitutional configuration o f  1980 
with that o f  2010, based on the respective scores for political and econom ic 
decentralization according to each country’s constitution. The ‘before and 
after’ com parison can be represented as shown in Figure 2.1.
The shaded area in each figure indicates the ‘gain’ in decentralization  
resulting from p o st-1980 constitutional reforms in LA. The dotted area 
shows the ‘initial’ decentralization status in our base year, 1980. A s will be 
seen, in som e cases there have been no reforms, or those that were intro­
duced did not entail a greater degree o f  decentralization according to our 
weighting scheme.
W ith respect to the degree o f  ‘political’ decentralization, the changes 
do not appear to be very significant. Nevertheless, the parameters for 
four countries (Brazil, Argentina, C olom bia and Ecuador) reveal a sharp 
swing towards fiscal decentralization. In a sense, these countries appear 
to be reversing the previous imbalance: constitutions that com bined high 
degrees o f  political decentralization with very lim ited fiscal decentraliza­
tion. That was o f  course possible under a sort o f  m inim al state m odel 
where local services did not go beyond policing, but it no longer works in 
the case o f  subnational entities coping with responsibilities for m anaging, 
prom oting and delivering social services. W e m ay say that in a system
T a b le  2 .2  F isc a l d e c e n tra liza tio n  in 12  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s
Country Local resources Transferred resources Score





Brazil • o • ■ • • 75 92
Argentina • o • ■ ■ □ 42 83
Colombia • o • ■ ■ 42 75
Ecuador • o 0 □ ■ ■ 33 75
Mexico • o • 0 50 50
Uruguay • 0 • o 50 50
Bolivia (Plurinational • 0 • □ 42 50
State of)
Venezuela (Bolivarian • o • 0 50 50
Republic of)
Chile • o 0 □ 33 42
Paraguay • o o n 33 42
Peru o • □ 25 33
Guatemala • 0 25 25
Note: Items that appeared in constitutions in force in 1980 and that have not subsequently been significantly amended are indicated as circles
(with V  for items of full specification and ‘o’ for items of limited specification). Items that have undergone amendments since 1980 are indicated as 
squares (with V  for items of full specification and for items of limited specification).
Source: Comparative constitutional survey conducted for this research by the authors.
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Source: Comparative constitutional survey conducted for this research by the authors.
Figure 2.1 Constitutional decentralization in 12 Latin  American  
countries, 1980-2010
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where the state was largely defined as an administrator o f  ‘negative liber­
ties’ the division o f  responsibilities was an easier matter than it is in a state 
where the constitution requires it to be m ore attentive and proactive on  
behalf o f  positive freedoms.
If  we speak o f  a reversal or a rectification, we must admit that it has 
been m odest. The taxation powers o f  local governm ents are still cond i­
tioned and subordinate: they are confined to a narrow range o f  taxes and 
tariffs o f  little significance in com parison to the resources that the national 
state can raise through its taxing powers.
This requires federal com pensation, invariably involving a one-way  
flow  o f  transfers from  the central governm ent to subnational governm ents 
which depend on these funds to cover current expenditures in their basic 
budgets. This is a central feature o f  the new norm ative system s which, at 
the subconstitutional level, m ust concern them  with distribution in a much  
greater degree o f  detail than did the constitution writers o f  the nineteenth  
century (who confined themselves to a simple division o f  taxation sources).
D istribution is usually regulated through two distinct channels: regular, 
fixed-rate transfers that becom e a direct part o f  the local unit’s assets, 
w ithout conditions, and systems involving decentralization agencies and 
programs under which resources are assigned to specific objectives and 
in am ounts that depend on the econom ic situation. These channels are 
not m utually exclusive, and they allow  for hybrid distribution systems 
com bining major ‘fixed’ com ponents with lesser ‘variable’ or ‘ad h oc’ 
com ponents in each fiscal year. It is easy enough to see that this solution  
can generate other problem s such as vertical fiscal im balances when local 
entities are encouraged to share in spending w ithout having to contribute 
any o f  their own resources.
Contradictory Tendencies
It has rightly been said that federal system s m ust be com pared with 
caution (W atts, 1999: 1), and the same care m ust be taken in intertem poral 
com parisons o f  the kind presented above. W hat is clear is that subnational 
institutional arrangements in federal systems have varied and continue 
to vary in m any ways: in the characteristics and im portance o f  their eco ­
nom ic and social structures, in the number o f  local subunits, and in their 
relative asym metry in terms o f  size, resources, or constitutional status. 
There are certainly no definitive equations or static systems when it com es 
to the vertical distribution o f  powers (nor o f  course in M ontesquieu’s 
classical, tripartite ‘horizontal’ division o f  powers).
A t the beginning o f  this chapter we spoke o f  tw o critical periods in the 
intertwined developm ent o f  federalism and o f  the state -  both o f  them
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occurred in the twentieth century. The first was the liberal, federalist and 
anti-statist m ovem ent that prevailed in the early decades o f  the century 
and, to a lesser extent, until the Great D epression o f  the 1930s. The second  
took the opposite direction, turning its back on liberalism, cham pioning  
state intervention, and constraining the federalist m odel in vogue until 
then.
These two m ovem ents found their reflection in legal arrangements and 
in the evolution o f  jurisprudence in the region. In particular, as we saw 
in Section 2, constitutions tended to track these conflicting tendencies. 
Thus, the ‘fusion’ constitutions that carried over from the nineteenth into  
the early twentieth century -  the product o f  nation states that had little 
administrative capacity and were norm ally dependent on agricultural 
exports; states that were closely tied to the international market and were 
com m itted to an econom ic doctrine very close to liberalism  but stripped o f  
any m eaningful social com m itm ent. The constitutions prom ulgated after 
the m id-twentieth century, on the other hand, reflected a new state: activ­
ist, powerful, determined to regulate the econom ic life o f  new societies, 
socially aware, and decidedly interventionist.
The last decades o f  the twentieth century as well as the first years o f  the 
twenty-first once again present us with a shifting panoram a. The 1990s, in 
particular, were sym ptom atic o f  a trend that had been gestating for m any  
years. The welfare state inherited from  the N ew  D eal, the m assive, activ­
ist, socially com m itted state that was to prom ote econom ic progress and 
social equity, was in crisis. The state seemed to have becom e bloated and 
alarmingly inefficient, it was the target o f  constant accusations o f  corrup­
tion and, worse, it was having ever m ore trouble in coping with steadily  
growing and proliferating social costs. In response to these many unm is­
takable signs that the welfare state was exhausted and in need o f  renewal, 
the entire hemisphere seems to have been swept by a new wave o f  anti­
statist sentiment. Once again, at the beginning o f  the century, the state was 
held guilty o f  causing the very ills it was supposed to remedy.
A s in the early years o f  the nineteenth century, federalism  was the 
inspiration for various constitutional schemes, based on rationales that 
were in m any cases contradictory. For exam ple, the devolution o f  respon­
sibilities, which can in principle be seen as a m ove to local em powerm ent, 
could also be understood as a way o f  alleviating cyclical pressures on the 
national public accounts. ‘Transferring’ responsibility can be a subterfuge 
for abandoning or hollow ing out a social policy, a regulation or a public 
service, when it is obvious that the ‘transferee’ will n ot have the m eans 
to implement it. This explains why in so m any cases, regardless o f  the 
country’s constitutional fram ework, the central governm ent has devolved  
responsibilities by fiat, at its ow n initiative, rather than in response to
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subnational entities’ demands for greater powers. In these circumstances, 
‘localizing’ constitutional reforms deserve careful reading.
The new tasks o f  the state generate tw o-w ay flows, involving principles 
o f  subsidiarity and a ‘pro-local’ bias, while at the same time establish­
ing general frameworks o f  a centralizing thrust, the im plem entation o f  
which will be defined by agencies or authorities o f  the national govern­
m ent. There is indeed a tendency to superim pose levels o f  responsibility, 
leaving certain fields open to concurrent and sim ultaneous action by dif­
ferent levels o f  governm ent. In this juxtaposition we can identify a broad  
range o f  variants: the exercise o f  a responsibility can be sim ultaneous and 
coordinated; sim ultaneous but conflictual; local with central obstruction; 
central with local obstruction; or it can be sim ultaneously neglected by all 
levels o f  governm ent.
A s reforms have strayed from  their course, and in light o f  the obvious 
dispersal in current Latin Am erican constitutionalism , we find that there 
is a relatively broad spectrum o f  potential configurations for the vertical 
distribution o f  powers within a state. This is not a new phenom enon, but 
is rather part o f  the matrix o f  Am erican constitutionalism , for we saw  
earlier how  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave rise to undertak­
ings that involved centro-federalist arrangements. There is a perceptible 
change here: while som e solutions were conceived in terms o f  a rigid com - 
partm entalization o f  exclusive powers (meaning that the ‘national’ and the 
‘subnational’ spheres are m utually exclusive), the new constitutional rules 
accept and encourage the overlapping o f  powers and responsibilities and 
the ‘m ultilevel’ delivery o f  public goods, where the core problem s involve 
coordination and financing.
There is also a constant tendency to give constitutional recognition to  
m unicipal autonom y, and to go so far as a m odel with three nom inally  
independent levels o f  governm ent. This adds a new factor to the dynamics 
o f  public m anagem ent, policies and taxation. W hile the concept o f  m unici­
pal autonom y predates the latest wave o f  reforms, new im portance is now  
being given to this once-neglected level o f  self-government, as a result 
o f  a conjunction o f  circumstances: swelling urban populations, the new  
problem s and issues -  environm ent, transportation, quality o f  life -  that 
arise as cities reach m egalopolis dim ensions, and the need to tailor policies 
and programs in response to very specific and pressing local com m unity  
dem ands which the central governm ent could never satisfy.
The arguments for reform, then, go beyond considerations o f  political 
philosophy and offer a justification o f  decentralization in terms o f  effi­
ciency, a fa vorite criterion o f  econom ic theory for rationalizing the benefits 
o f  local self-government: the presum ption is that the lower levels o f  juris­
diction are better placed to identify and deliver public goods and services
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where the benefits are regionally confined (M usgrave and M usgrave, 1989: 
445-55), because governm ents at this level have m ore inform ation and 
greater incentives to m anage local public goods in keeping with the needs 
and preferences o f  their voters (Stiglitz, 1995: 732).
There have also been attem pts (either in constitutions or in legislation) 
to establish other institutional arrangements such as ‘regionalization’ (a 
grouping o f  provinces or states) or ‘m icro-regions’ em bracing neighboring  
municipalities. In practice, however, the results o f  these ‘new ’ forms o f  
decentralization have been m odest.
Lastly -  in a departure from  strictly constitutional analysis -  we may 
note the emerging influence o f  various trading blocs (M ercado Común del 
Sur, M E R C O SU R , the Andean Com m unity, A lianza Bolivariana para  
los Pueblos de N uestra Am érica - Tratado de libre com ercio de los pueblos, 
A L B A -T C P ), which should in due course lead to legislative and tax har­
m onization am ong the countries o f  each bloc and which could place som e 
constraints on local powers o f  legislation, regulation or taxation as they 
affect the circulation o f  goods and services.
Interpretation Challenges
It is useful to assess the im plications o f  the reforms described above and 
to understand the m eaning o f  the new constitutional consensus. Here we 
should recall the candid but considered observation o f  C hief Justice John  
Marshall, who reminded us that ‘it is a constitution we are expounding’.6 
This cautioning, issued in the course o f  a seminal case involving the divi­
sion o f  powers at a time when the jurisprudence o f  the U S  Supreme Court 
was first taking shape, provides us with som e im portant points o f  reference 
with respect to rigidity, vagueness and hierarchy o f  source.
The hierarchical rank o f  the constitutional source m eans that its rules 
must be the fulcrum o f  political debates (beyond the will o f  ephemeral 
electoral majorities), and also the touchstone for a contingent judicializa- 
tion o f  tax policies. A t this juncture, jurisprudence m ust surely take special 
care and precautions if it is not to stray into dysfunctional solutions: when  
called upon to interpret the constitution, judges will be obliged to hear 
and decide cases not only on the basis o f  the rules and conventions o f  
juridical interpretation (arguments a simili, a contrario, a fortiori, am ong  
others) but bearing in mind as well the com plex articulations and deriva­
tions o f  the vertical division o f  state power in its history and in its political 
philosophy.
Constitutional rules are also rigid, and any change in them requires 
a special procedure. Som e constitutions in the region, such as that o f  
Argentina, can be am ended only by a convention convened for that
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purpose. There are other m odels, such as that o f  Brazil, where partial 
reforms can be enacted as legislation, with a qualified majority. Other 
countries -  Venezuela, for exam ple -  provide that am endm ents m ust be 
approved by popular referendum. O f Latin American federal systems, 
only M exico’s follow s the U S  m odel whereby constitutional am endm ents 
m ust be ratified by the com ponent states o f  the U nion . Som e o f  these pro­
cedures may be com bined as successive steps in the am endm ent process, 
which is in fact an extrem ely com plex m echanism . M arshall indeed argued 
that this rigidity dem anded a careful reading, bearing in m ind that ‘a con ­
stitution [is] intended to endure for ages to com e, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises o f  hum an affairs’.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, a constitution’s rigidity is offset to a 
certain extent by a degree o f  functional am biguity or vagueness in its 
provisions. In the M cC ulloch  case, M arshall pointed out that
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into 
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely 
be embraced by the human mind. . . .  Its nature . . . requires that only its great 
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the 
objects themselves.7
In the area o f  concern to us, am biguity is accom panied by a program ­
m atic or generalizing thrust: the practical em powerm ent o f  local entities 
is usually subject to  organic laws o f  intermediate rigidity, the details o f  
which are not spelled out in the constitution. In particular, we find that 
constitutional provisions relating to fiscal federalism are ‘soft’ law, and 
also ‘blank’ law: they set out rather vague criteria, the application o f  which  
depends on laws o f  subconstitutional rank, and when they establish pro­
hibitive or im perative principles they leave the way open to ‘exceptions’ o f  
uncertain scope and unpredictable shape. W e m ust recognize that when it 
com es to coparticipation and distribution, this is natural enough: indeed, 
it w ould be unworkable to enshrine in the constitution a rigid m odel o f  
distribution, detailing figures, floors and shares, for that m odel will surely 
have to change in response to circumstances.
In looking at issues o f  decentralization and fiscal federalism  in light o f  
these four points (hierarchy, rigidity, am biguity and generality), we must 
recall that constitutional provisions in many countries do not constitute  
an endpoint -  as they were perhaps in the founding stage o f  nation states, 
som e o f  which were in the throes o f  choosing between the extreme options 
o f  union or secession -  but rather a starting point that m ust be understood  
in the context o f  institutional history and political philosophy.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The revival o f  the federalist cause tells us much about the current state 
o f  constitutionalism  in the region. That revival speaks not only o f  a still- 
unfinished agenda o f  republican reforms: it reminds us, above all, that 
Latin Am erican constitutionalism  is still in an unstable situation, and 
that there are glaring institutional deficits to be m ade up and too m any  
dem ands still unattended. In this context, the question o f  federalism seems 
to be gaining in priority within the collective interests that inevitably lead 
to demands for constitutional reform. This region-wide phenom enon has 
m any causes: am ong them are growing doubts about the excessive powers 
that the executive branch still wields and the ever louder voices o f  groups 
and com m unities that were once com pletely overlooked (and that today, 
thanks in part to the constitutional status they have w on, are again aware 
o f  their rights and the justice o f  their demands).
There is no doubt that the confrontation between opposing m odels o f  
constitutional organization is still unresolved. In any case, Latin American  
constitutionalism  seems far from  having achieved its stasis point. From  a 
‘territorial’ viewpoint, the situation reveals a paradoxical state o f  affairs. 
A s it was in the beginning, the federalist banner is again being raised by 
two powerful m ovem ents that cham pion the ideal but that do so with 
contradictory am bitions.
One o f  those m ovem ents, part o f  a lon g  history o f  anti-statist strug­
gle, seems poised to spearhead a battle against the w elfare state inherited  
from  the m id-tw entieth  century, and is being led by subnational states 
and provinces determ ined to lim it the pow ers o f  the federal govern­
m ent once and for all. A t the sam e time, however, w e see a m ovem ent 
pointed  in the opposite direction, one that is not hostile to the old  
welfare state but furtherm ore insists on its renewal and expansion. In 
this case, dem ands for federalism  are being m ade in the nam e o f  ever 
m ore firmly entrenched rights, norm ally o f  a m ultiethnic and m ultina­
tional kind. Thus, the first m ovem ent is hostile and resistant to constitu ­
tional reforms o f  a social nature such as those advanced throughout the 
twentieth century, while the second cham pions those reform s, draws its 
sustenance from  them  and dem ands that they be expanded rather than  
limited.
NOTES
1. A perfectionist moral stance holds that what is good for each individual is independent 
of what that individual may think about the matter.
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2. In this respect, good examples may be found in the constitutions of Chile 1823 and 1833, 
Peru 1839 and 1860, Ecuador 1860, and Colombia 1843 and 1886.
3. Bello suggested further that in this situation the intendencias (municipal governments) 
committed all kinds of outrages and excesses against which the national government was 
powerless. The fate of individuals was thus hostage to the good will of the local authori­
ties of the day (1997: 258).
4. We decided to focus on these 12 particularly representative nations, in the expectation 
that the resulting sample would be sufficiently robust for scrutinizing trends and patterns 
of decentralization and fiscal federalism. The reference materials used for the survey were 
obtained from the Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas. Unless 
indicated otherwise, the legal references refer to current constitutional provisions in each 
country.
5. Normally, the powers we have defined as first-tier (greater) also imply second-tier powers 
(lesser), but not vice versa. On the other hand, depending on the level of constitutional 
specification, each of these items may be identified as being of lesser (‘limited’) or greater 
(‘full’) relative development, assigning them a point or a half point as explained earlier.
6. Supreme Court of the United States, McCulloch v. State o f Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819).
7. Ibid.
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3. Fiscal decentralization: increasing 
social cohesion am ong widely 
d isparate territorial units
Oscar Cetràngolo and Ariela Goldschmit
1 INTRODUCTION
Latin Am erica is a heterogeneous region marked by a high degree o f  
inequality and wide disparities that are also found at the country level. 
W hile it is know n to be the region with the sharpest incom e inequalities, 
it is also subject to serious imbalances in terms o f  territorial developm ent. 
Decentralization o f  the public sector’s delivery o f  various goods and serv­
ices has been carried out in differing ways from one country to the next, 
and it is therefore quite probable that the process has heightened som e 
o f  the region’s pre-existing differences, heterogeneities or inequalities. 
There are, nonetheless, a number o f  cross-cutting issues, similarities and 
shared features that provide a basis for an analysis o f  these processes at 
the regional level.
Decentralization has posed a new kind o f  challenge for societies that 
wish to plot a course towards a genuine equality o f  rights. The countries 
that are at the forefront o f  this effort m ust therefore take steps to meet the 
public policy challenges involved in ensuring equal econom ic, social and 
cultural rights for all their citizens and in achieving convergence am ong the 
different territorial units in which social expenditure has been decentral­
ized. In order for them  to do so, they m ust understand the im portance o f  
rebuilding the sense o f  society, o f  belonging and o f  com m itm ent to shared 
societal objectives. That is an essential com ponent o f  any cohesive society  
that embraces the principle o f  shared responsibilities (H openhayn, 2007).
A  renewed appreciation o f  the im portance o f  social cohesion within the 
framework o f  the region’s agenda for public policy reform is associated  
with an effort to m ove away from  one-dim ensional approaches which  
seek to encapsulate a country’s degree o f  socioeconom ic integration in 
a single key com prehensive indicator -  an approach that can result in 
piecem eal sectoral policy recom m endations (Vaitsos, 2001). Instead, it can
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be argued, as H openhayn has done, that this som ewhat vaguely defined 
concept can encom pass the broader issues o f  poverty, social exclusion and 
governance (H openhayn, 2007).
Based on the assum ption that the concept o f  social cohesion can lend 
itself to a variety o f  interpretations, the E U R O sociA L  program  has 
attem pted to frame a practical, operational definition:
Social cohesion is an attribute of societies that entails equality of opportunities 
such that the people can exercise their fundamental rights and ensure their well­
being, free of discrimination of any sort and with respect for diversity. From an 
individual perspective, it means that people feel that they are part of a commu­
nity, participate actively in various spheres of decision-making and are capable 
of exercising active citizenship. Social cohesion also involves the development 
of public policies and mechanisms for fostering solidarity among individuals, 
collectives, territories and generations. (ECLAC/EUROsociAL, 2007, p. 5)
Particular attention should be devoted to this definition’s em phasis on  
public policies as m echanism s for prom oting solidarity am ong different 
territorial units. The concept o f  social cohesion encom passes the idea o f  
progress towards the full enjoym ent o f  peop le’s rights as citizens rather 
than under conditions o f  social vulnerability. The feeling o f  belonging, o f  
being a member o f  a given society, is thus founded upon the idea that each 
person is ‘an equal’ in terms o f  the rights that he or she enjoys by virtue o f  
being part o f  the same society. In Latin Am erica, territorial disparities are 
a major obstacle to the developm ent o f  a feeling o f  belonging to a single 
nation; the challenge to be m et by the more fiscally decentralized countries 
is therefore to ensure that reforms lead to greater, rather than less, territo­
rial equality. A s will be seen in the follow ing discussion, the decentraliza­
tion o f  public services in Latin Am erica has not always been conducted in 
a way that achieves this very im portant objective.
This study will take a critical look  at decentralization policies in Latin  
Am erica that m ay have had an adverse im pact in terms o f  social cohe­
sion. It will not attempt to develop a new conceptual definition o f  social 
cohesion but will rather, based on the existing form ulations (as discussed  
above), assess the effects on social cohesion o f  public policies on decen­
tralization and contem plate the types o f  reforms needed to achieve greater 
social cohesion within a decentralized policy environm ent.
The fact that should be borne in mind is that the theoretical rationale 
for decentralization involves the need to boost the efficiency o f  resource 
allocation. Nevertheless, as public policies have a strong impact on the 
level o f  social equity, this process has created tensions that, in m any cases, 
have placed an additional constraint on efforts to achieve m acroeconom ic 
stabilization. A t the same time, the distributive and m acroeconom ic
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stabilization functions that are usually associated with central govern­
m ents’ public policy objectives have begun to becom e a factor for sub­
national governm ents. For som e, this is reason enough for subnational 
governm ents to take on a role in pursuing stabilization by establishing  
fiscal rules that will counter the m acroeconom ic effects o f  decentralization. 
For others, however, the answer is to focus entirely on resolving distribu­
tive problems through transfers to households and territorial units.
Central governm ent policies can certainly have differentiated im pacts 
on each territorial unit when necessary, provided that they are based on an 
approach that is aligned with the policies applying to the national econom y  
as a whole (M usgrave, 1999). This analysis will highlight the im portance o f  
taking the com plex web o f  interrelated policy objectives into account and, 
from  that perspective, will focus on a new wave o f  reforms based on the 
redefinition o f  the relevant sectoral policies as a m eans o f  achieving greater 
social cohesion in the countries o f  the region.
In order to develop this line o f  reasoning, the discussion will begin with  
a brief overview o f  the way in which decentralization has taken place in 
Latin Am erica, the inroads that have been m ade and the reasons why these 
processes have been undertaken. It will then turn to the tensions and con­
straints in terms o f  greater social cohesion that are associated with these 
reforms, given their effects on fiscal correspondence and solvency. After 
exploring the options for easing these tensions, their im pacts on social 
cohesion will then be evaluated and a number o f  policy recom m endations 
will be made.
2 DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN THE 
REGION
D oes decentralization lead to increased social cohesion? Is decentralized  
service delivery at the local level a m ore efficient and equitable way o f  
m eeting the population’s needs and, therefore, does it contribute to greater 
cohesion at the territorial level? D o decentralization policies offer a way 
o f  improving distribution and access to basic social services for the entire 
population?
U nfortunately, there is no single answer to all o f  these questions in the 
countries o f  the region. The diverse nature o f  the different decentralization  
processes hinders their analysis at the regional level, as it is im possible to  
talk about a single, uniform  decentralization process for the entire region. 
Instead, decentralization has taken place in different ways in each country  
and territorial unit. The dynam ics have differed, as have the advances 
and setbacks, and the process has been driven by differing reasons and
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ra t io n a le s  (som e o f  w h ic h  d e p a r t  f ro m  th e  re le v a n t th e o re tic a l  p re s c r ip ­
tio n s). D iffe re n t se c to rs  h a v e  b een  in v o lv ed , a n d  th e  e x te n t o f  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n  h a s  a lso  d iffe red  in  e a c h  case , a s  h a s , in  co n se q u e n c e , th e  o u tc o m e .
C lea rly , g iven  th e  d if fe re n t v a n ta g e  p o in ts  f ro m  w h ich  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
p ro ce sse s  h a v e  b e e n  v iew ed , th e re  h a v e  b e e n  a  w ide  ra n g e  o f  e x p e c ta ­
t io n s  a s  to  th e ir  p o te n t ia l  fo r  s tre n g th e n in g  d e v e lo p m e n t, g a lv an iz in g  
d e m o c ra tic  p ro ce sse s , im p ro v in g  so c ia l e q u ity , in c re a s in g  th e  efficiency 
o f  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  o r  m o v in g  to w a rd s  a  m o re  co h esiv e  socie ty . T h e  
ch a llen g e , th e n , is to  a r r iv e  a t  a  b a la n c e d  v iew  th a t  ta k e s  in to  a c c o u n t th e  
specific  c o n d itio n s  o f  ea c h  case . T h e  id e a  is to  fin d  p ra g m a tic  a p p ro a c h e s  
fo r  im p ro v in g  th e  s ta te ’s de liv e ry  o f  g o o d s  a n d  serv ices a n d  th u s  in c rea se  
th e  p o p u la t io n ’s w e ll-b e in g , e n su re  th a t  p e o p le  en jo y  e q u a l r ig h ts  a n d  
fo s te r  a  sense o f  b e lo n g in g  to  soc ie ty . C le a rly , th e n , in  o rd e r  to  b u ild  so c ia l 
c o h e s io n , d iffe ren t ty p e s  o f  p o lic ie s  w ill b e  c a lled  fo r  in  e a c h  case.
A s n o te d  by  M u sg ra v e , th e  fiscal a r ra n g e m e n ts  o f  each  c o u n try , in s o fa r  
a s  th e y  re la te  to  its  fe d e ra l o rg a n iz a tio n , a re  b a s ica lly  a  re f le c tio n  o f  th e  
im p e ra tiv e s  o f  its  p o li tic a l a n d  g e o g ra p h ic  s tru c tu re  (M u sg ra v e , 1999). 
N o  g e n e ra l d e fin itio n s  o f  fisca l fe d e ra lism  c a n  th e re fo re  b e  e s ta b lish e d . 
In  a n y  g iven  case  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  p u b lic  serv ices to  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n ts , th e  firs t s tep  is to  a sk  w h a t ty p e  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e s s  is b e in g  
co n s id e re d , w h ich  p u b lic  serv ice is in v o lv ed , to  w h a t level o f  ju r is d ic tio n  
th e  tr a n s fe r  is b e in g  m a d e .1 C lea rly , o n e  in e v ita b le  q u e s t io n  c o n c e rn s  th e  
w ay  in  w h ich  th e  re le v a n t c o u n tr y ’s in s ti tu t io n a l s t ru c tu re  is o rg a n iz e d . 
In  o rd e r  to  sh ed  so m e  lig h t o n  th e se  q u e s tio n s , a  series o f  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
w ill n o w  be  ex a m in e d  th a t  w ill b e  o f  a ss is ta n c e  in  u n d e rs ta n d in g  w h a t 
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  e n ta ils  in  L a tin  A m erica .
F ir s t ,  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in  th e  re g io n  is in f lu en ced  b y  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  
a  w ide  a r r a y  o f  in s ti tu t io n a l s tru c tu re s . A  d is tin c tio n  h a s  to  b e  d ra w n  
b e tw een  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  fe d e ra l sy s tem s (A rg e n tin a , B raz il, M ex ico  a n d  
V en ezu e la  (B o liv a ria n  R e p u b lic  of)) a n d  th o s e  th a t  h a v e  a d o p te d  u n ita ry  
sy s tem s o f  g o v e rn m e n t. In  a d d it io n , th e re  a re  d iffe ren t ty p es  o f  fe d e ra l a n d  
u n ita ry  s tru c tu re s , w h ic h  fu r th e r  c o m p lic a te  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  a  ty p o l­
ogy. T h e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  th e  v a r io u s  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  h a v e  ta k e n  
th e se  ty p es  o f  case-spec ific  c o n d it io n s  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  m u s t th e re fo re  be 
ex am in ed .
M a n y  o f  th e  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  fe d e ra l s t ru c tu re s  a re  a m o n g  th e  la rg e s t 
in  size a n d  ex h ib it s h a rp  in te rn a l d isp a ritie s . T h e re  a re  tw o  ty p es  o f  
s i tu a tio n . O n  th e  o n e  h a n d , th e re  a re  c o u n tr ie s , su ch  a s  A rg e n tin a  a n d  
M ex ico , in  w h ich  fe d e ra lism  is a  w ay  o f  k e e p in g  p re v io u s ly  a u to n o m o u s  
s ta te s  u n ite d . O n  th e  o th e r , th e re  a re  th o se , su ch  as  B raz il, in  w h ic h  it 
w as  th e  c e n tra l a u th o r i ty  th a t  o p te d  fo r  a  fe d e ra l sy s tem . In  a ll th r e e  o f  
th ese  cases , h o w ev e r, fe d e ra lism  is a  legacy  o f  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n a l s t ru c tu re
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th a t  ex is ted  d u r in g  c o lo n ia l tim es . V en ezu e la  (B o liv a ria n  R e p u b lic  of) 
is a  d iffe ren t case , since, a lth o u g h  fe d e ra lism  w as c h o se n  by  th e  c e n tra l 
a u th o r ity ,  it  ex is ts  m o re  in  n a m e  th a n  in  fa c t (F e rn a n d e z  S a lg ad o , 2006). 
A m o n g  th e  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  u n i ta ry  sys tem s, a  d is tin c tio n  sh o u ld  be  d ra w n  
b e tw een  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  h a v e  th e  m o re  tr a d i t io n a l  ty p e  o f  sy s tem  (fo r 
ex am p le , U ru g u a y )  a n d  th o s e  th a t  a re  o rg a n iz e d  as  a  u n ita ry  b u t  d e c e n ­
tra liz e d  re p u b lic  c o m p o s e d  o f  a u to n o m o u s  te r r i to r ia l  u n its  ( fo r  ex am p le , 
C o lo m b ia ) .
T e m p o ra l d y n a m ic s  a re  a lso  a  fa c to r , a s  th e  u n i ta ry  sy s tem s w ere  n o t  
a lw ay s  u n ita ry  a n d  th e  fe d e ra l sy s tem s w ere  n o t  a lw ay s  fed e ra l. T h is  is 
re flec ted , in  p a r t ,  in  th e  m a n y  d iffe ren t c o n s t i tu tio n s  f r a m e d  b y  v a r io u s  
c o u n tr ie s  d u r in g  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry . F o r  e x am p le , C o lo m b ia ’s c o n s t i­
tu t io n s  o f  1853, 1858 a n d  1863 d efin ed  th e  s ta te  as h a v in g  a  fed e ra l sy s tem , 
w h e rea s  th o s e  o f  1821, 1830, 1832, 1843 a n d  1886 d e fin ed  th e  sy s tem  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t as u n i ta ry  (see R o d rig u e z  R o d r ig u e z , 2001 , p . 11). In  M ex ico , 
th e  firs t fed e ra l c o n s t i tu tio n  o f  1824 w as  fo llo w ed  b y  a  n u m b e r  o f  a l te rn a t­
in g  a tte m p ts  to  e s ta b lish  u n ita ry  a n d  fe d e ra l sy s tem s o f  g o v e rn m e n t b e fo re  
th e  fe d e ra lis t o p t io n  w as  d e fin itive ly  e n d o rs e d  in  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f  1857 
(F e rn a n d e z  S a lg a d o , 2006).
A  seco n d  fa c to r , p a r t ia l ly  lin k e d  to  th e  first, is t h a t  th e  ro le  o f  th e  m u n ic ­
ip a litie s  is d if fe re n t in  e a c h  c o u n try . In  B razil, th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h av e  b een  
reco g n ized  as  p o litic a lly , a d m in is tra tiv e ly  a n d  fin a n c ia lly  a u to n o m o u s  
g o v e rn m e n ta l u n its  o f  th e  n a tio n a l s ta te  ev e r s ince  th e  c o n s t i tu tio n a l 
re fo rm  o f  1988, w h e re a s  A rg e n tin a  leaves th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  m u n ic i­
p a li tie s ’ n o rm a tiv e  fra m e w o rk  u p  to  each  p ro v in c e , a n d , c o n se q u e n tly , 
th e re  a re  23 d iffe ren t p o ss ib le  s tru c tu re s .
T h e  c lea rly  d is tin c t c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  in  L a tin  
A m e ric a  h av e  a  b e a r in g  o n  th e  d iffe rin g  fu n c t io n s  th a t  th e y  c a n  p e rfo rm . 
U n d o u b te d ly , serv ice  d e liv e ry  c a p a c ity  a n d  efficiency is n o t  th e  sam e 
w h en  a  sm a ll g o v e rn m e n t w ith  few  re so u rc e s  a n d  c a p a b ilit ie s  is in  ch a rg e  
a s  w h en  a  la rg e r  g o v e rn m e n t w ith  a  g re a te r  f in an c ia l, a d m in is tra t iv e  a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t c a p a c ity  is. In  som e cases , th e  n ecessa ry  scale  fo r  th e  p ro v i­
sio n  o f  som e p u b lic  serv ices m a y  exceed  th a t  o f  a  g iven  lo ca lity . L a rg e  
m e tro p o l ita n  a re a s  a n d  m a jo r  c ities p ro b a b ly  o p e ra te  o n  a  b ig  e n o u g h  
eco n o m ic , h u m a n  a n d  in s ti tu t io n a l scale  to  u n d e r ta k e  su ch  ac tiv itie s  in  
a  fa ir ly  a u to n o m o u s  fa s h io n  a n d  to  o p e ra te  effic ien tly  a n d  successfu lly . 
S m alle r lo ca l o r  ru r a l  u n its , h o w ev er, n eed  to  b a n d  to g e th e r  a n d  to  secu re  
te c h n ic a l a ss is ta n c e  a n d  c o o p e ra t io n  f ro m  o th e r s  in  o rd e r  to  p u t  such  
in itia tiv e s  in to  p ra c tic e  (E C L A C , 2009).
T a b le  3.1 o ffers a n  o v e rv iew  o f  th e  re g io n a l s i tu a t io n  b u t  d o es  n o t 
p ro v id e  a  fu ll p ic tu re  o f  th e  w ide  ra n g e  o f  s i tu a t io n s  th a t  ex is t. T h e  fac t 
th a t  o n ly  som e c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  in te rm e d ia te  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t (s ta te  o r
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Brazil 183,910 27 5,508 33,390
Mexico 105,700 32 2,446 43,213
Colombia 44,920 32 1,099 40,874
Argentina 38,370 24 2,150 17,847
Peru 27,560 25 1,836 15,011
Venezuela 26,280 24 335 78,448
(Bolivarian
Republic of)
Chile 16,170 13 341 47,419
Ecuador 13,040 21 205 63,610
G uatem ala 12,290 22 331 37,130
Bolivia 9,010 9 311 28,971
(Plurinational
State of)
D om inican 8,410 28 153 54,967
Republic
Flonduras 7,050 19 298 23,658
Paraguay 6,020 17 224 26,875
N icaragua 5,380 15 152 35,395
C osta Rica 4,250 7 81 52,469
Panam a 3,180 9 75 42,400
Uruguay 3,440 19 181,053
Jam aica 2,640 14 188,571
Guyana 883 6 147,167
Suriname 450 10 45,000
Total 518,953 107 10,439 217 5,155 33,279
Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis o f International M onetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics, W ashington, DC, February 2006, and Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2005, W ashington, DC, 2005; Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), Making Decentralization Work in Latin America and the Caribbean, A 
Background Paper for the Sub-National Development Strategy, W ashington, DC, 1997; and 
Cetrangolo (2007b).
p ro v in c ia l g o v e rn m e n ts )  is w o r th  d w e llin g  o n  fo r  a  m o m e n t, since, w ith in  
th e  re a lm  o f  th e o ry , th e  e x te n t o f  th e  p o w e rs  th a t  th is  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t 
s h o u ld  h a v e  w ith  re sp e c t to  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  is n o t  c le a rly  d efined . In  
m o s t cases, th e  th e o ry  o f  fisca l fe d e ra lism  re g a rd s  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  as 
th e  re s u lt o f  a  ch o ice  b e tw e e n  c e n tra liz e d  serv ice  d e liv e ry  o r  d e liv e ry  b y  
lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  th e n  w eighs its  im p a c t o n  efficiency. H o w e v e r, th e  
ex is ten ce  o f  in te rm e d ia te  g o v e rn m e n ts  o f  a  size w h ich , a  p r io r i ,  d o es  n o t  
c o r re s p o n d  to  th e  scale  o f  p u b lic  serv ice sy s tem s m erits  so m e  a n a ly s is ,
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Table 3.2 Concentration o f  the population, by municipality ( selected 
countries )
C ountry T o ta l num ber o f 
municipalities
M unicipalities in 
which 50% o f the 
population  resides
Percentage o f 
m unicipalities accounting 
for 50% o f the population
A rgentina 2,150 78 3.63
Brazil 5,508 224 4.07
Chile 342 36 10.53
C olom bia 1,099 53 4.82
G uatem ala 331 54 16.31
H onduras 298 20 6.71
Mexico 2,446 99 4.05
N icaragua 152 23 15.13
Peru 1,836 85 4.63
U ruguay 19 2 10.53
Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of International M onetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics, W ashington, DC, February 2006, and Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2005, Washington, DC, 2005; and Cetrângolo (2007b).
ta k in g  in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  in s ti tu t io n a l, h is to r ic a l, p o li tic a l a n d  g e o g ra p h i­
ca l fa c to rs .
A  th i rd  e lem en t is th a t  th e  av e ra g e  size o f  th e  re g io n ’s m u n ic ip a litie s  
(m e a su re d  b y  p o p u la t io n )  is th e  n e t re s u lt o f  th e  figu res  fo r  c a p ita l  cities 
t h a t  p e r fo rm  a d m in is tra t iv e  a n d  service ac tiv itie s  o n  a n  e n o rm o u s  scale, 
o th e r  m a jo r  in d u s tr ia l  c ities (fo r  ex am p le , S âo  P a u lo  in  B raz il, R o s a r io  
in  A rg e n tin a ) , a n d  a  w ide  a r r a y  o f  m ed iu m -sized  to w n s  a n d  sm all v illages 
lo c a te d  in  re m o te  ru r a l  a rea s . S ince th e  size a n d  th e  so c io d e m o g ra p h ic  
a n d  g e o g ra p h ic  fe a tu re s  o f  a  g iven  te r r i to ry  h a v e  specific  im p lic a tio n s  th a t  
n eed  to  be  c o n s id e re d  w h en  d es ig n in g  a n d  im p le m e n tin g  p u b lic  p o lic ies , 
flex ib le  so lu tio n s  h a v e  to  b e  dev ised  th a t  can  be  a d a p te d  to  each  ty p e  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t. In  m a n y  cases , th is  is n o  easy  ta sk . In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t o f  p u b lic  p o licy  so lu tio n s  fo r  specific g ro u p s  w ith in  th e  p o p u la t io n  
(s c a tte re d  ru r a l  p o p u la t io n  g ro u p s , o n es  th a t  in c lu d e  a  la rg e r  p e rc e n ta g e  
o f  in d ig e n o u s  p e o p le s  o r  m u lti lin g u a l p o p u la t io n s , f o r  ex am p le ) is a  fo r ­
m id a b le  ch a llen g e , esp ec ia lly  in  th e  ca se  o f  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth  po lic ies .
In  o rd e r  to  flesh  o u t  th is  p ic tu re , T a b le  3.2 sh o w s p o p u la t io n  c o n c e n tra ­
t io n  in d ic a to r s  fo r  se lec ted  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  re flec t th e  n u m b e r  a n d  p e rc e n t­
age  o f  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  in  w h ich  h a l f  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  lives. A s  m a y  b e  seen 
f ro m  th e  ta b le , in  A rg e n tin a , B razil, C o lo m b ia , M ex ico  a n d  P e ru , h a l f  
o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  is c o n c e n tra te d  in  less th a n  5 p e rc e n t o f  e a c h  o f  th o se
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c o u n tr ie s ’ m u n ic ip a lit ie s . T h is  c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  a n d  th e  
c o u n tr ie s ’ u n e v e n  se ttle m e n t p a t te rn s  go  h a n d  in  h a n d  w ith  m a rk e d  im b a l­
an ces  in  o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  secu rin g  m a te r ia l  w e ll-b e in g  (E C L A C , 2010). 
P o licy  m a k e rs  sh o u ld  ta k e  th is  s i tu a t io n  v e ry  m u c h  in to  a c c o u n t w h en  
d es ig n in g  p o lic ie s  a im e d  a t  im p ro v in g  so c ia l co h es io n . I t  is p a r t ic u la r ly  
im p o r ta n t  to  re m e m b e r  th a t  th e  av e rag e  c o s t o f  p ro v id in g  a  g iven  serv ice 
w ill d iffe r a c ro s s  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  th a t  som e h a v e  g re a te r  
f in a n c ia l a n d  m a n a g e m e n t c a p a c itie s  th a n  o th e rs , a s  w ell a s  so u rces  o f  
re v e n u e  f ro m  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  n a tu r a l  re so u rc e s . S itu a tio n s  o f  th is  so r t 
c a n  g ive rise  to  a t te m p ts  to  ach iev e  te r r i to r ia l  a u to n o m y  o r  e m a n c ip a ­
tio n  th a t ,  in  tu r n ,  e x a c e rb a te  in e q u itie s  w ith in  a  g iven  c o u n try  a n d  th u s  
u n d e rm in e  its  so c ia l co h es io n .
B efo re  b r in g in g  th is  b r ie f  overv iew  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesse s  in  th e  
re g io n  to  a  close, it  s h o u ld  be  n o te d  th a t  n o  single p a t te rn  fo r  th e se  p ro cesses  
in  L a tin  A m e ric a  c a n  b e  id en tif ied . I t  sh o u ld  a lso  b e  sa id , h o w ev er, th a t  th is  
s i tu a t io n  is n o t  u n iq u e  to  th is  reg io n . M a n y  d iffe ren t co n c e p ts  a re  g e n e r­
a lly  su b su m e d  u n d e r  th e  te rm  ‘d e c e n tra liz a tio n ’, a n d  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
o f  a  p u b lic  service m u s t be  d is tin g u ish e d  f ro m  its  d é c o n c e n tra tio n , w h ich  
sim p ly  invo lves th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  b u re a u c ra tic  fu n c tio n s  f ro m  th e  c e n tra l 
g o v e rn m e n t to  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts . D e c e n tra liz a tio n  c a n  a lso  b e  a  p u re ly  
a d m in is tra tiv e  p ro cess  th a t  gives lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  so m e  a u to n o m y , o r  
it  c a n  b e  a  p o lic y -b a se d  o n e  w h e reb y  fu ll p o lic y -m a k in g  a n d  re g u la to ry  
p o w e rs  a re  tra n s fe r re d  to  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts . A n o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n  
is th a t ,  w hile  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesses  a re  w id e sp re a d  in  th e  reg io n , th ey  
h a v e  n o t  b een  e x p a n d e d  u p o n  a t  a n  even  p ace . In  effect, a s  h a s  b een  seen, 
d iv e rs ity  h a s  b een  th e  h a llm a rk  o f  L a tin  A m e ric a n  d e c e n tra liz a tio n .
3 INROADS AND MOTIVATING FORCES
A b o v e  a n d  b e y o n d  a n y  th e o re tic a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s , th e  w idely  v a ry in g  
m o t iv a t in g  fo rce s  b e h in d  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  in  th e  re g io n  
h av e  tr a n s la te d  in to  s ig n ifican t b u t  ex trem e ly  u n e v e n  a d v a n c e s  a c ro s s  
c o u n tr ie s  a n d  sp h e res  o f  g o v e rn m e n t. T h e  sp e c tru m  goes f ro m  s itu a tio n s  
in  w h ich  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is a  c o re  c o m p o n e n t o f  p o litic a l re fo rm  (B o liv ia  
(P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f), C o lo m b ia , P e ru )  to  th o s e  in  w h ic h  se c to ra l 
re fo rm s  p re d o m in a te  (C h ile ) a n d , in  th e  ex tre m e , s i tu a t io n s  in  w h ich  fiscal 
a n d  fin an c ia l c o n s id e ra t io n s  a re  th e  so le  m o t iv a t io n  (A rg e n tin a ) .
D i G ro p e llo  a n d  C o m in e tt i  (1998) h a v e  o b se rv e d  th a t  fiscal co n c e rn s  
w ere  th e  m a in  m o t iv a t io n  fo r  th e  firs t g e n e ra t io n  o f  re fo rm s , w h ich  w ere  
la u n c h e d  u n d e r  u n d e m o c ra tic  p o li tic a l sy s tem s (A rg e n tin a , B raz il, C h ile ), 
w h e re a s  th e  re fo rm s  u n d e r ta k e n  d u r in g  th e  seco n d  h a lf  o f  th e  1980s a n d
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th e  1990s w ere  d r iv e n  by  th e  n eed  to  d e m o n s tra te  th e  leg itim acy  o f  new ly  
in s ta lle d  d e m o c ra tic  g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  w ere  th e re fo re  m o re  p o litic a lly  
m o tiv a te d . E ffic iency -seek ing  re fo rm s  in  th e  serv ices sec to r, o n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d , w ere  n o t  seen  u n ti l  th e  la te  1990s.
A n  an a ly s is  o f  th e  f in an c ia l tie s  b e tw een  d iffe ren t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t 
show s th a t  th e  m o tiv a tin g  fo rces  b e h in d  th e  firs t-g e n e ra tio n  p ro cesses in 
A rg e n tin a  a n d  B raz il (b o th  w ith  fed e ra l system s) c a n  be  in te rp re te d  a s  
ex trem e  a n d  d ia m e tr ic a lly  o p p o se d  cases. In  A rg e n tin a , th e  d e c e n tra liz a ­
tio n  o f  h e a lth , b a s ic  e d u c a tio n  a n d  o th e r  socia l serv ices w as d es ig n ed  by  
th e  cen tra l g o v e rn m e n t as a  m ean s  o f  a p p ro p r ia t in g  re so u rces  fro m  th e  
p ro v in ce s  by  a lte r in g  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  fu n c tio n s  b e tw e e n  levels o f  g o v e rn ­
m e n t w ith o u t re co g n iz in g  specific b u d g e t item s (see C arc io fi e t a l., 1996; 
C e trà n g o lo  a n d  B isang , 1997). T h is  c a n  th e re fo re  b e  re g a rd e d  as  th e  p a r a ­
d ig m  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesses  in  w h ich  th e  sole a im  is th e  ach ie v em en t 
o f  fiscal su s ta in a b ility , w ith o u t re g a rd  fo r  th e  effects o n  soc ia l c o h esio n . 
In  B razil, o n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in v o lv ed  a  p o litic a l p ro cess  
w h ereb y  re so u rce s  w ere  tr a n s fe r re d  to  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  as a  w ay  o f  
p u tt in g  a n  en d  to  th e  ce n tra liz e d  m a n a g e m e n t sty le  o f  th e  d ic ta to r sh ip  a n d  
th e re b y  p ro m o tin g  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  d e m o c ra c y  (see A fo n so , 2003, p . 38).
T h e  f irs t-g e n e ra tio n  re fo rm s  in  C h ile  w ere  o f  a  d if fe re n t so r t, a lth o u g h  
th e  m o tiv a t in g  fo rce s  b e a r  so m e  s im ila ritie s  to  th e  case  o f  A rg e n tin a . A  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e s s  w as c a rr ie d  o u t  in  th e  ea rly  1980s b y  th e  u n d e m o ­
c ra t ic  g o v e rn m e n t o f  th e  tim e  p r im a r ily  fo r  p o li tic a l a n d  fiscal re a so n s  
(a p p lic a tio n  o f  th e  n e o lib e ra l m o d e l, th e  a im  o f  d o w n s iz in g  th e  s ta te  a n d  
a s  a  m e a n s  o f  b o ls te r in g  th e  p r iv a tiz a tio n  p o licy ), a n d  it  c o m b in e d  m o d if i­
c a tio n s  in  th e  w ay  serv ices w ere  o rg a n iz e d  a t  th e  m ic ro e c o n o m ic  level w ith  
th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  fu n d in g  m e c h a n ism s  re la te d  to  d e m a n d  su b s id ie s  (see 
D i G ro p e llo  a n d  C o m in e tt i ,  1998, p . 51).
In  th e  te rm s  e s ta b lish e d  b y  th e  t r a d it io n a l c la s s if ic a tio n  o f  s ta te  fu n c ­
tio n s  (M u sg ra v e  a n d  M u sg ra v e , 1992) it c a n  be  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  ad v o c a c y  
o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  is b a se d  o n  th e ir  p o te n t ia l  a d v a n ta g e s  fro m  
th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  re so u rc e  a llo c a tio n . H o w ev e r, in  A rg e n tin a  th e  c h ie f  
p o licy  o b jec tiv e  o f  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  soc ia l serv ices w as c lea rly  m a c r ­
o e c o n o m ic  s ta b il iz a tio n . In  C h ile , th e  re d e f in itio n  o f  se c to ra l p o lic ie s  w as a 
c o n c e rn , a s  w as a  c lo se r c o r re la t io n  w ith  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  re so u rc e  a llo c a ­
tio n . E q u ity  w as  n o t  a c o n s id e ra t io n  in  e ith e r  case , even  th o u g h  th e  item s 
o f  e x p e n d itu re  th a t  w ere  b e in g  d e c en tra liz ed  w ere  th o s e  o f  so c ia l fu n c ­
tio n s . In  a n y  ev en t, it  is g en e ra lly  a c c e p te d  th a t  th e se  ex am p le s  c a n n o t  be  
fu lly  u n d e rs to o d  w ith o u t re fe ren ce  to  th e  p o litic a l c irc u m s ta n c e s  ex is tin g  
in  th ese  c o u n tr ie s  d u r in g  th e  seco n d  h a lf  o f  th e  1970s a n d  th e  e a rly  1980s.
G e n e ra lly  sp eak in g , th e  d iffe rences b e tw een  th e se  cases n o tw ith s ta n d ­
in g , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  w ere  o rig in a lly  c a rr ie d  fo rw a rd  by  th e
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Figure 3.1 Introduction o f  elected posts at the local level
c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t, w h e th e r  fo r  fisca l o r  p o li tic a l re a s o n s . T h e  case  o f  
B raz il, h o w ev er, is th e  ex c e p tio n  a n d  d isp lay s  c e r ta in  a sp e c ts  th a t  a re  
ex trem e ly  in te re s tin g  in  te rm s  o f  th e  p re s e n t a n a ly s is . I n  B raz il, th e  p re s ­
en ce  o f  a  s izab le  h e a lth -c a re  re fo rm  m o v e m e n t th a t  w as seek in g  to  e x p a n d  
c o v e rag e  a n d  g ra d u a lly  b u ild  a  g re a te r  c o m p o n e n t o f  so lid a rity  in to  th e  
sy s tem  p a v e d  th e  w a y  fo r  a  m o d e l o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  th a t  w a s  to  a c c o m ­
p a n y  th e  t r a n s it io n  to  d e m o c ra c y  a n d  th a t  w as u lt im a te ly  c ry s ta lliz e d  in  
th e  c o n s t i tu tio n  o f  1988.2
O n  th e  c o n tra ry , th e  p re d o m in a n t  m o tiv a t in g  fo rces  fo r  th e  seco n d - 
g e n e ra tio n  re fo rm s  w ere  a s so c ia te d  w ith  p o li tic a l c o n s id e ra tio n s  a n d  
in s ti tu t io n a l re fo rm s  th a t  w ere  b e in g  p u rs u e d  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  t r a n s i t io n  to  
d em o c ra c y . T h ese  p ro ce sse s  in itia lly  fo cu sed  o n  th e  p o li tic a l a re n a , a n d  
specifica lly  o n  th e  c re a t io n  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  d e m o c ra c ie s  a t  th e  lo ca l level. 
D u r in g  th e  1980s a n d  1990s, e le c to ra l re fo rm s  w ere  a p p ro v e d  in  a  m a jo r ity  
o f  th e  c o u n tr ie s . T h e y  in c lu d e d  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  e le c tio n s  fo r  th e  p o s t  
o f  in te n d a n t  a t  th e  lo ca l level a n d , to  a lesser e x te n t, fo r  g o v e rn o rsh ip s , 
th e re b y  b re a k in g  w ith  a  lo n g s ta n d in g  tr a d i t io n  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  
th e  C a r ib b e a n  w h e re b y  lo ca l a u th o r it ie s  w ere  d e s ig n a te d  b y  th e  c e n tra l 
g o v e rn m e n t (D a u g h te r s  a n d  H a rp e r ,  2007).
A s il lu s tra te d  in  F ig u re  3.1, th e  re g io n  h a s  m a d e  a  g re a t  d e a l o f
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h e a d w a y  in  te rm s  o f  th e  e le c tio n  o f  lo ca l a u th o r it ie s , a lth o u g h  in  som e 
cases (A rg e n tin a , U ru g u a y )  e lec ted  p o s ts  a lre a d y  ex is ted  a t  su b n a tio n a l 
levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t (d u r in g  th o s e  p e rio d s , o f  co u rse , w h e n  c o n s t i tu tio n a l 
r ig h ts  w ere re sp ec ted ). I n  o th e r  cases, h o w ev e r, s ig n ific an t ch an g es  h av e  
o c c u rre d , su ch  as, fo r  ex am p le , th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  m a y o ra l  e le c tio n s  in  
P e ru  a n d  C o lo m b ia  in  1998.
L astly , so m e  fe a tu re s  o f  w h a t c o u ld  b e  re fe rre d  to  a s  a  ‘th i rd  w ave  o f  
re fo rm s ’ c a n  b e  d isce rn ed . In  th e  p a s t  few  y ea rs , a  d e b a te  h a s  b e g u n  to  ta k e  
sh a p e  a n d  so m e  s tep s  h a v e  b e e n  ta k e n  to w a rd s  r e fo rm u la tin g  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n  p o lic ie s  in  w ays th a t  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t th e ir  im p a c t o n  soc ia l a n d  
te r r i to r ia l  c o h e s io n . S om e a sp e c ts  o f  re fo rm s  in s ti tu te d  in  c e r ta in  c o u n tr ie s  
(fo r  ex am p le , C o lo m b ia  a n d  M ex ico ) c o u ld  b e  p o in t in g  in  th is  d ire c tio n . 
T h is  w ill b e  d iscu ssed  in  g re a te r  d e p th  in  S ec tio n  5.
A n  overv iew  o f  th e  m o tiv a t in g  fo rces fo r  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  in 
th e  re g io n  c o n firm  th e  o b s e rv a tio n  th a t  th e  re a s o n s  t h a t  h a v e  p ro m p te d  
c o u n tr ie s  to  d e c e n tra liz e  g iven  u tilitie s  o r  serv ices v a ry  a n d  h a v e  n o t  
a lw ay s c o r re s p o n d e d  to  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  th a t  h a v e  so lid  th e o re tic a l 
fo u n d a tio n s . T h e  c o u n tr ie s  h av e  a lso  h a d  e n o rm o u s  d ifficu lty  in  d e te rm in ­
in g  w h a t m ig h t b e  c h a ra c te r iz e d  as th e  ‘o p tim u m  e x te n t o f  d e c e n tra liz a ­
t io n ’. F o r  th e  m o s t p a r t ,  th e  p o s i tio n  o f  e a c h  c o u n try  is th e  re s u lt o f  a  
seq u en ce  o f  in s ti tu t io n a l re fo rm s . P e ru , w ith  q u ite  specific  d y n a m ic s  o f  its 
o w n  th a t  h a v e  led  i t  to  go  b a c k  a n d  fo r th  o n  th is  is su e , is a n  in te re s tin g  
e x a m p le .3
W ith in  th e  d iv e rse  ra n g e  o f  s i tu a t io n s  th a t  ex is t in  th e  reg io n , th e  m o t i­
v a tin g  fo rces  fo r  th e  d iffe ren t d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e sse s  h av e  b een  o n e  o f  
th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  p a th s  th e y  h av e  fo llo w ed . In  c a se s  w h e re  fiscal c o n ­
s id e ra tio n s  o f  th e  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t h a v e  b een  th e  so le  m o tiv a t in g  fo rce , 
p re -e x is tin g  in e q u a lit ie s  m a y  h a v e  b een  h e ig h te n e d  w h e n  lo ca l g o v e rn ­
m e n ts  w ere  le ft to  re ly  o n  th e ir  o w n  fin an c ia l a n d  m a n a g e m e n t c ap ac itie s  
fo r  th e  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  so c ia l serv ices. In  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a  c o o rd in a te d  
a p p ro a c h , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  m a y  n o t  h av e  re s u lte d  in  th e  in c re a se d  e q u ity  
a n d  soc ia l c o h e s io n  th a t ,  in  th e o ry , th e se  re fo rm s  a re  s u p p o s e d  to  p ro d u c e  
a n d  th a t ,  in  fa c t, th e y  h av e  b ro u g h t  a b o u t  in  m o re  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s . 
T h is  q u e s tio n  w ill b e  e x a m in e d  fu r th e r  in  S ec tio n  5.
A g a in s t th is  v a rie d  b a c k d ro p , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e sse s  in  th e  c o u n ­
tr ie s  o f  th e  re g io n  h av e  a d v a n c e d  to  d iffe rin g  d eg ree s , in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  
e a c h  n a t io n ’s level o f  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t. T a b le  3 .3  p ro v id e s  a n  in d i­
c a tio n  o f  th o s e  a d v a n c e s  b a se d  o n  th e  r a t io  o f  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n t 
e x p e n d itu re  to  th e  to ta l  e x p e n d itu re  o f  th e  c o n s o lid a te d  p u b lic  se c to r .4
T h is  in d ic a to r  sh o w s th a t  e c o n o m ic  a n d  h u m a n  leve ls o f  d e v e lo p m e n t 
b e a r  n o  c lea r re la tio n sh ip  w ith  th e  in ro a d s  m a d e  by  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . I f  
th e re  is a n y  o n e  v a r ia b le  th a t  h e lp s  to  a c c o u n t fo r  th e  g re a te r  o r  lesser
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T a b le  3 .3  A d v a n c e s  in d e c e n tra liza tio n , b y  g ro u p  o f  co u n tr ie s
G roup  o f countries Level o f  decentralization
(subnational public expenditure as a percentage o f  the total)
G reater than  20% Between 10% and
20%
Less than 10%
Qh H igh H D I A rgentina (49.5%)
0 . 0 M id­ Chile (12.2%)
M B range
s i H D IO Low H D I Mexico (31.8%) U ruguay (14.5%)
H igh H D I Peru (26.8%) Venezuela (Boi. Panam a (3.2%)
U i Rep. of) (19.6%) El Salvador
(4.6%)
g> 0 M id­ C osta R ica (3.3%)
ni cd
S-c range Dom inican
3  & H D I R epublic
S  °
Low H D I Brazil (45%) 
C olom bia (39.0%)
(2.9%)
a H igh H D I Bolivia (Plur. State
‘cL of) (29.7%)
O  0 » M id­ Paraguay (6.2%)
Ì5 0  o, O range N icaragua (5.2%)
£ H D Io
Low H D I G uatem ala (12.4%) H onduras (8.0%) 
E cuador (7.5%)
Note: H D I is the H um an Development Index ranking.
Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data from ECLAC, U N D P, and 
Cetrangolo (2007b).
e x te n t o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , it  is th e  size o f  th e  te r r i to ry  c o n c e rn e d . T h e  
la rg e r  its  te r r i to ry , th e  m o re  like ly  a  c o u n try  is to  h av e  a d o p te d  a fed e ra l 
sy s tem  a n d  to  h a v e  d e c e n tra liz e d  th e  e x e c u tio n  o f  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  to  a  
g re a te r  e x te n t. F ig u re  3.2 il lu s tra te s  th a t  re la tio n sh ip  in  th e  reg io n .
T h e  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  h a v e  d e c e n tra liz e d  th e ir  so c ia l serv ices th e  m o s t h av e  
b e e n  th e  la rg e r  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  fed e ra l sy s tem s a n d  so m e  o f  th e  sh a rp e s t 
te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a lit ie s  (B raz il, M ex ico  a n d , to  a  lesser e x te n t, A rg e n tin a ) . 
T h is  w o u ld  seem  to  in d ic a te  th a t  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p o lic ie s  a re  a n  in e v ita b le  
c o n se q u e n c e  o f  th e  d e m a n d s  a sso c ia te d  w ith  g o v e rn in g  la rg e  te r r ito r ie s ,
5 0 D ecentraliza tion  and reform  in L atin  A m erica
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis o f data from ECLAC, and Cetràngolo
(2007b).
Figure 3.2 Degree o f  decentralization in the countries o f  Latin America 
and the Caribbean (public expenditure by subnational 
governments as a percentage o f  the total)
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r a th e r  th a n  th e  o u tc o m e  o f  a  p o licy  d ec is io n . T h e re  a re  a lso  o th e r  c o u n ­
tr ie s  w ith  m e d iu m -s iz e d  te r r ito r ie s  ( fo r  ex am p le , C o lo m b ia  a n d  P e ru )  w ith  
u n i ta ry  sy s tem s o f  g o v e rn m e n t th a t  h a v e  d e c e n tra liz e d  to  th e  e x te n t th a t  
th e  r a t io  o f  s u b n a t io n a l e x p e n d itu re  to  th e  to ta l  is q u ite  h ig h  re la tiv e  to  
o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  re g io n  a n d  o th e r  sm a lle r  o r  is la n d  te r r ito r ie s  (fo r 
e x am p le , m o s t o f  th e  C e n tra l  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s ) , w h ic h  h a v e  d e c e n tra l­
ized  very  little . In  c o n tr a s t ,  a n  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  E u ro p e  
sh o w s th a t  th e re  is n o  s ig n ifican t c o r r e la t io n  w ith  th e  size o f  n a tio n a l te r ­
r i to r ie s  th e re . D e c e n tra l iz a t io n  th e re fo re  a p p e a rs  to  b e  a n  o p tio n  fo r  a ll 
th e  E u ro p e a n  g o v e rn m e n ts , w ith  so m e  c o u n tr ie s  h a v in g  a  h ig h  p e rc e n ta g e  
o f  su b n a tio n a l e x p e n d itu re  (fo r ex am p le , S p a in  a n d  S w ed en ) a n d  o th e rs  
h a v in g  a  lo w  ra t io  ( fo r  e x am p le , G reece).
4 DECENTRALIZATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: 
TENSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS STEMMING 
FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF SOLVENCY AND 
FISCAL CO-RESPONSIBILITY
A s d iscu ssed  in  th e  p re c e d in g  sec tio n , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  in  th e  
re g io n  h a v e  b een  q u ite  d iv e rse . U n fo r tu n a te ly , h o w ev e r, s tu d ie s  th a t  
w o u ld  serve  as a  b a s is  fo r  a ssessin g  th e ir  im p a c t o n  in co m e  d is tr ib u tio n  
a n d  soc ia l c o h e s io n  a re  n o t  av a ila b le . T h e  w ide  a r r a y  o f  fa c to rs  th a t  c o n ­
t r ib u te  to  te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a litie s , th e  fa c t th a t  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is re la tiv e ly  
re c e n t a n d  th e  le a d  tim e  in v o lv e d  in  th is  ty p e  o f  re fo rm  m a k e  it  d ifficu lt 
to  a r r iv e  a t  a  co n c lu s iv e  a n a ly s is .5 H o w ev e r, it is p o ss ib le  to  su g g est th a t  
m a n y  o f  th e  d is tr ib u tiv e  im p ro v e m e n ts  th a t  w ere  e x p ec ted  to  re s u lt f ro m  
th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  p ro v id in g  b a s ic  so c ia l serv ices to  lo ca l 
g o v e rn m e n ts  h a v e  n o t  m a te r ia liz e d . T h is  to p ic  w ill be  e x p lo re d  fu r th e r  
la te r  on . T h e  re g io n  c o n tin u e s  to  ex h ib it a  h ig h  deg ree  o f  in e q u a lity , a n d  
e n su r in g  e q u ita b le  access to  b a s ic  so c ia l serv ices fo r  a  la rg e  p a r t  o f  th e  
p o p u la t io n  re m a in s  a  cha llen g e . In  som e cases, te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a lit ie s  m a y  
even  h a v e  in c re a se d  as a  re s u lt o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , a n d  th e  ab se n c e  o f  
su ffic ien t f in a n c ia l a n d  m a n a g e m e n t c a p a c ity  a t  th e  lo ca l level h a s  a c te d  
as a  se r io u s  c o n s t ra in t  o n  e ffo rts  to  ach iev e  th e  de liv e ry  o f  d ec e n tra liz e d  
serv ices o n  a n  a u to n o m o u s  bas is .
D o e s  th is  m e a n  th a t  th e  a p p ro a c h  ta k e n  to  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  h a s  b een  
flaw ed  a n d  th a t  th e  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  re g io n  w ill n e e d  to  c h a n g e  th e ir  co u rse  
in  th is  re sp ec t?  W h a t  o rg a n iz a tio n a l c o n s tra in ts  o n  th e  d e c e n tra liz e d  
d e liv e ry  o f  p u b lic  serv ices h av e  n o t  b een  ta k e n  in to  a c c o u n t?
A s h a s  b een  p o in te d  o u t, th e  w ide  ra n g e  o f  e co n o m ic , so c ia l, p o litic a l 
a n d  in s ti tu t io n a l c irc u m s ta n c e s  th a t  ex is t in  th e  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  re g io n
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d e lim it th e  sco p e  a n d  p o te n t ia l  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e s se s  a n d  th e re fo re  
g ive rise  to  a  p o lic y  d ile m m a  re g a rd in g  th e  o b jec tiv e  o f  in c re a se d  socia l 
co h es io n . S o lu tio n s  th a t  d o  n o t  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t th e  p a r t ic u la r  fe a tu re s  o f  
each  lo c a t io n  a re  o u t  o f  th e  q u e s tio n , a n d  th is  fa c t h a s  se rv ed  as  th e  b asis  
f o r  a  w e ll-d ev e lo p ed  lin e  o f  a rg u m e n t in  fa v o r  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p o lic ie s  
a n d  e ffo rts  to  b r in g  d e c is io n  m a k in g  c lo se r to  th e  lo c a l level. H o w ev e r, 
th is  d iv erse  ra n g e  o f  s i tu a t io n s  a lso  ra ise s  th e  u su a l d o u b ts  a s  to  w h e th e r  
th e  in s ti tu t io n a l a n d  f in an c ia l c a p a c ity  to  a d d re s s  is su es  o f  so c ia l c o h e ­
s io n  ex is ts  a t  th e  lo ca l level. T h is  p o in ts  to  o n e  o f  th e  tra d e -o ffs  b e tw een  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  so c ia l c o h e s io n  th a t  is a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  
s tr ik in g  d isp a rit ie s  in  d iffe ren t p ro d u c t io n  sec to rs  w ith in  th e  reg io n . In  th is  
c o n te x t, te r r i to r ia l  d isp a rit ie s  a re  seen as  c o n s tra in ts  o n  e ffo rts  to  ach ieve  
e q u a lity . T h is  is th e  re s u lt o f  th e  d ire c t im p a c t o f  in e q u a lity  a n d , in d irec tly , 
o f  th e  u n ev en  f in a n c ia l c a p a c ity  o f  s u b n a tio n a l u n its  a s  a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f  
th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  ta x  base .
W h ile  e f fo r ts  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  to  a c c e le ra te  th e  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t  o f  th e  u n d e rp r iv ile g e d  a re a s  a s  a  w a y  o f  a c h ie v in g  g re a te r  t e r ­
r i to r ia l  c o h e s io n , th e y  h a v e  n e v e r  b e e n  a s  e ffec tive  a s  th e i r  c o u n te r p a r t  
in i tia tiv e s  in  E u ro p e . T h e  e x te n t o f  th e  d is p a r it ie s  a n d  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  
s ig n if ic a n t u n m e t p u b lic  p o lic y  d e m a n d s  th r o u g h o u t  th e  re g io n  h a v e  
p re v e n te d  th e s e  in i tia tiv e s  f ro m  b e in g  m o re  su c c e s s fu l th a n  th e y  w o u ld  
o th e rw ise  h a v e  b e e n  ( th is  q u e s t io n  w ill b e  e x a m in e d  in  g re a te r  d e ta i l  in  
a  la te r  se c tio n ) . I n  a d d it io n ,  th e  re c e n t l i te r a tu re  o n  th e  d y n a m ic s  o f  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t o f  p ro d u c t io n ,  c o m p e tit iv e n e s s  a n d  te r r i to r i a l  c o n c e rn s  
in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  g lo b a l e c o n o m y  is n o w  r e tu rn in g  to  a  fo c u s  o n  th e  
ro le  o f  s u b n a t io n a l  a n d  lo c a l p ro d u c t io n  sy s tem s . T h e  n e e d  to  ta k e  
th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l  p ro x im ity  o f  sm a ll a n d  m e d iu m -s iz e d  e n te rp r is e s  in to  
c o n s id e ra t io n  c a n  g e n e ra te  e x te rn a l e c o n o m ie s  a n d  fo s te r  a n  ‘in d u s ­
t r ia l  a tm o s p h e re ’ a t  th e  lo c a l level (B o sc h e r in i a n d  P o m a , 2000; P o m a , 
2000 ). T h e  im p lic a tio n  is th a t ,  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a c tiv e  c o u n te r b a la n c ­
in g  p o lic ie s , th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  th e  p ro d u c t io n  s e c to r  w ill e x h ib i t  a n  
e n d o g e n o u s  te n d e n c y  to  re p l ic a te  a n d  e x a c e rb a te  e x is tin g  in e q u a lit ie s . 
B e y o n d  th e se  in i t ia l  o b s e rv a tio n s , h o w e v e r, th e  q u e s t io n  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t 
p o lic ie s  d e s ig n e d  to  re d u c e  d is p a r it ie s  in  th e  p r o d u c t io n  s e c to r  w ill n o t  
be  e x a m in e d  in  th is  a n a ly s is .
A n o th e r  issue  to  be  a d d re s se d  in  th e  d iscu ss io n  a n d  an a ly s is  o f  d ecen ­
tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  in  th e  re g io n  in v o lv es  th e ir  e ffects o n  fiscal a c c o u n ts . 
In  m a n y  cases , th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  to  s u b n a t io n a l  levels o f  
g o v e rn m e n t h a s  n o t  b een  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  a  tr a n s fe r  o f  th e  c o rre sp o n d in g  
b u d g e t a l lo c a tio n s . T h is  h a s  h a d  a  se r io u s  im p a c t o n  th e  f in an c ia l s i tu ­
a tio n  o f  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts , o f te n  s p a rk in g  a  g re a t d e a l o f  fisca l te n s io n  
b e tw een  d iffe ren t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t a n d , in  so m e  cases , h e ig h te n in g
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lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ fu n d in g  re q u ire m e n ts . In  a d d it io n , a s  n o te d  e a rlie r , 
w h en  th e re  is g re a te r  lo ca l a u to n o m y , r ic h e r  a re a s  te n d  to  re s is t fu n d in g  
p u b lic  p o lic ie s  in  p o o re r  a re a s , w h ich  ru n s  c o u n te r  to  th e  o b jec tiv e  o f  
g re a te r  so c ia l c o h e s io n . T h e  re s u ltin g  te n s io n s  m a y  le a d  to  p ro b le m s  o f  
fiscal in so lv en cy . T h u s , a lth o u g h  e ffo rts  h a v e  b een  m a d e  to  d e c e n tra liz e  
m a n y  d iffe ren t sec to rs  to  v a ry in g  d eg rees , th e  re su lts  re flec t th e  s tre n g th s  
a n d  w eak n esses  o f  e a c h  c o u n try  a n d , in  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  a s s o c ia te d  fu n d in g  
m ech a n ism s .
T h e  fo llo w in g  su b se c tio n  w ill in tro d u c e  a n  o f te n  n eg lec ted  issue  th a t  h a s  
a  su b s ta n tiv e  b e a r in g  o n  th e  a ch ie v em en t o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p o lic y  o b je c ­
tives. T h e  g e o g ra p h ic a l d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  ta x  b a se  in  e a c h  case  m a k e s  it 
v e ry  d ifficu lt to  m e e t th e  fiscal c o -re sp o n s ib ili ty  ta rg e ts  th a t  m a n y  o f  th e  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  n o w  u n d e r  w ay  re q u ire .
Territorial Disparities
T h e  n a tu r e  o f  e q u ity  p ro b le m s  w ith in  n a t io n a l  te r r ito r ie s  s h o u ld  b e  a 
k ey  fa c to r  fo r  a d d re s s in g  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  a n d  th e ir  f in an c in g  
in  L a tin  A m e ric a . A lth o u g h  in d ic a to rs  o f  p e rs o n a l in co m e  d is tr ib u tio n  
a re  a s su m e d  to  b e a r  so m e  re la tio n  to  te r r i to r ia l  fe a tu re s , th e  an a ly s is  
h e re  fo cu ses  o n  te r r i to r ia l  a sp ec ts . A c c o rd in g ly , F ig u re  3.3 m a p s  th e  
d iv id es  b e tw een  h ig h e s t a n d  lo w est p e r  c a p ita  o u tp u t  a m o n g  su b n a tio n a l 
ju r is d ic tio n s  fo r  a  g ro u p  o f  c o u n tr ie s .6
T h is  in d ic a to r  is seen  to  d iffe r s u b s ta n t ia l ly  b e tw e e n  E u ro p e a n  a n d  
L a t in  A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s . W ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  th e  sm a lle r  C e n tra l  
A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s  a n d  U ru g u a y  (w h ic h  h a s  a  m a rk e d ly  u n ita ry  sy s tem  
o f  o rg a n iz a t io n  a n d  b e t te r  e q u ity  in d ic a to r s ) ,  L a t in  A m e r ic a  sh o w s 
la rg e r  g a p s  b e tw e e n  r ic h  a n d  p o o r  ju r is d ic t io n s  th a n  a n y  E u ro p e a n  
c o u n try . T h e  p e r  c a p i ta  o u tp u t  o f  A rg e n t in a ’s r ic h e s t p ro v in c e  (S a n ta  
C ru z ) , fo r  e x a m p le , is 7 .9  tim e s  th a t  o f  its  p o o re s t  (F o rm o s a ) .  In  
C o lo m b ia , th e  p e r  c a p i ta  o u tp u t  o f  C a s a n a re  is 7 .7  tim e s  th a t  o f  C h o c o , 
a n d  in  B ra z il th e  p e r  c a p i ta  o u tp u t  r a t io  b e tw e e n  th e  F e d e ra l  D is t r ic t  
a n d  M a r a n h a o  is 6 .9 . T h e  a v e ra g e  ra t io  f o r  E u ro p e a n  c o u n tr ie s  is 1.8. 
W i th o u t  c o n s id e r in g  th e se  d iffe ren ces , i t  w o u ld  b e  d ifficu lt to  im p ro v e  
so c ia l c o h e s io n  a n d  a d v a n c e  to w a rd s  a  n ew  a g e n d a  o f  re fo rm s  a im e d  a t  
f r a m in g  e q u a l r ig h ts  f o r  th e  e n tire  L a t in  A m e r ic a n  p o p u la t io n .  I t  is y e t 
m o re  c u m b e rs o m e  to  e q u a liz e  r ig h ts  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  d e c e n tra liz e d  p o l i ­
c ies , s ince  th e  p o o re s t  re g io n s  a re  p re c ise ly  th e  o n e s  w ith  th e  sm a lle s t ta x  
b a se  fo r  fu n d in g  lo c a l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  p r io r i t ie s , su c h  as  in f r a s t ru c tu re ,  
h e a l th  a n d  e d u c a t io n .
U n b a la n c e d  re g io n a l d e v e lo p m e n t lead s  to  c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  ta x  b ases 
in  a  few  te r r ito r ie s  w ith in  th e  c o u n tr ie s , in e v ita b ly  im p e d in g  fu ll fiscal





















Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data from the OECD, ECLAC,
CEPALSTAT (http://websie.eclac.ci/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and 
Cetràngolo (2007b).
Figure 3.3 Gaps in regional per capita GDP in Latin America and Europe
c o -re sp o n s ib ility  a n d  p re v e n tin g  th e  d e p lo y m e n t o f  v ir tu o u s  d e c e n tra liz a ­
t io n  p ro cesses  in  th e  te rm s  p ro p o s e d  b y  th e  th e o ry , a s  w ill be  seen  la te r . 
T h is  d o es  n o t  m e a n  th a t  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is a n  o b s ta c le  to  soc ia l co h es io n , 
b u t  it  d o es flag  te n s io n s  w h ich  m u s t b e  co n s id e re d , a s  w ell a s  th e  n eed  to  
e s ta b lish  w ays to  c o o rd in a te  se c to ra l p o lic ies , in c lu d in g  c o m p e n s a to ry  
m e c h a n ism s  fo r  m o re  d is a d v a n ta g e d  re g io n s  (as w ill b e  d iscu ssed  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  sec tions).
F ig u re  3.4 sh o w s h o w  th e  d eg ree  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  re la te s  to  te r r i to r ia l  
in e q u a lity , m e a s u re d  b y  th e  o u tp u t  r a t io  b e tw e e n  ex trem e  reg io n s . 
W h e re a s  in  E u ro p e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  sh o w s u p  a s  a  v a r ia b le  in d e p e n d ­
e n t o f  re g io n a l in e q u a lity  (w h ich  is, in  a n y  ev en t, n o t  p a r t ic u la r ly  la rg e ), 
in  L a tin  A m e ric a  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o p tio n  is h eav ily  a s so c ia te d  w ith  
re g io n a l d isp a rity : th e  m o re  d e c e n tra liz e d  c o u n tr ie s  sh o w  g re a te r  te r r i to ­
r ia l in e q u a lity . A s  d iscu ssed  e a rlie r , th is  reflec ts th e  fa c t th a t  b o th  deg ree  
o f  te r r i to r ia l  d is p a r ity  a n d  level o f  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a re  d irec tly  
re la te d  to  th e  size o f  th e  c o u n try . T h is  te lls  u s  n o th in g  a b o u t  th e  d y n a m ic s  
o f  te r r i to r ia l  d is p a r it ie s  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , w h ich  it  re m a in s  fo r  su b se ­
q u e n t re se a rc h  to  ex p lo re  fu r th e r . L it tle  sp e c u la tio n  h a s  b een  v e n tu re d  o n  
th is  su b jec t g iv en  th e  ab se n c e  o f  su ita b le  in d ic a to r s  a n d  th e  m u lti tu d e  o f  
fa c to rs  th a t  c a n  a c c o u n t fo r  te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a lit ie s .7
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Figure 3.4 Gaps in regional per capita GDP and decentralization in Latin  
America and Europe
5 DECENTRALIZATION AND THE TENSIONS 
THAT PREVENT GREATER SOCIAL COHESION
T h e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e s s  d o es  n o t  le a d  u n e rr in g ly  to w a rd s  g re a te r  
so c ia l co h e s io n . O n  th e  c o n tra ry , it  ru n s  u p  a g a in s t a  n u m b e r  o f  te n s io n s  
w h ic h  p u b lic  p o licy  m u s t a d d re ss . H a v in g  e s ta b lish e d  th a t  d e c e n tra liz a ­
t io n  is n o t  a  sing le  o r  u n ifo rm  p ro c e s s  in  th e  reg io n , i t  w o u ld  b e  a b s u rd  to  
p ro p o s e  a  sing le  s o lu tio n  to  th e  te n s io n s  i t  g e n e ra te s . I t  h a s  b e e n  c o n s is t­
en tly  a rg u e d  h e re  th a t ,  s ince  th e  rea litie s  in  th e  c o u n tr ie s  a re  v e ry  d iffe r­
en t, th e  p ro p o s e d  re sp o n se s  m u s t lin e  u p  w ith  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  e a c h  o n e . 
N ev e rth e le ss , so m e  g e n e ra l c r i te r ia  m a y  be  o ffe red  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  p a s t  
ex p erien ce  a n d  o f  th e  s t ru c tu ra l  c o n d it io n s  p re v a ilin g  in  th e  reg io n .
T a x a tio n  sy s tem  flaw s g e n e ra te  u n m e t d e m a n d s  fo r  p u b lic  p o licy  a c tio n , 
w h ich  c a n n o t  be  re so lv e d  b y  s im p ly  sh iftin g  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  to  a  d iffe ren t 
level o f  g o v e rn m e n t. A t  th e  sam e  tim e , tw o  b a r r ie rs  p re v e n t th e  p rin c ip le  
o f  fiscal c o -re sp o n s ib ili ty  f ro m  o p e ra t in g  p ro p e r ly : th e  la rg e  p r o p o r t io n  o f
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ta x  p a y m e n ts  g o in g  to  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t a n d , o f  p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t he re , 
th e  g re a t d is p a r it ie s  b e tw e e n  te r r ito r ie s  a n d  w ith in  c o u n tr ie s  re g a rd in g  
th e ir  d e v e lo p m e n t level. F isc a l tr a n s fe r  system s m u s t th e re fo re  p e r fo rm  a 
tw o fo ld  fu n c tio n . F ir s t ,  th e y  m u s t r ig h t th e  v e rtic a l im b a la n c e s  b e tw e e n  
th e  in co m e  a n d  e x p e n d itu re  o f  d iffe ren t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  th e  
c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  ta x  re v e n u e s  in  th e  c e n tra l  a d m in is tra t io n . S eco n d , th ey  
m u s t r e d is tr ib u te  re so u rc e s  b e tw een  te r r ito r ie s  in  o rd e r  to  re so lv e  h o r iz o n ­
ta l  im b a la n c e s  a n d  th e re b y  p ro v id e  e q u a li ty  o f  r ig h ts  (A h m a d  a n d  C ra ig , 
1997). T h e  m o re  d e c e n tra liz e d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t fu n c t io n s  vis-à-vis r e d is ­
tr ib u tiv e  o b jec tiv es  (h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a tio n , fo r  ex am p le ) th e  g re a te r  th e  
ro le  tra n s fe rs  sh o u ld  p la y . T h is  sec tio n  w ill b r in g  so m e  o f  th e  a rg u m e n ts  
ra ise d  ea rlie r  to  b e a r  u p o n  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem s, soc ia l p o lic ie s  a n d  th e ir  lin k s  
w ith  e ffo rts  to  b u ild  g re a te r  so c ia l c o h esio n .
Difficulties Arising from Extreme Territorial Disparities
G iv e n  th e  w ay  in  w h ich  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesse s  a re  im p le m e n te d , 
th e ir  im p a c t o n  so c ia l c o h e s io n  c a n  h a rd ly  be  assessed  w ith o u t c o n s id e r­
in g  f in an c ia l t r a n s fe r  sch em es b e tw een  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t. I n  th e o ry , 
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e sse s  o p e ra te  u n d e r  d iffe ren t m o d a lit ie s  d e p e n d ­
in g  o n  th e  p u rp o s e  fo r  w h ic h  th e y  a re  c re a te d . L ev e lin g  tra n s fe r s  ( th o se  
a im e d  a t  re d u c in g  d isp a rit ie s  b e tw een  d iffe ren t s ta te s ’ f in an c ia l c a p a c i­
ties  to  p ro v id e  p u b lic  g o o d s  a n d  c a rry  o u t  o th e r  s u b n a t io n a l fu n c tio n s )  
g en e ra lly  ta k e  th e  fo rm  o f  u n c o n d it io n a l schem es. T h e  re la tiv e  size o f  
th ese  tra n s fe rs  in d ic a te s  th e  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ d eg ree  o f  a u to n o m y  a n d , 
a t  th e  sam e tim e , defines th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  m o d a li ty  th r o u g h  w h ich  
s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  m a y  receive  h ig h e r  levels o f  f in a n c in g  w ith o u t 
c h a n g in g  th e ir  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p o w ers . T h is  is p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t  in  
fed e ra l c o u n tr ie s , w h o se  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a re  m o re  a u to n o m o u s . 
F ro m  th e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  p o in t  o f  view , th e  p ro b le m  w ith  th e se  sy s tem s 
is th a t  th e y  m a k e  e n d o g e n o u s  tra n s fe rs  to  in c rea se s  in  ta x  co lle c tio n  a n d  
th e re fo re  in t ro d u c e  a  h eav ily  p ro -cy c lic a l e lem en t in to  s u b n a t io n a l  sp e n d ­
ing . P o litic a l sc ien tis ts , m o re o v e r , a rg u e  th a t  re so u rc e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem s 
e n c o u ra g e  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  c lien te lis t n e tw o rk s  w ith in  s u b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts  (L a rd o n e , 2004) a n d  e ro d e  in cen tiv es  to  co lle c t tax e s  o f  th e ir  
o w n , th u s  re p lic a tin g  th e  re n t-se e k in g  s i tu a t io n s  c o m m o n  in  s ta te s  w h o se  
fin an c in g  co m es f ro m  n a tu r a l  re so u rce s  (G e rv a so n i, 2010).
A  n u m b e r  o f  case  s tu d ie s  c o n d u c te d  in  th e  L a tin  A m erican , c o u n tr ie s 8 
se rved  as a  b a s is  o n  w h ic h  to  a t te m p t a  c la s s if ic a tio n  o f  tr a n s fe r  system s:
•  Revenue sharing between the national level and intermediate govern­
ment levels T h is  o c c u rs  in  fed e ra l c o u n tr ie s  su c h  as A rg e n tin a ,
F iscal decentralization 5 7
w h ere  th e re  is n o  sy s tem  o f  a u to m a tic  tra n s fe rs  to  m u n ic ip a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts .
•  Revenue sharing between the national level and different subnational 
government levels In  B raz il, tra n s fe r s  a re  m a d e  to  b o th  s ta te s  a n d  
m u n ic ip a litie s .
•  Revenue sharing between intermediate and municipal government 
levels T h ese  a re  p a r t ic u la r ly  im p o r ta n t  w h e re  c e n tra l g o v e rn ­
m e n ts  d o  n o t  m a k e  d ire c t  tr a n s fe r s  to  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts , su ch  a s  in  
A rg e n tin a .
•  System s that include revenues from  natural resources In  M ex ico  
a n d  P e ru , fo r  ex a m p le , th e  d is tr ib u tio n  in c lu d es  re so u rc e s  th a t  a re  
n o t  specifica lly  ta x  b a se d  (m in in g , h y d ro c a rb o n s , fo re s try ) .
•  System s with exceptions In  H o n d u ra s ,  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  w h ich  ben e fit 
f ro m  p o r t  a c tiv ity  a re  ex c lu d e d  f ro m  c e r ta in  tra n s fe rs , a s  a  w ay  o f  
p ro m o tin g  re s o u rc e  leveling .
•  Horizontal revenue sharing A n  e x a m p le  is th e  M u n ic ip a l C o m m o n  
F u n d  (F C M ) o f  C h ile .
•  Revenue sharing with entities other than subnational govern­
ments T h e se  u su a lly  a rise  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  e ffo rts  to  o v e rco m e  
fiscal c o n s tra in ts . F o r  ex am p le , re so u rc e s  a re  sh a re d  w ith  a  n u m b e r  
o f  b o d ie s  in  A rg e n tin a  a n d  w ith  u n iv e rs itie s  in  B o liv ia  (P lu r in a t io n a l 
S ta te  of).
•  Sharing o f  funds fro m  non-tax sources F o r  ex am p le , th e  d is tr ib u ­
tio n  o f  fu n d s  a r is in g  f ro m  d e b t re lie f  a r r a n g e m e n ts  b e tw e e n  B o liv ia  
(P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f) a n d  th e  In te rn a t io n a l  M o n e ta ry  F u n d  
( IM F ).
T h e  v a r io u s  tr a n s fe r  m o d a lit ie s  a rise  fro m  th e  c o u n tr ie s ’ d iffe ren t e ffo rts  
to  level th e  p ro v is io n  o f  p u b lic  g o o d s  a n d  serv ices th r o u g h o u t  th e ir  te r r i ­
to r ie s . T h e re  a re  se r io u s  b a rr ie rs  to  th e  ach ie v e m e n t o f  th a t  a im , h o w ev er. 
T h e  g re a te s t o n e , a s  seen  b e fo re , is th e  sh ee r m a g n itu d e  o f  th e  d is p a r i­
ties. T h is  is n o t  to  say  th a t  tra n s fe rs  d o  n o t  h a v e  a  leve ling  effect; r a th e r ,  
th e ir  effect is o n ly  p a r t ia l .  I n  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  la rg e  te r r i to r ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t 
d isp a rit ie s , th e  im p a c t o f  leve ling  tra n s fe rs  is l im ite d  b y  th e  d ev e lo p e d  
re g io n s ’ w illin g n ess  to  ced e  re so u rc e s . I t  c o u ld  b e  sa id  th a t  th e se  re g io n s  
c h o o se  ( th ro u g h  th e  d e c is io n -m a k in g  m e c h a n ism s  in  e a c h  case) h o w  m u c h  
in te rn a l so c ia l c o h e s io n  to  fo rg o  in  th e  in te re s t o f  g re a te r  c o h e s io n  n a t io n ­
w ide. O fte n , sh o r tc o m in g s  in  te r r i to r ia l  c o h e s io n , c o m b in e d  w ith  a  deg ree  
o f  fa c to r  m o b ility , e n c o u ra g e  m ig ra t io n  to  th e  m o re  d e v e lo p e d  reg io n s . 
A lth o u g h  th is  m a y  re d u c e  so m e  g a p s , it a lso  m a k e s  th e  la t te r  reg io n s  less 
w illing  to  tr a n s fe r  re so u rc e s  to  in c rea se  te r r i to r ia l  c o h e s io n  c o u n try w id e .
A  se c o n d  fa c to r  (w h ich  is re la te d  b u t  h a s  t r a i ts  th a t  set it  a p a r t )  d e riv es
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fro m  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  g re a te r  e q u ity  a n d  soc ia l c o h e s io n  
re q u ire s  p u b lic  p o lic ie s  th a t  c a n n o t  b e  f in a n c e d  a c ro s s  th e  b o a rd ,  m a k in g  
re g io n a l r e d is tr ib u t io n  a n  in c o m p le te  so lu tio n . T h e  p ro b le m  is n o t  o n ly  
a  f in an c ia l o ne : m a n a g e m e n t a n d  a d m in is tra t iv e  c a p a b ilit ie s  a n d  o th e r  
ty p es  o f  c a p a c itie s  a re  a lso  h ig h ly  un ev en . T h is  is w h y  th e  re s o u rc e  tr a n s fe r  
sy s tem s d e v e lo p e d  a re  n o t  in d e p e n d e n t o f  d e c e n tra liz e d  se c to ra l p o lic ies .
T h e  ro le  o f  s e c to ra l p o lic ie s  in  tr a n s fe r  system s is a p p a re n t  f ro m  a  rev iew  
o f  re so u rc e  d is tr ib u t io n  c r i te r ia . A t o n e  ex trem e  is A rg e n tin a , w h ic h  since 
1988 h a s  o p e ra te d  a  sy s tem  o f  fixed ra t io s  d e fin ed  n o t  b y  ex p lic it t e r ­
r i to r ia l  c r i te r ia , b u t b y  c r i te r ia  fo r  a llo c a tio n  b e tw een  fu n d s  fo r  specific 
p u rp o s e s  (C e trà n g o lo  a n d  J im én ez , 2004). M ex ico , co n v erse ly , c o m b in e s  
in d ic a to rs  o n  p o p u la t io n  d is tr ib u tio n  a n d  ta x  c o lle c tio n  f ro m  th e  d iffe ren t 
reg io n s . G u a te m a la  uses a  s ligh tly  m o re  c o m p lex  schem e, w ith  d iffe ren t 
d is tr ib u tio n  seg m en ts  b e in g  a llo c a te d  in  e q u a l p a r ts ,  b y  p o p u la t io n , by  
p e r  c a p ita  in co m e , b y  th e  n u m b e r  o f  v illages a n d  h a m le ts , a n d  b y  inverse  
p r o p o r t io n  to  m u n ic ip a l p e r  c a p ita  in co m e . P e ru  m a in ta in s  a  M u n ic ip a l 
C o m p e n sa t io n  F u n d  (F O N C O M Ú N ) w h ich  d is tr ib u te s  re so u rce s  fro m  
d iffe ren t ta x e s  b e tw e e n  p ro v in c ia l a n d  d is tr ic t m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a c c o rd in g  
to  a  la rg e  a r r a y  o f  in d ic a to rs , w hile  a lso  d if fe re n tia tin g  b e tw een  ru ra l  a n d  
u rb a n  m u n ic ip a litie s . H o n d u ra s  h a s  a  m u c h  s im p le r sy s tem , in  w h ich  d is ­
tr ib u t io n  is b a se d  o n  tw o  c rite r ia : e q u a l p a r ts  a n d  n u m b e r  o f  in h a b i ta n ts .  
In  c o n tra s t , so m e  sch em es, in  th e  c o n te x t o f  w h a t is re fe rre d  to  a s  th e  ‘th i rd  
w ave  o f  d e c e n tra liz in g  re fo rm s ’ a ffo rd  m o re  a t te n t io n  to  th e  o b jec tiv e s  o f  
d e c e n tra liz e d  s e c to ra l p o lic ie s  a n d  th e ir  im p a c t o n  so c ia l c o h e s io n , a s  w ill 
b e  seen  b e lo w . F ir s t,  h o w ev e r, a  s h o r t  d iscu ss io n  o n  soc ia l c o h e s io n  in  
L a tin  A m e ric a  fo llow s.
How Does Decentralization Relate to Social Cohesion?
I t  is n o  sim p le  m a t te r  to  assess soc ia l c o h e s io n  in  e a c h  c o u n try . I t  is d if­
ficu lt in d eed  to  re d u c e  soc ia l c o h e s io n  to  a  single d im e n s io n  o r  to  ex p ress  
it  a s  a  sy n th e tic  in d ic a to r . O n  th e  c o n tra ry , th e  essence  o f  so c ia l c o h e s io n  
is th e  b a la n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  b e h a v io r  a n d  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  a  so c ie ty  a n d  th a t  
o f  its  e co n o m y  o v era ll. T h u s , c o h e s io n  c a n  h a rd ly  en su e  f ro m  a n y  p o licy  
in  iso la tio n , h o w e v e r  sw eep ing . In s te a d , it m u s t re f lec t th e  d if fe re n t ty p es  
o f  in e q u ity , c a p a c itie s , access to  o p p o r tu n it ie s  c o n d it io n s  a n d  e x c lu s io n  
f ro m  th e m  a n d , in  g en e ra l, th e  eco n o m ic , soc ia l a n d  c u ltu ra l r ig h ts  o f  all 
a  c o u n tr y ’s c itizens .
D e c e n tra l iz a t io n  p ro cesse s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  th e  C a r ib b e a n  
o fte n  ta k e  a s  re fe ren ce  th e  ex p e rien ce  o f  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s , e spec ia lly  
E u ro p e a n  c o u n tr ie s  a n d  C a n a d a . L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  c e r ta in  
tr a its  th a t  a ffec t th e  d y n a m ic s  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  th a t  se t th e m  a p a r t
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f ro m  th e  re s t o f  th e  w o rld . O n e  o f  th e  m a in  d ifficu lties w ith  th e  d esig n  o f  
p u b lic  p o lic ie s  in  th e  re g io n  h a s  b een  th e  fa c t th a t  it h a s  b een  t r e a te d  as 
h o m o g e n e o u s , w ith  a  te n d e n c y  to  a p p ly  c e r ta in  p re s c r ip t io n s  re g a rd le ss  o f  
th e  specific tr a i ts  o f  e a c h  te r r ito ry . T h is  h a s  e m erg ed  s tro n g ly  in  th e  d e b a te  
o n  th e  v ir tu e s  a n d  d ifficu lties o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . In  o th e r  w o rd s , w hile  
th e  w h o le  re g io n  d o e s  h a v e  so m e  sh a re d  c h a ra c te r is tic s , th e  p a r t ic u la r it ie s  
a n d  h e te ro g e n e itie s  o f  e a c h  c o u n try  a n d  te r r i to ry  m u s t a lso  b e  reco g n ized .
T h e  d iffe rences b e tw e e n  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  th e  d e v e lo p e d  w o rld  a re  
o f  p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t  f o r  th e  issues a d d re s se d  he re . T o  an a ly z e  th e m , a  
n u m b e r  o f  in d ic a to r s  w ere  b o r ro w e d  f ro m  th e  System  o f  Indicators fo r  
Monitoring Social Cohesion in Latin America  (E C L A C /E U R O so c iA L , 
2007): d is ta n c e , in s ti tu t io n a l in c lu s io n -e x c lu s io n  m e c h a n ism s  a n d  sense 
o f  b e lo n g in g .
T h e  d is ta n c e  c o m p o n e n t in c lu d es  th e  o u tc o m e s , o r  v is ib le  e x p re ss io n s , 
o f  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  in c lu s io n -e x c lu s io n  m e c h a n ism s  a n d  re fe rs  to  th e  
m a te r ia l  c o n d it io n s  o f  th e  g ro u p s  a n d  c o m m u n itie s  ex c lu d e d  f ro m  p a r t ic i­
p a t io n  in  life -su s ta in in g  soc ia l a c tiv itie s , th e  exerc ise  o f  th e ir  fu n d a m e n ta l  
r ig h ts  a n d  access to  re so u rc e s  a n d  o p p o r tu n it ie s  n e e d e d  fo r  th e  d e v e lo p ­
m e n t o f  th e ir  p o te n t ia l .  T h e  d im e n s io n s  o f  th e  c o m p o n e n t c o n s id e re d  h e re  
in c lu d e  in d ic a to r s  o f  p o v e rty , e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth , w h ich  a re  fo u n d  to  
be  c lo se ly  tied  to  serv ices h eav ily  a ffec ted  b y  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesses . 
A lth o u g h  th e  in d ic a to r s  u se d  fo r  p o v e r ty  a n d  h e a lth  a re  th e  u su a l ones 
(p o p u la tio n  be lo w  th e  p o v e r ty  line  a n d  ch ild  m o r ta lity ) , th e  in d ic a to r  
u se d  fo r  e d u c a t io n  is e n ro lm e n t in  p re s c h o o l e d u c a t io n , since  th is  v a ria b le  
c le a rly  d iffe ren tia te s  th e  cases  s tu d ie d  a n d  reflec ts re c e n t e ffo rts  to  e x p a n d  
th e  c o v e ra g e  o f  e d u c a t io n  sy s tem s a t  e a r lie r  ages.
In s t i tu t io n a l  in c lu s io n -e x c lu s io n  m e c h a n ism s  re fe r to  th o s e  a c tio n s  
c a rr ie d  o u t b y  v a r io u s  in s ti tu t io n a l a c to r s  th a t  m a y  h a v e  a n  effect u p o n  th e  
s t ru c tu re  o f  o p p o r tu n it ie s , th e  a c c u m u la tio n  o f  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d is a d v a n ­
tag es , a n d  p ro ce sse s  a n d  o u tc o m e s  o f  in c lu s io n -e x c lu s io n . T h e  d iffe ren t 
d im e n s io n s  o f  th e se  in s t i tu t io n a l  m e c h a n ism s  o p e ra te  th ro u g h  th e  d e m o ­
c ra t ic  sy s tem  a n d  th e  ru le  o f  law  (f ig h tin g  c o r ru p tio n , e q u ity  in  th e  a d m in ­
is tr a t io n  o f  ju s tic e  a n d  h u m a n  se c u r ity  p o lic ie s ), p o lic ie s  a n d  m a rk e ts . T h e  
in d ic a to r  u se d  in  th is  c ase  w as  th e  F re e d o m  H o u se  in d e x .9
L as tly , th e  sense  o f  b e lo n g in g  c o m p o n e n t in c lu d e s  all th o s e  p s y c h o s o ­
c ia l a n d  c u ltu ra l  e x p re s s io n s  th a t  sh o w  th e  d eg rees  o f  p e o p le ’s lin k ag es  
a n d  id e n tif ic a tio n  w ith  so c ie ty  a s  a  w h o le  a n d  th e  g ro u p s  th a t  c o m p rise  
it. T h ese  b o n d s  fo rm  th e  b a s ic  g lue th a t  k eep s  so c ie ty  to g e th e r  a n d , a t  th e  
sam e  tim e , th e y  in flu en ce  th e  w ays in  w h ic h  d if fe re n t a c to r s  re s p o n d  to  th e  
specific m o d a lit ie s  o f  in c lu s io n -e x c lu s io n . T h e  d im e n s io n s  o f  th e  sense  o f  
b e lo n g in g  c o m p o n e n t a re  m u ltic u ltu ra lism  a n d  n o n -d is c r im in a tio n , so c ia l 
c a p ita l ( in fo rm a l so c ia l n e tw o rk s , co n fid en ce  a n d  p a r t ic ip a tio n ) ,  p ro s o c ia l
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Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data from the OECD, ECLAC, 
CEPALSTAT (http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and 
Cetràngolo (2007b).
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v a lu e s  a n d  so lid a r ity , fu tu re  e x p e c ta tio n s  a n d  p ro s p e c ts  o f  so c ia l m o b ili ty , 
a n d  sense o f  in te g ra t io n  a n d  soc ia l a ffilia tio n . O w in g  to  th e  la c k  o f  c o m p a ­
ra b le  in fo rm a t io n  fo r  th e se  a rea s , n o  in d ic a to r  w as c a lc u la te d  fo r  sense  o f  
b e lo n g in g  a t  th is  in itia l p o in t .  T h is  is n o t  to  d en y , h o w e v e r, th a t  th e  sense 
o f  b e lo n g in g  to  a  sing le  n a t io n  a m o n g  th e  in h a b i ta n ts  o f  d iffe ren t te r r i to ­
ries is im p o r ta n t  fo r  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n s  se t fo r th  here .
T a k in g  a s  a  re fe ren ce  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s  o f  E u ro p e ,10 a n d  th e  d iffe ren t 
d im en s io n s  id en tif ied , b y  c o m p a r iso n , L a tin  A m e ric a  sh o w s w o rse  in d ic a ­
to rs , o n  av e ra g e , fo r  d e m o c ra c y , p o v e rty , ch ild  m o r ta l i ty  a n d  e d u c a tio n . 
T h is  in d ic a te s  lo w e r levels o f  w ell-b e in g  a n d  d ra w s  a t te n t io n  to  th e  n eed  
fo r  p u b lic  p o lic ie s  fo r  in c re a s in g  eq u ity . A lth o u g h  th e  d e m o c ra c ie s  o f  th e  
L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  co m e  a  lo n g  w ay  in  p ro c e d u ra l  a sp ec ts , 
b as ica lly  in  th e  e le c to ra l s p h e re ,11 th e y  re m a in  m o re  w eak ly  d ev e lo p e d  
th a n  th o se  o f  E u ro p e a n  c o u n tr ie s . C o n v erse ly , w ith  re g a rd  to  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n , if  th e  r a t io  o f  p u b lic  sp en d in g  m a n a g e d  b y  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n t to  to ta l  p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  e a c h  c o u n try  is ta k e n  as  a n  in d ic a to r ,  th e  
av e rag e  level in  b o th  reg io n s  m a sk s  su ch  la rg e  in te rn a l d iffe ren ces th a t  it  is 
h a r d  to  say  w h ich  is m o re  d ec e n tra liz e d . F ig u re  3.5 su m m arize s  th e  in fo r ­
m a tio n  o n  th e  se lec ted  in d ic a to r s  a n d  h e lp s  fo rm  a  p ic tu re  o f  th e  c o n c e p t 
o f  soc ia l c o h e s io n  a n d  d eg ree  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n .
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Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis o f ECLAC, CEPALSTAT (http://websie.
eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and Cetràngolo (2007b).
Figure 3.6 Group A: close to the regional average
T h e  h e te ro g e n e ity  o f  s i tu a t io n s  w ith in  th e  re g io n  is il lu s tra te d  w ith  g ra p h ic  
re p re se n ta t io n s  o f  th e se  in d ic a to r s  fo r  sev e ra l L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s , 
classified  in  five g ro u p s :
•  Cases closest to the regional average (A )  P e ru  is th e  c o u n try  
c lo sest to  th e  re g io n a l a v e rag e , w h e re a s  B raz il sh o w s a  g re a te r  
d eg ree  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  M ex ico  h a s  a  p a r t ic u la r ly  h ig h  ra te  
o f  e n ro lm e n t in  p re s c h o o l e d u c a t io n  (F ig u re  3.6).
•  Lowest level o f  decentralization and poorest social cohesion indi­
cators (B )  T h is  re fe rs  to  th e  C e n tra l  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  s u r ­
veyed  (G u a te m a la , H o n d u ra s  a n d  N ic a ra g u a )  w h ic h  a re  sm a lle r  
a n d  h av e  a  lo w e r level o f  d e v e lo p m e n t (ex p la in in g  th e ir  lesser 
d e c e n tra liz a tio n )  (F ig u re  3.7).
•  Low level o f  decentralization and high level o f  social cohesion
(C )  U ru g u a y  a n d  C h ile  a re  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  a  u n i ta ry  o rg a n i­
z a tio n  a n d  a  lo n g  h is to ry  o f  p u b lic  p o lic ie s  a im e d  a t  im p ro v in g  
so c ia l c o h e s io n , a l th o u g h  th e re  a re  m a rk e d  d iffe ren ces b e tw e e n  th e  
tw o . T h ese  a re  th e  cases  c lo ses t to  th e  E u ro p e a n  re fe ren ce  g ro u p  
(F ig u re  3.8).
•  High level o f  decentralization and good social cohesion indicators
(D )  A rg e n tin a  is th e  ex am p le  o f  a  fe d e ra l c o u n try  w ith  a  re la tiv e ly  
h ig h  level o f  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t in  th e  reg io n . T h is  ca se  a lso  co m es 
c lose  to  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  th e  E u ro p e a n  c o u n tr ie s  (F ig u re  3.9).
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Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of ECLAC, CEPALSTAT (http://websie. 
eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and Cetràngolo (2007b).
Figure 3.7 Group B: low level o f  both decentralization and social cohesion
Decentralization
Democracy index
Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of ECLAC, CEPALSTAT (http://websie. 
eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and Cetràngolo (2007b).
Figure 3.8 Group C: low level o f  decentralization and high level o f  social 
cohesion






Sources: Prepared by the authors, on the basis o f ECLAC, CEPALSTAT (http://websie. 
eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=l), and Cetràngolo (2007b).
Figure 3.9 Groups D  and E: high level o f  decentralization and different
levels o f  social cohesion (high in Group D and low in Group E )
•  High level o f  decentralization and poor social cohesion indicators
(E ) C o lo m b ia  (F ig u re  3.9).
T h is  in fo rm a t io n  w o u ld  seem  to  in d ic a te  th a t  n o  c lea r re la tio n  ex ists  
b e tw een  th e  d if fe re n t in d ic a to r s  e x a m in e d  a n d  th e  d e p th  o f  fiscal d e c e n ­
tr a liz a tio n . In  a n y  e v e n t, th e  d iffe ren t d eg rees  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  co ex is t 
w ith  a  b ro a d  ra n g e  o f  s t ru c tu ra l  s i tu a t io n s  in  w h ich  i t  is d ifficu lt to  e s ta b ­
lish  a n y  c le a r  c a u sa lity . I n  L a tin  A m e ric a , a t  le a s t, th e  ch o ice  o f  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n  m u s t b e  a sse ssed  in  th e  lig h t o f  e a c h  c o u n tr y ’s p o lic ie s  re g a rd in g  its 
te r r i to r ia l  d isp a ritie s . T h is  le ad s  to  a  d e b a te  o n  th e  ro le  o f  c e n tra l g o v e rn ­
m e n t a n d  c o m p e n s a to ry  se c to ra l p o lic ies , w h ich  w ill b e  d iscu ssed  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  su b se c tio n .
Towards Greater Social Cohesion with Decentralized Public Policies
T h e  p re v io u s  s u b s e c tio n  sh o w ed  th a t  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  d o es  n o t  ex p la in  th e  
g re a te r  o r  lesser d eg ree  o f  so c ia l c o h e s io n  in  th e  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s . 
I f  th e  a im  o f  p u b lic  p o lic ies  is to  ach iev e  so c ia lly  m o re  co h esiv e  socie ties 
o n  th e  b a s is  o f  e q u a l r ig h ts , th e n  th e  d e c e n tra liz e d  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  p u b lic  
p o lic ie s  m u s t be  v iew ed  as fo rm in g  th e  sp o k e s  o f  se c to ra l p o lic ies , w h ich  
m u s t, in  tu rn , b e  red e f in ed  b e a r in g  in  m in d  tw o  c o n s tra in ts . F ir s t,  th e  
p ro b le m s  set o u t  h e re  c o n c e rn in g  te r r i to r ia l  d isp a ritie s . S eco n d , th e  fa c t
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th a t  soc ia l p o licy  fo rm u la t io n  is u n d e rg o in g  d eep  re fo rm  in  th e  reg io n , 
espec ia lly  a f te r  th e  e x h a u s t io n  o f  th e  o ld  w e lfa re  s ta te  m o d e l. A lth o u g h  
th is  su b jec t fa lls  o u ts id e  th e  a n a ly s is  u n d e r ta k e n  h e re , so m e  e lem en ts  o f  
th a t  d e b a te  h av e  a n  im p a c t o n  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in  lig h t o f  se c to ra l p o licy  
re fo rm u la tio n  a n d  m u s t b e  c o n s id e re d  a c co rd in g ly .
T h e  m o s t re c e n t re fo rm s  to  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e sse s  h av e  ta k e n  in to  
a c c o u n t -  m o re  o r  less a c ro s s  th e  b o a rd  a n d  som e m o re  ex p lic itly  th a n  
o th e rs  -  th e  d e m a n d s  im p o se d  b y  th e  p a r t ic u la r  r a t io n a le  o f  e a c h  se c to ­
ra l  p o licy . T h e  p ro c e ss  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  itse lf  h a s  h a n d e d  d o w n  m a jo r  
le sso n s  in  th is  re g a rd . In  so m e  sec to rs , th e  d ec is io n  to  d e c e n tra liz e  h a s  
b een  ta k e n  fo llo w in g  a n  an a ly s is  o f  te c h n ic a l, e c o n o m ic  a n d  in s ti tu t io n a l 
o p e ra t io n , id e n tify in g  a lte rn a tiv e s  fo r  r e d is tr ib u t in g  te r r i to r ia l  c o m p e ­
tences a n d  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  d iffe ren t p h a se s  a n d  segm en ts  
o f  th e  p ro c e ss  (p la n n in g , re g u la tio n , fin an c in g , o p e ra t io n , sca ling , a n d  so 
o n ), b u t  in  o th e r s  th is  h a s  n o t  h a p p e n e d  (E C L A C , 2009).
M a n y  o f  th e  re fo rm s  h a v e  c o n d itio n a lit ie s  b u il t  in to  tra n s fe r s  b e tw een  
d iffe ren t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t. By itse lf, h o w ev e r, c o n d it io n a l i ty  offers 
n o  g u a ra n te e  o f  s tre n g th e n in g  se c to ra l p o licy : it  is in c re a s in g ly  c lea r th a t  
th e  specific o p e ra t in g  ra t io n a le  a n d  d iffe ren t c o m p o n e n ts  a n d  d im e n ­
s ions o f  p o lic ies , as w ell a s  th e  m o s t d e s ira b le  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  te r r i to r ia l  
co m p e te n c e s  a n d  re sp o n s ib ilitie s , m u s t be  ca re fu lly  th o u g h t  o u t in  o rd e r  
to  im p ro v e  th e  im p a c t o f  p u b lic  po lic ie s  a n d  e n h a n c e  th e i r  efficiency. T h e  
tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  th a t  a c c o m p a n ie s  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  a  serv ice m u s t, 
in  sh o r t, be  p a r t  o f  th e  re fo rm  itse lf  -  n o t  a  w ay  o f  c o m p e n s a tin g  fo r  its  
effects. I t  is, th e re fo re , v e ry  im p o r ta n t  to  c o n tro l  th e  seq u en ce  in  w h ich  
p ro cesse s  o c c u r .12 In  p ra c tic e , th e  ex p e rien ce  o f  th e  r e g io n  h a s  n o t  b een  
p a r t ic u la r ly  e n c o u ra g in g  in  th is  reg a rd .
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
T h e  b r ie f  a c c o u n t o f  th e  d iffe ren t ty p es  o f  tr a n s fe r s  b e tw e e n  levels o f  g o v ­
e rn m e n t a n d  th e ir  c o n d itio n a lit ie s  is in te n d e d  to  p ro v id e  a  fin a l lin k  in  th e  
a rg u m e n t fo r  th e  n eed  to  re d re ss  th e  r e g io n ’s fa ilu re s  in  te rm s  o f  te r r i to r ia l  
im b a la n c e s  a n d  th e i r  im p a c t o n  e q u a lity  o f  r ig h ts  a n d  so c ia l c o h e s io n . T h e  
p o in t  h e re  is th a t  i f  th ese  p ro b le m s  a re  to  be e ffec tive ly  ta c k le d , d e c e n ­
tra liz a tio n  sh o u ld  n o t  b e  th e  m a in  c o n c e rn  o f  p u b lic  p o lic y  re fo rm  effo rts . 
In s te a d , g iven  th e  n eed  fo r  p o lic ies  to  im p ro v e  in co m e  d is tr ib u t io n  (a m o n g  
o th e r  d e m a n d s ) , so c ia l p o lic ie s  s h o u ld  b e  red e fin ed  w ith  a  h e a v y  em p h as is  
o n  th e  ro le  to  b e  p la y e d  b y  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n ts . In  th is  a p p ro a c h  to  th e  
p ro b le m , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  s h o u ld  b e  v iew ed  o n ly  a s  a n  in s ti tu t io n a l c o n ­
s id e ra tio n  o r  a  m e a n s  o f  o rg a n iz a tio n  u se d  to  e n h a n c e  se c to ra l p o licy . T h e
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sam e  goes fo r t r a n s fe r  schem es, w h ich  m u s t b e  in c o rp o ra te d  in to  se c to ra l 
p o lic y  design .
F o r  ex am p le ,
A  strategy to  achieve equality in education m ust give priority  to  expanding 
the coverage o f preschool education and lengthening the school day in public 
schools, im proving secondary com pletion rates in socio-econom ic sectors with 
low er achievem ent levels . . . and  reducing the learning and  knowledge gaps 
built up  over the education  cycle. (EC LA C , 2010, p. 207)
T h is  re q u ire s  a  re d e f in itio n  o f  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  sch o o l a n d  o f  th e  e d u c a ­
t io n  sy s tem  o v e ra ll, in  w h ich  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  re s o u rc e  tr a n s fe r  
in v o lv ed  c a n n o t b e  t r e a te d  a s  se p a ra te  po lic ies .
C o n v e rse ly , w ith  re g a rd  to  h e a lth  sy s tem  re fo rm , th e  re g io n  m u s t 
c o m b a t  f r a g m e n ta tio n  a n d  e n su re  b ro a d  a n d  e g a li ta r ia n  access to  h e a lth  
serv ices, p ro v id in g  th e  p o p u la t io n  w ith  ex p lic it g u a ra n te e s  re g a rd le ss  o f  
in c o m e  level a n d  a re a  o f  re s id en ce . T o  m a k e  th is  p o ss ib le , a s  w ell a s  c o o r ­
d in a t in g  th e  p u b lic  a n d  so c ia l secu rity  su b se c to rs  (a n d  p ro p e r ly  re g u la tin g  
p ro v is io n  by  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r) , c o u n tr ie s  m u s t set u p  h e a lth -c a re  n e t­
w o rk s  in  w h ich  s u b n a t io n a l te r r i to r ie s  (w h e th e r th e  sy s tem  is d ec e n tra liz e d  
o r  n o t)  a re  in  c o m m u n ic a t io n  w ith  e a c h  o th e r  a n d  tig h tly  in te rc o n n e c te d . 
H e re , e a c h  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t h a s  d iffe ren t re sp o n s ib ilitie s  a n d  th e  c a tc h ­
m e n t a re a s  o f  p a r t ic u la r  h e a lth  fac ilitie s  m a y  n o t  co in c id e  w ith  p o litic a l 
ju r is d ic tio n s  o r  w ith  sch o o l c a tc h m e n t a rea s .
T h e se  ta s k s  in  th e  a re a s  o f  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  a re  ju s t  so m e  ex am p les  
in  w h ic h  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is o n ly  p a r t  o f  th e  p ro b le m  th a t  n eed s  to  be  
so lv ed  to  im p ro v e  so c ia l co h es io n . U n lik e  m a n y  d iscu ss io n s  o n  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n , th is  c h a p te r  h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  p a r t ic u la r  a t te n t io n  m u s t b e  a f fo rd e d  
to  th e  ro le  p la c e d  b y  th e  n a t io n a l  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t. T h is  is th e  level 
w h ic h  m u s t ta k e  m e a su re s  to  c o m p e n s a te  fo r  d iffe rences b e tw e e n  reg io n s , 
e n su re  b a s ic  th r e sh o ld s  fo r  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  c e r ta in  serv ices a n d  c o o rd i­
n a te  p u b lic  po lic ie s  w h ich  h a v e  a  sh a re d  ax is, a lb e it  w ith  g re a te r  o r  lesser 
d eg rees  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . L a c k  o f  so c ia l c o h e s io n  a lm o s t a lw ay s lead s  
to  th e  d e g ra d a t io n  o f  h u m a n  a n d  soc ia l r ig h ts , th e  b re a k a g e  o f  e ssen tia l 
so c ia l lin k s  a n d  th e  im p o v e r ish m e n t n o t  o n ly  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l b u t  a lso  o f  
th e  re la tio n s  w h ic h  define  so c ia l p lace  a n d  id en tity .
T h e  o n ly  w ay  o f  o p tim iz in g  th e  ro le  o f  c o n d it io n a l tra n s fe rs  b e tw een  
levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t is to  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t th e  d esig n  o f  e a c h  se c to ra l 
p o licy . T ra n s fe rs  m u s t b e  c o n s is te n t w ith  p o lic ie s  im p le m e n te d  a t  th e  sec­
to r a l  level. T h is  is esp ec ia lly  tr u e  in  v iew  o f  th e  p ro d u c tiv e  a n d  te r r i to r ia l  
in e q u a lit ie s  ty p ic a l o f  th e  re g io n ’s c o u n tr ie s , th e  d iffe ren t m a n a g e m e n t a n d  
h u m a n  re so u rc e  c a p a c itie s  o f  e a c h  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  th e  c o m p e tin g  te n s io n s
6 6 D ecentralization  and reform  in L atin A m erica
im p o se d  o n  th e  fisca l a c c o u n ts  b y  d iffe ren t p u b lic  p o lic y  o b jec tiv es . T h e  
a c tio n  o f  tra n s fe rs  a lo n e  c a n n o t  p o ss ib ly  re so lv e  a ll th e se  d ifficu lties.
W h ere  th ese  te n s io n s  ex is t, th e  h e a r t  o f  th e  m a t te r  in  soc ia l p o licy  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is f in d in g  a  fo rm u la  to  m a k e  th e  d if fe re n t o b jec tiv es 
co m p a tib le , a n d  it  c a n n o t b e  a ssu m e d  th a t  a ll th e se  o b jec tiv e s  w ill n ece s­
sa r ily  b e  m e t s im u lta n e o u s ly . U n le ss  c a re  is ta k e n  in  th e  d esig n  o f  such  
re fo rm s  a n d  d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  te n s io n s  in  e a c h  case , th e  
s o lu tio n  m a y  c re a te  a d d it io n a l fiscal p re s su re s  a n d  th e  in c re a se d  d e m a n d  
fo r  fiscal re so u rc e s  m a y  g e n e ra te  new  te n s io n s  o r  fu e l ex is tin g  ones. T h is  
w o u ld  seem  to  b e  th e  id e a l p la c e  fo r  a  d iscu ss io n  o f  th e  c o m b in e d  im p a c ts  
o n  so c ia l c o h e s io n  a n d  fiscal su s ta in a b ili ty . I t  m ig h t b e  sa id  th a t  i f  soc ia l 
c o h e s io n  d e p e n d s  o n  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  a  sh a re d  a im  in  w h ic h  th e  d iffe ren t 
m e m b e rs  o f  a  d e m o c ra tic  so c ie ty  feel in c lu d e d , th e n  fiscal co h e re n c e  is 
n ece ssa ry  to  m a k e  th e  a im  su s ta in a b le .
L astly , it is im p o r ta n t  n o t  to  t r e a t  th e  m a p  o f  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  o f  th e  d if ­
fe re n t g o v e rn m e n t levels a s  a n  in a lte ra b le  te m p la te  o f  re fo rm  dec is io n s. 
T h ro u g h o u t  h is to ry , p u b lic  po lic ie s  h a v e  h a d  to  a s su m e  n ew  d e m a n d s  
w h ich  h av e  re q u ire d  p e r io d ic  rev iew s o f  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  fu n c tio n s  a n d  
re so u rc e s . L a tin  A m e ric a  i ts e lf  o ffers n o ta b le  ex am p le s  o f  th is . I l lu s tra t io n s  
h av e  b een  g iven  h e re  o f  th e  n eed  to  s u p p o r t  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  re fo rm s  
in  d e c e n tra liz e d  sy s tem s. I t  m ig h t w ell be  reca lled  th a t  in  th e  n in e te e n th  
c e n tu ry  h e a lth  c a re  w as n o t  c o n s id e re d  a  m a jo r  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  s ta te , a s  it 
c e r ta in ly  w as by  th e  e n d  o f  th e  tw e n tie th , fo llo w in g  o n  f ro m  in n o v a tio n s  
th a t  w o u ld  im p a c t g re a tly  o n  th e  p o p u la t io n ’s h e a lth  a n d  w ell-be ing . I t  
w as n o t  u n til th e  m id - tw e n tie th  c e n tu ry  th a t  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  ‘lo ca l 
h e a lth  sy s tem s’ b e g a n  to  b e  d e b a te d . L a te r , w ith  th e  e m erg en ce  o f  soc ia l 
secu rity , th e  n e e d  fo r  n ew  in f ra s tru c tu re s  a n d  -  to  c ite  a n  ex am p le  w h ich  
h a d  n o  sm all im p a c t o n  th e  p u b lic  a c c o u n ts  -  th e  o b lig a tio n  to  m ee t 
in c re a s in g  d e b t liab ilitie s , n ew  fu n c tio n s  a ro se  w h ich  o f te n  cam e  to  re s t by  
d e fa u lt o n  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t in itia lly , w ith  th e  d is c u ss io n  o n  h o w  b es t 
to  a ss ig n  th e m  b e tw e e n  d iffe ren t levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t s ta r t in g  o n ly  la te r .
T o d a y , n ew  issues m u s t b e  p la c e d  o n  th e  ta b le . N e w  schem es o f  c o n ­
d it io n a l tra n s fe rs  to  lo w -in co m e  fam ilies  d ra w  a t te n t io n  to  th e  ro le  o f  
lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts , a l th o u g h  th e ir  im p a c t o n  e q u ity  is su ch  th a t  th e y  m u s t 
c e r ta in ly  b e  f in a n c e d  ce n tra lly . M ex ico  a n d  B raz il o ffe r ex am p le s  in  th is  
a re a . In  e -g o v e rn m e n t, n ew  tec h n o lo g ie s  a re  b e in g  in c o r p o ra te d  in to  g o v ­
e rn m e n t a d m in is tra t io n , w ith  a n  im p a c t o n  tr a n s p a re n c y  (d ig ita l c ities), 
efficiency (p u b lic  p ro c u re m e n t)  a n d  so lv en cy  (ta x  a d m in is tra t io n ) ,  a n d  th is  
seem s to  be  d e v e lo p e d  in  a  h ig h e r  deg ree  in  th e  m o s t a d v a n c e d  reg io n s , 
w h ic h  is w o rse n in g  te r r i to r ia l  g aps. S o m e th in g  s im ila r h a s  o c c u rre d  w ith  
ex p e rien ces o f  lo c a l p ro d u c tiv e  d e v e lo p m e n t, in  w h ic h  successfu l cases 
o c c u r  f re q u e n tly  in  th e  m o s t a d v a n ta g e d  reg io n s . T h e se  m a t te r s  a re
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p a r t ic u la r ly  in te re s tin g  in s o fa r  as th e y  h av e  th e  p o te n t ia l  to  b eco m e  p a r t  
o f  th e  so lu tio n  o r  p a r t  o f  th e  p ro b le m  as re g a rd s  te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a litie s , 
a n d  th e y  h av e  a  g re a t  b e a r in g  o n  p o ss ib ilit ie s  o f  im p ro v in g  soc ia l c o h e ­
sion . I n  a ll th is , it m u s t  n o t  b e  fo rg o tte n  th a t  th e  ch a llen g es  L a tin  A m e ric a  
faces in  c lo s in g  g a p s  a n d  re d u c in g  in e q u a lity  m u s t be  ta c k le d  in  system ic  
a n d  m u ltid im e n s io n a l w ays th a t  a llo w  fo r  a c tio n  o n  d iffe ren t f ro n ts  o f  
d ev e lo p m en t.
NOTES
1. ‘Economic theory offers limited guidance for assigning expenditure responsibilities 
among different levels o f government’ (Ahmad and Craig, 1997, p. 25).
2. An interesting analysis o f these reforms can be found in Falleti (2009, ch. 2).
3. In 1979, a decentralization effort started in support o f democracy: elections o f munici­
pal officials were reinstated, and new areas of responsibility and authority were estab­
lished. In the late 1980s, however, this process lost credibility and, during the 1990s, 
with the return of a centralist government, the regional governorships were eliminated 
and the municipalities’ autonomy was restricted. Then, in 2001, decentralization began 
to gain m omentum once again (Flores, 2005).
4. A number o f different decentralization indicators have been tried out in recent years. 
The one used here is the most suitable for the focus in this analysis. For a discussion 
of alternative indicators, see ILPES-ECLAC (2007) and ECLAC (2010, chapter IV).
5. Besides these limitations, it should be noted that, for example, in Argentina (one of the 
first countries to decentralize education and health services), the further decentraliza­
tion of public sector expenditure has been associated with a deterioration in equality 
indicators (ECLAC, 2008).
6. The indicator used is unfortunately not ideal, due to difficulties arising from the national 
accounts of the Latin American countries. N ot all the countries keep data on subna­
tional output (very few calculate subnational revenues), they use differing methodologies 
with varying degrees of reliability, and the jurisdictions for which calculations are per­
formed are also highly diverse and depend on the institutional organization in each case.
7. Nevertheless, Shankar and Shah (2008, p. 169) offer a classification of countries by 
degree of convergence in regional income. They find Brazil, a highly decentralized 
country, to be one of the most divergent. Mexico is in an intermediate position and 
Chile (which has a low degree o f decentralization) is classified as convergent in terms of 
territorial income.
8. In particular, those conducted by the Sustainable Development and Hum an Settlements 
Division of ECLAC in the framework of the project ‘U rban poverty: an action-oriented 
strategy for urban governments and institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean’ 
(see Cetrangolo, 2007a).
9. The democracy index prepared by Freedom House summarizes average ratings gained 
by countries in an expert assessment of 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties 
questions. The assessment of political rights looks at three categories: electoral process 
(3 questions); political pluralism and participation (4); and functioning of government 
(3). The assessment o f civil liberties includes four categories: freedom of expression 
and belief (4); associational and organizational rights (4); rule of law (4); and personal 
autonomy and individual rights (4). The inverse o f the index is graphed for illustrative 
purposes. For details on the survey methodology, see http://www.freedomhouse.org.
10. This refers to EU15, that is, Austria, Belgium, Denm ark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.
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11. According to U N D P (2004) electoral democracy refers to the existence of free, competi­
tive and institutionalized elections and rules and procedures for forming and running 
a government, as the essential components of democracy and those which comprise its 
most basic sphere. But democracy is not limited to this realm either in terms of its reach 
or range of action.
12. Failed (2004) notes that the shift in the balance of power between government levels 
is highly dependent on the sequence in which administrative, fiscal and political 
decentralization is carried out.
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1 INTRODUCTION
T h e  l i te ra tu re  o n  fe d e ra lism  o fte n  ev o k es  a n  a s s o c ia tio n  b e tw een  re d e ­
m o c ra tiz a tio n  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , in  w h ic h  th e  c o n s o lid a t io n  o f  d e m o c ­
ra c y  is a s so c ia te d  w ith  a  s tre n g th e n in g  o f  fe d e ra lism  a n d  a  t r e n d  to w a rd s  
a d m in is tra tiv e , p o li tic a l a n d  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n  (S o u z a , 1999). T h e  
fa c t th a t  th is  is d r iv e n  b y  th e  n eed  to  p ro v id e  re so u rc e s  a n d  su p p ly  b e tte r -  
q u a li ty  p u b lic  serv ices, m a k e s  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  soc ia l sp e n d ­
in g  h ig h ly  re le v a n t. A c c o rd in g ly , th e  a im  o f  th is  c h a p te r  is to  a n a ly z e  th e  
t r e n d  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  A m e r ic a .1
S evera l L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h av e  b een  p u rs u in g  a n  in ten s iv e  
p ro c e ss  o f  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o v e r th e  la s t tw o  d ecad es; a n d , a t  th e  
sam e  tim e , a lm o s t th e  e n tire  re g io n  h a s  m a d e  c h a n g e s  to  its  so c ia l p o l i­
cies. T h ese  tw o  p ro ce sse s  reflec t, first, th e  desire  to  g e n e ra te  a llo c a tio n  
efficiency g a in s , w h ich  h a v e  a n  im p a c t o n  e x p a n d in g  th e  d e c is io n -m a k in g , 
fiscal, a n d  f in a n c ia l a u to n o m y  o f  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ; a n d , se co n d , th e  
d es ire  to  s t re n g th e n  d e m o c ra c y . T h e  la t te r  h a s  h a d  re p e rc u ss io n s  o n  socia l 
p o licy  a c tio n s  a n d  serv ices, g e n e ra tin g  b ro a d e r  c o v e ra g e  a n d  h ig h e r  m o n ­
e ta ry  benefits , to g e th e r  w ith  im p ro v e d  access , e x p a n s io n  o f  co v e rag e , a n d  
th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  ju r is d ic tio n s  a n d  re so u rce s  fo r  serv ice  p ro v is io n .
In  som e c o u n tr ie s , d e c e n tra liz a tio n  w as seen  a s  a  w ay  to  re so lv e  in s ti­
tu t io n a l  p ro b le m s  c a u se d  b y  a  lo ss  o f  re so u rc e s  a n d  th e  a b ility  o f  fed e ra l 
g o v e rn m e n ts  to  f in an ce  so c ia l p o lic ies  a n d  re s tru c tu re  serv ice p ro v is io n , 
w h ile  a t  th e  sam e  tim e  a d a p tin g  to  th e  g ro w in g  im p o r ta n c e  o f  lo ca l a re a s  
in  fe d e ra tiv e  re s o u rc e  sh a r in g  a n d  a u to n o m o u s  g o v e rn a n c e .
B esides th is , th e  d es ire  to  in c re a se  e q u ity  a n d  a llo c a tio n  efficiency h a s  
in sp ire d  n u m e ro u s  a tte m p ts  to  o rg an ize  th e  p ro v id e rs  a n d  fin an c ie rs  o f  
serv ices, w ith  a  v iew  to  im p ro v in g  th e  b a la n c e  a n d  m a tc h  b e tw een  su p p ly
70
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a n d  d e m a n d . M o v e s  h av e  a lso  b een  m a d e  to  re s tr ic t th e  sco p e  o f  d e c e n ­
tra liz e d  so c ia l p o lic ie s , w h ich , in  m a n y  cases , b e c o m e  a ss o c ia te d  w ith  p o l i ­
cies to  re d u c e  p o v e r ty  a n d  g u a ra n te e  m in im u m  ben efit p a c k a g e s  fo r  th e  
d e s titu te . In  th a t  c o n te x t, a  th o r o u g h  rev iew  o f  th e  c o n c e p t o f  u n iv e rsa lism  
is u n fo ld in g , a s  u n iv e rsa l h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  p o lic ie s  te n d  to  give w ay  to  
ta rg e te d  po lic ies .
N e ith e r  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  n o r  so c ia l p o licy  re fo rm s  h a v e  fo llo w ed  th e  
sam e  m o d e l in  a ll c o u n tr ie s , since  th e  p ro b le m s , n eed s  a n d  p re v io u s  in s ti­
tu t io n a l  h is to ry , a lo n g  w ith  c o n c e p ts  a n d  v a lu es , a re  d iffe ren t in  e ach  
socie ty . N o n e th e le s s , it  is p o ss ib le  to  an a ly z e  soc ia l p o licy  d e c e n tra liz a ­
t io n  in  se lec ted  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  b y  fo cu s in g  o n  specific issues, 
su ch  as: (a) a n  e v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  re la tio n  b e tw een  so c ia l e x p e n d itu re  a n d  
fiscal p o licy ; (b ) a  rev iew  o f  th e  im p a c t o f  so c ia l p o licy  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
o n  p o v e r ty  a n d  in c o m e  d is tr ib u tio n ; a n d  la s tly , (c) a n  a t te m p t to  id en tify  
tr e n d s  in  th e  im p a c ts  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , specifica lly  o n  p o lic ie s  su ch  as 
h e a lth , e d u c a t io n  a n d  so c ia l a ss is tan ce .
T h e  co m p lex ity  o f  so c ia l p o lic y  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  is re flec ted  in  
th e  d iv e rs ity  o f  a p p ro a c h e s  to  th e  to p ic . In  a n  a t te m p t to  c la r ify  th e  d is ­
tr ib u t io n  o f  soc ia l sp e n d in g  a n d  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  th e  c o rre s p o n d in g  in v e s t­
m e n ts  in  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s , th is  c h a p te r  is o rg a n iz e d  as  fo llow s. 
S e c tio n  2 o u tlin e s  p e rsp e c tiv e s  a n d  a p p ro a c h e s  in  th e  c u r r e n t d e b a te  o n  
so c ia l-sp e n d in g  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in  th e  reg io n . S e c tio n  3 d iscu sses th e  
ra t io n a le  o f  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  its  re la tio n  to  so c ia l sp e n d in g , in  a 
m e th o d o lo g ic a l a p p ro a c h . S ec tio n  4 lo o k s  a t  th e  g lo b a l c o n te x t. S ec tio n  5 
a n a ly z e s  th e  tr e n d  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , b o th  to ta l  a n d  by  
sec to r. S ec tio n  6 c h a ra c te r iz e s  a n d  e v a lu a te s  th e  p u b lic  p o lic ie s  o f  se lec ted  
c o u n tr ie s . F in a lly , S e c tio n  7 se ts o u t  th e  m a in  c o n c lu s io n s  o f  th e  s tu d y .
2 THE CURRENT DEBATE: PERSPECTIVES AND 
APPROACHES
T h e re  a re  n u m e ro u s  a rg u m e n ts  to  ju s ti fy  th e  ex is ten ce  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . 
F ir s t,  th e  fiscal p e rsp e c tiv e  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  fo cu ses o n  th e  tr a n s fe r  o r  
d e v o lu t io n  o f  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t’s ta x a t io n  a n d  sp e n d in g  p o w ers  
to  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  (T e r-M in a s s ia n , 1997; de  M e llo , 2000). 
M o tiv a t io n s  fo r  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in c lu d e  a llo c a tio n  efficiency g a in s  a n d  
c o s t re d u c t io n  (eco n o m ic , a d m in is tra tiv e , a n d  m a n a g e ria l) , in  w h ich  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is seen  a s  a  re sp o n se  by  th e  v a r io u s  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t 
(p r in c ip a l-a g e n t)  to  in cen tiv e s  fo r  effic ien t a n d  cost-e ffec tive  serv ice d e liv ­
e ry  (de  M e llo , 2 0 0 4 ).2 T h is  d e v o lu tio n  d e p e n d s  o n  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  a n d  
specific d e s ig n  o f  th e  p o lic ie s  in  q u e s tio n . T h u s , c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t sh o u ld
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re m a in  a t  th e  fo r e f ro n t o f  re d is tr ib u t iv e  p o lic ie s  a n d  p ro v id e  in te rg o v e rn ­
m e n ta l  tr a n s fe r s  to  m itig a te  d ifferences in  av e ra g e  in c o m e  levels b e tw e e n  
su b n a tio n a l u n its , in s te a d  o f  g ra n t in g  ta x  b re a k s  a n d  tr a n s fe r s  to  in d iv id u ­
a ls  (M c L u re  a n d  M a rtin e z -V a z q u e z , 2000, in  d e  M e llo , 2004).
T h ese  o b se rv a tio n s  g ive rise  to  a  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  c la ss ica l soc ia l 
p ro te c tio n  po lic ie s , o f  th e  so c ia l in s u ra n c e  a n d  a ss is ta n c e  ty p e , w h ic h  p a y  
m o n e ta ry  ben efits  a n d  th u s  d o  n o t  re q u ire  d e c e n tra liz a tio n ; a n d  th o se  
in v o lv in g  a c tio n s  a n d  serv ices o f  v a ry in g  c o m p le x ity  re q u ir in g  u n iv e rsa l 
co v e rag e , su ch  a s  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a tio n , w h ich  a re  su ite d  to  d e c e n tra liz a ­
tio n  a n d  b u rd e n  sh a r in g  b e tw een  th e  d iffe ren t sp h e res  o f  g o v e rn m e n t.
O th e r  a u th o r s  s tre ss  efficiency, d e c is io n -m a k in g  tr a n s p a re n c y , a n d  
sen s itiv ity  to  d e m a n d  (S h a h , 1998), a lo n g  w ith  g re a te r  re p re s e n ta t io n  a n d  
so c ia l p a r t ic ip a tio n . T o  so m e  ex te n t, c o u n tr ie s  th a t  h av e  re c e n tly  em erg ed  
fro m  d ic ta to r sh ip s , su ch  as  B raz il, h a v e  c lea rly  p e rc e iv e d  a  lin k  b e tw een  
c e n tra liz a tio n  w ith  a u th o r ita r ia n is m , o r , co n v erse ly , b e tw e e n  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n  a n d  re d e m o c ra t iz a tio n  (D a in  a n d  V ia n n a , 1989).
A n a ly s ts  h a v e  id en tif ied  v a r io u s  fo rm s  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  fo rm a ts  
g iv ing  d iffe ren t d eg rees  o f  a u to n o m y  to  lo ca l e n titie s , su ch  a s  d é c o n c e n ­
tr a t io n , d e v o lu tio n  a n d  n o n -c e n tra l iz a tio n  (F in o t, 1998). T h is  is tr u e  b o th  
fo r  fed e ra tiv e  ex p e rien ces  (W a tts , 1996), a n d  fo r  u n i ta ry  s ta te s  (de  M ello , 
2004).
P r iv a tiz a tio n , w h e n  p a r t  o f  p ro ce sse s  to  se p a ra te  th e  p ro v is io n  a n d  p r o ­
d u c tio n  o f  p u b lic  p o licy  serv ices, a n d  p u b lic  re g u la tio n , a lso  e n c o m p a sse s  
th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  tr e n d  c o n s id e re d  h e re  (M ed ic i, 2005) a n d  c h a ra c te r ­
izes th e  ‘n o n -s ta te  p u b lic ’ sp h e re  (A fo n so , 2007). B o x  4.1 ex am in es  p u b lic  
a n d  p r iv a te  serv ices in  B ra z il’s sing le  h e a lth  system .
In  a d d it io n , th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e ss  re q u ire s  k n o w le d g e  o f  th e  
d iv e rs ity  o f  in s ti tu t io n a l f ra m e w o rk s  c u rre n tly  p re v a ilin g  in  th e  c o n tin e n t, 
a lo n g  w ith  d iffe ren ces in  e c o n o m ic  a n d  soc ia l c o n d itio n s ; th e  ex is ten ce  o f  
s ta te  b u re a u c ra c ie s  a b le  to  fo rm u la te  a n d  im p le m e n t p o lic ie s  a t  th e  lo ca l 
g o v e rn m e n t levels; a n d , in  th e  case  o f  fe d e ra tio n s , th e  c a p a c ity  to  m o b iliz e  
in te rn a lly  g e n e ra te d  ta x  rev en u es , in  a d d it io n  to  t r a n s fe r s  rece iv ed  fro m  
h ig h e r  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t. A n a ly s ts  a w a re  o f  th e se  d iffe ren ces h av e  
h ig h lig h te d  th e  d ifficu lty  o f  e v a lu a tin g  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s , b o th  
f ro m  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f  u s in g  efficiency a n d  efficacy in d ic a to r s , a n d  in  
te rm s  o f  th e  e q u ity  o f  o u tc o m e s . T h ey  a lso  d ra w  a t te n t io n  to  th e  co m p lex  
c o n f ig u ra tio n  o f  c au se -an d -e ffec t re la tio n s , in  th e  f ra m e w o rk  o f  a n  a n a ly ­
sis o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  co n fin ed  to  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l fisca l re la tio n s  (de 
M e llo , 2004).
D e sp ite  th e  lo g ica l p o ss ib ility  o f  c o n s tru c tin g  a  sy s tem  o f  d e c e n tra li­
z a tio n  in d ic a to rs , m a n y  o f  th e  re su lts  a ch ie v ed  s tem  fro m  p o lic y  design  
r a th e r  th a n  f ro m  th e  level o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , a n d  its  re p e rc u ss io n s  o n
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BOX 4.1 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SERVICES IN 
BRAZIL’S SINGLE HEALTH SYSTEM
In Brazil, the process of building a single and decentralized 
command structure for health policy over the last decade has 
strengthened its state dimension, since funding was transferred 
to subnational governments endowed with a network of publicly 
owned services. At the same time, however, it involved service 
production by the private network. This shows that it is possible 
to combine public funding, universal access and improved man­
agement with autonomous provision of services, whether state or 
private, or both (Dain, 2000).
In countries that have opted to outsource health services, 
both the public and private sectors have operated management 
mechanisms that are typical of competition, such as the adoption 
of incentive systems or performance-based contracting. These 
performance-inducing mechanisms have been applied both to 
the services provided and to human resource policy (ibid.).
A recent trend in the intensification of decentralization patterns 
for many countries, some of them in Latin America, involves 
significant change in federative systems, with clear rules on the 
distribution of tax and spending powers, and substantial gains in 
autonomy for local governments (Afonso and Lobo, 1996).
Although the federative system is predominantly based on the 
relationship between federal and state governments, municipal 
authorities have also gained ground in recent years, either as 
executors of public policies via the delegation and déconcentra­
tion of state power, or by being defined as federative entities, with 
full autonomy.
The dilemmas and conflicts are manifold. First and foremost, 
they are exacerbated where fiscal and management autonomy 
is combined with a hierarchical decentralization of services, the 
organization of networks and role differences between local 
governments based on population size and infrastructure endow­
ments.
Brazil’s single health system provides a good example of this, 
where the ability to take action depends on a complex vertical 
and horizontal interaction between political actors and managers. 
Excessive municipalization, to the detriment of command and 
control exercised at the state government level, as is the case in
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Canada and Spain, makes the process of reaching agreement 
between government entities in Brazil more difficult and complex; 
and it makes federal incentives to adhere to national and univer­
sal policies less effective (Dain, 2007).
The challenge of responding to the tension between the objec­
tives of social cohesion and conserving fiscal sustainability 
(Cetràngolo, 2007) results in various solutions being adopted by 
each of the countries analyzed. From the social cohesion stand­
point, inequality, heterogeneity and fragmentation, more than 
poverty, increase the difficulty of engaging various ‘clienteles’ 
around common goals (Dain, 2007).
re d u c in g  a g g re g a te  e x p e n d itu re  (ib id .). T h u s , th e  e m p h a s is  o n  e v a lu a tin g  
th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  specific sec to r p o lic ie s  is ju s ti f ie d  (C e trá n g o lo  a n d  
G a tto ,  2009), a s  a n  in te g ra l p a r t  o f  th e  a n a ly tic a l f ra m e w o rk  u n d e rly in g  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesses. G iv e n  th e  d iv e rs ity  o f  p o ss ib le  re sp o n se s  to  th e  
p a t te rn  o f  re fo rm s  d e sc r ib e d  ab o v e , severa l q u e s tio n s  c a n  be  p osed :
1. Is  it  p o ss ib le  to  id e n tify  a  u n iq u e  se t o f  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d is a d v a n ta g e s  
a s so c ia te d  w ith  p ro ce sse s  a n d  levels o f  p u b lic  se rv ice  d e c e n tra liz a tio n ?
2. D o  such  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  d is a d v a n ta g e s  v a ry  w ith  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
po lic ies , su ch  th a t  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is ad v isa b le  w h e re  g e o g ra p h y  is th e  
c e n tra l p il la r  o f  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  a c tio n s  a n d  services?
3. F ro m  a  c o m p a ra tiv e  s ta n d p o in t ,  a p a r t  f ro m  m e a s u r in g  th e  d eg ree  
o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o r  a  ra n g e  o f  c o u n tr ie s  th r o u g h  in d ic a to rs , w h a t 
o th e r  a n a ly tic a l e lem en ts  sh o u ld  be  c o n s id e re d  w ith in  th e  p r in c i­
p le  o f  c o m p a ra b il ity ?  W h a t  e lem en ts , i f  c o n s id e re d , m a k e  n a tio n a l 
ex p erien ces c o m p a ra b le ?
4. Is  a  c o ro l la ry  o f  p u b lic  p o licy  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  th e  s tre n g th e n in g  o f  
lo ca l g o v e rn m e n t p o w e r  a n d  d e c is io n -m a k in g  a u to n o m y , th u s  te n d in g  
to  s tre n g th e n  a n d  c re a te  fed e ra tiv e  s tru c tu re s?  A lte rn a tiv e ly , co u ld  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  b e  re d u c e d  to  m ere ly  a  te c h n ic a l-a d m in is tra t iv e , a n d  
th e re fo re , ‘d e -p o lit ic iz e d ’ re q u ire m e n t?
5. M ig h t th e  p o litic a l a n d  fiscal m o d e l o f  fe d e ra tiv e  in te rg o v e rn m e n ­
ta l re la tio n s  be  b e tte r  su ited , th a n  u n ita ry  s ta te s , to  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  
new  sy s tem s fo r  f in a n c in g  a n d  d e liv e rin g  a u to n o m o u s , effic ien t a n d  
effective services?
N o n e  o f  th ese  q u e s tio n s  h a s  a n  ea sy  an sw er; a n d  e a c h  re q u ire s  a  set 
o f  h ig h ly  c o m p lex  sp ec ific a tio n s . N o n e th e le ss , b a s e d  o n  th ese  q u e s tio n s ,
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th e  s tu d y  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  c lea rly  e x te n d s  b e y o n d  its  te c h n ic a l fu n c ­
tio n a l a n d  fiscal d im e n s io n s . T o  re s p o n d , a lb e it in co m p le te ly , to  th e  
n u m e ro u s  issues ra is e d  b y  th e  to p ic , th e  n e x t sec tio n  w ill c o n s id e r  th e  
lo g ica l f r a m e w o rk  o f  th e  s tu d y , in  a n  a t te m p t to  ex p lic a te  th e  r a t io n a le  o f  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro cesses .
3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
T h u s  fa r  w e h av e  c o n s id e re d  p o ss ib le  re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
a n d  fed e ra lism  a n d , a lm o s t a s  a  c o ro lla ry , c o n c e n tra tio n  a n d  th e  u n ita ry  
s ta te . T o  ex p la in  th e  re la tio n s  b e tw een  th e se  m e c h a n ism s , th is  sec tio n  w ill 
p re s e n t th e  u n d e rly in g  ra t io n a le  o f  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  its  re la tio n  
to  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g .3 A c c o rd in g ly , F ig u re  4.1 seeks to  sch em a tize  
th a t  in te rfa c e  b e tw e e n  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n , fed e ra lism  (n o t necessa rily )
Source: Adapted from Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda (2009).
Figure 4.1 Fiscal and social-spending decentralization
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a n d  soc ia l p o lic ie s , in  w h ich  o n e  im p a c ts  th e  o th e r . T h is  d ra w s  h eav ily  
o n  a  s im ila r sch em e p re s e n te d  b y  Jo rg e  M a rtin e z -V a z q u e z  a n d  C ris tia n  
S ep u lv ed a , in  a  p re s e n ta t io n  e n ti tle d  ‘T h e  co n se q u e n c e s  o f  fiscal d e c e n ­
tra liz a tio n  o n  p o v e r ty  a n d  in e q u a lity ’, g iven  a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  c o n fe r­
en ce  o n  ‘T h e  P o litic a l a n d  E c o n o m ic  C o n se q u e n c e s  o f  D e c e n tra l iz a t io n ’, 
h e ld  in  S a n tia g o  de  C o m p o s te la , S p a in , in  N o v e m b e r  2009.
F ig u re  4.1 sh o w s th a t  th e  a p p ro a c h  a d o p te d  is g ro u n d e d  in  n a tio n a l 
fiscal a n d  ta x  p o licy , in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  fiscal re la tio n s  (d is tr ib u t io n  o f  
ta x a t io n  p o w e rs , re v e n u e  sh a r in g  a n d  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t 
re sp o n s ib ilitie s ) , n a tio n a l e x p e n d itu re  p o lic ie s  a n d  th e ir  s u b n a t io n a l c o u n ­
te rp a r ts ,  w ith  th e  re sp ec tiv e  in cen tiv es  fo r  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . T h ese  d im e n ­
sions a re  c o n d it io n e d  b y  th e  in s ti tu t io n a l f ra m e w o rk , w ith  its  p o li tic a l a n d  
in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  d e te rm in a n ts , a n d  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  a n d  so c ia l p o lic ie s  a s  a  
b a c k d ro p .
A  c o n c e p tu a l re fe re n c e  re sp e c ts  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  p o w e rs  to  im p le ­
m e n t soc ia l p o lic ie s  b e tw e e n  sp h eres  o f  g o v e rn m e n t (less so in  te rm s  o f  
p o licy  fo rm u la t io n )  a n d , c o n se q u e n tly , re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  im p le m e n t­
in g  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  in  th e  so c ia l a re a . I t  c a n n o t  b e  o v e rs ta te d  th a t ,  
g iven  its  n a tu re , e x p e n d itu re  th a t  h a s  n a tio n a l e x te rn a li tie s  sh o u ld  b e  th e  
p re se rv e  o f  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t. T h is  is ty p ic a l o f  b en e fits  su ch  a s  soc ia l 
in su ra n c e  o r  a s s is ta n c e  (u n e m p lo y m e n t in su ra n c e , in c o m e  tra n s fe r s  fo r  
p o o r  fam ilies , a n d  s u p p o r t  fo r  ch ild ren , th e  e ld erly , a n d  th e  d is a b le d ) , th e  
e n ti tle m e n t to  w h ic h  s h o u ld  be  g u a ra n te e d  e q u a lly  fo r  a ll in h a b i ta n ts  o f  
th e  d iffe ren t p a r ts  o f  n a t io n a l  te r r ito ry ; ju s t  a s  th e  m o n e ta ry  a m o u n t  a lso  
n eed s  to  b e  p a id  eq u a lly  to  a ll b en efic ia ries , to  a v o id  tr ig g e rin g  m ig ra t io n s  
to  g a in  a d v a n ta g e s  f ro m  th e  benefit.
A n o th e r  c ase  in v o lv es a c tio n s  a n d  serv ice p ro v is io n  th a t  c a n  b e  t r a n s ­
fe r re d  to  g o v e rn m e n t u n its  th a t  a re  c lo se r to  th e  b en e fic ia ry  p o p u la t io n , 
su ch  as  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth ; o r  ty p ica lly  lo ca l a c tio n s , su ch  as h o u s in g  
a n d  o rg a n iz a tio n , w h ere  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t u n its  c a n  be  h e ld  
a c c o u n ta b le  fo r  th e ir  im p le m e n ta tio n .
T h a t  d is tin c tio n  is a lso  re f lec ted  in  m e th o d s  o f  fin a n c in g . S o c ia l e x p e n ­
d itu re s  f in an ced  th ro u g h  specific  c o n tr ib u t io n s  (ty p ic a l o f  so c ia l in s u r ­
an ce ) a lso  te n d  to  b e  o rg a n iz e d  a n d  c o m m a n d e d  b y  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t, 
since  p a y ro l l  ta x a t io n  th ro u g h  c o n tr ib u t io n s  is a n  exc lu s ive  c o m p e te n c y  
o f  th a t  sp h e re  (even  in  th e  specific case  o f  B raz il, w h e re  c o n tr ib u t io n s  a lso  
im p in g e  o n  in v o ic in g  a n d  p ro f its , it  is a lso  th e  p re se rv e  o f  th e  fe d e ra l g o v ­
e rn m e n t) . N o te  th a t ,  d e sp ite  a tte m p t in g  to  c o p y  th e  w e lfa re  s ta te  b a se d  o n  
th e  E u ro p e a n -s ty le  ‘la b o r  so c ie ty ’, L a tin  A m e ric a  su ffers f ro m  a  s t ru c tu ra l  
deficiency: lo w er c o n tr ib u to ry  c o v e rag e  w h ich , in  m o s t c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  
reg io n , w o rse n e d  fu r th e r  b e tw een  1990 a n d  2002 (J im en ez , 2006b).
U n iv e rsa l p ro g ra m s , su ch  a s  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth , te n d  to  b e  fin an ced
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o u t  o f  th e  b u d g e t a s  a  w h o le  a n d , a s  such , a re  m o re  like ly  to  b e  c a n d id a te s  
fo r  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . I n  th is  case , a s  m a n y  p ro g ra m s  h av e  b een  tr a n s fe r re d  
to  in te rm e d ia te  a n d  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  o v e r  th e  la s t tw o  d e c a d e s  in  L a tin  
A m e ric a , it  h a s  a lso  b e e n  c o m m o n  to  ass ig n  p a r t  o f  th e  n ew  o r  a d d it io n a l 
re so u rc e s  t r a n s fe r re d  f ro m  th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t to  th o s e  p ro g ra m s . 
T h is  u su a lly  re q u ire s  in te rm e d ia te  g o v e rn m e n t sp h e re s  (w h en  th ese  ex ist) 
a n d  lo ca l o n es , to  u se  a  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  w h a t th e y  ra ise  d ire c tly  ( in  ta x e s , fo r  
ex am p le ), a n d  a  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  w h a t th e y  rece ive  in  re v en u e  s h a r in g  fro m  
h ig h e r  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t, to  f in an ce  a n  a re a  as a  w h o le  (su ch  as m a in ­
te n a n c e  o f  th e  e d u c a t io n  o r  h e a lth  sy s tem , a s  a  fo rm  o f  b lo c k  g ra n ts ) , o r  
ev en  specific p ro g ra m s  (su ch  as w h en  a  specific p o r t io n  is re se rv ed  fo r  b a s ic  
o r  s e c o n d a ry  e d u c a t io n , o r  fo r  h o s p ita l  a t te n d a n c e  o r  h e a lth  su rv e illan ce ).
A n o th e r  w ay  to  d ilfe re n tia te  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  n o t  
o n ly  e n c o m p a sse s  th e  a c tio n  o r  so c ia l serv ice  th a t  w as a llo c a te d  to  s u b n a ­
tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , b u t  a lso  in c lu d es  h o w  th e se  a re  fin an ced . N o te  th a t  
L a tin  A m e ric a n  so c ia l-sp e n d in g  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce sse s  h a v e  u su a lly  
b een  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  so m e  o f  th ese  p o ss ib ilitie s4 -  tr a n s fe r  o f  p o w e r  to  
ra ise  tax es  d irec tly ; a n  in c rease  in  free ly  u sa b le  tra n s fe rs , g en e ra lly  a r is in g  
fro m  re g u la r  a n d  p re -e s ta b lis h e d  sh a r in g  in  n a t io n a l  o r  re g io n a l ta x  re v ­
en u es; th e  a d  h o c  g ra n t in g  o f  n e g o tia te d  tra n s fe rs , w ith  lim ite d  p e r io d ic ­
ity  a n d  o b jec tiv es , a n d  even  fin an c in g , ta rg e te d  o n  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts . 
N o n e th e le ss , n o  ev id en c e  h a s  b een  fo u n d  o f  a  re la tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  deg ree  
o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  th e  s tage  o f  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t a n d  so c ia l 
w e lfa re  (C e trà n g o lo , 2007).
A n o th e r  k ey  c o n s id e ra t io n  fo r  th is  s tu d y  c o n c e rn s  m e th o d o lo g ic a l 
a sp ec ts  o f  d e c e n tra liz e d  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  s ta tis tic s , th e  an a ly s is  o f  
w h ic h  is severe ly  lim ite d  by  th e  d ifficu lty  o f  o b ta in in g  c o n s is te n t a n d  u p -  
to - d a te  s ta tis tic s  o n  sam e  v a ria b le s  fo r  d if fe re n t co u n tr ie s .
W h ile  th is  p ro b le m  h a s  to  b e  fa c e d  ev en  in  a  sim p le  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m ­
p a r is o n , it is m o re  se r io u s  in  th e  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  case , since th e  re g io n  
d o es  n o t  h av e  a  c o m m o n  s ta tis tic a l sy s tem  o r  b a se , p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  p u b lic  
fin an ces  -  u n lik e  th e  E u ro p e a n  U n io n , w h ich  c o n s titu te s  a  c o m m o n  b lo c , 
o r  ev en  in  th e  case  o f  th e  O E C D , w h ich  o b ta in s  s ta n d a rd iz e d  d a ta  fro m  
its  m e m b e rs . R e g a rd in g  g lo b a l s ta tis tic s  f ro m  m u lti la te ra l  o rg a n iz a tio n s , 
h o w ev e r, th e se  b a re ly  m a n a g e  to  b re a k  d o w n  g e n e ra l g o v e rn m e n t s p e n d ­
in g  by  sp h e re  o f  g o v e rn m e n t, s till less c ro ss -re fe ren ce  w ith  th e ir  fu n c tio n s  
a n d  p ro g ra m s . T h e  sa m e  ty p e  o f  l im ita t io n  a p p lie s  to  E C L A C , d e sp ite  its 
h u g e  a n d  g ro w in g  e ffo r t to  b e t te r  m o n i to r  a n d  re p o r t  o n  th e  s i tu a t io n  o f  
th e  re g io n .5
A lth o u g h  th e re  is n o  c o n s is te n t a n d  c o m p a ra b le  s ta tis tic a l b a se , it  sh o u ld  
a lw ay s  b e  re m e m b e re d  th a t  soc ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  as a  w h o le  e n c o m ­
p asse s  d iffe ren t c o n c e p ts  w ith  very  d if fe re n t ra tio n a le s ; a n d  d if fe re n tia te d
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s ta n d a rd s  c a n  b e  fo u n d  ev en  w ith in  e a c h  e x p e n d itu re  c a te g o ry . E d u c a tio n  
is th e  best e x a m p le  o f  h o w  su ch  d iv e rs ity  c a n  be  e x p re sse d  in  th e  fe d e ra ­
tiv e  d iv is io n  o f  ta sk s , since it  is c o m m o n  fo r  th e  p u b lic  sch o o l n e tw o rk  
p ro v id in g  b a s ic  e d u c a t io n  to  b e lo n g  to  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts , o f te n  a t  th e  
in te rm e d ia te  level, w h ile  th e  p u b lic  u n iv e rs ity  n e tw o rk  is d ire c tly  o p e ra te d  
by  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t.
H a v in g  ra is e d  th e se  m e th o d o lo g ic a l issues, o u r  n e x t s tep , w ith  a 
c o n tin e n t-w id e  fo cu s , is to  re la te  th e  t r e n d  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  
A m e ric a  to  th e  ra t io n a le  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  re so u rc e  d is tr ib u tio n , 
a n d  th e n  an a ly z e  so c ia l p o lic ie s  a t  th e  se c to ra l level.
4 THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
D e sp ite  th e  su ccess io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l e c o n o m ic  c rises  th a t  h av e  b u ffe ted  
th e  w o rld  since th e  e a rly  1990s, L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h av e  m a in ta in e d  
a  re sp e c ta b le  g ro w th  tr e n d  in  soc ia l p u b lic  sp en d in g , w h ic h  ro se  f ro m  a 
level o f  12.4 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  1990 to  a ro u n d  17.9 p e rc e n t in  2007 . A p a r t  
f ro m  in c re a s in g  sig n ifican tly , so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  o u tp a c e d  G D P  in  th e  
re g io n  in  p ro p o r t io n a l  te rm s . A s n o te d  b y  C a s tro  e t a l. (2003), m o re  th a n  
a  sim p le  in d ic a to r  an a ly s is , th e  t r e n d  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  exp resses  
a  (a lb e it im p rec ise  a n d  a p p ro x im a te )  w ay  o f  m e a s u r in g  p u b lic  a c tio n  in  
th e  soc ia l a re a s , w h ich  u lt im a te ly  a im s to  p ro m o te  th e  p o p u la t io n ’s w ell­
be ing . T o  b e  p rec ise , w h en  w e c o m p a re  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  b e tw een  d if ­
fe re n t c o u n tr ie s  a n d  d iffe ren t p o in ts  in  tim e , w e a re  re a lly  c o m p a r in g  th e  
a c tio n s  ta k e n  b y  g o v e rn m e n ts  in  each  c o u n try  to  p ro m o te  th e  q u a li ty  o f  
life o f  th e ir  in h a b ita n ts .
T h e  tr e n d  p re v a ilin g  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  a n d  e n d  o f  th e  1990s -  in  w h ich  
th e  v a r ia tio n  in  so c ia l p u b lic  sp en d in g  b ecam e  d e c o u p le d  f ro m  G D P  
g ro w th  -  w as re s to re d  in  th e  la te  2000s.
A n o th e r  w ay  to  an a ly z e  th e  e v o lu tio n  a n d  verify  th e  g ro w th  t r e n d  o f  
so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  is to  e v a lu a te  th is  in d ic a to r  in  p e r  c a p ita  te rm s .
O n  av e rag e , L a tin  A m e ric a n  p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  th e  soc ia l sec to rs  
a m o u n te d  to  ro u g h ly  U S $318  p e r  p e rs o n  in  1 9 9 0 -9 1 , a n d  h a d  risen  to  
U S $ 8 12 p e r  p e rs o n  b y  2008 (a t c o n s ta n t 2000 p rices) -  ro u g h ly  150 p e rc e n t 
g ro w th  o v e r th e  p e r io d . E v en  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  so c ia l sp e n d in g  a lre a d y  
a b o v e  th e  L a tin  A m e ric a n  av e rag e , su ch  a s  A rg e n tin a , U ru g u a y , C u b a  
a n d  B razil, p o s te d  s ig n ific an t g ro w th  o v e r th e  la s t few  y ea rs , m a in ta in in g  
th e ir  p o s itio n s  a s  th e  la rg e s t w elfa re  s ta te s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a . D e sp ite  th e  
s u b s ta n tia l in c rea se  in  b o th  a b so lu te  a n d  p e r  c a p ita  te rm s , th e  p e r fo rm ­
a n c e  o f  soc ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  is h a rd e r  to  id en tify  w h en  c o n s id e r in g  to ta l  
p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re . D e sp ite  r a p id  g ro w th  b e tw een  1990 a n d  2007 , soc ia l
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p u b lic  sp e n d in g  re m a in e d  v ir tu a lly  u n c h a n g e d  re la tiv e ly  a t  ju s t  u n d e r  30 
p e rc e n t o f  G D P .6 G iv e n  th e  e r ra tic  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  to ta l  e x p e n d itu re  a n d  
th e  re g u la r i ty  o f  g ro w th  in  soc ia l sp en d in g , th e  ra t io  b e tw e e n  th e se  tw o  
item s (so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g /to ta l p u b lic  sp e n d in g )  ro se  su b s ta n tia lly  
b e tw een  th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  1990s a n d  2007. W h ile  in  th e  f irs t y e a r  o f  th e  series 
th e  soc ia l a re a  a c c o u n te d  fo r  44  p e rc e n t o f  to ta l  p u b lic  sp en d in g , by  2007 
th e  p r o p o r t io n  h a d  risen  to  61 p e rc e n t.
A n o th e r  m o d e  o f  an a ly s is  is b y  c o m p a r is o n  w ith  o th e r  reg io n s . In itia lly , 
th e  re g io n  as a  w h o le  c a n  b e  c o m p a re d  w ith  o th e r  w o rld  b lo cs  (C lem en ts  
e t a l., 2007) u s in g  d a ta  fo r  2004, w h ich  sh o w  g en e ra l g o v e rn m e n t s p e n d ­
in g  a t  12.7 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  th e  soc ia l a re a  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , a b o v e  
th e  e q u iv a le n t fig u re  fo r  em erg in g  A sia  (8 .4  p e rc e n t)  a n d  M id -N o r th  
A fr ic a  (9.1 p e rc e n t) , b u t  lo w er th a n  in  E a s te rn  E u ro p e  (22 .8  p e rc e n t)  a n d  
w ay  b e lo w  th e  32 .6  p e rc e n t av e ra g e  a m o n g  O E C D  m e m b e r c o u n tr ie s .7 
B re a k in g  d o w n  e x p e n d itu re  b y  seg m en t, so c ia l p ro te c t io n  w as  th e  key  
c o m p o n e n t fo r d e fin in g  th e  size o f  to ta l  e x p e n d itu re  a n d  th e  d iffe rence  
b e tw een  reg io n s  -  L a t in  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  (5 .4  p e rc e n t o f  G D P )  sp en t 
m o re  th a n  A s ia n  a n d  A fr ic a n  n a tio n s , b u t  ju s t  o n e - th ird  o f  th e  av e ra g e  
level in  r ic h  c o u n tr ie s . In  re la tio n  to  th e  la t te r , th e  g a p  w as  sm a lle r  in  th e  
case  o f  e d u c a t io n  -  e x p e n d itu re  in  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  (4 .2  p e rc e n t)  
w as tw o - th ird s  o f  th e  O E C D  level; b u t  it w as w id e r in  th e  h e a lth  sec to r, 
w h e re  e x p e n d itu re  in  th e  re g io n  (2 .6  p e rc e n t)  is less th a n  40  p e rc e n t w h a t 
rich  c o u n tr ie s  sp en d .
B y b re a k in g  d o w n  L a tin  A m e ric a n  e x p e n d itu re  b y  c o u n try , it  is p o ss ib le  
to  a t te m p t a c o m p a r is o n  a g a in s t lo n g - te rm  av e ra g e  sp e n d in g , ta k in g  a  
re s tr ic tiv e  d e fin it io n  a n d  u s in g  O E C D  s ta tis tic s .8 F ig u re s  4 .2  a n d  4.3 show  
so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  b y  th e  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  re g io n  in  2005 a n d  2008. 
T h e  figu res e v a lu a te  th e  re c e n t t r e n d  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  
A m e ric a  in  2005 a n d  2008, u s in g  th e  O E C D  a v e ra g e  to  2005 (20 .6  p e rc e n t 
o f  G D P )  as  a b e n c h m a rk . E x p e n d itu re  in  th e  re g io n  d isp lay s  h u g e  d is p e r ­
s ion . A p a r t  f ro m  th e  spec ia l case  o f  C u b a , th e  S o u th e rn  C o n e  c o u n tr ie s  
te n d  to  sp en d  m o re  in  th e  so c ia l a re a  th a n  o th e r  L a t in  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  
c o u n tr ie s , a lth o u g h  C o s ta  R ic a  a n d  th e  P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f  B o liv ia  seem  
to  b e  ex cep tio n s . E v e n  u s in g  a  s tr ic te r  c o n c e p t a n d  a  lo n g - te rm  av e rag e  
fo r  th e  O E C D , sp e n d in g  in  m o s t c o u n tr ie s  is fa r  b e lo w  th e  level in  r ich  
c o u n tr ie s . M o re o v e r , in  th e  case  o f  th o s e  w ith  h ig h e r  sp e n d in g  levels ( th e  
S o u th e rn  C o n e ) th e  d is ta n c e  f ro m  th e  level o f  r ic h -c o u n try  sp e n d in g  is 
less, b u t  th e  g a p  is still e n o rm o u s  c o n s id e rin g  o th e r  re su lts  o f  th e  p ro v is io n  
o f  b a s ic  soc ia l serv ices, o r  ev en  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t in d ic a to rs .
N o n e th e le s s , th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  fo r  in c re a s in g  th e  
p o p u la t io n ’s w e ll-b e in g  c a n n o t b e  d en ied . C h a ra c te r iz e d  b y  h ig h  levels o f  
p o v e r ty  a n d  soc ia l in e q u a lity , L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  in c re a s in g ly  n eed
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Figure 4.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: social public spending 
compared to the OECD, 2005 (%> o f  GDP)
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Figure 4.3 Latin America and the Caribbean: social public spending 
compared to the OECD, 2008 (% o f  GDP)
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Source: ECLAC (2010a).
Figure 4.4 Latin America and the Caribbean (21 countries): trend o f  social 
public spending by sector, 1990/1991 and 2008 (% o f  GDP)
in v e s tm e n ts  in  th e  so c ia l a re a  to  p ro m o te  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t; a n d  in  th a t  
c o n te x t, th e  tr e n d  o f  soc ia l sp e n d in g  in  th e  re g io n  ra ise s  a  n a tu r a l  q u e s ­
tio n : w h ic h  sec to rs  h a v e  g a in e d  m o s t w ith  th e  in c rea se s  in  soc ia l p u b lic  
sp en d in g ?  T o  a n sw er, a  fig u re  e x tra c te d  f ro m  ‘S o c ia l P a n o ra m a  o f  L a tin  
A m e ric a  2 0 0 9 ’ (E C L A C , 2009) w ill a g a in  b e  u sed .
M o s t  o f  th e  g ro w th  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp en d in g  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  d u rin g  
th e  p e r io d  u n d e r  an a ly s is  w as  b a se d  o n  ta rg e te d  p ro g ra m s , su ch  as  w e lfa re  
a n d  so c ia l se cu rity  a ss is ta n c e , a s  sh o w n  in  F ig u re  4.4. B e tw een  1990 a n d  
2007 , L a t in  A m e ric a n  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  g rew  by  5.2 p e rc e n ta g e  
p o in ts  o f  G D P , w ith  2 .6  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts  a r is in g  exclu sively  f ro m  soc ia l 
se c u r ity  a n d  th e  re s t f ro m  e d u c a t io n  (1 .4  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts )  a n d  h e a lth  
(0 .7  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts ) .
A  s h o r t- te rm  a n a ly s is  (1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 5 ) sh o w s th a t  ta rg e tin g  re m a in s  q u ite  
in te n se , since so c ia l se cu rity  a n d  w e lfa re  a re  th e  m a in  d riv e rs  o f  th e  g ro w th  
o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  th e  p e rio d .
D e sp ite  re p re se n tin g  c o n s id e ra b le  p ro g re ss  in  te rm s  o f  p u b lic  po lic ies , 
th e  g ro w th  o f  e x p e n d itu re  o n  soc ia l se cu rity  show s, o n  th e  o n e  h a n d , a 
ta rg e te d  e ffo rt to  m e e t specific n eed s, su ch  as  so c ia l a ss is tan ce ; a n d , o n  th e  
o th e r , in v e s tm e n ts  in  serv ices th a t  in v o lv e  th e  ta x p a y e r  d irec tly , su ch  as 
so c ia l in su ra n c e . C o m p a re d  to  ex p en ses th a t  a re  o f te n  u n iv e rsa l serv ices in
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th e  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  reg io n , su ch  as  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n , th e re  is a  c o n s id ­
e ra b le  m ism a tc h  b e tw e e n  in v es tm en ts  in  th e se  sec to rs . T h is  d o es  n o t  m e a n  
th a t  in v es tm en ts  in  soc ia l secu rity  a re  n o t  im p o r ta n t ,  b e c a u se  th e y  g e n e ra te  
so c ia l p ro g re ss  b y  g u a ra n te e in g  r ig h ts  fo r  p e o p le  w h o , fo r  v a rio u s  re a so n s , 
d o  n o t p a r t ic ip a te  in  fo rm a l la b o r  m a rk e t m e c h a n ism s  (re tire m e n t, d is ­
a b ility , a m o n g  o th e rs ) . W h a t  w e w a n t to  sh o w  is th a t  th e  u n iv e rsa l serv ices 
th a t  la rg e ly  u n d e rp in  e q u a l o p p o r tu n it ie s , su ch  a s  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a tio n , 
h a v e  g ro w n  less th a n  soc ia l secu rity  in  te rm s  o f  p u b lic  sp en d in g .
5 THE SECTOR CONTEXT
A lth o u g h  L a tin  A m e ric a  en co m p a sse s  a  g ro u p  o f  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  s im ila r 
c u ltu ra l , e th n ic , p o li tic a l, so c ia l a n d  e c o n o m ic  c h a ra c te r is tic s , d iffe rences 
in  system s o f  g o v e rn m e n t a c ro s s  th e  su b c o n tin e n t , a n d  p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  
d is tr ib u tio n  o f  re so u rc e s , a re  s tr ik in g . T h u s , to  ta k e  b e t te r  a c c o u n t o f  th e  
d iffe rences b e tw een  fe d e ra tiv e  c o u n tr ie s  a n d  u n ita ry  s ta te s  p u rs u in g  a 
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro ce ss , th e  s tu d y  w ill c o n s id e r  se lec ted  so c ia l p o lic ie s  fo r 
A rg e n tin a , B raz il a n d  M ex ico  ( fe d e ra tio n s ) , o n  th e  o n e  h a n d , a n d  C h ile  
a n d  C o lo m b ia  (u n i ta ry  s ta te s , e n g ag ed  in  s ig n ific an t d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
p ro cesses), o n  th e  o th e r .
B efo re  s ta r t in g  th is  c o m p a ra tiv e  sec tio n , a  n u m b e r  o f  d isc la im ers  
s h o u ld  b e  m a d e . A s e m p h a s iz e d  th r o u g h o u t  th e  c h a p te r ,  th e  p ro cess  
o f  c o m p a r in g  so c ia l e x p e n d itu re , a n d  even  its  c o n c e p tu a liz a t io n , is n o t  
a  tr iv ia l m a tte r . T o  th e  e x te n t th a t  so c ia l sp e n d in g  c a n  be  c o n s id e re d  a  
m e a su re  o f  g o v e rn m e n t e ffo rts  to  p ro v id e  w e ll-b e in g  to  th e ir  p o p u la t io n s , 
a n  in itia l exerc ise  in v o lv es  e v a lu a tin g  th e  rea l n eed s  o f  each  p o p u la t io n . 
F o r  ex am p le , e d u c a t io n , w h ich  is c o n s id e re d  to  b e  a  u n iv e rsa l ex p en se  
a im e d  a t  re d u c in g  in e q u a litie s , c o u ld  re q u ire  w id e ly  d iffe rin g  e ffo rts  f ro m  
c o u n try  to  c o u n try . T h is  is b ecau se , w ith  d iffe ren t levels (ea r ly  c h ild h o o d  
e d u c a tio n , p r im a ry  a n d  s e c o n d a ry  sch o o l, a n d  h ig h e r  e d u c a tio n ) , th e re  
a re  d iffe ren t re tu rn s  fo r  in d iv id u a ls . A  soc ie ty  th a t  m a in ly  in v es ts  in  h ig h e r  
e d u c a t io n , w h ile  n e g le c tin g  b a s ic  e d u c a t io n , is a c tu a lly  m a k in g  in d iv id u a l 
o p p o r tu n it ie s  less e q u a l in s te a d  o f  re d u c in g  in e q u itie s . T h is  d iscu ss io n  
c a n  b e  e x te n d e d  to  e x p e n d itu re  o n  h e a lth , soc ia l in s u ra n c e , soc ia l secu rity  
a n d  all o th e r  e lem en ts  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp en d in g . In  th is  c h a p te r , h o w ev er, 
w e sh a ll co n fin e  o u rse lv es  to  th e  t r e n d  o f  in d ic a to r s  a n d  th e  a g g reg a te  
an a ly se s  o f  so c ia l sp en d in g .
T o  p e r fo rm  th is  c o m p a r is o n , p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  w ill b e  a n a ly z e d  in  seg ­
m e n ts , u s in g  th e  r a t io n a le  p re se n te d  in  F ig u re  4.4. In itia lly , to ta l  e x p e n d i­
tu re  a n d  its  e v o lu tio n  in  th e  se lec ted  c o u n tr ie s  w ill b e  sh o w n , in c lu d in g  
p e r  c a p ita  sp e n d in g , a n d  th e n  th e  v a r io u s  sec to rs  o f  th e  so c ia l a re a  th a t
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c o m p rise  soc ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  w ill be  a n a ly z e d  se p a ra te ly . T h ese  a re : (i) 
so c ia l se cu rity  a n d  a ss is tan ce ; (ii) h e a lth ; (iii) e d u c a tio n ; a n d  (iv) h o u s in g  
a n d  o th e r . T h e  la s t  th re e  seg m en ts  a re  th o s e  in  w h ich  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is 
o c c u rr in g  m o s t ra p id ly  in  L a tin  A m e ric a , a s  in  th e  re s t o f  th e  w o rld ; th is  
c h a p te r  w ill p re s e n t th e  an a ly s is  th ro u g h  b o x es  th a t  in d iv id u a lly  h ig h lig h t 
th e  m o s t s ig n ifican t c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  th a t  p ro c e ss  a n d  n o te  key  e x p e ri­
en ces in  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  reg io n . A s B raz il is th e  c o u n try  th a t  
h a s  m a d e  m o s t p ro g re ss  in  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , th e  s ta te  o f  th e  a r t  in  te rm s  
o f  size o f  so c ia l e x p e n d itu re  a n d  its  fe d e ra tiv e  d iv is io n  is p re s e n te d  n ex t 
(B ox  4.2).
Social Spending
E x c e p t fo r  C h ile , th e  five se lec ted  c o u n tr ie s  a n d  th e  L a tin  A m e ric a n  
av e ra g e  d isp la y e d  a  r is in g  t r e n d  in  soc ia l sp en d in g  as  a  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  
G D P  b e tw een  1990 a n d  2007. C o n s id e r in g  th e  C h ile a n  case  in  s ligh tly  
m o re  d e ta il, th e re  w as  a  slow  g ro w th  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  s ta r t in g  in  1996, 
w h ich  w as  rev e rsed  in  2003, su ch  th a t  b y  th e  e n d  o f  th e  series, th e  level o f  
so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  w as a t  th e  sam e  level a s  a t  th e  s ta r t.  I n  th e  o th e r  
fo u r  c o u n tr ie s  so c ia l sp e n d in g  g rew  to  a  g re a te r  o r  lesse r d eg ree . B raz il led  
th e  w ay  w ith  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  a lm o s t 25 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  2007, 10 
G D P  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts  m o re  th a n  a t  th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  1990s. (F ig u re  4 .5 .)
M ex ico  a n d  C o lo m b ia  sh o w  v e ry  s im ila r re su lts  in  a  p o in t - to -p o in t  c o m ­
p a r is o n , w ith  sp e n d in g  o f  ju s t  o v e r  5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  1990, t r e n d in g  u p  
to  ro u g h ly  10 p e rc e n t in  2007. T h e  d ifference  in  th e  tw o  is in  th e ir  g ro w th  
p a th s : w h ile  C o lo m b ia  p ro m o te d  v e ry  in ten siv e  sp e n d in g  g ro w th  in  th e  
firs t six y e a rs  b e fo re  s tab iliz in g , M ex ico  g rew  m o re  s tead ily  th r o u g h o u t  th e  
series, b u t  g ro w th  w a s  m o re  re s tra in e d  a n d  re g u la r . T h e  case  o f  A rg e n tin a  
a lso  d ese rv es c o m m e n t. D e sp ite  b e in g  th e  c o u n try  w ith  th e  sec o n d - la rg e s t 
sp e n d in g  a n d  a lso  h a v in g  p ro g re sse d  in  te rm s  o f  e x p e n d itu re  g ro w th , its  
so c ia l sp en d in g  g rew  m o re  slow ly  th a n  th a t  o f  its  n e ig h b o r in g  co u n tr ie s . 
T h ro u g h o u t  th e  se ries  th e re  w ere  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  so c ia l sp e n d in g , w h ich  in  
2006  a n d  2007 w ere  w ell a b o v e  20 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . N o n e th e le ss , th is  w as 
n o t  e n o u g h  to  lo se  its  s ta tu s  a s  th e  c o u n try  w ith  th e  la rg e s t e x p e n d itu re  in 
th e  a re a  in  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  G D P .
W h e n  th e  fo cu s  o f  th e  an a ly s is  sh ifts  f ro m  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  G D P  to  p e r  
c a p ita  sp en d in g , th e  re su lts  o f  th e  c o u n tr ie s  a re  m u tu a lly  v e ry  s im ila r, 
ex cep t in  th e  case  o f  A rg e n tin a . U n lik e  w h a t h a p p e n e d  in  th e  case  o f  
to ta l  sp en d in g , th is  c o u n try  sh o w s th e  m o s t s teep ly  r is in g  tr e n d  o f  th e  
five se lec ted  c o u n tr ie s . W h e re a s  in  1990, av e ra g e  sp e n d in g  p e r  p e rs o n  w as 
m o re  th a n  U S $ 1 ,0 0 0  (a t 2000 p rices), in  2007 it  h a d  su rp a sse d  U S $ 2 ,0 0 0  
(in  2000  p rices) d e sp ite  th e  s h a rp  fa ll th a t  o c c u rre d  in  2 0 0 2 -0 3 . G D P
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BOX 4.2 DECENTRALIZATION OF BRAZILIAN 
PUBLIC SPENDING IN 2009
Brazil is a federation, in fact and by law, and that gives its decen­
tralization experience particular relevance -  it was motivated 
much more by political decisions taken during the drafting of the 
1988 Constitution, which marked the country’s return to democ­
racy and promoted a vigorous decentralization of tax revenue, 
particularly towards local governments. This means that the 
decentralization process was not mainly the result of a deliber­
ate plan, but was imposed by the loss of federal government tax 
revenue, which required its reduction in general government. But 
a decade and a half ago, general government returned to active 
social policies. Initially, it adopted deliberate decentralization 
processes, in terms of basic education and the national health 
system. Recently, it has prioritized consolidating income transfer 
programs and expanding social insurance schemes.
Publication of the national consolidation of balance sheets for all 
governments to 20091 makes it possible to produce an up-to-date 
and detailed table of the state of the art, regarding both the size of 
the country’s public expenditure and its degree of federative division 
-  from the standpoint of the government that actually incurred the 
expense, but not necessarily the entity that financed it (estimates 
were made to provide the breakdown by government function).
In 2009, the level of primary and social public spending 
reached significant levels in Brazil, close to those of the advanced 
economies.
Total general government primary expenditure amounted to 37 
percent of GDP (if interest and debt service are included, it would 
approach 40 percent), just half of which is executed by the federal 
government, 30 percent by state governments, and 20 percent by 
the municipal governments.
According to the same accounts consolidation, expenditure 
on social programs would amount to 24.7 percent of GDP using 
a broader definition of social spending. Its relative importance is 
even greater when one considers that it accounts for two-thirds 
of general government primary expenditure, and represents 
around US$2,300 per inhabitant. Its level of decentralization is 
not far from the global standard: federal government executed 52 
percent of expenditure, with 27 percent being executed by state 
governments and 20 percent by municipal governments.
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Consolidated government in 2009: expenditure by function and 





% of function Amount Share
Total Union States Municipalities Total R$/hab %
Total
= Fiscal 36.99 49.5 30.2 20.3 6,071 100
Pension 11.45 80.5 15.6 3.9 100 1,879 31.0
saving
Assistance 1.33 75.1 7.7 17.2 100 219 3.6
Labor 0.98 94.1 3.4 2.6 100 160 2.6
= protection 13.76 81.0 14.0 5.1 100 2,258 37.2
Education 4.54 18.4 38.2 43.4 100 744 12.3
Health 3.73 15.3 35.9 48.8 100 613 10.1
Sanitation 0.32 0.3 30.7 69.0 100 53 0.9
Housing 0.15 0.6 40.6 58.8 100 25 0.4
= universal 8.75 16.1 37.0 46.9 100 1,436 23.6
Safety/ 1.47 13.0 82.8 4.2 100 241 4.0
security
Related (*) 0.71 24.1 46.3 29.7 100 116 1.9
= Social 24.68 52.3 27.2 20.6 100 4,051 66.7
= other 2.48 39.3 50.6 10.1 100 407 6.7
authorities
= others 9.82 45.2 32.6 22.2 100 1,612 26.6
Note: 'Environmental management, culture, sports and leisure, citizens’ rights.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the 2009 balance sheet 
consolidation, published by the Treasury, 3 August 2010.
Those aggregate results conceal quite varied sizes, both in terms 
of the nature, and (particularly) in relation to the responsibility of 
each sphere of government.
A breakdown of social spending by type shows that, in rela­
tion to GDP in 2009 13.8 percent was accounted for by social 
protection functions, 8.7 percent by universal services, and 2.2 
percent by related programs (such as public safety, leisure, sport, 
culture). Excluding the last category, under the stricter definition 
and possibly better for the purposes of international comparison, 
social spending is on the order of 22.5 percent of GDP (in line 
with the ECLAC statistics mentioned above). A comparison of the 
other two shows that targeted programs absorb nearly 1.6 times
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more resources than those considered universal, and it is pre­
cisely those that are essentially centralized.2
The social protection bloc is led by social insurance (11.5 
percent of GDP) which alone absorbs 31.0 percent of Brazilian 
primary expenditure. As would be expected, 81.0 percent of 
expenditure is undertaken by the central government, because 
that level includes the general regime of retirement and pensions, 
including workers from the private sector (the subnational share 
of expenditure is explained by the income paid to retired civil 
servants, and pensioners). Labor (1.0 percent of GDP) includes 
unemployment insurance among other programs, and for that 
reason displays the highest level of centralization (94 percent) 
among social spending. Social assistance has expanded (1.2 
percent of GDP), and central government accounts for three- 
quarters of this, following the consolidation and expansion of the 
Bolsa Familia income transfer program.
Universal programs consist mainly of education (4.5 percent 
of GDP) and health (3.7 percent) because public expenditure 
on sanitation and housing is very low (0.32 and 0.15 percent, 
respectively). Decentralization predominates here. Although the 
federal universities are the largest in the country, the large 
public basic education network which is increasingly decentral­
ized implies that municipalities account for 43 percent of social 
spending on education, followed by 38 percent by the states, and 
just 18 percent by the federal government. In the health sector, 
although the central level provides most of the financing, expendi­
ture is increasingly decided on by other spheres of government; 
and, surprisingly, local government alone accounts for half of 
all spending, compared to 36 percent at the state level, and 15 
percent at the federal level. The municipal predominance is also 
significant in the small amount spent on sanitation and housing, 
with virtually no expenditure executed by the federal government 
(although it finances part of that spending).
Although Brazil has a volume of non-social public spending, by 
the government as a whole, way above the level in other Latin 
American countries, the federative composition of that spending 
is not very different from the pattern seen in the other countries.
Social protection Is expenditure made mainly by the central 
sphere of government, especially if there is no special pension 
regime for civil servants, as there is in the Brazilian case but not
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in many other countries. A degree of decentralization is expected 
only in the case of social assistance when it involves actions 
(such as shelter for the homeless) that have lost ground in rela­
tion to the benefits of income transfer programs.
In a totally different federative scenario, expenses on so-called 
universal or structural programs, such as education, health, low- 
income housing and sanitation, tend to be decentralized, with an 
intensity that is greater to the extent that the country is organized 
as a federation -  in other words, a unitary state that opted for an 
intensive program of fiscal decentralization. The major difference 
between Brazil and other decentralized Latin American countries 
is possibly the importance of municipal governments, which is 
growing and already a majority in that case.3 In the other coun­
tries, the intermediate government spheres must predominate 
-  see the discussion of the role of municipalities in the region’s 
social policies in Cetràngolo (2006).
Notes:
1. The balance sheets of all government entitles are consolidated by the 
Ministry of Finance and published on the National Treasury portal at: http:// 
www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/hp/est_consoLgeral.asp. It is important to note 
that publication merely presents a summary of the amounts reported by 
Its balance sheet, without any critical evaluation. For the purposes of this 
analysis, intergovernmental transfers were eliminated. This means that 
the standpoint of this calculation is that of the government responsible for 
direct expenditure execution, for which reason only the expenses actually 
undertaken by that government level are calculated (moreover, such trans­
fers recorded as expenditure when granted amounted to 8.4% of GDP, but 
revenue actually collected was 8.1%).
2. The priority for expenditure on protection in relation to universal services 
can also be seen in terms of the trend in Brazil. It is interesting to note that, 
in comparison, a similar survey based on the consolidation of government 
balance sheets for 2004 found an increase of 1.04 percentage points of GDP 
in expenditure on the three functions identified as social protection (pensions, 
assistance and labor five years ago spent 11.07%, 0.65% and 1% of GDP, 
respectively), compared to an increase of just 0.53 percentage points of GDP 
In the group encompassing the four so-called universal functions (education, 
health, sanitation and housing spent 4.36%, 3.46%, 0.30%, and 0.12% of 
GDP, respectively).
3. Comparing the federative division of by Brazilian consolidated government 
expenditure in 2009 with that of 2004, there is a clear increase in the local 
share in the two main universal programs: health, which jumped from 41% to 
49% of national expenditure, and education from 35% to 43%, in both cases, 
compared to reduction in the share of the federal and state levels.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Mote: Latin America and the Caribbean is defined as a weighted average of the countries. 
Includes estimates for years where data on certain countries are missing. Colombia: 
Preliminary figures; from 2000 onwards from the Ministry of Finance not comparable with 
earlier years. The previous series was obtained from the N ational Planning Departm ent and 
the National Statistical Administrative Department (DANE).
Source: ECLAC (2009).
Figure 4.5 Latin America (selected countries and Latin  America and the 
Caribbean) : social public spending (% o f  GDP)
p e r  c a p ita  sp e n d in g  in  r e la tio n  to  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  s h o u ld  b e  h ig h lig h te d . 
C o m p a re d , fo r  ex am p le , to  B raz il, th e  c o u n try  w ith  th e  se c o n d  h ig h es t 
level o f  p e r  c a p i ta  sp e n d in g , A rg e n tin a  h a s  a lm o s t d o u b le  B ra z il’s level o f  
soc ia l sp en d in g  p e r  c a p ita . M o re  a c c e n tu a te d  still, is th e  d is ta n c e  in  re la ­
t io n  to  th e  c o n tin e n ta l  av e rag e .
In  te rm s  o f  th e  ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f  p e r  c a p ita  so c ia l sp en d in g , th e  o th e r  
fo u r  c o u n tr ie s  a ll b e h a v e d  v e ry  s im ila rly  to  th e  L a t in  A m e ric a n  av e rag e . 
O n ly  B raz il d isp la y e d  a  s lig h tly  fa s te r  g ro w th  a t  th e  en d  o f  th e  series. In  
te rm s  o f  th e  v o lu m e  o f  sp e n d in g  th ro u g h  tim e , B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia  s ta n d  
o u t fo r  o p p o s i te  re a so n s . B raz il, d e sp ite  b e in g  c lo se  to  th e  av e rag e , a lw ays 
h a d  its  p e r  c a p ita  so c ia l sp en d in g  a b o v e  th e  L a tin  A m e ric a n  av e rag e , 
re a c h in g  a  level o f  ro u g h ly  U S $ 1 ,0 0 0  (a t  2000 p rices) in  2007. In  c o n tr a s t ,  
C o lo m b ia  d isp la y e d  a  level c lea rly  b e lo w  th e  c o n tin e n t av e ra g e  th r o u g h ­
o u t  th e  tim e  series, b a re ly  su rp a ss in g  U S $ 5 0 0  p e r  c a p i ta  (a t  2000 p rices).
T h e  n e x t s tep  is to  an a ly z e  th e  t r e n d  o f  soc ia l sp e n d in g  se p a ra te ly  fo r 
e a c h  sec to r m e n tio n e d  a t  th e  s ta r t  o f  th is  sec tio n . B efo re  th a t ,  h o w ev er, 
it  is w o r th  n o tin g , in  re la tio n  to  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  th is  a n a ly s is , th a t  th e  
p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  as  a  w h o le  w as m a tc h e d  by  in c rea se s  in
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th e  level o f  e x p e n d itu re  u n d e r ta k e n  b y  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  in  th e  
reg io n . J im en ez  (2006a) c o m p a re d  sp e n d in g  b y  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  
as  a  p r o p o r t io n  o f  G D P  fro m  th e  seco n d  h a lf  o f  th e  1980s u n ti l  th e  f irs t 
h a l f  o f  th e  firs t d e c a d e  o f  th e  tw en ty -firs t c e n tu ry ; a p a r t  f ro m  B raz il, he  
fo u n d  in c reases  in  seven  c o u n tr ie s  o f  th e  re g io n  (A rg e n tin a , B o liv ia , C h ile , 
C o lo m b ia , C o s ta  R ic a , M ex ico  a n d  P a ra g u a y )  -  led  by  a  3.5 p e rc e n t o f  
G D P  in c rease  in  th e  case  o f  A rg e n tin a  a n d  a lso  M ex ico .
A lth o u g h  th e re  is a  la c k  o f  d is a g g re g a te d  a n d  c o n s is te n t d a ta  th a t  
w o u ld  m a k e  it p o ss ib le  to  p re p a re  a  m a tr ix  c ro s s -re fe re n c in g  e x p e n d itu re  
b y  n a tu r e  a n d  fu n c t io n  a n d  g o v e rn m e n t p ro g ra m , th e re  is ev id en ce  ( to  be 
d iscu ssed  b e lo w , by  e x p e n d itu re  b lo c s) th a t  th e  g re a te r  p re se n c e  o f  s u b ­
n a t io n a l  sp h e res  in  L a tin  A m e ric a n  g o v e rn m e n ts  o v e r th e  la s t  few  y ea rs  
h a s  b een  a ss o c ia te d  w ith  b e tte r  p ro v is io n  o f  so c ia l serv ices. N o n e th e le ss , 
i f  th e  p ro g re ss  in  so c ia l sp e n d in g  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , in  th em se lv es , c a n  
be  seen  as p o s itiv e  f ro m  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f  d e m o c ra tiz a tio n  o f  th e  re g io n  
a n d  t r a d i t io n a l  fe d e ra lism  id ea s , b y  b r in g in g  serv ice  p ro v is io n  c lo se r to  th e  
m o s t b en e fited  c o m m u n ity , th is  c o u ld  a lso  p o se  n ew  p ro b le m s  i f  th e  t r a n s ­
fe r o f  re sp o n s ib ili ty  fo r  sp e n d in g  to  s u b n a tio n a l levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t w ere  
n o t  m a tc h e d  in  te rm s  o f  fin a n c in g  c a p a c ity . I f  su ch  a  m ism a tc h  ex is ted , it  
w o u ld  n o t  b e  lo n g  b e fo re  p ro b le m s  o f  ju r is d ic tio n , efficiency a n d  m a c r ­
o e c o n o m ic  s ta b ility  s ta r te d  to  a p p e a r . T h e re  is th u s  a  v e ry  fu ll a g e n d a  o f  
issues to  be  a d d re s se d  by  e v a lu a tio n s  o f  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e s s  in  
th e  re g io n , fo r  w h ich , a t  le a s t fo r  th o se  th a t  c a n  b e  d o n e  in  th e  re g io n a l o r  
c o n tin e n ta l  sp h e re , th e  la ck  o f  a  c o n s is te n t a n d  u p - to -d a te  s ta tis tic a l b a se  
n eed s  to  b e  o v e rco m e . T h is  is a  p ro b le m  th a t  c a n n o t  b e  o v e rs ta te d  in  th is  
s tu d y .
Social Security and Assistance
A s n o te d  ab o v e , th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  so c ia l p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  
h a s  b een  b a se d  o n  ta rg e te d  so c ia l p ro g ra m s . E x c e p t fo r  C h ile , th e  a n a ly s is  
b y  c o u n try  d o es n o t  a d d re s s  th is  th es is . B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia , in  p a r ­
t ic u la r , sh o w  v e ry  s ig n ific an t g ro w th  o f  sp e n d in g  o n  so c ia l se c u r ity  a n d  
a ss is ta n c e  (w h ich  a re  ty p ic a lly  ta rg e te d  so c ia l ex p en ses) th r o u g h o u t  th e  
1990s a n d  2000s. B raz il, w h ich  in  1990 sp e n t ju s t  o v e r 8 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  
o n  th is  ty p e  o f  so c ia l e x p e n d itu re , in  2007 w as c lo se  to  13 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . 
C o lo m b ia  p o s te d  ev en  s t ro n g e r  g ro w th , f ro m  a ro u n d  2 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  a t  
th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  series to  n e a rly  7 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  2007 -  m o re  th a n  t r ip ­
ling  e x p e n d itu re  o n  th is  ty p e  o f  po licy . I t  is a lso  w o r th  n o tin g  th a t  B raz il 
b ecam e  th e  le a d e r  in  th is  ty p e  o f  e x p e n d itu re  a m o n g  th e  se lec ted  c o u n tr ie s . 
I n  th e  m id -1990s, B ra z il ia n  e x p e n d itu re  o n  so c ia l se cu rity  su rp a s se d  th a t  
o f  A rg e n tin a , a n d  th is  t r e n d  h a s  b een  m a in ta in e d .
9 0 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
M ex ico  is th e  le a d in g  c o u n try  in  th is  sam p le . A t th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  series it 
h a d  v ir tu a lly  n o  so c ia l se cu rity  e x p e n d itu re , b u t  b y  th e  seco n d  h a l f  o f  th e  
2000s, its  e x p e n d itu re  w as  a ro u n d  2 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . In  A rg e n tin a , d e sp ite  
so m e  g ro w th  in  th is  ty p e  o f  ta rg e te d  e x p e n d itu re , th e  t r e n d  in c rea se  w as 
v e ry  sm all, a n d  c a n  b e  b e t te r  d e sc r ib e d  as s ta b il ity  r a th e r  th a n  g ro w th . 
C h ile  a lo n e  re d u c e d  its ta rg e te d  sp en d in g , re a c h in g  a  level o f  ju s t  b e lo w  6 
p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  2007 , c o m p a re d  to  n e a rly  8 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  a t  th e  s ta r t  
o f  th e  1990s.
In  b rie f, o n  a v e rag e , ta rg e te d  soc ia l sp e n d in g  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  
th e  C a r ib b e a n  ro se  f ro m  a ro u n d  5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  a t  th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  
tim e  series to  n e a r ly  8 p e rc e n t b y  th e  e n d  o f  th e  p e r io d  (2 0 0 6 -0 7 ). T h is  
m o v e m e n t p ro b a b ly  s h o u ld  a lso  cau se  e x p e n d itu re  o n  se cu rity  a n d  soc ia l 
w e lfa re  to  in c rea se  th e ir  w e ig h t o n  th e  b u d g e ts  o f  th e  r e g io n ’s g o v e rn ­
m e n ts , rev e rs in g  th e  g a p  seen  f ro m  th e  s t ru c tu re  o f  sp e n d in g  in  a d v a n c e d  
eco n o m ies . B e tw een  1970 a n d  2000, d e  M ello  (2004) n o te d  th a t  th is  g ro u p  
c o n su m e d  ju s t  22 p e rc e n t o f  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t e x p e n d itu re , less th a n  5 
p e rc e n t o f  in te rm e d ia te  e x p e n d itu re  a n d  u n d e r  3 p e rc e n t o f  lo ca l e x p e n d i­
tu re , w h e rea s  th e  sam e p r o p o r t io n  w as s ig n ifican tly  h ig h e r  o n  a v e ra g e  in  
th e  O E C D  (34, 13 a n d  15 p e rc e n t by  th e  re sp ec tiv e  g o v e rn m e n t sp h eres). 
T h is  a lso  m e a n s  th a t  i f  th is  is a  ty p ica lly  c e n tra liz e d  fo rm  o f  e x p e n d itu re , 
th e  te n d e n c y  is m o re  a c c e n tu a te d  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  th a n  in  th e  m o re  
a d v a n c e d  e co n o m ies .
T h is  g ap  b e tw e e n  re g io n s  sh o u ld  h av e  d im in ish e d  a f te r  th e  tu r n  o f  
th e  c e n tu ry . T h e re  is n o  d o u b t  th a t  th e  m o s t d y n a m ic  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  
th e  re c e n t t r e n d  o f  soc ia l sp en d in g  in  th e  re g io n  w ere  soc ia l secu rity  
a n d  p o v e r ty  re d u c t io n . In  th is  case , it  is w o rth  n o tin g  th a t  c o n d it io n a l 
t r a n s fe r  p ro g ra m s  a re  n o w  re a c h in g  s ig n ifican t p ro p o r t io n s  in  so m e  c o u n ­
trie s . A c c o rd in g  to  J im én ez  (2006a), th e  b e n e f ic ia r ie s - to -p o p u la tio n  ra t io  
re a c h e d  25 p e rc e n t in  M ex ico  ( Oportunidades), 16 p e rc e n t in  B raz il (Bolsa 
Familia), 9 p e rc e n t in  J a m a ic a  (Avance) a n d  4  p e rc e n t in  C o lo m b ia , w ith  
e x p e n d itu re  levels o f  a ro u n d  0.3 p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts  o f  G D P  in  th e se  fo u r  
c o u n tr ie s . B o x  4 .3  ex am in es  n e w  issues th a t  a re  a r is in g  fo r  th e  fe d e ra tiv e  
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  reg io n , in  re la tio n  to  a  specific a r ra n g e m e n t u se d  by  
th e  fo rm u la t io n  a n d  e x e c u tio n  o f  th o se  new  p ro g ra m s  w ith in  th e  fed e ra l 
a n d  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n t sp h e re s , w h ich  ex c lu d es th e  in te rm e d ia te  level, w ith  
th e  B raz ilian  ca se  th e  m o s t c le a r-c u t ex am p le  o f  th is  p ro ce ss .
Health
A lo n g  w ith  e x p e n d itu re  o n  so c ia l secu rity  a n d  a ss is ta n c e , p u b lic  h e a lth  
e x p e n d itu re , c h a ra c te r iz e d  as  u n iv e rsa l, h a s  a lso  g ro w n  since th e  ea rly  
1990s, b u t in  a  s ig n ifican tly  sm a lle r  p ro p o r t io n . A s a n  a v e rag e  fo r  th e
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BOX 4.3 POVERTY REDUCTION AND 
FEDERALISM REVISITED
As a response to the structural problem of poverty and the 
adverse circumstances faced by emerging economies at the turn 
of the century, several initiatives were undertaken to create and 
expand income transfer programs.
In Latin America, the motivations were different, and so were 
the time periods; often more than one program was created in the 
same country and then consolidated; conditionality was a very 
common element, but the point that was always common was the 
design of the policy and implementation of expenditure directed 
by the central sphere of government. While the initiatives were 
welcome and, in principle, successful in reducing poverty, new 
issues were raised for the federative or decentralization debate 
because the relation between decentralization and the impact 
of public policies, particularly policy to reduce poverty and social 
inequalities was not always directly visible (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Sepulveda, 2009).
Here, again, the Brazilian case is emblematic.1 The federal 
government rapidly became the main financier and direct execu­
tor of such programs, particularly after consolidating several of 
them in the Bolsa Familia program. This led to a direct relation 
with beneficiaries (apart from that achieved within the general 
social insurance regime, in which local governments played a 
secondary role of maintaining cadastres (property registers) and 
monitoring the supported families, whereas state governments 
had no function -  either coordination or evaluation.
In other countries, however, this change may have been even 
more radical than in Brazil and is causing changes in the fed­
erative pattern and even in the organization of states. The vast 
majority of federations follow a classical model formed by the 
union of member states; local government is a creation of each 
state. Thus, in these federative countries, in principle, central 
government does not deal directly with the local sphere. Brazil 
has always been an exception to that rule, however.
Progress with income transfer programs, particularly in a 
region with chronic poverty and inequality such as Latin America, 
is raising new challenges and important issues for federalism 
and fiscal decentralization that have not yet been analyzed and
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responded to in the necessary depth. The basic issue is: what 
are the repercussions of the creation and expansion of social 
income transfer programs by central governments, for intergov­
ernmental relations and for the federative division of resources 
and expenditure?
The challenge of making public sen/ices more efficient 
and effective requires greater attention to social policies -  as 
Cetràngolo (2006, p. 25) warns, ‘When social programs involve 
local governments it is necessary to combat cronyism, generate 
adequate information and establish compensatory financing’.
Intergovernmental relations need to be rethought -  in particu­
lar owing to the trend of central government to relate directly to 
the lower spheres of government, producing or even dispensing 
with interference from the intermediate level of government. The 
greatest concern is that such assistance programs lack integra­
tion with other social and regional development public policies, 
to make it possible to address the structural issue; and, in the 
medium or long term, with the acceleration of growth and job 
creation, welfare benefits could be reduced.
Note: 1. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Afonso (2007).
c o n tin e n t, e x p e n d itu re  in  th is  se c to r  ro se  fro m  3 to  3.5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  
1990 a n d  2007.
B raz il is th e  c o u n try  w ith  th e  g re a te s t g ro w th  in  p u b lic  h e a lth  e x p e n d i­
tu re : in  2007, it  re a c h e d  a  level o f  ju s t  o v e r 4 .5  p e rc e n t o f  G D P , c lo se  to  
th e  A rg e n tin e  level, w h e re a s  in  1990 it  w as s ligh tly  o v e r  3 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . 
C h ile  a n d  A rg e n tin a , d e sp ite  h a v in g  d iffe ren t levels o f  h e a lth  e x p e n d i­
tu re , d isp la y e d  a  re la tiv e ly  c o n s ta n t  tr e n d , o f  ro u g h ly  1 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  
b e tw e e n  o n e  p o in t  in  tim e  a n d  th e  o th e r: w h e rea s  h e a lth  e x p e n d itu re  in  
C h ile  ro se  f ro m  ju s t  u n d e r  2 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  to  3 p e rc e n t, A rg e n tin a  g rew  
fro m  ju s t  o v e r 4  p e rc e n t o f  G D P  to  a ro u n d  5 p e rc e n t.
P u b lic  h e a lth  e x p e n d itu re  in  C o lo m b ia  a n d  M ex ico  w as a ty p ic a l. In  th e  
firs t case, th e re  w as s ig n ific an t g ro w th  f ro m  1990 to  1999, r is in g  f ro m  1 to  
3 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . N o n e th e le s s , th e  su b se q u e n t p e r io d  u n ti l  2003, saw  a 
s h a rp  fa ll to  th e  level o f  2 p e rc e n t o f  G D P , b e fo re  s ta b iliz in g  a t  th a t  level. 
In  th e  seco n d  case , e x p e n d itu re  in itia lly  fell u n ti l  1997 (f ro m  3 to  n e a rly  2 
p e rc e n t o f  G D P ) , b e fo re  slow ly  re c o v e r in g  to  re g a in  th e  in itia l level o f  3 
p e rc e n t in  2007.
T h e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a tio n  e x p e n d itu re  is a  ty p ica l
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a n d  w ell-e s tab lish ed  fe a tu re  o f  th e  m o s t a d v a n c e d  fed e ra tiv e  ex p erien ces 
in  S o u th  A m erica . J im én ez  (2006a) r e p o r te d  th a t ,  in  2003, th e  s u b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts ’ sh a res  o f  n a tio n a l e x p e n d itu re  in  th ese  tw o  a re a s  w as  59 
p e rc e n t in  A rg e n tin a , 52 p e rc e n t in  B o liv ia  (P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f), 50 
p e rc e n t in  B razil a n d  48  p e rc e n t in  C o lo m b ia  (in  th e  la s t tw o  c o u n tr ie s , on ly  
m u n ic ip a litie s  w ere  c o u n te d ) . In  a  rev iew  o f  th e  c o m p o s it io n  o f  ex p e n d itu re  
by  n a tu re  in  e a c h  o f  th e  th re e  sp h eres  o f  g o v e rn m e n t in  1970 a n d  2000, 
d e  M ello  (2004) sh o w ed  th a t  h e a lth  a c c o u n te d  fo r  70  p e rc e n t o f  fed e ra l 
ex p e n d itu re  in  L a tin  A m e ric a n  co u n tr ie s , c o m p a re d  to  9 p e rc e n t a m o n g  
O E C D  g o v e rn m en ts , w h e re a s  th e  o p p o s ite  w as  tru e  o f  o th e r  g o v e rn m e n t 
levels (a t  th e  in te rm e d ia te  g o v e rn m e n t levels 14 p e rc e n t c o m p a re d  to  90 
p e rc e n t, a n d  in  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n t 8 p e rc e n t c o m p a re d  to  11 p e rc e n t, re sp e c ­
tive ly ). In  o th e r  w o rd s , i f  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  e x p e n d itu re  in  w e a lth y  c o u n tr ie s  
w as  ta k e n  a s  a  p a ra d ig m , it w o u ld  be  p o ss ib le  to  p re d ic t th a t  h e a lth  w ill lo se  
g ro u n d  in  th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t b u d g e t in  L a tin  A m erica , w hile  in c re a s ­
in g  its  size a m o n g  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m en ts . B ox  4 .4  d iscusses a  n u m b e r  
o f  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  th is  p ro c e ss  in  th e  reg io n , b a s e d  o n  a  li te ra tu re  review .
Education
P u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  o n  e d u c a t io n  is th e  o n ly  c a te g o ry , a m o n g  th e  fo u r  
ty p es  o f  soc ia l e x p e n d itu re  b e in g  a n a ly z e d , in  w h ich  all five c o u n tr ie s  h av e  
m a d e  p ro g re ss  in  th e  19 9 0 -2 0 0 7  p e r io d , d e sp ite  h ig h ly  f lu c tu a t in g  p a th s  in  
so m e  cases -  p a r t ic u la r ly  B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia .
B e tw een  1990 a n d  2007 , A rg e n tin a  is th e  c o u n try  th a t  sp e n t m o s t p u b lic  
fu n d s  o n  e d u c a tio n , r is in g  f ro m  ju s t  o v e r 3.5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  th e  f irs t 
y e a r  o f  th e  series to  ju s t  o v e r 5 p e rc e n t in  th e  fin a l y ea r. T h ese  fig u res  a re  
very  s im ila r to  th o se  re p o r te d  b y  B raz il, w h e re  e x p e n d itu re  w as s ligh tly  
lo w e r th a n  in  A rg e n tin a  in  th e  re sp ec tiv e  y ea rs . N o n e th e le s s , p u b lic  
ex p e n d itu re  o n  e d u c a t io n  th r o u g h o u t  th e  1990s w as m u c h  m o re  v o la tile  in  
B raz il th a n  in  A rg e n tin a . U p  to  2001 , e x p e n d itu re  in  B raz il ro se  a n d  fell 
successively , b e fo re  re s ta b iliz in g . I n  th e  A rg e n tin e  case , th e re  w as s te a d y  
g ro w th  u n ti l  2003, w h en  th e re  w as a  fa ll, b e fo re  re su m in g  re g u la r  g ro w th  
o n ce  a g a in . T h e  b e h a v io r  o f  e d u c a t io n  e x p e n d itu re  in  A rg e n tin a  is s im ila r 
to  th e  L a tin  A m e ric a n  a v e ra g e  c o m p a re d  to  B raz il, s ince it  is c h a ra c te r iz e d  
by  a  v e ry  sm o o th  series w ith o u t su d d e n  c h an g es .
C h ile  a n d  M ex ico  a re  tw o  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  d isp lay in g  a  v ery  sm o o th  
cu rv e  o f  p u b lic  e d u c a t io n  e x p e n d itu re , im p ly in g  a  s te a d y  ra te  o f  g ro w th  
th ro u g h  tim e . B o th  c o u n tr ie s  s ta r t  f ro m  a  level o f  e x p e n d itu re  c lo se  to  
2 .5  p e rc e n t o f  G D P  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  1990s. M e x ic a n  e x p e n d itu re  
g rew  ra p id ly  u n ti l  1995, b e fo re  s tab iliz in g  a ro u n d  4 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . In  
c o n tra s t , C h ile ’s e x p e n d itu re  g rew  slow ly  b u t  s te ad ily  u n ti l  2003 , w h en  it
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BOX 4.4 HEALTH AND DECENTRALIZATION IN 
LATIN AMERICA
To a greater or lesser extent, each of the five countries selected 
to represent Latin America in this analysis displays a developed 
process of decentralization In its respective health system. 
This characteristic could be projected for the other Latin 
American countries and be classified as a common feature. 
This explanatory box reviews a number of Latin American 
health systems.
Argentina
From the standpoint of intergovernmental relations and decen­
tralization, the Argentine health system has changed little since 
the 1990s.1 According to Uga and Santos (2007), ‘although 
the Ministry of Health is the top authority, the provinces have 
autonomy to formulate and implement public health policies 
and are also responsible for service provision. In that system, 
the municipalities are responsible for implementing the pro­
grams and services within their jurisdictions, but municipal 
autonomy and responsibility are defined by each province. 
Under these conditions, the 1990s reform basically affected the 
social security and health system . . .  and did not greatly alter 
the federative system in terms of inter-governmental relations’ 
(Uga and Santos, 2007, p. 542). Changes to the already highly 
decentralized system were marginal, as shown in the following 
table:
Number of public sector establishments, by level of dependency, 
1980-1995
Year National Provincial Municipal Other official 
dependency
Total
1980 51 3,507 903 187 4,648
(1.1%) (75.5%) (19.4%) (4.0%) (100%)
1995 16 4,628 2003 324 6,971
(0.2%) (66.4%) (28.7%) (4.6%) (100%)
Source: Belmartino et al. (2001).
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In simplified terms, the health actions of the Argentine public 
sector can be described as municipalities being responsible for 
basic health care for the population, with their actions being 
undertaken independently. Central government operates in the 
provinces through Health Ministry delegations supported by 
other agencies. The Ministry of Health and Social Assistance has 
decentralized agencies, which strengthens the network nature of 
the country’s public health system (Piola and Cavalcante, 2004).
Colombia
The Colombian public health system has become more decen­
tralized since the early 1990s, as a result of the regular transfer of 
central government powers to the municipalities, which now regu­
late the private and public agencies that participate in the system. 
Note that along with the transfer of competencies to regional gov­
ernments, the 1990s reform also promoted a downsizing of the 
state’s role in providing health services (privatization). A system 
was created ‘of private insurance, financed by public and private 
funds, and consisting of private health insurance companies -  
Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) -  and private and public 
health service providers -  Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios 
de Salud (IPS) (public hospitals reorganized under the legal form 
of State social enterprises with private management tools)’ (Ugá 
and Santos, 2007, p. 538).
One of the principles governing the Colombian health system 
since then has been public financing of private insurance for 
low-income population groups. In other words, there is targeting 
within the country’s public health system, because only the target 
public has its expenses financed by the public sector. Even health 
expenditure, which, in principle, is a universal type of expense, 
involves means testing with access limited to specific population 
groups. Thus, as in most Latin American countries, social spend­
ing in Colombia is predominantly targeted; this aspect of health 
expenditure strengthens this situation even further.
Chile
The Chilean health system was decentralized earlier, starting in 
2000, during the government of Ricardo Lagos: ‘The Ministry of 
Health started to play a more regulatory role, leaving the health 
supervisors (Superintendencias) to undertake direct actions and
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monitor private and public actions. To streamline the system 
and health units, mechanisms for decentralizing powers to the 
regional authorities and self-management of hospitals will be 
introduced in the ministry’s work system’ (Biasoto, 2006, p. 291).
Mexico
As in the Colombian case, Mexico also developed a health 
system with a high level of targeting. As part of the fiscal adjust­
ment imposed on developing countries in the 1990s, the Mexican 
government prioritized ‘specialization in the medical sphere in 
terms of public health, the aim of which was to ascertain the 
population’s needs and meet demand by ensuring equilibrium 
between those needs and resources’ (Almeida and Pêgo, 2002, 
cited by Ugâ and Santos, 2007).
According to Merino (2003), ‘two decentralization processes 
can be distinguished in Mexico. The first occurred during the 
1980s in an attempt to decentralize the management of health 
service delivery. In that process, the management of several 
hospitals and other health services was transferred, and insur­
ance and health institutions were integrated at the local level. 
Nonetheless, this process was identified with a déconcentra­
tion of functions rather than a decentralization process, since 
no policy formulation responsibility was transferred to the local 
level. The second decentralization process began in 1996, when 
it was presented as one of the key strategies of the health sector 
reform program of 1995-2000. The central pillar of that program 
consisted of reversing the excessive centralism of the health 
system and, consequently, the apparently inefficient resource 
allocation decisions: failure to specify the responsibilities of each 
level of government, excessive bureaucracy and inertia in deci­
sions regarding the destination of expenditure between the states 
(Merino, 2003)’ (Ugâ and Santos, 2007, p. 540).
Brazil
According to data obtained by Afonso and Castro (2010), public 
health expenditure in Brazil has featured two contrasting trends 
since the introduction of the 1988 Constitution: first, from 1988 to 
1997, greater centralization, with the Union accounting for one-fifth 
of expenditure in 1988, and one-half in 1997; second, from 1990 
to 2008, greater decentralization, with subnational governments
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raising their share of expenditure from just over 55 percent in 
1998 to roughly 71.5 percent in 2008. A detailed explanation of 
the Brazilian health system is provided in Box 4.1.
Note: 1. One of the explanations for this process is the decentralization of health 
services in Argentina that occurred in 1978.
a t ta in e d  th e  level o f  4  p e rc e n t o f  G D P . S ince th e n , e x p e n d itu re  d ec lin ed  
u n ti l  th e  e n d  o f  th e  series, w h e n  e d u c a t io n  e x p e n d itu re  a m o u n te d  to  ju s t  
o v e r  3 p e rc e n t o f  G D P .
L a s tly , p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  o n  e d u c a t io n  in  C o lo m b ia  d isp la y e d  slow  
g ro w th  in  a  p o in t - to -p o in t  c o m p a r iso n : f ro m  2 .5  p e rc e n t o f  G D P  to  
ro u g h ly  3 p e rc e n t, w ith  r a p id  g ro w th  u n ti l  1998/99, fo llo w ed  b y  a  
s u b s e q u e n t d ec lin e , a lso  ra p id , u n ti l  th e  e n d  o f  th e  series.
W hile  e d u c a tio n  e x p e n d itu re  w as h igh ly  sensitive to  th e  b u sin ess  cycle , it 
w as a lso  e ssen tia lly  d ecen tra lized , a lo n g s id e  h e a lth , as n o te d  a b o v e  -  a t  th e  
s ta r t  o f  th is  d ecad e , n e a rly  h a lf  o f  ex p e n d itu re  w as m a d e  by  s u b n a tio n a l g o v ­
e rn m e n ts  in  A rg e n tin a , B oliv ia , B razil a n d  C o lo m b ia , a c c o rd in g  to  J im én ez  
(2006a). B u t u n lik e  th e  p a t te rn  d esc rib ed  fo r  h e a lth , i f  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  p u b lic  
e x p e n d itu re  in  th e  ad v a n c e d  eco n o m ies w as a  p a ra d ig m  fo r  L a tin  A m erican  
c o u n tr ie s , th e  re c o m m e n d a tio n  w o u ld  be  to  sligh tly  e x p a n d  fu r th e r  th e  
m u n ic ip a liz a tio n  o f  e d u c a tio n  b u t g rea tly  red u ce  th e  space  th a t  th e  sec to r 
o ccu p ie s  in  b u d g e ts  a t  th e  in te rm e d ia te  g o v e rn m en t level a n d , in  p a r tic u la r , 
th e  c e n tra l level. T h is  is b ecau se , a cco rd in g  to  de  M ello  (2004), be tw een  1970 
a n d  2000, e d u c a tio n  a c c o u n te d  fo r  17 p e rcen t o f  loca l ex p e n d itu re  in  L a tin  
A m e ric a n  co u n tr ie s , c o m p a re d  to  19 p e rc e n t in  th e  O E C D , w h ile  a c c o u n tin g  
fo r  26 p e rc e n t in  c e n tra l g o v e rn m en t ex p e n d itu re  c o m p a re d  to  8 p e rcen t, a n d  
36 p e rc e n t o f  e x p e n d itu re  b y  in te rm e d ia te  g o v e rn m en t en titie s  c o m p a re d  to  
26 p e rcen t. A  b r ie f  e v a lu a tio n  o f  th a t  p ro cess  b a se d  o n  specific b ib lio g rap h ic  
re fe ren ces o n  th e  su b jec t is p re se n te d  in  B ox 4.5.
D e sp ite  h ig h e r  sp e n d in g  b y  all c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  e d u c a t io n  se c to r  (a lso  
a  u n iv e rsa l ex p en se ), th e  in c rea se  w as less in ten s iv e  th a n  th a t  o f  ta rg e te d  
e x p e n d itu re  su ch  a s  so c ia l secu rity . I t  is in te re s tin g  to  n o te  th a t  in v e s t­
m e n ts  in  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n , w h ic h  a re  a  p r io r i  d e fen s ib le  a s  u n iv e rsa l 
so c ia l-w e lfa re -e n h a n c in g  expenses , a lso  h a v e  p o te n t ia l  c o m p le m e n ta ri tie s , 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  fe d e ra tiv e  a n d  d e c e n tra liz e d  c o u n tr ie s . In  o th e r  w o rd s , as 
n o te d  b y  d e  M ello  a n d  P isu  (2009), a c tio n s  ta rg e te d  o n  p o licy  in itia tiv e s  
in  th e  e d u c a t io n  a re a  (h e a lth  a n d  w e lfa re  a ss is tan ce ), w h ich  seek  c o m ­
p le m e n ta r ity  in  h e a lth  c a re  (e d u c a tio n ) , c a n  be  m a d e  m o re  effective by  
g o v e rn m e n t a c tio n  to  p ro m o te  so c ia l d e v e lo p m e n t.
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BOX 4.5 EDUCATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
IN LATIN AMERICA
Most Latin American countries currently have a decentralized 
education system. Di Gropello (1997) shows, for the five countries 
analyzed here (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), 
the periods in which there were changes in the responsibilities 
attributed to the different spheres of government. Chilean munici­
palities started to manage primary schools in 1981, whereas in 
Colombia the 1991 constitution made municipalities responsible 
for schools’ physical infrastructure.
The Argentine education system started its decentralization 
process following the military dictatorship period, which began 
the process of transferring certain responsibilities to the provinces 
(Krawczyk and Rosar, 1999). According to Barreyro (2003), the 
decentralization process gathered pace under the Menem gov­
ernment (1989-99) when school administration passed directly 
to the country’s 24 provinces.1 1978 and 1992 can be considered 
key years for the transfer of management responsibility from the 
central government to the provinces, in the case of primary and 
secondary schools, respectively (Di Gropello, 1997), even though 
the initial attempts at decentralization occurred during the govern­
ment of Arturo Frondizi (1958-62) (Falleti, 2004). Furthermore, 
1994 can be seen as a landmark year, because it was then that 
the Federal Education Act was signed, in which the central gov­
ernment undertook to transfer resources to the provinces to help 
finance education.
An interesting feature in the recent history of Argentine edu­
cational policies is the emergence of targeting within education 
expenses, which have typically been classified as universal. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Argentine government adopted pro­
grams that directed resources towards specific schools, leaving 
the others without those benefits. The funds in question could be 
used to buy materials, books and equipment; undertake works 
to repair and expand school facilities; award study scholarships; 
and finance specific pedagogical guidance (Barreyro, 2003). As 
the volume of targeted social spending in Argentina already out­
weighed its universal expenses, this feature of educational policy 
made targeting even more important in determining the country’s 
social policies.
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In Mexico, the process began in 1992, when the states took over 
responsibility for primary schools. Apart from operational responsi­
bility, the federal government also transferred financial resources, 
students, and human resources (teachers) to the states. Mexico’s 
educational decentralization is criticized for making state gover­
nors mere educational administrators, without power to promote 
an improvement in educational services (Mizrahi, 2004).
In Brazil, the educational decentralization process intensified 
following the 1988 Constitution, and became a system char­
acterized by high levels of fragmentation and broad autonomy 
for federal entities in educational management (Draibe, 2002). 
Afonso and Castro (2010) use the official statistics of the Brazilian 
public sector to show that the states and, mainly, municipali­
ties, have increased their share of public education expenditure 
since 1988. Whereas subnational governments accounted for 58 
percent of total public sector education spending in 1988, this 
proportion had risen to 85.5 percent by 2008.
Note: 1. Dussel et al. (1998) argue that, although the provinces directly manage 
Argentine schools, there has been a vigorous recentralization of the educational 
system on four fronts: the establishment of common basic educational contents; 
evaluation of the education system; teacher training; and the implementation of 
compensatory policies. In that way, the authors suggest that the decentralization 
process in Argentina was merely apparent and, in reality, the central government 
under Menem did not give up control of the country’s  education policies.
Urban Development
T h e  fin a l p o in t  to  be  a d d re s se d  in  re la tio n  to  p u b lic  sp e n d in g  in  o th e r  
soc ia l a re a s , p a r t ic u la r ly  h o u s in g , s ta n d s  o u t  f ro m  th e  re s t b e c a u se  i t  d is ­
p lay s  tw o  d iffe ren t b e h a v io r  p a t te rn s  in  th e  tw o  d e c a d e s  u n d e r  ana ly s is . 
W h e re a s  in  th e  1990s, L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  k e p t  th e ir  sp e n d in g  in  th e  
se c to r  v ir tu a lly  s ta b le  ( th e re  w a s  even  a  s lig h t d ec line), in  th e  2000s th e re  
w as a  p o s itiv e  c h a n g e  o f  d ire c tio n , w ith  r a p id  g ro w th  u n ti l  2007 , b y  w h ich  
tim e  it re a c h e d  a  level o f  ro u g h ly  17 p e rc e n t o f  G D P . T h is  d y n a m ic  c a n  be 
c lea rly  seen  in  th e  in d iv id u a l cases o f  M ex ico  a n d  A rg e n tin a . In  M ex ico , 
h o u s in g  e x p e n d itu re  w as ju s t  u n d e r  1 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  1990, r is in g  to  
ju s t  o v e r 1 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  1999, a n d  e n d in g  th e  series (2007) a b o v e  2 
p e rc e n t o f  G D P . In  A rg e n tin a , e x p e n d itu re  s ta r te d  a t  1.6 p e rc e n t o f  G D P , 
d ro p p e d  to  1.5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  in  1999, b e fo re  re a c h in g  n e a r ly  2 p e rc e n t 
o f  G D P  in  2007.
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T h e  cases o f  B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia  a re  o p p o s ite s  in  te rm s  o f  h o u s in g  
e x p e n d itu re . T h e se  c o u n tr ie s  s ta r t  f ro m  v e ry  d iffe ren t levels a t  th e  b e g in ­
n in g  o f  th e  series: B raz il w ith  ju s t  u n d e r  1.5 p e rc e n t o f  G D P , a n d  C o lo m b ia  
w ith  0 .5  p e rc e n t. B y th e  e n d  o f  th e  1990s, th e  ro le s  rev e rse , w ith  B raz il 
sp e n d in g  a ro u n d  0 .5  p e rc e n t o f  G D P  a n d  C o lo m b ia  sp e n d in g  1 p e rcen t. 
S ince th e n , th e  s i tu a t io n  h a s  re v e rse d  o nce  a g a in , w ith  B ra z il in c re a s in g  its 
e x p e n d itu re  a n d  C o lo m b ia  re d u c in g  it. B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia  re a c h e d  th e  
e n d  o f  th e  series w ith  p u b lic  e x p e n d itu re  o n  h o u s in g  o f  1.7 a n d  0 .5  p e rc e n t 
o f  G D P , respec tive ly .
H o u s in g  e x p e n d itu re  in  C h ile  re m a in e d  s ta b le  a t  ro u g h ly  0.25 p e rc e n t o f  
G D P  th r o u g h o u t  th e  series. C o m p a re d  to  o th e r  ty p es  o f  so c ia l sp en d in g , 
th is  c a te g o ry  is re la tiv e ly  sm a ll a n d  it h a s  n o t  g ro w n  s ig n ific an tly  o v e r th e  
la s t tw o  d ecad es.
6 TARGETING VERSUS UNIVERSALIZATION: 
WHAT WORKS IN LATIN AMERICA?
C o n sid e r in g  th e  sh a re  o f  e a c h  o f  th e  fo u r  fu n c t io n s  d iscu ssed  ab o v e  
(w e lfa re  a n d  so c ia l se cu rity  a ss is tan ce , h e a lth , e d u c a t io n  a n d  h o u s in g )  in  
e a c h  c o u n tr y ’s soc ia l sp e n d in g , a  p ro file  o f  th e  so c ia l p o lic y  b ia s  a d o p te d  
in  e a c h  c o u n try  c a n  be  id en tif ied ; a lso  a n  a t te m p t c a n  b e  m a d e  to  fin d  a  
p a t te rn  th a t  c h a ra c te r iz e s  th e  c o n te m p o ra ry  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  w e lfa re  s ta te .
A s sh o w n  in  F ig u re  4 .6 , b es id es  f ro m  M ex ico , e x p e n d itu re  o n  socia l 
se cu rity  a n d  w e lfa re  a ss is ta n c e  p re d o m in a te s  in  th e  c o u n tr ie s  an a ly z e d  in  
th e  2 0 0 6 -0 7  p e rio d . W h e n  th e  m o re  h ig h ly  ta rg e te d  h o u s in g  e x p e n d itu re  is 
in c lu d ed , ta rg e te d  p o lic ies  c le a rly  d o m in a te  ( to  th e  d e tr im e n t o f  u n iv e rsa l 
on es) in  A rg e n tin a , B raz il a n d  C o lo m b ia . T h is  re la tio n  is a lm o s t id e n tic a l 
in  C h ile , b u t  m o re  fa v o ra b le  to  u n iv e rsa liz a tio n  in  M e x ic o , o w in g  to  th e  
h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  o f  e d u c a t io n  e x p e n d itu re  in  th a t  c o u n try .
D e sp ite  n o t  re p o r tin g  o n  th e  t r e n d  o f  th e  ta rg e tin g /u n iv e rsa l iz a t io n  
re la tio n , th e  re su lts  sh o w n  in  F ig u re  4 .6  sh o w  th e  c u r r e n t  p o s i t io n  o f  
L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  in  te rm s  o f  so c ia l po lic ies . A lth o u g h  it  p re se n ts  
tw o  very  im p o r ta n t  sec to rs  c h a ra c te r iz e d  b y  u n iv e rsa l serv ice  p ro v is io n  
-  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  -  it is ta rg e te d  soc ia l p o lic ie s  -  so c ia l secu rity  
(o r  in su ra n c e )  a n d  w e lfa re  a ss is ta n c e  -  th a t  a b s o rb  th e  la rg e s t v o lu m es 
o f  soc ia l sp e n d in g , th u s  d e m o n s tra t in g  a c le a r te n d e n c y  to w a rd s  p u b lic  
e x p e n d itu re  ta rg e tin g . In  o th e r  w o rd s , th e re  is a  c le a r  p re fe re n c e  fo r 
p o lic ies  th a t  re q u ire  so m e  ty p e  o f  m e a n s -te s tin g  to  ta rg e t  a  specific p u b lic , 
r a th e r  th a n  p o lic ie s  th a t  co v e r ev e ry o n e  reg a rd le ss  o f  th e  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  
th e  p o p u la t io n  in  q u e s tio n .
B ox  4 .6  d iscu sses  th e  c o n tro v e rs ie s  in  B razil.
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■  Education □  Health S Welfare and social security 0  Housing and other
Note: Latin America and the Caribbean is defined as a weighted average of the countries.
Includes estimates for years where data on certain countries are missing.
Source: ECLAC (2009).
Figure 4.6 Latin America (selected countries): per capita social spending, 
2006/2007 (dollars at 2000prices)
7 FINAL COMMENTS
T h is  c h a p te r  h a s  p u t  fo rw a rd  a  n u m b e r  o f  co n c lu s io n s  th a t  a re  w o r th  
h ig h lig h tin g . I t  d e sc r ib e d  th e  fu n c tio n in g  a n d  ra t io n a le  o f  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  
o f  p u b lic  fu n d s  fo r  th e  so c ia l a re a  in  L a t in  A m e ric a , e x p la in in g  th e  r a t io n ­
a le  o f  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  h o w  it  re la te s  to  so c ia l sp en d in g . S evera l 
issues w ere  ra ise d  in  th is  c o n te x t, su ch  as  th e  n eed  fo r  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
p ro cess . T h e  r a t io n a le  o f  th e  fu n c t io n in g  o f  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  e x p e n d itu re  
m a k e s  it  p o ss ib le  to  in fe r  a n d  an a ly z e  th e  q u a li ty  a n d  ta rg e tin g  o f  su ch  
e x p e n d itu re  in  th e  reg io n .
A s n o te d  th r o u g h o u t  th e  tex t, d e sp ite  th e  e c o n o m ic  c rises  th a t  b u ffe ted  
L a tin  A m e ric a , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  1990s, so c ia l sp e n d in g  h a s  m a in ta in e d  a 
g ro w th  tr e n d  o v er th e  la s t 20 y ea rs . In  te rm s  o f  b o th  to ta l  e x p e n d itu re  a n d  
p e r  c a p ita  sp en d in g , L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h av e  sh o w n  a  r is in g  tr e n d  
in  in v e s tm e n t in  th e  so c ia l a re a . T h is  re su lt, h o w ev e r, w a r ra n ts  specia l 
a t te n tio n .
I n  th e  g lo b a l a n a ly s is  fo r  th e  g ro u p  o f  a ll c o u n tr ie s  c o m p r is in g  L a tin  
A m e ric a , th e  in c re a se  in  soc ia l sp en d in g  is c o n c e n tra te d  in  th e  soc ia l 
se c u r ity  a n d  w e lfa re  a ss is ta n c e  sec to r, w h ich  a t ta in s  a  level o f  ro u g h ly  7
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BOX 4.6 CONTROVERSIES IN THE BRAZILIAN 
DEBATE
The polemics surrounding universalization versus targeting have 
become involved in the tax reform debate in Brazil, and warrant a 
critical review of the two extreme points of view.
A predominant idea among Brazilians who defend the country’s 
social policies is that all that matters in financing this segment is 
an arrangement that channels ever-larger amounts of resources 
to the sectors in question. Accordingly, a social-type tax reform 
would, at least, leave untouched the current system of earmark­
ing resources for social spending; and, ideally, it would increase 
such funding sources still further. This would be the ‘progressive’ 
school of thought, which focuses the issue of social policy financ­
ing on a single point -  more resources are needed to finance 
actions which should be universal (Serra, 2002). This argu­
ment, which marked the preparation of the 1988 Constitution, 
when the overall Brazilian tax burden was around 22 percent of 
GDP, continues to be repeated in exactly the same form, over 
two decades later, and despite the tax burden having jumped to 
over 35 percent of GDP, most of which is explained by the social 
contributions that were created (financial profit and transactions) 
or increased (revenues and wages) during the period. Another, 
‘neoliberal’, current of opinion focuses on the efficiency of spend­
ing in the social area, and advocates increased targeting of public 
action so as to reduce the total amount of resources needed for 
the area (Ministério da Fazenda, 2003; and Neri, 2003). The criti­
cism of universal services aims to gain space in a limited social 
expenditure budget. The issue of financing, to some extent, will 
continue to be a matter of size; targeting social policies to achieve 
less social and total public spending.
An alternative, equidistant between the two extreme points of 
view, argues that quality also should be considered and even 
prioritized. This does not mean ignoring quantity, but it needs to 
be reconciled with better quality in the way it is financed and also 
spent. As pointed out by Ocampo (2008), a challenge to achieve 
a better balance between universalization and targeting is to 
strengthen the tax system and make it more progressive, even 
increasing direct taxation. This is curious because the following 
questions are rarely asked, on the revenue side for example:
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‘From where and how are the public funds to be channeled into 
social spending obtained?’ or, ‘What are the economic and social 
impacts of taxes assigned to the social area?’. On the expendi­
ture side, from time to time other questions are raised, such as: 
‘What do we spend public funds on and how?’ or, ‘What is the 
cost per beneficiary, and what is the return?’. But, these two 
types of question are seldom asked together: ‘Where do the 
public funds channeled into the social area come from and where 
do they end up?’. Put more simply: ‘Who pays and who receives 
public funds?’. Studies on the distribution of taxes and expendi­
ture between families by income category are rare in Brazil, as 
also in the rest of the Southern Cone, although studies have been 
conducted in a number of countries in the Andean Community 
(Barreix et al., 2007).
Source: Prepared by author.
p e rc e n t o f  G D P . E d u c a tio n  a n d  h e a lth  e x p e n d itu re  c u rre n tly  a c c o u n t fo r  
ju s t  o v e r  2 p e rc e n t o f  G D P .
F o r  a  s e p a ra te  e v a lu a tio n  o f  e x p e n d itu re  b y  e a c h  c o u n try , see E C L A C ’s 
‘S o c ia l P a n o ra m a  o f  L a t in  A m e ric a , 2009 ’ (N o v e m b e r  2009). I n  c la ssify ­
in g  th e  m a tr ic e s  o f  so c ia l p ro te c t io n  in  th e  reg io n , c o u n tr ie s  a re  d iv id ed  
in to  g ro u p s  th a t  w e ig h t th e  level o f  e x p e n d itu re  a n d  co v e ra g e  (see pp . 
3 9 -4 0 ) , a s  fo llow s:
•  Group 1 : C o u n tr ie s  w ith  u n iv e rsa l reg im es.
•  Group 2 : C o u n tr ie s  w ith  d u a l reg im es.
•  Group 3: C o u n tr ie s  w ith  so -ca lle d  ‘fa m ily ’ reg im es.
U s in g  th is  d iv is io n , d e sp ite  a  n u m b e r  o f  d ifferences , th e  d iv e rg en ce  
b e tw e e n  e x p e n d itu re  o n  so c ia l se cu rity  a n d  e x p e n d itu re  o n  e d u c a t io n  a n d  
h e a lth  seem s to  b e  a  tr e n d , as c a n  b e  seen  in  T a b le  4 .1 . P u b lic  sp en d in g  
o n  so c ia l secu rity  a n d  w e lfa re  a ss is ta n c e  v ir tu a lly  d o u b le s  h e a lth  e x p e n d i­
tu re , ex cep t in  g ro u p  3 c o u n tr ie s ; a n d  so c ia l se cu rity  ex p en ses g en e ra lly  
a lso  o u tw e ig h  e d u c a t io n  expenses . I n  th e  la t te r  case , g ro u p  3 is a g a in  th e  
e x c e p tio n , w ith  e d u c a t io n  e x p e n d itu re  su rp a ss in g  soc ia l secu rity .
O n e  o f  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  is th a t ,  a s  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  a re  sec to rs  w ith  
d e c e n tra liz e d  e x p e n d itu re , th e  in h e re n t c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  p ro v id in g  so c ia l 
w e lfa re  a n d  in s u ra n c e  serv ices re s u lt in  th ese  serv ices b e in g  ta rg e te d . A p a r t  
f ro m  th a t ,  a ll b u t  a  few  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  d e s ig n ed  so c ia l in s u ra n c e  serv ices in
T a b le  4 .1  L a tin  A m e r ic a  ( c o u n try  g r o u p s ) :  so c ia l  e x p e n d itu r e  in d ic a to r s  a ro u n d  2 0 0 7  (c o u n try  g ro u p  a v e r a g e s )
G ro u p  o f  co u n tries Social p ub lic  
spend ing  per 
cap ita  (in d o lla rs)a
Social p u b lic  
sp en d in g  as a  
p e rcen tag e  o f  
G D P a
Social p u b lic  spen d in g  
in w elfare  a n d  
social secu rity  as a  
p e rcen tag e  o f  G D P b
Social pub lic  
sp en d in g  in  h ea lth  
care  as a  percen tag e  
o f  G D P a
Social p u b lic  
spend ing  in 
e d u ca tio n  as a  
p e rcen tag e  o f  G D P a
G ro u p  1: A rg en tin a , 
B razil, C hile , C o sta  
R ica , P a n a m a  a n d  
U ru g u ay
1 , 1 0 2 17.7 7.9 3.9 4.5
G ro u p  2: C o lo m b ia , 
M exico  a n d  V enezuela  
(B o livarian  R ep u b lic  
of)
638 13.0 4.9 2 . 2 4.3
G ro u p  3: E cu ad o r,
El S a lv ad o r, Bolivia 
(P lu rin a tio n a l S ta te  of), 
G u a tem ala , H o n d u ra s , 
N ic a ra g u a , P a rag u ay , 
P e ru  a n d  D o m in ican  
R epub lic
178 1 0 . 2 2.6 2.3 4.1
Notes:
a In dollars at 2000 prices data for 2006-07. Simple average of each group of countries.
b In dollars at 2000 prices data for 2006-07. Simple average of each group of countries. Does not include Nicaragua.
Source: ECLAC (2009).
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th e  fo rm  o f  in d iv id u a l in su ra n c e  schem es, w h e re  th e  ta x p a y e r  fin an ces  h is 
o r  h e r  fu tu re  p e n s io n . A c c o rd in g ly , d e sp ite  g u a ra n te e in g  a  fu n d a m e n ta l  
w o rk e rs ’ r ig h t in  s i tu a t io n s  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t, soc ia l in s u ra n c e  is n o t  a  
u n iv e rsa l expense , n o r  d o es  it  affec t th e  w h o le  p o p u la t io n  eq u a lly , a s  in  th e  
case  o f  u n iv e rsa l serv ices.
A n o th e r  p o in t  h ig h lig h te d  in  th is  c h a p te r  is th a t ,  b e y o n d  a  d e sc rip tiv e  
an a ly s is  a n d  m e a s u re m e n t o f  in d ic a to rs , th e  d a ta  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  a n a ly ­
sis o f  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  so c ia l sp e n d in g  y ie ld  a n  im p o r ta n t  fin d in g . T h e  
a m o u n ts  in  q u e s tio n  c a n  b e  u se d  to  in fe r th e  d e s ig n  o f  p u b lic  p o lic ie s  in  
th e  reg io n .
By c o n c e n tra tin g  so c ia l sp e n d in g  o n  so c ia l secu rity , L a tin  A m e ric a n  
c o u n tr ie s  e n d  u p  d e s ig n in g  p u b lic  po lic ie s  th a t  a re  m o re  ta rg e te d  th a n  
u n iv e rsa l. A lth o u g h  m o s t c o u n tr ie s  o ffer u n iv e rsa l h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  
serv ices, m o s t in v e s tm e n ts  in  h ig h ly  ta rg e te d  serv ices u lt im a te ly  d isp lay  
a  c lea r p re fe ren ce  fo r  p o lic ie s  th a t  re q u ire  so m e  ty p e  o f  m e a n s -te s tin g , to  
ta rg e t a  specific p u b lic  r a th e r  th a n  p o lic ie s  th a t  co v e r ev e ry o n e  reg a rd le ss  
o f  th e i r  c h a ra c te r is tic s .
In  te rm s  o f  so c ia l p o lic ie s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s , a n  in te n s if ic a ­
tio n  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is c u rre n tly  c o in c id in g  w ith  g re a te r  p re s su re  f ro m  
soc ia l m o v e m e n ts  a n d  ch an g es  in  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  re la tio n s , w h ich  
c o m b in e  w ith  th o se  s te m m in g  f ro m  th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s fe d e ra tiv e  p rac tic e s . 
C h a n g e s  su ch  a s  th e se , w h ich  e x p a n d  p a r t ic ip a t io n  b y  so c ie ty  a n d  lo ca l 
g o v e rn m e n t m e c h a n ism s  -  w h e th e r  in  u n i ta ry  s ta te s  o r  in  fe d e ra tio n s  -  
a ffec t th e  fo rm u la t io n , m a n a g e m e n t a n d  fin a n c in g  o f  p u b lic  po lic ies .
T h e  ju x ta p o s i t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  v a r io u s  m o v e m e n ts  d e sc r ib e d  d o es  n o t  
m e a n  th a t  th e y  a re  s im ila rly  m o tiv a te d , h o w ev e r. V a rio u s  c o m b in a tio n s  
o f  th e  m a in  v e c to rs  o f  c h a n g e  c a n  b e  seen  in  p u b lic  p o lic ies , n o t  o n ly  in  
th e  c e n tra l c o u n tr ie s , b u t  a lso  in  th e  less d e v e lo p e d  n a tio n s  in c lu d in g  L a tin  
A m e ric a n  o nes. T h o se  c o m b in a tio n s  en d  u p  g e n e ra tin g  s ig n ifican t ch an g es  
in  p u b lic  p o licy  desig n .
T h e  firs t line  o f  c h a n g e  re la te s  to  re fo rm s  o f  th e  s ta te  a n d  so c ia l p ro te c ­
t io n  sy stem s, w h ic h  a l te r  th e  p u b lic -p r iv a te  re la tio n , d iv e rsify  fo rm s  o f  
f in a n c in g  a n d  th e  sc o p e  o f  so c ia l p ro te c tio n  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  m a c r ­
o e c o n o m ic  a d ju s tm e n ts  a n d  s ta b il iz a tio n  p o lic ie s  in i tia te d  in  th e  1970s in  
b o th  c e n tra l a n d  p e r ip h e ra l  c o u n tr ie s . T h o se  re fo rm s  h a v e  re p e rc u ss io n s  
in  th e  c o v e rag e  a n d  a m o u n t  o f  m o n e ta ry  b en e fits , a n d  a lso  in  th e  e x te n s io n  
a n d  q u a li ty  o f  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  p u b lic  serv ices.
T h e  seco n d  line  o f  c h a n g e  c o n c e rn s  th e  a s s o c ia tio n  b e tw e e n  re d e m o c ­
ra t iz a t io n  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n . In  L a tin  A m e ric a , th e  re fo rm s  d iscu ssed  
a b o v e  a re  ju x ta p o s e d  w ith  th e  r e d e m o c ra t iz a tio n  o f  th e  c o n tin e n t, w h ich  
la rg e ly  inv o lv es th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  p o li tic a l p o w e r a n d  ta x  rev en u es , 
a n d  d e v o lu tio n  o f  a d m in is tra t iv e  a u to n o m y  to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts ,
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p a r t ic u la r ly  m u n ic ip a litie s . A t th e  sam e tim e , th e re  is a  re c o g n itio n  o f  th e  
p o p u la t io n ’s civil r ig h ts , a n d  in c o rp o ra t io n  o f  so c ia l m o v e m e n ts  in  th e  
fo rm u la t io n , c o n tro l  a n d  ex e c u tio n  o f  p u b lic  p o lic ies , w h ich  is e sse n tia l fo r  
s tre n g th e n in g  so c ia l c o h e s io n . F u r th e rm o re , g lo b a l iz a t io n  h a s  b e e n  s t im u ­
la tin g  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  su p ra n a tio n a l fe d e ra tio n s , a s  sh o w n  by  th e  c re a ­
t io n  o f  th e  E u ro p e a n  U n io n , a s  a  w ay  to  m a in ta in  p o li tic a l, e c o n o m ic  a n d  
so c ia l c o h e s io n  b e tw e e n  n a tio n s . S o lu tio n s  a re  a lso  so u g h t to  p ro b le m s  
re la tin g  to  r is in g  c o s ts , in su ffic ien t co v e rag e , ineffic ien t m a n a g e m e n t a n d  
d issa tis fied  c lien te les , w h ic h  s tre n g th e n  th e  n eed  fo r  re fo rm s  a n d  p ro m o te  
th e ir  effec tiveness. T h o se  c h an g es , in  tu rn , a lte r  f in a n c in g  p a tte rn s ,  fo rm s  
o f  re g u la tin g  su p p ly  (level, q u a li ty  a n d  th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l d is tr ib u tio n  o f  
serv ices, fo r  ex am p le ), to g e th e r  w ith  s tra teg ie s  fo r  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  p u r ­
ch ase  o f  serv ices. T h is  ro u te  m a p , w h ich  is fre q u e n tly , b u t  n o t  exclusively , 
a s so c ia te d  w ith  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , in c lu d es  s e p a ra tio n  b e tw een  serv ice 
f in an c in g  a n d  p ro v is io n , a n d  h a s  p r iv a tiz a tio n  as  its  e n d  p o in t.
T h e  an a ly s is  o f  c o m p a ra tiv e  s tu d ie s  d o es  n o t  seem  to  o ffer a  sing le  
a n sw e r to  th e  m o m e n tu m  o f  c h a n g e  seen  in  m a n y  c o u n tr ie s . In  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s , n o t  o n ly  w ere  so c io e c o n o m ic  in d ic a to rs  very  d iffe ren t a t  th e  
o u tse t, th e re  w ere  a lso  d iffe rences in  p o litic a l p ro cesse s , a d m in is tra t iv e  
s tru c tu re s , re s o u rc e  a v a ila b il ity  (p u b lic  a n d  p r iv a te )  a n d  serv ice su p p ly  
n e tw o rk s . T h ese  specific fe a tu re s  ex p la in  th e  v a rie ty  o f  re su lts  o b ta in e d . 
In  a  c o m p a ra tiv e  s tu d y  in v o lv in g  12 fe d e ra tio n s , W a tts  (1996) n o te s  th a t ,  
a lso  in  p ra c tic e , th e re  is n o  sing le  a n d  p e rm a n e n t m o d e l o f  th e  c e n tra l 
g o v e rn m e n t-  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t re la tio n  in  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  a d o p t  
fed e ra lism . O sc il la t io n  b e tw een  c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  is 
in tr in s ic  to  fe d e ra tiv e  sy s tem s a n d  c a n  b e  seen  in  th e  p a th  fo llo w ed  b y  th e  
c o u n tr ie s , h e  e x p la in s . T h a t  a u th o r  a lso  h ig h lig h ts  th e  d ifficu lty  o f  m e a s u r ­
in g  deg rees o f  c e n tra liz a tio n  v e rsu s  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , since th e re  a re  m a n y  
p o ss ib le  a r ra n g e m e n ts  in  th e  leg is la tive , a d m in is tra tiv e , a n d  fiscal sp h e res, 
a s  w ell as in  c o n s t i tu tio n a l ru le s  a n d  in  th e  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  th e  d e c is io n ­
m a k in g  p ro c e ss , w h ich  d isp lay  d iffe ren t levels o f  d ep e n d e n c y , p o li tic a l 
in flu en ce  a n d  fisca l c o n tro l  b e tw een  th e  v a r io u s  sp h e re s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t.
D e sp ite  su ch  d iffe rences , sev era l a sp ec ts  a re  c o m m o n  to  all cases . T h e re  
h a s  b een  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  p o litic a l a n d  a d m in is tra t iv e  p o w er, a n d  a lso  
o f  re so u rce s , b o th  in  fe d e ra tiv e  s tru c tu re s  a n d  in  u n i ta ry  s ta te s . A lth o u g h  
th e re  is a n  a  p r io r i  a s s o c ia tio n  b e tw e e n  fed e ra lism  a n d  d e c e n tra liz a tio n , a  
c o m p a r is o n  b e tw een  c o u n tr ie s  sh o w s th a t  ev en  in  u n i ta ry  s ta te s , th e  sh ifts  
th a t  h av e  o c c u rre d  h av e  n o t  b een  lim ited  to  a  m e re  d é c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t a n d  u se  o f  re so u rc e s , b u t  g e n u in e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  h a s  b een  
ta k in g  ro o t.
A  fina l c o m m e n t c o n c e rn s  th e  lim ita tio n s  fa c e d  in  u n d e r ta k in g  th is  
an a ly s is . T h e re  is n o  d o u b t  th a t  th e  s tru c tu ra l  ch a n g e s  u n d e r ta k e n  in  th e
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re g io n  in  th e  la s t few  y ea rs  -  ra n g in g  f ro m  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  to  an  
a c tiv e  s tan ce  in  fo rm u la t in g  a n d  ex e c u tin g  so c ia l p o lic ie s  a n d  c u lm in a tin g  
in  c o n d it io n a l in c o m e  tr a n s fe r  p ro g ra m s  -  re q u ire  a  s ig n ifican t red e s ig n  
a n d  im p ro v e m e n t in  th e  c o lle c tio n  o f  e x p e n d itu re  d a ta ,  in  te rm s  o f  b o th  
c o v e ra g e  a n d  d is a g g re g a tio n .
NOTES
1. The concept of ‘social spending’ is not simple to define. The main focus o f this study, 
Latin America, has been displaying a rising trend in social spending, specifically 
education, health, social security and social assistance; yet the measurement o f such 
expenditure can vary substantially from one country to another. As noted by ECLAC, 
the calculation o f social expenditure in 15 out o f the 2 1  countries considers only central 
government or the budgetary central government (in other words, it includes only 
amounts approved in the budget law); two other countries include general government 
(encompassing all levels o f public administration); while three countries also include 
public enterprises. Only one country includes the entire public sector in the calculation 
(ECLAC, 2010a).
2. As noted by de Mello (2004, p. 4), ‘The consideration of the principal-agent nature of 
decentralized service delivery has highlighted a finer distinction between delegation and 
decentralization. Delegation is preferred when subnational governments are best suited 
as agents of the center and when clear incentives for efficiency gains can be put in place’.
3. For a detailed discussion on the fiscal decentralization relation and impact on public pol­
icies, see Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda (2009). See also United Nations (2010) which 
finds an ambiguous impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty. Another key study 
of the relation between fiscal decentralization and social cohesion is von Haldenwang 
(2008), who attempts to show that promoting social inclusion and equity requires a favo­
rable fiscal environment, including characteristics such as horizontal and vertical equi­
ties, and a fiscal decentralization regime based on the principles o f market conservation, 
fiscal equivalence and accountability.
4. When constructing indicators for the 1980-97 period de Mello (2004) found reason­
able decentralization indicators for Latin America -  for example, tax autonomy was 
49.5%, compared to 41.4% in the OECD; and vertical imbalances were 28.4% compared 
to 40.4%, respectively. The situation was different in terms of expenditure, however: 
subnational expenditure o f 3.3% of G D P in Latin America compared to 14.7% in the 
OECD, resulting in relative weights in total expenditure o f 15.0% compared to 31.0%, 
respectively.
5. ECLAC’s mission includes providing information on the economic and social situation 
of the region through official documents. For that purpose, the organization regularly 
compiles data on social spending in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is officially 
reported through specific documents and/or electronic media. An example is the ‘Social 
Panoram a of Latin America’ (ECLAC, 2005, 2009, 2010b) which, apart from reporting 
on the trend of social spending, periodically includes a relevant topic on social issues in 
the region, highlighting the actions taken by Latin American countries in relation to that 
topic. For example, monetary transfers and the downward trend of poverty and income 
inequality indicators are the special topic o f the 2009 document (ECLAC, 2009).
6 . As Figure 4.2 shows, despite fluctuations in the trend of public social spending, the 
average is maintained over the period.
7. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was set up in 1948 to 
support the Marshall Plan to rebuild member countries after the Second W orld War. In 
1961, it became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
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and it currently encompasses 31 countries which produce over half of the wealth of 
the entire planet. These are countries with a high human development index (HDI) a, 
high level o f income per capita (except Mexico and Turkey, which are considered high- 
middle-income countries) and a high level o f socioeconomic development.
8 . The data used for this com parison were taken from the O EC D ’s ‘Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX)’, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_ 
AGG. (accessed 13 October 2010). This database encompasses the 30 OECD coun­
tries for the 1980-2005 period. The main social policy areas are: the elderly, social 
security (including social assistance and insurance, health, family, active labor market 
policies, unemployment, housing and other social policy areas). Given the greater 
economic and social development o f this bloc, a comparison of indicators reflects an 
attempt to lay down a reference point for prom otion, in other words, the closer Latin 
American indicators are to those of the OECD, the better the provision of resources 
to society.
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L a tin  A m e ric a ’s in v e s tm e n t- to -G D P  ra t io  is lo w  b y  in te rn a t io n a l  c o m p a r ­
iso n . A lth o u g h  it  h a s  t r e n d e d  u p w a rd s  in  re c e n t y ea rs , th e  re g io n ’s av e rag e  
sh a re  o f  g ro ss  fixed  c a p ita l fo rm a tio n  in  G D P  -  th e  n a t io n a l  a c c o u n ts ’ 
s ta n d a rd  g au g e  o f  in v e s tm e n t a c tiv ity  -  is so m e w h a t lo w e r th a n  th a t  o f  the  
h ig h - in c o m e  c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  O E C D  a re a  a n d  m u c h  lo w e r  th a n  th a t  o f  th e  
fa s t-g ro w in g  em erg in g  A s ia n  e co n o m ies , su ch  as C h in a  a n d  I n d ia .1 L a tin  
A m e ric a n  g o v e rn m e n ts  a lso  in v es t re la tiv e ly  little  b y  e m e rg in g -m a rk e t a n d  
d ev e lo p in g  c o u n try  s ta n d a rd s ,  a  fe a tu re  o f  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  p u b lic  fin an ces 
th a t  c a n  b e  a t t r ib u te d  to  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  v o la til ity  in  th e  1980s a n d  1990s 
a n d  su b se q u e n tly  fiscal d u re ss . T h e  p r iv a te  sec to r a c c o u n ts  fo r  th e  b u lk  
o f  in v e s tm e n t, b u t  its  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  in f ra s t ru c tu re  d e v e lo p m e n t a n d  
u p g ra d in g  is h e ld  b a c k  b y  in s ti tu t io n a l a n d  re g u la to ry  c o n s tra in ts .
A t th e  sam e  tim e , th e  s ta te  o f  ex is tin g  in f ra s t ru c tu re  in  m o s t L a tin  
A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  su g g ests  th a t  sp en d in g  o n  o p e ra t io n s  a n d  m a in te ­
n a n c e  is e q u a lly  low . T h e  re g io n  fa re s  re la tiv e ly  p o o r ly  in  in te rn a t io n a l 
c o m p a r iso n s  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  a  h o s t  o f  in d ic a to r s  o f  in f ra s t ru c tu re  q u a li ty  
a n d  in  te rm s  o f  su rv ey s o f  b u sin e ss  sen tim en t. A rg u a b ly , a  c o m b in a tio n  
o f  lo w  in v e s tm e n t a n d  p o o r  in f ra s t ru c tu re  q u a li ty  is h o ld in g  b a c k  g ro w th . 
In  a d d it io n , access to  in f ra s t ru c tu re  is u n e q u a l a m o n g  th e  d iffe ren t soc ia l 
g ro u p s , w h ich  a c ts  a s  a  d ra g  o n  so c ia l d e v e lo p m e n t.
D e c e n tra l iz a t io n  p o se s  ch a llen g es  fo r  th e  d e liv e ry  a n d  fin a n c in g  o f  
in v e s tm e n t b y  th e  g o v e rn m e n t. M a n y  c o u n tr ie s  in  L a t in  A m e ric a  h av e  
e m b a rk e d  o n  a m b itio u s  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro g ra m s , o f te n  d riv e n  b y  a  
re tu rn  to  d e m o c ra tic  ru le  in  th e  1980s, w h ich  h a v e  d ev o lv e d  a  n u m b e r  
o f  e x p e n d itu re  fu n c tio n s , in c lu d in g  in v e s tm e n t, a n d  re v e n u e  so u rces  to  
th e  su b n a tio n a l lay e rs  o f  g o v e rn m e n t. P u b lic  f in an ce  th e o ry  n ev erth e le ss  
h ig h lig h ts  im p o r ta n t  d ifficu lties a s so c ia te d  w ith  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  
p u b lic  in v e s tm e n t. I n  p a r t ic u la r ,  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a re  d is c o u r ­
a g e d  fro m  f in a n c in g  in v e s tm e n ts  w h o se  ben e fits  a re  lik e ly  to  sp ill o v e r
112
F iscal decentralization and public investm ent 1 1 3
ac ro s s  ju r is d ic tio n a l b o rd e r s  a n d  w h o se  s u n k  co sts  a re  to o  h ig h  fo r  su b ­
n a t io n a l  b u d g e ts , e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  p re sen ce  o f  c o n s tra in ts  o n  su b n a tio n a l 
b o rro w in g . M a n y  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  fa ile d  to  p u t  in  p lace  
a r ra n g e m e n ts  fo r  jo in t  f in a n c in g  a n d  serv ice  de liv e ry  ac ro s s  a n d  w ith in  
th e  d iffe ren t levels o f  a d m in is tra t io n  th a t  c o u ld  a d d re s s  th e se  d ifficu lties.
T o  sh e d  lig h t o n  th e  lin k  b e tw e e n  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  a n d  in v e s tm e n t in  
L a tin  A m e ric a , th is  c h a p te r  d iscusses tre n d s  in  g ro ss  (fixed) c a p ita l f o rm a ­
t io n  a n d  g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g  o n  in v e s tm e n t p ro g ra m s . T h e  c h a p te r  a lso  
p ro v id e s  som e em p ir ic a l ev id en ce  o n  th e  effects o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o n  
in v e s tm e n t b a se d  o n  a  p a n e l o f  c o u n tr ie s  fo r w h ich  d a ta  o n  in v e s tm e n t a re  
a v a ila b le  fro m  th e  W o rld  B a n k ’s W o rld  D e v e lo p m e n t In d ic a to r s  (W D I) 
a n d  th e  In te rn a t io n a l  M o n e ta ry  F u n d ’s G o v e rn m e n t F in a n c e  S ta tis tic s  
(G F S )  d a ta b a se s  since  th e  la te  1990s. T h e  em p ir ic a l an a ly s is  suggests th a t  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  d is c o u ra g e s  L a tin  A m e ric a n  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  
fro m  in v es tin g  (a c q u ir in g  fixed  asse ts) a n d  th a t  lo w er su b n a tio n a l sp en d in g  
o n  in v e s tm e n t is a s s o c ia te d  w ith  lo w er eco n o m y -w id e  g ro ss  fixed c a p ita l 
fo rm a tio n . L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  w ill th e re fo re  n eed  to  face  a  d o u b le  
c h a llen g e  o f  rev is itin g  th e  c u r re n t a rra n g e m e n ts  fo r  d ec e n tra liz e d  p ro v i­
s io n  th a t  d is c o u ra g e  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t in v e s tm e n t, w h ile  m a k in g  
th e  m o s t  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  as  a  p o licy  lever to  ra ise  p r iv a te  in v es tm en t.
T h e  c h a p te r  is s tru c tu re d  as  fo llow s. S ec tio n  2 review s tre n d s  in  in v es t­
m e n t sp en d in g  in  L a tin  A m erica  a n d  c o m p a re s  a n d  c o n tra s ts  these  tre n d s  
w ith  th o se  o f  O E C D  co u n tr ie s  a n d  em e rg in g -m a rk e t peers . S ec tio n  3 review s 
th e  a rg u m e n ts  fo r  a n d  a g a in s t th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  in v es tm en t fu n c ­
tio n s . S ec tio n  4 p re se n ts  th e  em p irica l analy sis. S ec tio n  5 d iscusses th e  m a in  
em p irica l f ind ings a n d  d raw s  lessons fo r  L a tin  A m erica . S ec tio n  6 conc ludes.
2 HOW DOES LATIN AMERICA COMPARE WITH 
OECD COUNTRIES AND EMERGING-MARKET 
PEERS?
Trends in Investment
L a tin  A m e ric a n  a n d  C a r ib b e a n  c o u n tr ie s  in v es t re la tiv e ly  litt le  b y  in te rn a ­
tio n a l co m p a r iso n . G ro s s  fixed c a p ita l fo rm a tio n  a c c o u n te d  fo r  less th a n  20 
p e rc e n t o f  G D P  o n  av e rag e  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  f ro m  th e  e a rly  1980s u n ti l  th e  
m id -2 0 0 0 s , w h en  it  b e g a n  to  rise  g ra d u a lly  to  c lo se  to  22 p e rc e n t o f  G D P  
in  2008 (F ig u re  5 .1). E x c e p t fo r  b r ie f  p e r io d s  since 1970, th is  r a t io  h a s  b een  
p e rs is te n tly  lo w er th a n  th e  av e ra g e  o f  th e  h ig h - in c o m e  c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  
O E C D  a re a , as w ell a s  th a t  o f  th e  fa s t-g ro w in g  A s ia n  c o u n tr ie s , in c lu d in g  
C h in a  a n d  In d ia . T o  so m e  e x te n t, c o m p a ra tiv e ly  lo w  in v e s tm e n t- to -G D P
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Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators).
Figure 5.1 Investment trends: international comparisons, 1960-2008
ra t io s  re flec t th e  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  tu rm o il  fa ced  b y  m o s t  o f  th e  la rg e r 
e co n o m ies  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  in  th e  1980s a n d  e a rly  1990s, c h a ra c te r iz e d  
by  e r ra tic  g ro w th  a n d  h ig h  in f la tio n , w h ich  h a s  d is c o u ra g e d  in v e s tm e n t, 
espec ia lly  in  in f ra s t ru c tu re  p ro je c ts .2 A n  e c o n o m ic  b o o m  d u r in g  2 0 0 3 -0 8  
h a s  b een  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  r is in g  in v e s tm e n t- to -G D P  ra t io s .
In v e s tm e n t is f in a n c e d  p re d o m in a n tly  b y  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r in  L a tin  
A m e ric a  a n d  th e  C a r ib b e a n . G o v e rn m e n t-f in a n c e d  in v e s tm e n t a c c o u n te d  
fo r  a b o u t  4 .4  p e rc e n t o f  G D P  o n  a v e rag e  d u r in g  2 0 0 0 -0 8  in  th e  L a tin  
A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  fo r  w h ich  in fo rm a tio n  is a v a ila b le  fro m  th e  I M F ’s 
W o rld  E c o n o m ic  O u tlo o k  d a ta b a s e  (F ig u re  5 .2 ).3 M u c h  as  in  th e  case  
o f  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t, g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g  a lso  tre n d e d  d o w n w a rd  in
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Source: International M onetary Fund (World Economic Outlook).
Figure 5.2 Composition o f  investment across countries, 1980-2008
re la tio n  to  G D P  fro m  th e  ea rly  1980s u n ti l  th e  2000s. T o  so m e  e x te n t fa llin g  
g o v e rn m e n t in v e s tm e n t d u r in g  th e  1990s reflec ts m a c ro e c o n o m ic  a n d  fiscal 
a d ju s tm e n t, w h ich  o f te n  to o k  a  to ll o n  c a p ita l e x p e n d itu re , a s  w ell as a 
c h a n g e  in  th e  c o m p o s it io n  o f  to ta l  in v e s tm e n t aw ay  f ro m  p u b lic  so u rces  
d u e  to  in c rea sed  p r iv a te  sec to r p a r t ic ip a tio n , in c lu d in g  th ro u g h  th e  p r iv a ti­
z a tio n  o f  p u b lic  e n te rp rise s  in  m a n y  o f  th e  la rg e s t eco n o m ies  in  th e  re g io n .4
In fo rm a t io n  is n o t  re a d ily  a v a ila b le  o n  a  c ro s s -c o u n try  c o m p a ra b le  
b a s is  o n  th e  se c to ra l c o m p o s it io n  o f  g ro ss  fixed  c a p ita l f o rm a tio n  b e tw een  
in f ra s tru c tu re  a n d  n o n - in f ra s tru c tu re  in v e s tm e n t. D a ta  o n  g o v e rn m e n t 
o u tla y s  o n  o p e ra t io n s  a n d  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  in f ra s tru c tu re  s to c k  a re  a lso  
d ifficu lt to  co m e  by . I t  n ev e rth e le ss  a p p e a rs  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  o u tc o m e  in d i­
c a to r s  th a t  a n  a d d it io n a l  side-effect o f  fiscal d u re ss  in  th e  1990s h a s  b een  a  
n eg lec t o f  b as ic  in f ra s tru c tu re s .
The Quality of Infrastructure
L a tin  A m e ric a  fa re s  p o o r ly  in  in te rn a t io n a l c o m p a r iso n s  o f  co n v e n tio n a l 
in d ic a to rs  o f  in f ra s t ru c tu re  q u a li ty . In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e re  a re  im p o r ta n t  
defic iencies in  a re a s  th a t  h av e  a  b e a r in g  o n  so c ia l d e v e lo p m e n t, such  
as w a te r  a n d  s a n i ta t io n , w h ich  a ffec t th e  h e a lth  s ta tu s  o f  th e  p o p u ­
la t io n  (T a b le  5 .1). In v e s tm e n t defic iencies m a y  th e re fo re  c o m p ro m ise
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Table 5.1 Infrastructure quality indicators: Latin America and OECD, 1989-2008
L a tin  A m erica O E C D
M ean  M ed ian  N o . M e a n M e d ian N o .
C o u n trie s C o u n trie s
T  elecom m  u n ica tio n s
L ines (per 100 p o p u la tio n ) 23.0 2 1 . 0 33 40.8 41.6 29
In te rn e t su b scrip tio n s (per 100 p o p u la tio n ) 9.3 5.3 33 22.9 23.6 29
T elep h o n e  su b scrip tio n s (p e r 100 p o p u la tio n ) 1 1 0 . 8 109.8 31 150.4 152.6 29
Cell p h o n e  su b scrip tio n s (p e r 100 p o p u la tio n ) 87.7 91.9 31 109.6 110.4 29
C o m p u te r a t  h o m e  (p e r 100 p o p u la tio n ) 4.6 2 . 8 5 49.9 42.6 4
T V  (2007) 96.7 96.7 2 97.6 98.3 6
T ra n sp o rt
R a il (m illion  to n s  o f  goods pe r km ) 39,140.6 6,672.5 1 0 148,118.3 12,039.0 24
R ail (m illion  p assengers p e r km ) 36,910.9 313.0 7 23,465.8 6,759.0 27
R o a d  den sity  (k m  o f  ro a d  p e r sq. k m  o f  lan d  a rea ) 135.4 71.7 3 118.8 115.3 16
Paved ro ad s  (%  o f  to ta l) 47.7 38.2 3 73.4 79.3 15
W ate r a n d  sa n ita tio n  (1970-2008)
Im p ro v ed  w a te r sou rce  (%  o f  p o p u la tio n  w ith  access) 8 6 . 8 91.0 24 99.1 1 0 0 . 0 23
Im p ro v ed  sa n ita tio n  facilities (%  o f  pop . w ith  access) 74.7 80.0 24 99.0 1 0 0 . 0 2 0
E lectric ity  (1970-2008)
V alue lo st d u e  to  o u tag es (%  o f  sales) 4.1 2 . 8 18 1 . 0 0 . 0 6
T ran sm iss io n  a n d  d is tr ib u tio n  losses (% o f  o u tp u t) 15.6 14.2 2 1 7.9 7.5 29
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators).
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lo n g e r - te rm  d e v e lo p m e n t ta rg e ts . T h is  is im p o r ta n t  b e c a u se  th e re  h a s  
b een  c o n s id e ra b le  p ro g re s s  o v e r th e  y ea rs  in  m a n y  a rea s , b u t  a  n u m b e r  o f  
c o u n tr ie s  in  L a tin  A m e ric a  a n d  th e  C a r ib b e a n  re m a in  fa r  f ro m  th e  ta rg e ts  
se t o u t  in  th e  M ille n n iu m  D e v e lo p m e n t G o a ls .
In  a d d it io n , access  to  in f ra s t ru c tu re  is fa ir ly  u n e q u a lly  d is tr ib u te d  in  
th e  reg io n , a n d  a re a -w id e  a v e rag es  m a s k  im p o r ta n t  d iffe ren ces in  access 
a c ro s s  so c ia l g ro u p s . B ased  o n  ev id en ce  fo r  e ig h t L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n ­
tr ie s , M a rc h io n n i a n d  G lü z m a n n  (2010) sh o w  th a t ,  in  so m e  cases, access 
is ex trem e ly  c o n c e n tra te d  in  th e  u p p e r- in c o m e  q u in tile s . F o r  ex am p le , in  
P e ru  o n ly  1 p e rc e n t o f  h o u se h o ld s  f ro m  th e  p o o re s t  q u in tile  h av e  a  fixed  
p h o n e  line , a g a in s t a lm o s t 70 p e rc e n t o f  h o u se h o ld s  fro m  th e  r ic h e s t q u in ­
tile . In  th e  case  o f  access  to  w a te r /s a n i ta tio n  a n d  gas, h o w ev er, th e re  d o es 
n o t  a p p e a r  to  b e  a  s tro n g  b ia s  in  access a c ro s s  in co m e  g ro u p s , a t  le a s t as 
f a r  a s  m e a s u re d  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  h o u se h o ld  e x p e n d itu re .
P o o r  in f ra s t ru c tu re  m a y  h in d e r  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th . I t  is d ifficu lt to  g au g e  
th e  effect o f  in v e s tm e n t in  g en e ra l, a n d  in f ra s t ru c tu re  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  o n  
lo n g - te rm  o u tp u t  g ro w th . C a u sa li ty  o f te n  ru n s  in  th e  o p p o s ite  d ire c tio n , 
so  th a t  g ro w th  te n d s  to  d riv e  in v e s tm e n t, r a th e r  th a n  th e  c o n v e rse .5 B u t, 
w h ile  e m p ir ic a l ev id en c e  is b y  a n d  la rg e  in co n c lu s iv e  in  th is  a re a , it is fa ir  
to  a rg u e  th a t  e ffo rts  to  im p ro v e  in f ra s t ru c tu re  w o u ld  a lso  y ie ld  a  g ro w th  
d iv id e n d  to  th e  e x te n t th a t  it p ro m o te s  p ro d u c tiv i ty  g a in s  a n d  red u ces  
p ro d u c t io n  costs.
3 THE ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
T h e re  a re  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o n s tra in ts  to  th e  fu ll d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  p u b lic  
in v e s tm e n t fu n c t io n s  to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  a re a  
o f  in f ra s t ru c tu re  d e v e lo p m e n t a n d  u p g ra d in g . F ir s t,  th e  su n k  co s ts  a s s o ­
c ia te d  w ith  p u b lic  in v e s tm e n t a re  o f te n  to o  h ig h  to  b e  fu lly  f in a n c e d  by  
s u b n a t io n a l b u d g e ts , w h o se  re v en u e  m o b iliz a tio n  a n d  b o rro w in g  c a p a c ity  
is lo w e r th a n  th a t  o f  h ig h e r  levels o f  a d m in is tra t io n . S eco n d , s u b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts  m a y  b e  sm all; it is th e re fo re  d ifficu lt fo r  th e m  to  m a k e  th e  
m o s t o f  e c o n o m ie s  o f  scale  a n d  n e tw o rk  effects in  p ro v is io n , w h ich  te n d  to  
b e  la rg e  in  th e  ca se  o f  in v e s tm e n t p ro g ra m s , e sp ec ia lly  fo r  in f ra s t ru c tu re  
serv ices. T h ird , p u b lic  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts  o f te n  c re a te  e x te rn a li ty  effects, 
b e c a u se  th e  b en efits  th e y  c re a te  w o u ld  a lso  like ly  a c c ru e  to  n e ig h b o r in g  
ju r is d ic tio n s , w h e re a s  th e  co s ts  o f  p ro v is io n  w o u ld  n eed  to  b e  in te rn a liz e d  
b y  th e  p ro v id in g  ju r isd ic tio n .
A s a  re s u lt o f  th e se  c o n s tra in ts , i t  is o f te n  a rg u e d  th a t  s u b n a tio n a l g o v ­
e rn m e n ts  m a y  -  a n d  th e y  o f te n  d o  -  c a rry  o u t  p u b lic  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts , 
a l th o u g h  f in a n c in g  sh o u ld  b e  p ro v id e d  a t  le a s t in  p a r t  b y  th e  c en te r. J o in t
1 1 8 D ecentralization  and reform  in L atin A m erica
f in a n c in g  w o u ld  a llo w  fo r  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  effects o f  e x te rn a li tie s  a n d  e c o n ­
om ies o f  scale, w h ic h  w o u ld  o th e rw ise  d is c o u ra g e  s u b n a t io n a l  p ro v is io n , 
a n d  fo r  m o b iliz in g  th e  n ece ssa ry  fu n d s  th a t  w o u ld  o th e rw ise  o v e rw h e lm  
su b n a tio n a l b u d g e ts .
Financing
M a n y  L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  re ly  o n  th e  e a rm a rk in g  o f  re v en u e  to  
f in an ce  p u b lic  in v e s tm e n t. T h is  is th e  case  o f  a ll levels o f  a d m in is tr a ­
tio n , n o t  o n ly  a m o n g  s u b n a tio n a l ju r isd ic tio n s . In  B raz il, rev en u e  f ro m  
th e  excise  ta x  o n  fuels is e a rm a rk e d  fo r  t r a n s p o r t ,  in c lu d in g  c a p ita l a n d  
re c u r re n t sp e n d in g . In  P e ru , lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  c a n  o n ly  sp en d  fu n d s  
f ro m  th e  canon a n d  sobrecanon ro y a lty  f ro m  n a tu r a l  re so u rc e s  o n  c a p ita l 
in v e s tm e n ts . E a rm a rk in g  is e x te n d e d  to  sh a re d  re v e n u e  in  so m e  c o u n tr ie s , 
a s  is th e  case  o f  N ic a ra g u a  a n d  P a ra g u a y , fo r  e x am p le , w h e re  a  p e rc e n t­
ag e  o f  sh a re d  re v e n u e  is e a rm a rk e d  fo r  in v e s tm e n t in  in f ra s tru c tu re . In  
G u a te m a la , o n e -e ig h th  o f  V A T  rev en u es  is e a rm a rk e d  fo r  in f ra s tru c tu re  
in  soc ia l a n d  b a s ic  serv ices, w h ile  a  sh a re  o f  th e  ta x  o n  m o to r  veh ic le  
re g is tr a tio n  is e a rm a rk e d  fo r  m a in te n a n c e  a n d  im p ro v e m e n ts  o f  ro a d s . 
In  C o s ta  R ic a , re c e n t leg is la tio n  p ro v id e s  fo r  th e  p o ss ib il ity  o f  in c rea s in g  
tra n s fe rs  to  th e  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  to  a ssu m e  n ew  co m p e te n c ie s , in c lu d in g  
in f ra s tru c tu re  d e v e lo p m e n t. I n  som e cases , re v e n u e  e a rm a rk in g  is a lso  
u se d  a s  a  re g io n a l d e v e lo p m e n t to o l, by  fa v o r in g  in v e s tm e n t in  e c o n o m i­
ca lly  d is a d v a n ta g e d  reg io n s . T h is  is th e  case , fo r e x am p le , o f  E c u a d o r , 
w h e re  a  c o n d it io n a l c a p ita l  in v e s tm e n t g ra n t  is ta rg e te d  to  th e  A m a z o n  
reg io n . In  M ex ico , a t  le a s t 20  p e rc e n t o f  th e  in v e s tm e n t g ra n ts  {Fondo 
de Compensación) f r o m  th e  fed e ra l g o v e rn m e n t m u s t b e  a ss ig n ed  to  th e  
p o o re s t  10 s ta te s  a n d  u se d  b y  th e  m u n ic ip a litie s  o f  th o s e  sta te s .
A  re lian ce  o n  rev en u e  e a rm a rk in g  to  f in an ce  in v e s tm e n t is, in  c o n tra s t  
w ith  th e  ex p e rien ce  o f  m o s t O E C D  co u n tr ie s , w h ere  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts  
c a rr ie d  o u t b y  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a re  o ften  f in a n c e d  th ro u g h  b lock , 
c o n d itio n a l o r  m a tc h in g  g ra n ts  fro m  h ig h e r  levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t. A m o n g  
L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s , th is  is a lso  th e  case  o f  C h ile  w h e re  f in an c in g  te n d s  
to  b e  p ro v id e d  in  th e  fo rm  o f  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t g ra n ts . W h ile  reco g n iz in g  
th a t  d iffe ren t g ra n ts  serve d iffe ren t p u rp o se s , th e re  is a  t r e n d  a m o n g  severa l 
O E C D  c o u n tr ie s  to w a rd s  in c rea sed  flex ib ility  in  th e  g r a n t  sy s tem , especia lly  
in  th o se  c o u n tr ie s  w h ere  c u r re n t a rra n g e m e n ts  a re  a d m in is tra tiv e ly  c u m ­
b e rso m e  a n d  w h e re  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n t a u to n o m y  is c u r ta ile d  by  re s tr ic tiv e  
c o n d itio n a lity . T h e  m a in  d is a d v a n ta g e  o f  rev en u e  e a rm a rk in g  is th a t  it c o m ­
p lic a te s  e x p e n d itu re  m a n a g e m e n t a n d  d isco u rag es  e ffo rts  to  im p ro v e  th e  
cost-effec tiveness o f  g o v e rn m e n t e x p en d itu re s , b ecau se  p o licy  m a k e rs  a re  
u n a b le  to  re a llo c a te  scarce  b u d g e ta ry  re so u rce s  to  co st-effec tive  ac tiv ities .
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In some cases, financing arrangements focus on investment projects 
and neglect to provide assistance for the recurrent costs o f operations and 
maintenance to jurisdictions that may be unable or unwilling to finance 
those associated expenditures. For example, Peru attempted to decentral­
ize much o f its road network to provincial and municipal governments 
but then failed to provide financing for the associated recurrent expendi­
tures (Gutman, 1999). This resulted in a widespread deterioration o f the 
network and, ultimately, recentralization (Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 
1996; Burki et al., 1999). In Brazil, federal assistance is now provided 
to those states that have accepted responsibility for maintaining federal 
roads in their jurisdictions.
The presence o f strict regulatory restrictions on subnational borrowing 
to finance investment programs also distinguishes Latin America from 
the OECD area, where borrowing is allowed in most countries subject to 
a golden rule (that is, long-term borrowing is allowed to finance capital 
expenditure only). Efforts to curtail subnational profligacy, to align 
subnational fiscal policies with overall macroeconomic objectives and to 
consolidate fiscal adjustment at all levels o f  administration are the main 
reasons for the introduction o f tight controls on subnational borrowing 
in many countries in Latin America. But arrangements vary across coun­
tries. In most cases, subnational governments are not allowed to borrow 
abroad, whereas in those countries where foreign financing is permitted, 
central government approval is required. Local government borrowing 
is banned in Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador, for 
example. In other countries, administrative constraints apply, as in the 
case o f required approval by higher levels o f government and/or the leg­
islature (for example, Nicaragua). More-flexible arrangements, whereby 
subnational borrowing is subject to prudential requirements based on debt 
service parameters, are in place in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, for example.6
Dealing with Economies of Scale and Externalities
Conditionality is often introduced in intergovernmental transfer systems 
to deal with externalities in subnational government provision. Earmarked 
or matching grants can be used to ensure that at least part o f the costs and 
benefits o f provision can be fully internalized by local residents. This is the 
case when the share o f delivery costs, that exceeds the benefits o f provi­
sion that can be internalized by local residents, can be compensated by 
the donor to the service provider. Of course, in practice, the design o f such 
grants is complicated by the fact that externalities are not directly observ­
able. Matching grants may therefore exceed the level required for mitigating
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the disincentives for provision arising from cross-border spillovers. These 
grants may also be complex to administer. Another difficulty associated with 
matching grants is that they may be underutilized in poorer jurisdictions, 
where support from higher levels of administration is most needed, because 
these jurisdictions may be unable to match the volume o f resources avail­
able to them. As discussed above, revenue earmarking is the most common 
arrangement for financing investment in Latin America, and experience with 
matching grants is considerably more limited. Conditional grants are also 
less common in Latin America than in other parts of the world.
In addition to intergovernmental transfers and grants, horizontal 
arrangements can be put in place to internalize benefits that straddle juris­
dictional borders and reduce provision costs by maximizing economies of  
scale. Experience with such cross-border joint ventures is, nevertheless, 
rather limited in Latin America, in contrast with a number o f OECD  
countries, especially in Europe, where various arrangements are in place, 
especially for transport, urban waste management, water supply, fire 
fighting and hospital administration. Norway also has an interesting expe­
rience with joint ownership o f power plants, which allows neighboring 
jurisdictions to cut costs in providing energy services. In Latin America, 
the Brazilian experience with intermunicipal consortia in the area of 
hospital administration is rather rare in the region.
International Comparisons
Institutional settings vary a great deal, involving different degrees o f sub­
national participation in the design and financing o f  investment projects. 
As a result, conventional decentralization indicators, such as the share 
of subnational capital expenditure in total public investment, can be 
misleading to the extent that subnational autonomy is not taken into con­
sideration. In addition, internationally comparable data are very difficult 
to come by, even for very crude measures o f infrastructure expenditure 
decentralization and the associated financial flows across levels o f admin­
istration, including capital transfers. Despite these caveats, the IM F’s 
GFS data on the acquisition o f fixed assets across the different levels 
o f administration allow for a comparison o f the composition o f public 
investment in Latin America and the OECD area. Ideally, because of 
greater consistency between private and public investment and among the 
different levels o f administration, the national accounts would be a more 
appropriate source o f data than budgetary sources.
On the basis o f the indicators presented in Table 5.2, there does not 
appear to be much difference in the composition o f investment across the 
different layers o f  government between the Latin American and OECD
Table 5.2 Public investment across levels of government (acquisition offixed capital in % of GDP, accrual basis, 
averages since 1995)
General Different layers o f government
government
Central Middle tier Local
Investment Total 
outlays
Investment Total outlays Investment Total outlays Investment Total outlays
Latin America 
Argentina 1.3 29.6 0 . 2 19.5 0 . 8 1 1 . 0 0.3 2.4
Chile 1.4 20.5 1 . 2 20.5 - - 0 . 2 2 . 6
Colombia 1.9 35.9 0 . 6 33.6 0.4 4.5 0.9 6 . 1
Mexico1 - - 0.5 15.9 - 7.0 - 1.4
Peru 1 2.4 19.0 1 . 2 18.3 0.4 3.2 0 . 8 2.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian - - 1.7 25.7 - - - -
Republic of) 1 
OECD (excluding Chile and Mexico) 
Italy 0.6 47.8 - 0 . 2 39.0 0 . 8 15.0
Japan 1 .1 37.8 - - - - - -
Spain 1.9 38.6 0.4 27.3 0 . 8 13.6 0.7 6 . 1
France 0.7 52.6 0 . 1 45.5 - - 0 . 6 10.4
United Kingdom 0.5 42.0 0 . 0 38.9 - - 0.5 1 2 . 1
Australia 0 . 6 34.5 0 . 1 25.3 0.4 13.9 0 . 2 2.3
Germany - 0 . 1 46.5 0 . 0 30.9 0 . 0 13.1 - 0 . 1 7.2
Switzerland1 2 . 2 37.4 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 1 .1 14.6 1 . 0 9.6
United States 1 . 2 36.3 0 . 1 2 1 . 0 - - - -
C anada 1 2.3 40.7 0.3 18.7 1 . 0 21.4 1 . 0 7.4
Note: 1 Cash basis.
Source: International M onetary Fund (Government Finance Statistics).
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countries for which information is available, at least as far as the ratio of 
acquisition o f fixed assets to G DP is concerned. O f course, there are limi­
tations to GFS data, including the fact that most countries do not report 
investment spending for the different layers o f administration in a sys­
tematic manner and that in some cases investment is carried out through 
extra-budgetary funds that are not consolidated in the fiscal accounts.
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Because o f the dearth o f  data on subnational capital spending, it is difficult 
to test empirically the extent to which indicators o f fiscal decentralization 
correlate with trends in subnational investment. Instead, simple invest­
ment equations can be estimated to compare the main determinants of 
investment across the different layers o f administration and to distin­
guish the effect o f decentralization on investment in subsamples o f Latin 
American and other countries.
Comparison with the Literature
The theoretical literature is inconclusive on the possible effects o f fiscal 
decentralization on investment. The Oatesian and Musgravean tradition 
o f fiscal federalism places limited emphasis on the composition o f public 
investment across the different layers o f administration. As discussed 
above, public investment would be best carried out and financed by higher 
levels o f administration in the presence o f economies o f scale and spillover/ 
network effects, which would discourage subnational provision and result 
in a suboptimal supply o f public investment. The theoretical literature 
also shows that horizontal tax competition, which is likely to arise from 
the decentralization o f revenue sources to lower levels o f administration, 
could result under certain conditions in suboptimal investment (Hulten 
and Schwab, 1997).
By contrast, another strand o f literature shows that competition among 
same-level jurisdictions could affect the composition of expenditure, 
leading subnational governments to overinvest in public goods that 
would make their jurisdictions attractive to private investment (Keen and 
Marchand, 1997). Consistent with this strand o f literature, there is some 
empirical evidence that decentralization is associated with higher levels of 
subnational spending on infrastructure projects. The cross-country evi­
dence reported by Estache and Sinha (1995) suggests that more decentral­
ized countries, especially in the developing world, tend to spend more (total 
and subnational) on infrastructure projects. Recent evidence reported by
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Kappeler and Vâlilâ (2008) for European countries shows that decentrali­
zation tilts the composition o f public investment towards more productive 
projects, notably infrastructure, a finding that the authors attribute to 
increased fiscal competition brought about by decentralization.
Turning to the quality o f infrastructure, there does not appear to be 
a strong correlation between the extent o f  fiscal decentralization and the 
quality o f services. On the basis o f  cross-country data, Humplick and 
Estache (1995) estimate the impact o f  decentralization on the performance 
o f several infrastructure projects, including roads, electricity, and water. 
Using different measures o f  decentralization in each sector, the authors 
find that at least one performance indicator improved in each sector as a 
result o f decentralization. Nevertheless, the correlation between decentrali­
zation and performance was not strong in general. This finding is consist­
ent with the raw correlations between the decentralization indicator used 
in this chapter (the share o f central to subnational government revenue or 
expenditure) and indicators o f the quality o f infrastructure, which are also 
rather poor, although revenue decentralization is associated with a lower 
density o f fixed telephone lines in the Latin American subsample.
A  different strand o f literature has delved into the effect o f  decentraliza­
tion on the efficiency o f investment. Evidence for Spain (Esteller and Solé, 
2005) and Bolivia and Colombia (Faguet, 2004) suggest that decentraliza­
tion has made investment decisions more responsive to local preferences 
and needs, which improves the composition o f  the capital stock among the 
subnational jurisdictions.
Data
The World Bank’s W DI database contains information on investment 
spending (gross fixed capital formation and gross capital formation, which 
includes changes in inventories) for a variety of developing, emerging- 
market and developed countries. The split between private and public 
investment, and the decomposition o f government spending across the 
different layers of administration, which is important for assessing the 
effect o f various arrangements for financing expenditure in a decentral­
ized setting, are nevertheless not available in the W DI database. To some 
extent, this deficiency can be remedied by using data available from the 
IM F’s GFS database, which provides information on government acqui­
sition o f fixed assets for the central, middle-tier and local levels o f admin­
istration (excluding public enterprises and off-budget expenditures). The 
GFS series are nevertheless very short, reflecting the transition to a new 
methodology in 2001 and a dearth o f  data on subnational finances for the 
vast majority o f countries.
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Despite these data deficiencies, it is possible to shed some light on the 
cross-country determinants o f investment using information for a panel 
o f up to 44 countries, including at most six Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica), during the 
1989-2008 period.
Estimation Strategy
The methodology for estimating the effects o f  decentralization on invest­
ment is simple: the G DP ratios o f gross fixed capital formation and 
government spending (central and subnational levels o f  administration, 
separately) on the acquisition o f  fixed assets are regressed on an intercept, 
an indicator o f decentralization and a set o f  control variables.7 To proxy 
for decentralization, an indicator constructed as the ratio o f  central to sub­
national government (middle tier and/or local governments) total (capital 
and current) revenue is included among the regressors.8
The selection of control variables is guided by the empirical literature 
and data availability, and include: G DP growth (reflecting the effect of 
faster growth on the demand for investment), GDP per capita (to proxy 
for the affordability o f investment), the share of agriculture in G DP (to 
proxy for economic structure and its effect on the demand for investment, 
especially infrastructure), the ratio o f government spending to G D P (to 
proxy for the size o f government), the ratio o f foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to GDP (which reflects supply-side considerations and the avail­
ability of external financing for investment projects) and the urbaniza­
tion rate (reflecting density effects, which are known to affect the price of 
infrastructure services provided through networks). The control variables 
are lagged to deal to the extent possible with possible simultaneity. The 
lagged dependent variable is also included in the regressions, because the 
investment series tend to be autocorrelated.
A preliminary assessment o f the data shows that the decentralization indi­
cators (expenditure or revenue) correlate poorly with the share o f investment 
(gross capital formation or gross fixed capital formation) in GDP at the 5 
percent level of statistical significance. In the subsample of Latin American 
countries, however, revenue decentralization is negatively correlated with the 
shares of gross fixed capital formation and gross capital formation in GDP. 
There is also a strong positive correlation between revenue decentralization 
and the share in GDP o f subnational government spending on fixed invest­
ment, a finding that is driven by the non-OECD and non-Latin American 
countries in the sample. By contrast, in the subsample of Latin American 
countries, revenue decentralization correlates strongly with central (rather 
than subnational) government spending on fixed investment.
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The Baseline Results
The baseline results, reported in Table 5.3, are estimated by fixed effects. 
On the basis o f  the Hausman test, the null hypothesis that the fixed effects 
are uncorrelated with the other regressors is rejected by the data in all 
specifications at classical levels o f significance. As is usual in the empirical 
literature, the lagged dependent variable is included among the regress- 
sors, because the investment or government spending ratios are serially 
correlated,9 resulting in the estimation o f a dynamic panel. Because it is 
correlated with the fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable was instru­
mented using its own lags (two lags) as instruments, and the adequacy of 
this instrumentation strategy was assessed on the basis o f an overidentifi­
cation test. Due to the dearth o f data on subnational government spend­
ing, the lagged dependent variable was not instrumented in the regressions 
using subnational investment as the dependent variable.
The main results o f  the regressions are as follows. The lagged dependent 
variables are positively signed and statistically significant in all models. 
The estimated coefficients (between 0.33 and 0.69) are statistically differ­
ent from unity and suggest that the impact o f the regressors on invest­
ment is considerably stronger in the long term than in the short run. For 
example, if revenue decentralization were to rise by 1 percent, the share 
in G D P o f subnational government spending on investment would fall 
by 0.06 percentage points in the short term and by twice as much in the 
long term. In addition, gross fixed capital formation and central govern­
ment spending on investment are unaffected by the extent o f revenue 
decentralization.
As for the control variables, GDP growth affects gross fixed capital 
formation positively but not central or subnational government spend­
ing on investment. A  country’s level o f development, proxied by GDP  
per capita, affects gross fixed capital formation and central government 
spending on investment positively. Nevertheless, subnational govern­
ment investment seems to be lower, not higher, in wealthier countries. 
A  large share o f agriculture in G D P is associated with higher central 
government investment ratios. The size of government, proxying for the 
user cost o f capital, is associated with lower subnational spending on 
investment, while having no discernible impact on gross fixed capital 
formation and central government investment. The availability o f exter­
nal financing, proxied by the ratio o f FD I to GDP, does not seem to be 
a powerful predictor o f investment.10 The urbanization rate is positively 
associated with subnational government investment, which likely reflects 
the role played by lower levels o f administration in the provision of 
urban amenities.
T a b le  5 .3  D e c e n tr a liza t io n  a n d  in v es tm e n t:  re g re ss io n  a n a ly s is
D e p en d e n t variab le :
G ro ss  fixed cap ita l G o v e rn m en t sp en d in g  G o v e rn m e n t spend ing  o n
fo rm a tio n  (log, %  o f  G D P ) o n  in v es tm en t (cen tra l in v estm en t (su b n a tio n a l
go v e rn m en t, %  o f  G D P )  go v erm en ts , %  o f  G D P )
L agged d e p en d e n t v ariab le 0.63*** 0.69*** 0.40*** Q  4 J * * * 0.52*** 0.33**
(0.063) (0 .062) (0.129) (0.128) (0.152) (0.130)
Baseline determ inants 
G D P  g ro w th  (%) 0 .0 1 *** 0 .0 1 *** - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0.03 0.03
(0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.033)
G D P  per c a p ita  (log, in  PP P) 0.16*** 0.13** 0.91* 0.90* \  4 5 *** -2 .25*
(0.054) (0.0533) (0.497) (0.498) (1.445) (1.268)
A g ricu ltu re  va lue  ad d ed  (log, %  o f  G D P ) -0 .0 3 -0 .0 3 0.42** 0.41** - 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1
(0.023) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.190) (0.190) (0.352) (0.289)
G o v e rn m en t sp en d in g  (log, %  o f  G D P ) 0.06 0.07** -0 .7 2 -0 .6 2 -1 .8 1 * * -0 .6 9
(0.034) (0.034) (0.494) (0.514) (0.771) (0.683)
D ecen tra liza tio n  index (log) 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 .0 0 * 0 . 0 0 -0 .0 6 * * 0 . 0 0
(0 .0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.027)
F D I  (log, %  o f  G D P ) 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.04 0 . 0 0
(0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.028) (0.044) (0.038)
U rb a n  p o p u la tio n  (log, %  o f  p o p u la tio n ) -0 .3 6 -0 .3 6 -0 .1 6 -0 .2 6 68.62*** 39.76***
(0.250) (0.243) (2.492) (2.506) (9.858) ( 1 0 .0 1 1 )
Interactions with L atin  Am erica dum m y
G o v e rn m en t sp en d in g  (log, %  o f  G D P ) -0 .1 9  -0 .8 7  -6 .3 9 * * *
(0.159) (2 .750) (1 .440)
D ecen tra liza tio n  index  (log) -0 .03*** -0 .0 3  -0 .1 2 * *
(0.009) (0 . 1 2 2 ) (0 .053)
M odel s ta tis tics
E stim a to r F E F E F E F E F E F E
N o . o f  o b se rv a tio n s 338 338 183 183 62 62
N o . o f  c ro ss-sec tiona l un its 39 39 29 29 9 9
R 2  (w ith in) 0 . 6 8 0.70 0.29 0.83 0.71 0.82
H au sm an ; P ro b  >  F  (p-value) 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.05 0 . 1 0 0.00 -
O v erid en tificatio n  tes t (/j-value) 0 . 0 2 0.04 0.26 0.32 - -
Note: All models include an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance a t the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels is denoted respectively by (***), (**), and (*). The lagged dependent variable is instrumented and two lags are used as instruments 
(except for the subnational government investment model).
Sources: D ata available from W orld Bank (W orld Development Indicators) and IM F (Government Finance Statistics); and author’s estimations.
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What about Latin America?
The subsample o f Latin American countries is too small and the time series 
are too short for estimating separate regressions to shed further light on 
the effects o f decentralization on investment. Instead, the main variables o f  
interest -  the size o f  government and the revenue decentralization indicator 
-  were interacted with a dummy variable identifying the subsample of 
Latin American countries (that is, the dummy variable takes the value 
o f T  for the Latin American countries in the sample and ‘O’, otherwise).
The regression results are instructive. While the main findings are com ­
parable to those o f  the baseline regressions for the control and the lagged 
dependent variables, there appear to be significant differences between 
Latin America and the other countries in the sample with regard to the 
effect of revenue decentralization on investment. In particular:
•  Revenue decentralization appears to discourage subnational gov­
ernment investment in Latin America but not in the other countries 
in the sample. The baseline finding of a negative association between 
revenue decentralization and subnational government investment is 
therefore driven by Latin America. Moreover, revenue decentraliza­
tion also discourages gross fixed capital formation in Latin America, 
while encouraging it in the other countries. As a result, the baseline 
finding o f no association between revenue decentralization and 
gross fixed capital formation is also driven by Latin America.
•  The size o f government -  measured as the ratio o f government 
spending to GDP -  discourages subnational government investment
- in Latin America, unlike the other countries in the sample, a finding 
that drives the baseline result o f a negative association between 
the size o f  government and subnational government investment. 
By contrast, the size of government is a good predictor of gross 
fixed capital formation in the subsample o f countries that excludes 
Latin America. The baseline finding o f no association between 
government size and investment is again driven by Latin America.
5 DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
The empirical findings reported above suggest that there are specific 
characteristics o f  fiscal decentralization in Latin America that impinge 
on investment and distinguish the region from other parts o f the world. 
These characteristics may include, as discussed above, a reliance on
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revenue earmarking, the presence o f strict restrictions on subnational 
borrowing and limited use o f intergovernmental grants and transfers to 
deal with externality and economies of scale effects in the provision of 
investment. O f course, there are important differences in institutional set­
tings among the Latin American countries that should not be neglected. 
But, as far as the countries in the region share, albeit to different degrees, 
these main characteristics, two policy challenges can be identified in light 
o f the empirical findings reported above. First, Latin America will need 
to eliminate the distortions associated with decentralization that discour­
age subnational governments from investing and, second, the countries in 
the region will need to create appropriate conditions to make the most of 
decentralization as a policy lever for lifting private instrument.
Eliminating the Policy Distortions that Discourage Subnational 
Governments from Investing 
Removing regulatory uncertainty
The assignment o f  expenditure functions across the different levels o f  
administration is particularly complex, especially in the sectors where 
investment needs tend to be large. In the case of network industries, 
which include m ost infrastructure sectors, regulatory, oversight, financ­
ing and service delivery functions are often unbundled and assigned to 
different layers o f  administration. This may create an overlap o f man­
dates (which creates uncertainty) and incentives for cost-shifting across 
the different levels o f  administration (which discourages governments 
from investing and the private sector from participating in infrastructure 
development and upgrading). International experience shows that Latin 
America is not alone in having to grapple with these issues. Because it is 
one o f the most decentralized countries in Latin America, Brazil offers 
an interesting example in the case o f water and sanitation, a sector where 
jurisdictional uncertainty among the municipalities, the states and the 
municipal and state water companies has discouraged both private and 
public investment. The key policy challenge in this area is therefore to 
ensure clarity in the assignment of functions across the different levels of 
administration.
Making the most of intergovernmental grants and transfers
As discussed above, most Latin American countries have yet to make 
full use o f intergovernmental grants and transfers to finance investment 
programs and to deal with the spillover effects that would discourage 
subnational investment. There is, therefore, scope for greater use of these 
instruments, especially matching grants, which would have the added
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advantage o f  encouraging the recipient jurisdiction to mobilize comple­
mentary resources locally. Experience with horizontal arrangements that 
could encourage neighboring jurisdictions to mobilize resources jointly to 
finance mutually beneficial investment programs is also limited. Greater 
support from higher levels of government, ranging from technical assist­
ance to financing and the establishment of a regulatory framework for such 
initiatives, would therefore be welcome.
Tackling predatory tax competition
Subnational governments’ ability to invest may be thwarted by an 
erosion o f their revenue base. A  case in point is predatory tax com ­
petition among the subnational jurisdictions to attract private (often 
foreign) investment. O f course, a distinction should be made between 
tax competition that is ‘desirable’, in the sense o f  acting to constrain an 
otherwise excessive rise in the subnational tax burden, and that which 
undermines subnational revenue mobilization. While plausible, this 
hypothesis has yet to be validated empirically for the different coun­
tries in the region. But, as far as the Brazilian experience is concerned, 
there is fairly compelling evidence o f predatory tax competition in the 
state-level value added tax (ICMS), whereby the states compete among 
themselves in a Stackelberg manner (de Mello, 2008). In other words, 
there appear to be ‘leaders’ among the states, whose moves to change 
their own tax rates encourage other states to follow suit. To the extent 
that the reduction in revenue brought about by tax com petition leads to 
underinvestment at the subnational level, revenue decentralization may 
also discourage private investment and result in a reduction in gross 
fixed capital formation.
There are options for encouraging salutary tax completion, while pre­
venting predatory practices. In particular:
•  Where applicable, subnational government autonomy in tax matters 
should be limited to setting tax rates, preferably within bounds set 
nationally, rather than bases. Nevertheless, the experience o f  Brazil 
illustrates the difficulties o f  achieving these objectives in a country 
where subnational governments enjoy considerable autonomy in 
tax matters. Although the municipalities are no longer free to set the 
base o f their sales tax (ISS) and can only set ISS rates within bounds 
set in law, legislation has yet to be approved to unify the state-level 
VAT code. Currently, changes in ICMS legislation, including those 
related to tax incentives, need to be agreed unanimously by the 
states, a requirement that has often been breached and resulted in 
lengthy legal disputes.
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•  Autonomy to grant tax expenditures, which narrow tax bases and 
reduce effective tax rates, should also be curtailed. Jiménez and 
Podestá (2009) estimate tax expenditures (all levels o f  government) 
to account for 2-2.3 percent o f G DP in Argentina, Brazil and Peru;
3.5 percent o f  GDP in Colombia; and 5-5.9 percent o f GDP in Chile 
and Mexico. This is all the more important because the empiri­
cal literature shows that tax incentives are weak determinants of 
investment decisions by multinational enterprises.11 The deadweight 
losses associated with tax expenditures are therefore high.
Creating incentives to tap underutilized revenue sources
Subnational governments’ own tax bases may be underutilized as a 
result of perverse incentives brought about by decentralization. There is 
a large body o f empirical evidence on ‘common pool’ problems associ­
ated with reliance on shared revenue to finance subnational provision.12 
Under certain conditions, subnational governments face the incentive to 
underutilize their own tax bases in favor of shared revenue, because in 
doing so they can export part o f the delivery costs to other jurisdictions. 
These untapped revenue sources include not only local property taxes, 
which tend to be underutilized in general, not only in Latin America, but 
also user charges for infrastructure services. This is despite the fact that 
subnational governments enjoy ample autonomy in most Latin American 
countries to introduce user chargers and fees for services. The scope for 
cost recovery through the introduction of user charges also varies across 
sectors and subsectors. O f course, there are reasons why these revenue 
sources are underutilized, including distributional and political economy 
considerations, that go beyond the perverse incentives that may arise with 
decentralized provision. To mitigate these problems, incentives can be 
created for subnational governments to fully utilize their tax bases, not least 
by rewarding tax effort in revenue-sharing arrangements.
Dealing with competing demands on subnational budgets
Decentralization has taken place in many Latin American countries at the 
same time as political liberalization and the emergence o f associated social 
demands that have created claims on the government. A strengthening 
of social safety-nets and emphasis on redistributive policies -  laudable 
in a continent with a notoriously skewed distribution o f income -  have 
resulted in a sharp rise in social spending in a number o f countries, includ­
ing Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. At the same time, the need to 
secure long-term funding for these programs has resulted in a proliferation 
of revenue earmarking and mandated spending provisions. Government 
investment has therefore suffered not only due to the emergence of
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competing demands for scarce budgetary resources, especially in the 
social area, but also through greater budgetary rigidity, which distorts the 
composition o f  spending at the expense o f public investment.13 Budgetary 
rigidity also exacerbates the pro-cyclicality of government investment by 
making capital outlays the easiest expenditure item to cut in periods of 
fiscal duress. Because budgetary rigidities constrain the ability o f  sub­
national governments to allocate budgetary resources to programs that 
may be more cost-effective than the protected ones, including possibly 
investment, a comprehensive review of the existing arrangements is in order. 
Such a review -  and subsequent corrective measures -  would also have the 
advantage of identifying ‘hidden’ fiscal space, which could allow for hiking 
cost-effective investment.
M aking the M ost of Decentralization to Encourage P rivate Investment
The results o f the regressions reported above show that the deleterious 
effect o f revenue decentralization on subnational government investment 
is not compensated in Latin America by higher central government or 
private sector investment, given an overall negative impact o f revenue 
decentralization on gross fixed capital formation. This is disturbing, 
because decentralization is found to encourage gross fixed capital forma­
tion in countries other than those in Latin America, while leaving govern­
ment spending unaffected. This suggests that, again, there may be features 
o f fiscal decentralization in Latin America that are detrimental to private 
sector investment.
M aking product market regulations more pro-investment
There is a growing body o f empirical evidence on the effects o f pro­
competition regulations in product markets on economic performance, 
especially productivity and growth.14 Most of this literature focuses on 
economy-wide regulations, rather than on variations in regulations across 
the different subnational jurisdictions, which can be substantial, espe­
cially in federal countries. In some cases, there may be entry, ownership, 
pricing and market structure impediments to private sector involvement 
in investment programs. Cross-country comparison on the basis o f the 
OECD indicator o f restrictiveness o f regulations in network industries 
shows that OECD countries have on average less burdensome regula­
tory regimes than the Latin American countries for which information is 
available (Brazil, Chile and Mexico). In particular, entry restrictions are 
particularly stringent in Mexico in telecommunications, electricity and gas 
(Figure 5.3). Impediments are also particularly stringent in Latin America 
in transport, especially rail, a sector that also tends to be fairly protected in
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Figure 5.3 Product market regulations: network industries, 2008
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Figure 5.4 F D I restrictiveness: international comparisons, 2010
OECD countries. Obstacles to private sector involvement also reflect FDI 
regimes, which tend to be less pro-investment in Latin America than in the 
OECD area on average (Figure 5.4).15 To the extent that sectoral regula­
tions are under the purview o f  subnational levels o f  government, as is the case 
to some extent in Brazil in a number o f  network industries, there is scope fo r  
removing restrictions that hold back private investment.
Avoiding costly regulatory arbitrage
Predatory tax competition among the subnational jurisdictions to attract 
investment, discussed above, creates room for regulatory arbitrage by
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investors, at least as far as tax matters are concerned. But uncertainty 
about other aspects o f  regulation, including at the sectoral level, across 
the different subnational jurisdictions imposes costs on investors, which 
may ultimately discourage investment. The example, noted above, o f 
water/sanitation in Brazil is a case in point. It is therefore desirable to make 
subnational regulations as transparent as possible.
Alternative forms of participation
Subnational governments have experimented with alternative modalities 
to encourage private sector participation, including public-private part­
nerships (PPPs) and concessions. In Brazil, for example, several states 
were pioneering in setting a regulatory framework for PPPs, often ahead 
of the federal government. The country also has considerable experience 
with concessions at the subnational level. These alternative investment 
modalities require considerable technical capacity, which is in many cases 
beyond subnational governments’ means. Among the key challenges to 
be addressed when designing PPP contracts is the need for appropriate 
risk sharing between the private sector and the government. In the case 
of concessions, the level o f subsidization needed to ensure adequate cost 
recovery poses important design challenges. These matters are discussed in 
Jiménez and Podestá (2009).
6 CONCLUSIONS
A  combination of low investment and poor infrastructure begs the ques­
tion of how much Latin American countries should invest.16 The economic 
literature is rather limited in this area, reflecting to a large extent a dearth 
of long time series on investment spending, even in the OECD area, which 
are needed for assessing the effect o f  investment on economic performance, 
including GDP growth and social outcomes. Based on standard growth 
accounting, it is possible to compute the increment in the investment-to- 
GDP ratio that would be needed to lift an economy’s potential growth, 
while keeping the rates o f growth o f other factors of production and mul­
tifactor productivity unchanged. But this mechanical computation fails to 
take on board the interactions between investment and productivity and 
efficiency in the use o f capital, for example, as well as the trade-offs that 
need to be considered for financing an increment in investment.
The empirical evidence reported in this chapter suggests that, control­
ling for other cross-country determinants o f  investment, there may be 
specific features o f  fiscal decentralization in Latin America that discour­
age subnational governments from investing. Regulatory uncertainty
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in the assignment o f expenditure functions across the different levels of 
administration, the design o f intergovernmental grants and transfers that 
make it difficult to finance investment projects jointly by different spheres 
o f government and institutional constraints on subnational financial man­
agement, including borrowing for investment purposes, are likely to be 
among the impediments to higher subnational investment in the region. 
There is therefore ample room for policy reform, depending on country 
conditions and institutional settings, so that decentralization may be used 
as an instrument for raising productivity-enhancing investment in support 
o f stronger growth.
NOTES
* First presented at the W orkshop on ‘Relaciones Intergubernamentales y 
Descentralización en America Latina’, held at ECLAC, Santiago, Chile, 25-26 
November 2009 .1 am indebted to the W orkshop participants, especially José Roberto 
Afonso, Giorgio Brosio, Juan Pablo Jiménez and Teresa Ter-Minassian, as well as 
Douglas Sutherland, for helpful comments and discussions, but remain solely respon­
sible for any remaining errors and omissions. The opinions and analyses presented in 
this chapter are mine and do not necessarily reflect those o f the OECD or its member 
countries.
1. To facilitate comparison, for the purpose of this chapter, OECD-wide averages exclude 
Chile and Mexico, the two Latin American countries that are also OECD members.
2. See M artner and Tromben (2005), Jiménez and Podestá (2009) and Rozas (2010) for 
more information and discussion on trends in Latin America.
3. This average is consistent with that computed by Lucioni (2009) for the region based on 
national accounts data.
4. Privatization has been more prevalent in sectors such as telecommunications and, to 
some extent, electricity generation and gas. Other vehicles for private sector involve­
ment, including concessions, are more common in sectors such as transport (ports, air­
ports, roads and railroads), water and sanitation, and some segments o f  the electricity 
sector (Guasch et ah, 2008).
5. Empirical evidence on the direction of causality between investment and G D P growth 
is by and large inconclusive. Nevertheless, recent empirical analysis based on cointegra­
tion and temporal causality techniques suggests that G D P growth tends to cause infra­
structure spending in a temporal sense, rather than the converse. Evidence based on 
structural model suggests that causality in the growth-investment nexus tends to take 
place via efficiency gains and a reduction of production costs (Estache and Fay, 2007).
6 . See Martinez-Vazquez (2010) for more information on the different arrangements in 
place in Latin America and de Mello (2010) for more information on the experience of 
European countries.
7. Most o f the empirical literature on the determinants o f aggregate investment is based 
on the estimation of growth regressions following the tradition of Barro (1991). In 
this setting, investment (total or private) depends essentially on the determinants of 
GDP growth, including hum an capital, government consumption and initial GDP. 
Subsequent contributions to the literature have maintained this basic setting, while 
incorporating other determinants. For example, indicators o f macroeconomic uncer­
tainty, which is known to affect investment because of the presence of sunk costs in 
investment projects, have also been considered in empirical literature (Aizenman and 
Marion, 1993; Brunetti and Weder, 1997).
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8 . The baseline results reported below are fairly robust to the use o f gross capital form a­
tion as the measure o f aggregate investment and the redefinition o f the decentralization 
indicator for expenditure, rather than revenue.
9. This is confirmed on the basis o f the Wooldridge test for panel autocorrelation.
10. A related literature shows that decentralization is detrimental to FDI. For example, 
Kessing et al. (2007) find a significant negative effect o f the number o f government 
layers of host countries on the amount o f inward FD I these countries receive.
11. See Jiménez and Podestà (2009) for a survey of the literature and discussions.
12. See de Mello (2000) for a review of the literature and empirical evidence.
13. See Allier (2006) and Cetràngolo et al. (2010) for an overview of budget rigidities and 
fiscal space in Latin America, and Afonso et al. (2005) for the case o f Brazil.
14. See, for example, de Mello and Padoan (2010) for a review of the empirical evidence.
15. See Kalinova et al. (2010) for more information and an update o f the indicator.
16. See Fay and Yepes (2003) for estimations of investment needs in Latin America.
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6. The financing of subnational 
governments*
Juan Carlos Gómez Sabaini and 
Juan Pablo Jiménez
1 INTRODUCTION
Objectives of the Chapter
For most o f  the Latin American countries, the relationship between differ­
ent levels o f government and the reassignment o f their respective respon­
sibilities and financing have been o f great significance to their economic, 
political and institutional development. Over the past decades, the region 
has undergone an intense and extensive process o f decentralization, shifting 
the responsibility o f  various public functions to different levels o f  govern­
ment. Although considerable time has elapsed since this process began, the 
impact of these various (and not always comparable) reforms has not been 
adequately evaluated, and the effectiveness of some has been doubtful.
How public services and goods are provided, and the methods to allo­
cate them among different levels o f government, are central to achieving 
a sound, stable intergovernmental system and a sustainable decentrali­
zation. Systems of intergovernmental fiscal relationships, and the sub­
national governments involved, employ a variety o f different financing 
instruments to fulfill the governments’ responsibilities. The amount of 
financing and the particular combination o f instruments largely determine 
the success o f the results.
In an attempt to address one aspect o f this issue, this chapter exam­
ines the allocation o f revenue to subnational governments, emphasizing 
financing changes over the last several decades. Focusing on these objec­
tives, it analyzes the functioning o f systems for financing subnational 
governments, with particular attention given to their changing levels of 
own resources. The examination o f specific cases is designed to spotlight 
the different self-financing options open to these jurisdictions (intermedi­
ate and/or local governments) -  this despite the predominance o f central
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government transfers1 -  as well as the main courses of action that could be 
taken to strengthen them.
Country Selection and Characteristics
The process o f decentralization in the region has been shaped by the 
diversity o f national circumstances: from differences in institutional and 
democratic features to differing motivations, institutional frameworks, 
procedural dynamics and sectors involved. Added to these factors are 
differences in the degree of autonomy o f subnational governments and 
national differences in social and economic structures (Cetràngolo et al., 
2009).
Given the differing situations in the various countries, in studying public 
finance at the local level, it is difficult to draw generalizations about Latin 
America as a whole. Any analysis must weigh the specific circumstances 
involved, as will be clear from an examination o f Table 6.1, in which a set 
of characteristics related to the nine countries considered in this chapter 
is shown.
The first distinctive characteristic among the countries is the system of 
government. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have federal systems and inter­
mediate levels of government between the central and local governments 
-  ‘provinces’ in Argentina, ‘states’ in Brazil and M exico.2 The rest have 
unitary or centralized systems o f government. This distinction makes 
for a significant difference in the taxing power o f the lower levels of 
government.3
The different types o f  federal and unitary structure further compli­
cate the analysis. In Mexico and Argentina the choice o f federalism was 
intended to achieve unity between previously autonomous states; in Brazil 
the choice of such a structure was made by the central government. The 
temporal dynamic must also be borne in mind. Neither unitary nor federal 
countries have always had their current government system. This is exhib­
ited in the numerous attempts made in constructing the constitutions of 
various countries throughout the nineteenth century (Cetràngolo et al., 
2009; Gargarella and Arballo, ch. 2 in this volume).
A  second characteristic is the population density in each jurisdiction, 
since this proves to be a significant variable in evaluating the cost of 
transferring functions to local jurisdictions. The higher the population 
density, the greater are the economies o f  scale in providing services, 
especially in education, health and infrastructure, which constitute the 
principal public outlays at the local level. This in turn entails a need to 
capture greater resources in order to offer the same level o f expenditure 
per inhabitant.
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Table 6.1 Principal socioeconomic indicators fo r  the countries analyzed
C o u n try System  o f  
g o v ern m en t
G o v ern m en ta l
s tru c tu re
E stim ated  
p o p u la tio n  
acco rd in g  
to  U n ited  
N a tio n s  (2010)





N a tio n s










(coeff. a n d  
ran k in g ), 
U N D P  
(2007)
G in i coeff. 
(e stim ated  
an n u al)
T o ta l 
tax  
b u rd e n  
2008 
(%  o f  
G D P )
%  R eg io n a l 
U rb a n  d isp a rities  
p o p . (gaps, 
(2005) c o n s ta n t 
pesos)
A rg en tin a F ed eral 23 prov inces, 
one
a u to n o m o u s 
city  a n d  1,301 
m unic ipalities
40,666,000 15 14,559 0.866 (49 th ) 0.513
(2006)
30.8 91.8 8 . 1
(2005)
Bolivia 
(P lu rin a ­
tiona l 
S ta te  of)
U n ita ry 9 d e p artm en ts , 
1 1 2  p rov inces 
a n d  327 
m un ic ipalities




Brazil F ed eral 26 sta tes, one  
federal d is tric t 
a n d  5,564 
m unic ipalities






C hile U n ita ry 15 regions, 54 
prov inces a n d  
346 co m m u n es 
(m unicipalities)
17,135,000 23 14,331 0.878 (44 th) 0.475
(2003)
19.6 8 6 . 6 4.6
(2008)
C olom bia
C o sta  R ica




U n ita ry
U n ita ry
F ed eral
U n ita ry
32
d e p artm en ts ,
1 0  d is tric ts  
a n d  1,096 
m un ic ipalities 
7 p rov inces,
81 can to n s  
(m unicipalities) 
a n d  463 
d istric ts
24 p ro v in cia l 
councils and  
2 2 1  c an to n s  
(m unicipalities) 
31 sta tes , one 
federa l d is tric t 
a n d  2,439 
m un ic ipalities
25 reg ions, 25 
d e p artm en ts , 
195 p rov inces 
a n d  1,832 
m un ic ipalities
46,300,000 41 8,870 0.807 (77 th) 0 .537 15.9 76.6 11.0
(2005) (2007)
4,640,000 91 11,122 0.854 (54th) 0 .577 21.4 62.6
(2004)




14,337 0.854 (53rd) 0 .490
(2002)






Sources: ECLAC, United Nations, World Bank: Zapata (2007), SUBDERE (2009), Gomez Sabaini et al. (2010) and Rezende and Veloso (ch. 8  
in this volume).
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Third, it is important to consider each country’s per capita income 
level. One obvious notion is that the greater this indicator for a 
country, the greater will be the potential tax base available to finance 
expenditures. However, the disparities between the region’s countries 
are such that, for example, the tax burden in Brazil is nearly 3.5 times 
what it is in M exico, although per capita income is 30 percent higher in 
Mexico.
The fourth characteristic is the degree o f territorial inequality, which 
is of particular relevance in designing and financing decentralized public 
policy. In contrast to the situation in more developed regions, there 
are large disparities in the degree o f development between different 
geographical areas within individual countries of Latin America -  a cir­
cumstance that calls for heightened attention. In light o f  this, the present 
work has examined, for a group o f countries in the region, the gaps in 
per capita output between the highest- and lowest-ranking subnational 
jurisdictions (Cetràngolo et al., 2009). Table 6.1 (column 11) shows that 
there are vast gaps between rich and poor jurisdictions, suggesting a great 
difference in the tax bases o f different areas within a single country. This 
circumstance makes it difficult to provide public goods and services based 
on decentralized expenditure and financing policies, since the poorer, 
needier areas are precisely the ones that have a smaller tax base to finance 
their most important local public expenditure (infrastructure, health and 
education).
Fifth, two highly important social indicators must be considered: the 
human development index (HDI) and the income inequality index, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient. These indicators point to the need for 
strong social policies, in an effort to improve social equity and cohesion in 
the region’s countries.
Sixth, the countries analyzed here have a large number o f municipali­
ties and intermediate-level entities (see column 3). Except for Costa Rica, 
Chile and Ecuador, which have fewer than 500 municipalities each, munic­
ipalities number in the thousands for individual countries, with over 5,000 
in Brazil. The task o f coordinating policies for local governments becomes 
a major challenge when such a wide range o f realities must be taken into 
consideration.
Seventh (column 9), country-to-country differences in the national tax 
burden within the region (lower in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador 
and Mexico, higher in Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of)) cause differences in the leeway that local governments have for 
collecting revenue.
In short, as is evident from the information outlined in Table 6.1, 
no stylized behavior can be defined for the countries as a whole; it is
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therefore difficult to draw general conclusions from an analysis o f their 
data.
2 CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING 
REVENUE ALLOCATION AND VERTICAL 
ASYMMETRY
The last two decades witnessed a major trend towards decentralization 
in Latin America. This is evident in the countries with traditional federal 
systems (where certain federal government functions were transferred 
to lower levels o f government), in unitary countries with multiple levels 
of government (where there was a major transfer of functions to local 
governments) and in what have traditionally been highly centralized 
unitary countries, which created new intermediate levels o f government 
and assigned them responsibility for formulating and implementing -  or, 
in some cases, merely managing -  major public policies (Jiménez and 
Vihuela, 2004).
Reforms and the process o f decentralization in the region’s countries 
have tended to create a high degree o f vertical asymmetry in the way that 
expenditures and revenue are allocated to the different levels o f govern­
ment. This imbalance is the consequence o f  a misalignment, or lack of 
correspondence, between the vertical distribution of authorities -  with 
the expenditure responsibilities that accompany them -  and the vertical 
distribution o f potential tax revenues (to fund the expenditures) between 
the different levels o f government.
Theory generally suggests that subnational governments should be 
financed, where possible, by their own resources. Looking beyond the 
theory to empirical data, however, one sees a strong vertical asymmetry, 
with expenditures being more decentralized than revenue in most world 
regions (OECD, 2003).
On the theoretical level, much has been written regarding the alloca­
tion o f taxes between different levels o f government. The quest for an 
optimal allocation o f resources poses questions about how to determine 
which taxes are to be collected by each level o f government, which level of 
government should be responsible for defining the tax basis, which level 
should establish tax rates and, finally, which level of government should 
administer and oversee the taxes once the foregoing questions have been 
answered (Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 2006).
There is, of course, no consensus or single answer to these questions. 
The excellent review by Ambrosanio and Bordignon makes it clear that the 
two extreme positions are based on: (i) the traditional normative theory
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of federalism (Musgrave, 1967; Oates, 1972); and (ii) a ‘public choice’ 
approach (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985).
According to the first o f these two approaches, optimal allocation 
relates to how expenditure functions are allocated between the different 
levels o f government. As expressed in Musgrave’s well-known definition, 
public sectors are charged with three functions: allocation, redistribution 
and stabilization. While the first o f these is shared by all levels o f govern­
ment, it is desirable for the last two to be carried out at the central level. It 
follows that income taxes should be a central government function, since 
they effectively serve both to redistribute income and to achieve macr­
oeconomic stability. As for the allocation function, conventional theory 
recommends that, for the sake of efficiency, both the central government 
and subnational governments should allocate taxes according to the prin­
ciple o f  benefit. First, according to this principle, local governments should 
tax real estate or assets, in order to prevent fiscal competition and loss of 
revenue. Second, the tax basis on which collections are made should be 
uniformly distributed among the jurisdictions, in order to avoid generating 
horizontal tax imbalances. Third, the taxes collected by local governments 
should have relatively stable real returns, thus making it easier to formulate 
expenditure plans.
In contrast with this method o f addressing resource allocation, the 
Brennan-Buchanan approach emphasizes the idea that taxes are used 
by the government as a means o f maximizing the resources appropriated 
from the private sector. The positive effect of decentralizing taxes, in this 
view, is based on the fact that it allows competition between different levels 
of government, creating constraints on the use of taxation and, ultimately, 
on the size o f  the public sector.
Both approaches have been criticized on a number o f fronts: the tra­
ditional approach for assuming that governments are benevolent (maxi­
mizers of social welfare) -  thus ignoring the political economy at work 
in the allocation o f resources -  and for failing to provide a satisfactory 
explanation o f allocation based on empirical data; the Brennan-Buchanan 
approach for considering monopolistic governments that do not consider 
competition between levels o f government which, just as in the real world, 
can introduce serious problems o f distortion in the allocation o f resources, 
leading to tax wars that erode the tax base and reduce revenues.
Beyond these differences, the two approaches share the common feature 
of being normative by nature, while neither is very effective in explaining 
the real world, as will be seen below.
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3 THE PROCESS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
AND FORMS OF FUNDING
The Path to Strengthening Local Governments
The last few decades in Latin America have seen the consolidation o f a 
gradual but clear trend towards decentralizing public spending, from the 
central government to lower levels.
According to Rezende and Veloso (ch. 8 in this volume), efforts to 
accomplish decentralization occurred in two major ‘waves’. The first one 
gathered strength in the closing years o f the 1980s, fueled by the view that 
decentralization would allow more efficient allocation o f public goods to 
a territorially diverse subnational citizenry, and that this would, in turn, 
improve channels for citizen participation and enhance political responsi­
bility and accountability. The second wave occurred in the context o f the 
macro crisis o f the mid-1990s. Here, the decentralizing reforms took a dif­
ferent approach. Tax coparticipation systems (in most cases unrestricted) 
were not given the priority they previously enjoyed; rather, preference 
was given to channeling federal resources to subnational governments for 
education and health, with a strengthening o f mechanisms for earmarked 
transfers.
In both periods, the decentralization process primarily involved public 
expenditure rather than revenue, though this varied somewhat from one 
area to another. In general terms, subnational fiscal decentralization has 
been most notable in Argentina and Brazil (countries with federal systems) 
-  as measured by either spending or revenue -  followed by Colombia and 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (among the unitary countries) (Aghôn and 
Edling, 1997).
Although the allocation o f expenditure responsibilities to subnational 
governments is important, the way in which these governments finance 
the services involved remains a key concern. Three financing methods 
(or combinations o f  the three) are used: (a) generation o f own resources, 
whether from taxes or from non-tax sources (royalties, municipal fees, 
levies, are among the most relevant); (b) intergovernmental transfers; and 
(c) borrowing.
In the strict sense, subnational own revenue is defined as consisting o f  
those taxes over which subnational governments have discretionary power 
to determine the tax burden on citizens (see Brosio and Jiménez, ch. 10 in 
this volume). This power can be exercised through three different instru­
ments: tax administration, setting tax rates and determining the tax base.
This chapter utilizes a broader definition of own resources, since a combi­
nation o f all three is present in Latin America, and the necessary information
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Note: Throughout this chapter the concept of subnational governments refers to
provinces in the case o f Argentina, prefectures and municipalities in the case of Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), states and municipalities in Brazil, municipalities in Chile, 
departments and municipalities in Colombia, local governments (cantons) in Costa Rica, 
provincial councils and municipalities in Ecuador, states and municipalities in Mexico.
* The data for Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico are from ECLAC projections.
Source: ECLAC.
Figure 6.1 Changing structure o f  total revenues in subnational
governments (%> o f  GDP): average fo r  Latin America, 
1997-2009
is not available in all cases. Therefore, a tax will be defined as subnational to 
the extent that it is administered by the subnational government.
As shown in Figure 6.1, the total fiscal revenues o f the subnational 
governments have grown considerably in the last 10 years. However, this 
is due primarily to increasingly important transfers from central govern­
ments, rather than to increases in own-tax resources at the intermediate 
and local levels. On average, total transfers increased by 1.5 percent of 
GDP between 1997 and 2009, while the growth in own resources increased 
only from 2.1 to 2.7 percent of G D P.4
Table 6.2 shows the current financing structures o f  the subnational 
governments o f the countries covered in this study. The first notable point 
is the difference seen in the quantity o f own resources (tax and non-tax) 
as a proportion o f total revenue received by these levels o f government. 
As indicated in the table, Brazil’s states and municipalities obtain more 
than half o f their revenues from own resources. This is equivalent to 11.9 
percent o f  GDP, 85 percent o f  which corresponds to tax revenues.
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Table 6.2 Structure o f  total revenues o f  subnational governments, 2008 
(% o f  GDP and % o f  total)
P ercen tag e  o f  G D P
O w n resources T ran sfe rs O th e r revenue T o ta l
A rg e n tin a 5.6 7.6 0.7 13.9
B oliv ia  (P lu rin a tio n a l. 3.9 7.4 0.5 1 1 . 8
Sta te  of)
B razil 11.9 7.9 1 . 6 21.4
C hile 1.5 0 . 2 0.4 2 . 1
C o lo m b ia 2.9 4.2 0 . 0 7.1
C o s ta  R ica 0.9 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.9
E c u a d o r 1 . 2 4.0 0 . 1 5.3
M exico 1.5 9.1 0 . 8 11.4
P eru 0 . 8 4.8 0.4 6 . 0
P ercen tage  o f  to ta l
O w n resources T ran sfe rs O th e r revenue T o ta l
A rg e n tin a 40.1 54.7 5.2 1 0 0
B oliv ia  (P lu rin a tio n a l. 33.1 62.4 4.5 1 0 0
S ta te  of)
Brazil 55.6 36.9 7.5 1 0 0
C hile 71.5 9.5 19.0 1 0 0
C o lo m b ia 41.0 59.0 0 . 0 1 0 0
C o sta  R ica 99.2 0 . 8 0 . 0 1 0 0
E c u a d o r 2 2 . 6 75.5 1.9 1 0 0
M exico 12.9 79.9 7.2 1 0 0
P eru 14.1 79.4 6.5 1 0 0
Note: Other revenue can include different forms of borrowing, investment, resources from
sales of assets, recovery of loans, or capital transfers; own resources include tax and non-tax 
own revenues.
Source: ECLAC.
In most countries, the subnational governments are highly depend­
ent on the transfer system used by the central government to provide 
the required funds to finance the expenditures o f  these lower levels o f 
government (that is, providing public goods to their citizens). Central 
governments in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), Brazil and Mexico transfer between 7.4 and 9.1 percent o f GDP to 
the lower levels o f  government. In Colombia and Peru,5 the figure is 4.8 
percent, while in Ecuador it is 2.5 percent.
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Chile and Costa Rica are exceptions to the Latin American trend. 
Although the revenues o f subnational governments in both o f these 
countries are low in terms o f GDP (as in nearly all o f the region’s unitary 
states), they are made up principally o f own resources. In Costa Rica, 
the process o f fiscal decentralization has not yet advanced significantly. 
The delegation o f responsibility involved has not occurred on either the 
expenditure or the taxation side. On the contrary, in Chile the prepon­
derance o f own resources as the principal source o f municipal revenues 
has two components: permanent own resources, and revenues from the 
Common Municipal Fund (Fondo Comun Municipal, or FCM). Since this 
mechanism of horizontal equalization and solidarity between municipali­
ties is 97 percent reliant on the tax resources collected by these jurisdictions 
themselves,6 in this chapter we consider their pre-distribution influence, 
that is, as a part o f  all available own resources, in order to better reflect 
their potential for financing subnational levels o f government.
Tax Revenues of Subnational Governments: Structure and Trends
As explained above, the decentralization o f taxing authority to subna­
tional governments has been relatively weak in most Latin American 
countries, although this varies according to the specific characteristics of 
the country involved.
Figure 6.2 shows the uneven, and generally small, role o f subnational 
governments in total tax collections in Latin American countries. Brazil 
exhibits the greater fiscal decentralization, with its states and munici­
palities accounting for 30 percent o f total collections, which represent 
10.1 percent o f GDP. A  second tier o f  countries includes Argentina and 
Colombia, where lower levels o f  government account for approximately 
15 percent of total collections.
In the remaining countries central governments have not significantly 
decentralized tax resources. Subnational tax collections in them average 
around 3 to 4 percent o f the countries’ total tax revenues. Tax collections 
by subnational governments in the region’s countries have remained stag­
nant during the last 10 years. This poor performance is related to weakness 
in the level and structure o f subnational taxation, which in turn is linked to 
the tax bases available to these governments. As discussed in the sections 
below, the taxes collected by intermediate and local governments are gen­
erally taxes on assets -  primarily real estate and vehicles. The most decen­
tralized countries have, in addition, some general consumption taxes; 
these are levied mostly by intermediate levels o f government. Examples are 
the Tax on Circulation o f Goods and Services (Imposto sobre Circulafdo 
de Mercadorias e Servifos, or ICMS) in Brazilian states, the Tax on All
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis o f official figures.
Figure 6.2 Tax revenues by level o f  government, 2008 (% o f  GDP and % 
o f  total)
Services (Imposto sobre Servifos de Qualquer Natureza , or ISS) in Brazilian 
municipalities, the tax on gross income in the Argentine provinces, 
excise taxes at the departmental level in Colombia and an Industry and 
Commerce Tax that is collected by Colombian municipalities.
Although the low level o f collection is a problem for own taxes, given 
the amount of expenditure that has to be financed by intermediate and 
local governments, they have little margin for reallocating taxing powers. 
What becomes clear is the difficulty that subnational governments face in 
attempting to exert their existing powers o f taxation. This is evident, for 
example, in the low levels o f revenue generated by real estate taxes in Latin 
American countries.
A detailed analysis o f the main features o f the principal taxes presented 
in Table 6.3, outlining their features in the countries being examined, 
follows.
Property taxes
The most recent research, along with available statistical information, 
confirms that property taxes are not significant as a percentage o f GDP, or 
as a percentage o f all taxes collected (excluding taxes on financial transac­
tions), in any o f the Latin American tax systems. Since taxes on assets are 
the principal instrument used by the region’s subnational governments to
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Table 6.3 Structure o f  the principal taxes o f  subnational governments, 
2008 (%> o f  GDP and % o f  total)
P ercen tage  o f  G D P
P ro p e rty E co n o m ic
activ ity
M o to r
vehicles
P e rso n a l O th ers  
incom e
T o ta l
A rg en tin a 0.4 3.2 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 6 4.4
Bolivia (P lu rin a tio n a l 0.5 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 2 0.9
S tate  of)
Brazil 0.4 7.9 0 . 6 0.5 0 . 8 1 0 . 2
C hile 0 . 6 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 0 0.3 1 . 1
C o lo m b ia 0.5 1.3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.7 2.5
C o s ta  R ica 0 . 2 0.4 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 6
E cu a d o r 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 0.4
M exico 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.3 0 . 2 0.7
P eru 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2
P ercen tag e  o f  to ta l
P ro p e rty E co n o m ic M o to r P e rso n a l O th ers T o ta l
activ ity vehicles incom e
A rg en tin a 8.7 72.2 5.5 0 . 0 13.6 1 0 0
B olivia (P lu rin a tio n a l 59.8 0 . 0 19.9 0 . 0 20.3 1 0 0
S tate  of)
Brazil 3.8 78.3 5.5 4.8 7.6 1 0 0
C hile 52.4 0 . 0 17.4 0 . 0 30.2 1 0 0
C o lo m b ia 19.2 52.5 0 . 0 0 . 0 28.3 1 0 0
C o sta  R ica 32.5 66.5 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 0 0
E c u a d o r 32.9 14.2 3.4 4.5 45.1 1 0 0
M exico 28.2 0 . 0 3.7 41.0 27.1 1 0 0
P eru 59.9 0 . 0 4.4 0 . 0 35.7 1 0 0
Source: E C L A C .
generate own resources, they are limited to finance expenditures in areas 
for which they are responsible.
At the same time, within the broad range of taxes normally imposed 
on assets, the real estate or land tax is the most commonly accepted, and 
is the tax most often used as a source o f revenue at the lower levels o f 
government, although it represents only 0.1 to 0.6 percent o f G D P for the 
countries covered in this chapter.7
Nevertheless, the share o f total subnational tax resources represented 
by real estate taxes varies considerably from country to country. Thus, as
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shown in Table 6.3, the property tax provides over half o f  own-tax rev­
enues in countries such as Chile, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Peru 
(although in this last country the amount obtained is small).
Chile’s Property Tax (Impuesto Territorial), which sets levels of contri­
butions for real property holdings, is the principal component o f  munici­
pal tax revenues.8 Its rate, tax base and exemptions are established by 
law. In practice, the municipalities benefit only from the revenues they 
collect, while playing practically no role in setting the rates. The property 
tax base is determined by the tax value of the property, as assessed by the 
Internal Tax Service {Servicio de lmpuestos Internos), and the rate is set 
by law. This creates an assets tax with no relation to the local goods and 
services whose costs must be underwritten by the municipality in which the 
property is located.
In addition, 60 or 65 percent of the sums collected (a figure that varies 
from one municipality to another) must be paid into the FCM, while the 
remaining 40 or 35 percent goes directly to the commune’s municipality 
in which the property is located (Horst, 2009). Thus, the system attempts 
to incorporate distributive criteria for a tax that usually is based on the 
concept o f direct benefits.
Three aspects o f Chile’s Property Tax are often cited. The first is its 
progressive nature: there is an income stratum that is exempt, and the 
scale is progressive for residential property, with allocations made through 
the FCM. Second, there is a large exempt tax base, although the revenue 
produced (0.6 percent o f  GDP) is 50 percent higher than the average for 
Latin America. Thus, the amount o f exempt property is probably coun­
terbalanced by higher rates than those in the other countries. Third, there 
is a high cost o f administering the tax, as compared with other domestic 
taxes. This is due to (i) the complex process o f  property assessment and 
the cost o f maintaining real estate rolls; and (ii) a combination o f rates and 
exemptions that produces low levels o f  revenue collected.
In Bolivia (Plurinational State of), the Property Tax (Impuesto a la 
Propiedad de Bienes Inmuebles) is collected by the municipalities. It has 
the peculiarity that the taxpayer can determine how much to pay, based 
on tables o f values for similar areas, as defined by the municipalities and 
approved by the central government. The sums collected are allocated 
exclusively to the municipalities, although the tax is regulated by the 
central government. The tax is calculated on the basis o f  taxpayer ‘self­
assessments’, rather than by formal tax assessments o f land and buildings 
and a real estate registry system, as is the case in most o f  the countries 
(Uribe and Bejarano, 2008).
In Peru, subnational governments obtain revenue from a set o f taxes 
including the property tax, which falls under municipal jurisdiction. Two
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methods are used to assess property values: the tax (or ‘official’) assess­
ment based on standards and specifications defined by the National 
Taxation Council, and the commercial (or ‘market’) value, which is sup­
posed to reflect inflation and actual real estate prices. The main problems 
with this type o f  assessment are:
1. The information on land area, construction footprint, and a building’s 
material and condition are declared by the taxpayer. Municipalities 
have few resources to update property registers with verified informa­
tion and, consequently, to audit the values declared by taxpayers.
2. Both the property values o f the land and the unitary values o f build­
ings are out o f step with market values. The latter tend to be higher by 
a factor o f  two or even three in areas with high-value residences.
Furthermore, the tax rate is cumulative and progressive, varying 
between 0.2 and 1 percent according to the value o f the property. Based on 
2006 data from the Ministry o f Economy and Finance of Peru, not only is 
this tax small in relation to GDP, but its collection is concentrated in a few 
municipalities. Ten municipalities (out o f a sample o f 1,300) account for 
38.8 percent o f the total collected, while the top 100 account for a full 86.4 
percent o f the national total (Gomez Sabaini et al., 2010).
Property tax revenues and collections are affected by the fact that only 
a small proportion o f properties are registered. In addition, there is a high 
rate of delinquency in paying these taxes, while properties themselves are 
greatly undervalued. There are numerous reasons for the high delinquency 
rates, but the most common ones are lack of information by citizens, 
and the government’s failure to disseminate information on the payment 
process. In addition, there is a public perception that failure to pay carries 
little risk, while there is a scarcity o f information and little transparency in 
how resources are used.
In the other group o f countries studied, the real estate tax provides an 
even lower percentage o f  tax revenues than in the countries mentioned 
above -  still an important portion, though not more than 0.2 percent of 
GDP. Countries in this group include Ecuador (32.9 percent), Costa Rica 
(32.5 percent) and Mexico (28.2 percent).
In Ecuador, only the National Congress is responsible for the crea­
tion, modification and elimination o f all types o f  taxes, although the 
provincial councils may establish additional taxes and set supplementary 
rates. However, the real estate tax is the main source o f tax revenue for 
Ecuador’s cantons in both urban and rural areas. The tax basis, which is 
the total value o f  the property, is updated every two years by the municipal 
property registry office, based on the value o f the land the buildings and
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their replacement value, pursuant to rulings by the Municipal Council. 
Nevertheless, given the logistical problems in most o f the jurisdictions, the 
assessment method relies on information provided directly by the property 
owner, along with data from land titles. Tax rates for urban properties 
range from 0.25 to 5 percent, and the rate in rural areas is between 0.25 
and 3 percent.
As mentioned above, the taxes collected by Costa Rica’s cantons are rel­
atively insignificant in relation to the national total. The principal reason 
for this is that the municipalities are responsible only for administering 
certain property taxes and sales taxes.9 Local governments are required 
to make assessments, carry out collections and demand payment o f  taxes 
under their jurisdiction. The effective rate, 0.25 percent o f the value o f  
the property, is set by the central government, and applies throughout 
the nation.
In Mexico, each state makes independent use of the authorities that the 
constitution assigns to them, including the authority to establish taxes. 
The property tax is essentially a municipal tax10 and represents the second 
most important source o f subnational tax revenue. In 2008, it accounted 
for 54 percent o f municipal tax revenues and 34 percent o f  tax revenues 
in the Federal District (Distrito Federal, or DF). Although no legal con­
straint prevents the federal government from instituting a property tax, 
this type of tax is assigned to the municipalities to ensure consistency in the 
tax system and to prevent double taxation. Thus, tax rolls and assessments 
are the responsibility o f  the municipalities and o f the D F, and common 
criteria for taxation can only be achieved through agreements between 
jurisdictions.
However, due to a failure to properly update assessments, in combi­
nation with a number o f other institutional factors, property taxes have 
little real ability to provide resources in Mexico. Municipalities need legal 
authorization from their respective state congresses to alter land assess­
ments, and these legislative bodies have no incentive to increase the land 
assessment tables, since the citizens, especially in the capital cities, view 
such increases as unjustified -  a situation that makes any decisions to raise 
the taxes politically unpopular. In addition, the average municipality in 
Mexico has little technical and administrative capacity to efficiently handle 
the real estate tax, and there is a high turnover rate among the municipal 
employees responsible for administering it (Alvarez Estrada, 2009).
In Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, although subnational governments 
also collect the real estate tax, the tax is subordinate to other types of taxes 
-  such as retail sales tax and the gross income tax -  that are larger revenue 
sources at this level.
In Argentina, the real estate tax is the second most important source o f
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tax revenue at the provincial level, although it accounts for only slightly 
under one-tenth of total collections (8.7 percent).11 Moreover, 80 percent 
o f the funds that it generates are concentrated in five o f the 24 provinces 
-  with the federal capital and the province of Buenos Aires together 
accounting for approximately 75 percent of GDP (Gomez Sabaini, et al., 
2010).
The assessment method most commonly used in Argentina takes 
account o f both land and buildings, and thus reflects the value o f  each 
property in its entirety. Another method used, specifically in the province 
o f Buenos Aires, is based on separate assessments o f the land and the 
buildings (or improvements). Different rates apply to each, with rates on 
betterment being lower than rates on land. The tax rates vary from one 
jurisdiction to another, and are generally a percentage o f  the value o f the 
property. According to the type o f  real estate involved, a single tax, or a set 
o f different taxes, may apply. Some cities have progressive tax scales, that 
is, rates that vary with the value of the real estate. In the city o f  Buenos 
Aires, for example, the so-called ‘territorial contribution’ has 16 different 
rates, one for each value bracket. The rates range from 0.2 to 1.5 percent 
o f assessed value.
In December 2006, a new National Real Estate Registry Act (Law 
26.209) was passed. This followed longstanding demands to modernize 
aspects o f the country’s property registry system. Changes included: the 
creation o f the new Federal Real Estate Registry Council (composed of 
all of the provincial registries and that o f the Autonomous City o f Buenos 
Aires); the granting of provincial autonomy for such purposes (under the 
constitution, the provinces have powers and are permitted to make their 
own laws, provided that these do not conflict with national legislation and 
are consistent with the Civil Code); and the definition o f  parameters relat­
ing to land parcels, such as georeferenced information on the location of 
the property (boundaries as defined by the legal descriptions on which they 
are based, such as lineal measures, angular measures and area).
Brazil has two taxes on real estate, one for urban property, the other 
for rural property. The Urban Property Tax (Imposto sobre a propriedade 
predial e territorial urbana, or IPTU) is under the exclusive authority of 
the municipalities and the federal district; the legal tax base therefore 
depends on rules established directly by each jurisdiction. Revenues from 
the IPTU12 amounted to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2008. This tax applies to 
ownership or possession o f real property in urban areas. The tax basis is 
determined by the market value of the property, while the rates are set by 
each municipality.
The tax represents only a small share (3.8 percent) o f all subnational 
government tax revenues. Brazil’s urban real estate tax, by contrast, is the
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second largest source o f revenue for municipalities, providing approxi­
mately 26 percent o f  total tax revenue; it is exceeded only by the ISS, 
which is discussed in the next subsection. The IPTU differs from the Rural 
Property Tax (Imposto Territorial Rural, or ITR), which consists o f  the set 
o f taxes assigned to the central government under current legislation and 
is applicable to rural land without improvements or buildings.
In Colombia, the Unified Land Tax, although it was originally under 
departmental jurisdiction, came under municipal responsibility as o f the 
1991 Constitution. The constitution gave the municipalities the authority 
to determine rates (within a set range), exemptions, preferential treat­
ments and specific permitted uses o f revenues from the tax. As might be 
expected, there can be (and in fact are) as many regulatory frameworks 
for real estate taxation as there are municipalities, reflecting the particular 
needs o f each jurisdiction. Thus, Colombia’s land tax, which represents 0.5 
percent of GDP, is levied on all real estate, both urban and rural, whether 
or not it includes buildings, within the geographical boundaries o f  each 
municipality. It is the second most important source o f tax revenue at the 
subnational level, accounting for 19.2 percent o f the total revenues of these 
jurisdictions (see Table 6.3).
The tax basis, in this case, is determined by the assessment made by 
decentralized registry offices in Bogota, Antioquia, Cali and Medellin, and 
by a private entity in the other departments. Property values are updated 
annually by a percentage set by the central government, consisting of 
between 70 and 100 percent o f  the consumer price index as o f  1 September 
o f each year. However, a number o f municipalities in Colombia have 
experienced problems, both because o f the difficulty of using market data 
to update assessments and due to the intrinsic difficulties involved. They 
have therefore resorted to using self-assessments o f  value -  with the caveat 
that the values reported by the taxpayer may not be less than a specified 
threshold value set by the land registry authority.
Finally, tax rates must be set by municipal authorities, and must be 
between 0.1 and 1.6 percent o f the assessed value o f  the property. The rate 
structure must be differentiated and progressive, varying based on socio­
economic strata and, in the case of urban areas, on how the land is being 
used -  factors that ultimately determine the tax value o f the property in 
question. Box 6.1 discusses the issue o f ‘betterment levies’.
Taxes on economic activity
Unlike real estate taxes -  where the differences in tax rates between juris­
dictions do not create major problems, given the constancy o f the tax 
base -  taxes on economic activities entail greater risks if there is a lack of 
tax coordination, since differences between rates in neighboring regions
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BOX 6.1 BETTERMENT LEVIES
In terms of financing urban development in Latin America, 
Colombia is recognized by academics and public administrations 
for its important experience in using the contribución de valor­
ización (Vejarano, 2008) -  a property tax to subsidize a specific 
public project, levied on property owners who have benefited, 
or are to benefit, from the project involved. Studies in Peru also 
point to increasing success in overcoming the obstacles to using 
such a tax (Gamarra Huayapa, 2001), while studies in Guatemala 
indicate that it, too, has had interesting experiences with this tax 
in the past (Eguino et al., 2002). Ecuador is a special case in the 
region, with this tax accounting for over 20 percent of municipal 
tax revenues (Pérez, 2010).
This instrument allows the state to recover some of the 
increase in land value resulting from public works. Thus, the tax 
functions partly as a means of recovering added value, although 
there is a limit on what can be charged, based on the total cost of 
the work carried out. The system does not allow recovery to be 
based upon the increased value of the land.
Except in a very few countries, such as Chile, rules allowing for 
the use of this mechanism can be found in various provisions for 
subsidizing public works or improvements. However, in practice, 
its application has been limited, owing in most cases to problems 
relating to the scope of the levy, the criteria for applying it, and 
difficulties of collecting it.
There is some consensus on the advantages of having some 
system based on taxing betterment,1 given the fact that such 
systems can encourage citizen participation in municipal decision 
making, while providing community support for projects that offer 
social benefits and increase property values.
As Macón and Merino-Mañón (1976) note, however, ‘better­
ment levies tax the increased value of real estate resulting from 
work carried out by the public sector’ , which in fact requires 
certain knowledge of the value of the real estate before and 
after the investment. Thus, determining the appropriate tax 
contribution for betterment has the same problems involved in 
taxing assets in general, although the problems are all the more 
challenging given the need to determine how much change has 
occurred in the value of the assets.
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Another issue is that the overlapping effect on external econo­
mies generated by public works (for example, sewerage, paving, 
roads) leads to benefits that extend beyond the people directly 
affected by the works, to third parties that also use them. Thus, it 
is difficult to establish the scope of the taxation process, that is, 
to decide whom to charge for the betterment. This has caused 
practical problems in implementing such systems.
Furthermore, collecting taxes on the basis of increased value is 
difficult, and financial problems arise in attempting to do so.
For these and other reasons, studies conclude that this instru­
ment, despite the fact that it deserves consideration as a financ­
ing mechanism for municipal governments, has so far fallen short 
of its expected results.
Note: 1. A brief summary of the lessons emerging from the use of this method 
of financing public works at the municipal level can be found In a report by Egulno 
et al. (2002).
can induce taxpayers to ‘export’ consumption and production/marketing 
to areas o f the country with lower tax burdens (as can also happen 
internationally with taxes on international trade).
In general, the countries use two different types of taxes on sales and 
consumption: (a) single-stage taxes (such as the general sales tax that 
consumers pay in the United States) or selective taxes on specific goods 
and services; and (b) non-cumulative multiple-stage taxes, such as the 
value added tax used in all Latin American countries. Less frequent, but 
also present in the region at the local government level, are cumulative 
or ‘cascading’ taxes that apply to each stage in the production, distribu­
tion and marketing process. These generate significant revenue with low  
rates, because they tax the same item multiple times. Examples o f  this are 
Argentina’s gross income tax and other, similar local taxes consisting of 
licensing taxes or fees.
The relative ease o f administering specific or selective taxes and the 
possibility o f using different rates for diverse regions make these measures 
a good potential source of revenue for the various levels o f government 
involved, though the jurisdictional principle must be taken into account 
in applying them.
As long as general sales or consumption taxes, as well as excise taxes, 
are levied in the location where the consumer lives (the destination prin­
ciple) rather than where the goods and services are produced or provided
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(the origin principle), these taxes will not have distortionary effects on 
taxpayers’ economic decisions (Larios et al., 2004).
It is clear that even when the destination principle is applied to a 
product, if different jurisdictions have different tax rates there will be an 
incentive to make purchases outside the buyer’s jurisdiction, thereby creat­
ing distortionary effects on resource allocation. These issues are difficult to 
avoid unless the different jurisdictions and areas coordinate their tax rates.
The various technical alternatives used to solve the problem o f double 
taxation at the local level include several options: establishing compensa­
tory funds between jurisdictions, deferring payment o f  the tax at the time 
o f sale, and creating an integrated system involving both the central and 
local governments to avoid double taxation. However, the experience o f  
the European Union shows that these techniques have their complexities 
and technical challenges.
Among the countries studied, four stand out because they grant subna­
tional governments the exclusive power to impose certain sales taxes; in all 
such cases, this becomes the main source o f  own-tax revenue for the lower 
levels o f  government.
In Argentina, the primary source o f tax revenue for the provinces is the 
gross income tax (a small percentage o f which is also allocated to certain 
municipalities). In 2008, this tax accounted for 72.2 percent of provincial 
revenues, or 3.2 percent o f  GDP. Rates differ depending on the province 
and the particular activity involved. There are also differences from one 
province to another in the importance o f the tax (ranging from 57.7 to
86.5 percent o f total tax revenues), although in all cases it serves as the 
largest source o f tax revenue. The gross income tax, along with being dif­
ficult to administer when interprovincial activities are involved, generates 
the inefficiencies known to be associated with ‘cascading’ taxes. It distorts 
the allocation o f resources by changing the relative price structure, while 
hurting domestic producers in the international competitive arena, among 
other problems. However, this tax continues to be used on a priority basis 
by the provincial governments given its high yield (it generates substan­
tial resources using a relatively low tax rate), and the fact that, at all o f 
its stages, it is difficult to evade. It is also favored because it allows the 
provinces to obtain substantial resources autonomously.
In Brazil, sales taxes were adopted by all three levels of government, 
creating difficulties for coordination across jurisdictions. In addition to 
the Industrial Products Tax (Imposto sobre Productos Industrializados, or 
IPI), which the federal government applies to a long list o f goods, based on 
a value added calculation, state governments have full power to impose a 
Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), which is also levied on 
goods and services at all stages but generally cover a tax base broader than
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that covered by the IPI. The municipalities also administer and collect the 
ISS, which applies, within the geographical boundaries o f each municipal­
ity, to the services specified in legislation. Each municipality has exclusive 
authority to set the rate it deems appropriate, up to a maximum o f 5 
percent o f the amount billed. Taking into account the ICMS and the ISS, 
Brazilian subnational governments raise 78.3 percent o f their tax revenue 
by taxing sales. This means that these taxes provide fiscal resources 
equivalent to 7.9 percent o f GDP, making these two taxes -  particularly 
the state ICMS -  the fundamental and largest source o f revenue for the 
country’s lower levels o f government.
In Colombia, too, sales taxes on goods and services play a major role in 
the overall tax revenue o f subnational jurisdictions. As Table 6.3 shows, 
collections o f these taxes in 2008 amounted to 1.3 percent o f GDP, or 52.5 
percent o f total subnational tax revenue. These resources at the subna­
tional level can be divided into two distinct groups. Regional governments 
account for 28.9 percent o f subnational tax collections, with 61.5 percent 
o f their revenue coming from three selective consumption taxes, on liquor, 
beer and cigarettes. For the municipalities, which account for over 70 
percent of the consolidated revenues of Colombia’s territorial entities, 
the main source o f own-tax revenue is the Industry and Commerce Tax 
(Impuesto de Industria y Comercio, or ICA), which generates more subna­
tional tax revenue than the real estate tax. The latter, according to 2008 
figures, accounts for 45.2 percent of total municipal tax revenue (and 32 
percent o f consolidated subnational revenues).
In the case o f  Ecuador, licensing taxes or fees, which fall under munici­
pal authority, apply to all economic activities o f a commercial or indus­
trial nature within the municipal jurisdiction. This tax accounted for 14.2 
percent o f subnational tax revenues in 2008, and applies to individuals or 
firms operating as merchants or manufacturers in each canton, as well as 
to individuals engaged in any form o f economic activity.
Finally, while insignificant in GDP terms, licensing fees in Costa Rica 
are the main tax levied by local governments, providing two-thirds of 
their tax revenues as o f  2008. In this case, the tax basis is the net taxable 
income and the annual gross sales or income received by natural or juridi­
cal persons engaged in gainful activities, with the applicable rate ranging 
between 0.1 and 0.2 percent.
M otor vehicle taxes
The countries o f the region adopt several approaches to taxing motor 
vehicles. The tax is imposed on the possession or ownership o f  a vehicle, 
given that this constitutes, in part, an asset o f  the taxpayer. Another 
option is to tax those who use this asset for travel on public roads (a
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vehicle registration fee). Finally, through their subnational governments, 
almost all o f the countries tax the transfer of vehicles from one citizen to 
another.
A  number o f countries, using a range o f alternatives for implementing 
and using the motor vehicle tax, rely on it as a source o f  revenue for lower 
levels of government, although in only a few countries does it represent 
more than a minimal share o f overall subnational tax revenue.
The rationale for this tax is primarily that it can be easily administered 
and tracked, and that it provides an ongoing and stable source o f income, 
especially for subnational governments whose territories are highly urban­
ized. Moreover, information on the number o f vehicles in a city is useful 
for implementing environmental taxes that limit the use o f  cars in order to 
control environmental pollution. In short, the tax can be used for purposes 
beyond merely the revenue motive.
Some countries have attempted to implement a tax on vehicles as part 
o f a redistributive policy, although this occurs primarily at the central 
government level. One method that has proved to be acceptable is to levy 
a progressive tax on the purchase of new vehicles.
In Argentina, the province o f  San Juan has a ‘progressive’ vehicle tax. 
The tax rate is 3 percent, but varies according to the automobile’s model, 
age and weight. This form o f taxing vehicles is administratively complex 
and may penalize new vehicles that are more efficient and less polluting 
than older models. Argentina’s provinces have the power to levy taxes on 
motor vehicle ownership, although some provinces have delegated this 
authority to their municipalities. The relative weight o f  this tax as a share 
o f provincial tax revenues varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, ranging 
from 0 percent (for example, Salta, Neuquén) to 9.8 percent (for example, 
Rio Negro), with the average being 5.5 percent.
Similarly, Mexico has a Vehicle Ownership or Use Tax (Impuesto sobre 
Tenencia o Uso de Vehículos), which comes under the exclusive authority 
of the states and the DF. It accounted for a mere 3.7 percent o f their total 
revenues in 2008.13 This system has several advantages in terms o f a tax 
that is collectible and equitable. The relevant tax base tends to be relatively 
stable, in that the number o f cars generally increases at the same rate as (or 
at a higher rate than) the growth in population and income. Moreover, the 
taxable property is relatively difficult to hide, and the tax burden falls on 
individuals with the greatest purchasing power. In Mexico, this tax occurs 
in two forms: an ownership tax and a use tax. In addition, the federal 
government imposes a tax on new cars. In place since 1968, M exico’s 
Vehicle Ownership Tax, which applies to both imported and domestically 
produced automobiles, charges a certain proportion o f  a vehicle’s market 
value, which varies according to its physical characteristics, model, year of
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manufacture, price, and installed equipment. The tax rates on ownership 
for each fiscal year are administered and collected by state governments, 
with the resulting funds going to their treasuries. Revenue from this tax 
source has been trending upward in recent years.
In Brazil, the Automobile Ownership Tax is the second largest source of  
tax revenue at the state level given the major share o f subnational revenues 
attributable to sales taxes (ICMS and ISS). Nevertheless, it represents only 
slightly more than 5 percent o f state tax revenues, or 0.6 percent o f GDP  
(see Table 6.3).
In Chile the automobile taxes represent a significant proportion o f the 
subnational tax revenues. In spite o f its small share o f G DP (0.2 percent), 
the tax paid by automobile owners (at the time o f purchase and in annual 
registration fees) constitutes 17.4 percent o f  own-tax revenues for subna­
tional governments. The amount o f the registration fee is usually based on 
the schedule established for motor vehicles by the Internal Tax Service, 
with different rates determined by the Municipal Revenue Law, though in 
practice the rates are unrelated to the cost o f road infrastructure or other 
services that the municipality provides to those using its roads. While this 
tax would not seem to bear any direct relation to specific municipalities 
(since vehicles may use all of the country’s drivable roads, not merely those 
in the municipality where the tax was paid), it is one o f the main sources of 
revenue for the country’s municipalities, even after taking into account the 
mandatory 62.5 percent contribution to the FCM. (In 2008, these transfers 
accounted for 18 percent o f the FCM funds.)14
The motor vehicle tax administered by municipalities in Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) plays a significant role in the tax structure of 
municipal governments and constitutes the second largest subnational 
source o f tax revenue -  19.9 percent according to the 2008 figures pre­
sented in Table 6.3. The country’s vehicle tax includes both ownership and 
transfers from one taxpayer to another. Given that it is a municipal tax, it 
has its weak points, for example, residents can register their vehicles in a 
neighboring municipality that has lower tax rates. Departmental jurisdic­
tion over this tax would provide an advantage in this respect, and would 
also allow for better administration o f market-based tax assessments and 
increased tax collections, particularly if departmental governments were 
given the power to legislate the tax.
O ther major taxes in the countries analyzed
In addition to the characteristic subnational taxes analyzed above, it is 
worth mentioning some examples of taxes used by these governments to 
expand the vast range o f fiscal instruments employed to obtain revenue.
In Mexico, payroll taxes are a function o f state governments, and
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accounted for 41 percent o f  subnational tax revenues in 2008 (0.3 percent 
of the country’s GDP). This type o f tax has both advantages and disad­
vantages. On the positive side, is easy to administer, particularly when it 
involves taxing large firms, and when a large proportion o f the economy is 
formal. Using relatively low tax rates, it can generate significant resources 
for regional governments. Its principal disadvantage is that it acts as a 
barrier to job creation in the formal sector (Larios et al., 2004), and can 
be a disguise for exporting taxes to other jurisdictions, since it taxes on 
the basis o f origin -  this is based on the assumption that origin affects 
production costs. However, since the bulk o f  the tax burden is borne by 
the urban middle class in the form o f personal income taxes, the payroll 
tax base tends to be overused as a source of revenue for both the central 
government and local governments. This overuse can incentivize infor­
mal employment and evasion of the tax system, and should therefore be 
discouraged.
Also notable is Argentina’s stamp tax (Impuesto a los Sellos), which 
serves as an important source o f tax revenue for provincial governments. 
In terms o f economic efficiency, the tax -  which is designed to bring 
those engaged in illegal activities into the tax regime -  is harmful inas­
much as it works against economic growth by increasing the tax burden. 
Nevertheless, the stamp tax is the third largest source o f tax revenue for 
these jurisdictions, representing 7.8 percent of total revenue as o f 2008, or 
0.3 percent o f GDP.
In Ecuador, as Table 6.3 indicates, approximately 45 percent o f subna­
tional tax revenue is from sources not cited in the above paragraphs. This 
is primarily because o f the high revenues provided by two taxes levied at 
the subnational level: the Total Assets Tax and the so-called ‘Alcabalas 
Tax’, which accounts for 14.5 percent o f subnational tax revenues. This 
is a municipal tax levied on real estate transactions and contracts, and 
applies to: (i) the transfer o f  ownership, for consideration, o f real estate 
and vessels; (ii) the creation, transfer, usufruct, use and inhabitation of 
real estate; and (iii) the giving o f  assets to persons other than legitimate 
heirs. The Municipal Tax on Total Assets accounts for 20.2 percent of 
tax revenues at the subnational level. It taxes commercial, industrial 
and financial activities that require that account records be maintained, 
whether the activities are carried out by individuals or companies, de 
facto companies, or individual businesses (domestic or foreign) domiciled 
-  or with offices, agencies or branches -  in the canton, pursuant to the 
Domestic Tax Regime Law and its Regulations. Taxation o f such business 
activities is based on an enterprise’s total assets.
Municipalities in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) have exclusive author­
ity over two taxes complementary to the assets-based taxes: the Municipal
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Tax on  Transfers o f  R eal Estate and A utom obiles (Impuesto M unicipal a 
las Transferencias de Inmuebles y  Vehículos Autom otores), and the Excise 
Tax on Certain A lcoh olic Beverages (Impuesto a l Consumo Específico a la 
Chicha de M aíz). These two taxes account for 20.3 percent o f  subnational 
tax revenues.
Chile’s subnational governm ents also obtain revenue from  business 
licenses, which are required by municipalities for all professional, trade, 
industrial, com m ercial, artistic or other gainful secondary or tertiary 
activity -  whatever its nature or category (including liquor licenses). In 
2008, this tax provided 30.2 percent o f  m unicipal tax revenues, and rep­
resented 0.3 percent o f  G D P. O f the three main sources o f  financing for 
Chile’s m unicipalities (the real estate tax, vehicle registration and m unici­
pal licenses), it is only in the case o f  licensing that the law  prescribes a 
range within which m unicipalities are permitted to set rates, with rates 
based on  the capital o f  the firm in question. H owever, those m unicipalities 
that are obliged to contribute resources from  these revenues to the FC M  
m ust do so by charging the m aximum  rate. This prevents them  from  
undercutting the am ount charged by other jurisdictions.
In Brazil, the aforem entioned subnational taxes are supplem ented by 
taxes on the transfer o f  goods in all forms. Such transfer o f  goods is taxed  
by the Inter Vivos Tax (known as ITBI), which falls under municipal 
authority; the Tax on  Asset Transfers due to D eath  [inheritances] and 
D onation s com es under the authority o f  the states and the federal district. 
In 2008, revenues collected from  these two taxes represented 0.2 percent 
o f  G D P.
Non-tax Revenues: Fees and Royalties
Generally, in addition to the various taxes on  which subnational govern­
m ents rely to finance their expenditures, there are major non-tax revenue 
sources that com plem ent these; in som e countries these sources produce 
even m ore revenue than taxes do.
N on-tax  resources at the subnational levels o f  governm ent com e from  
a wide range o f  fiscal instruments and they vary am ong countries. These 
resources include: fees for providing -  and the right to  use -  services; use, 
exploitation and dissem ination royalties; profits from  business activity; 
yields on assets; and royalties for the exploitation o f  natural resources such 
as hydrocarbons, though no universal criterion exists on this last point. 
These instruments play the greatest role in the m ore heavily populated and 
urbanized m unicipalities -  one reason being the higher level o f  econom ic  
activity in these areas, the other being the greater needs that m ust be met 
to serve these populations. The benefit principle governs the application
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Figure 6.3 Own resources o f  subnational governments, 2008 (%  o f  G D P  
and %  o f  to ta l collections)
o f  these measures, since it relates directly to the (actual or potential) tasks 
assigned to local governm ents. The line between public and private serv­
ices is a fine one, and varies according to circumstance. Thus, it is often  
difficult to differentiate public charges and fees from  private ones.
Figure 6.3 shows the differences between the countries analyzed in 
this chapter with regard to the relative weight o f  non-tax revenues as a 
portion o f  total ow n resources o f  subnational governm ents. Two groups 
o f  countries can be identified, each sharing com m on features as to how  
fiscal resources are obtained. Brazil, C olom bia and Argentina, though  
they differ significantly in sums collected, show a clear tendency to assign  
taxing authority to their decentralized entities. In these countries, own  
resources consist principally o f  taxes. A s in m ost o f  the region’s countries, 
this type o f  financing in itself is insufficient and m ust be supplem ented by 
a system o f  central governm ent transfers.
Except for C osta R ica, w hose cantons’ own resources are very limited 
(no m ore than I percent o f  G D P), non-tax revenues represent a growing  
share o f  total revenues. One im portant aspect o f  these non-tax com p o­
nents is the royalties assigned to subnational governm ents in w hose ter­
ritories econom ically exploitable non-renewable natural resources are 
present.
Thus, the countries that appear on the right in Figure 6.3 (M exico, 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia (Plurinational State of)) are precisely those in
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which the production and trade o f  primary com m odities provide a major 
source o f  subnational revenue. In m ost cases, the predom inance o f  fiscal 
resources o f  this type as a source o f  public financing for subnational gov ­
ernments implies greater volatility in revenue streams (as opposed to the 
relative stability o f  ow n-tax revenues), along with greater interregional 
disparities, since som e jurisdictions are endowed with such non-renewable 
resources, while others are not.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES
A  system  o f  stable fiscal relationships and a successful decentralization  
process require that there be a proper system o f  financing, in order for 
each level o f  governm ent to carry out its assigned functions. H owever, 
the am ount o f  financing at specific levels o f  governm ent is not the only  
concern; also relevant, at the subnational level, is the m ix o f  tax and n on ­
tax resources, intergovernm ental transfers and, in som e cases, borrowing  
options.
This chapter has focused primarily on own revenues, both tax and 
non-tax, in the region’s m ost decentralized countries. The findings m ake 
clear the need to strengthen inform ation on subnational financing, and to 
have a uniform  basis on which to make reliable com parisons between the 
region’s countries.
In part because o f  the fact that theoretical approaches provide little 
guidance on the optim al allocation o f  revenue for each level o f  govern­
ment, allocation in the real world seems to be based m ainly on institu­
tional history, tax adm inistration and political wrangling between the 
different levels o f  governm ent.
One o f  the central features o f  intergovernm ental relations in Latin  
Am erica is the high degree o f  vertical im balance. The low  quantitative 
im portance o f  taxes collected by local governm ents, com pared to the 
national tax burden, is the m ost com m only shared feature. This shows the 
lack o f  autonom y o f  local governm ents, especially in light o f  inform ation  
regarding the transfer o f  functions over the last several years.
A lso com m on is an inequality, between different local governm ents, in 
sources o f  own revenue, with variances based on the size o f  the popula­
tion, the availability o f  natural resources w ithin the jurisdiction, and the 
extent o f  respective tax bases. This is the case under both unitary and 
federal systems o f  governm ent. In Argentina, for exam ple, 62 percent o f  
the provincial taxes collected are concentrated in the city and province o f  
Buenos Aires; in Brazil, one-third o f  the states’ tax revenues are concen­
trated in Sao Paulo; in M exico, 46 percent o f  the real estate tax revenues
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are collected by the D F; while in Colom bia, Bogota receives 30 percent o f  
the total.
A lthough property taxes are the m ost appropriate instrument to capture 
tax revenues at the local level, collection rates are low  in all the countries. 
Problems with the property registers, discrepancies between assessm ents 
and market value, lack o f  autom ated m anagem ent processes and, above 
all, lack o f  political will to collect the tax, constitute the m ain challenges.
Similar problem s must be faced taxing property betterments, although  
these involve greater technical com plexities -  but not insurm ountable 
ones, as experience in som e countries has shown.
In taxing productive activities, licenses and sales at the local level, there 
are serious technical obstacles regarding the transfer o f  taxation to other 
jurisdictions. In addition, the cum ulative nature o f  these taxes tends to  
create distortions in resource allocation. Nevertheless, in countries that 
grant local governm ents such taxing authority, these taxes provide the 
greatest revenue for local governments.
Selective consum ption taxes on goods and services, based on the des­
tination principle, could be a significant, as yet underutilized, source o f  
additional funds. The same applies to certain taxes on assets, such as 
vehicle ownership taxes.
One particular feature distinguishes Latin Am erican countries from  
other world regions with regard to the allocation o f  taxes am ong the dif­
ferent levels o f  governm ent, namely, the total absence o f  a subnational 
incom e tax, even in the form o f  surtaxes.
A nother recurrent issue in the countries analyzed, though not exam ined  
in this chapter, is the problem  o f weaknesses in, and poor performance 
of, tax adm inistrations. This is traceable both to a lack o f  capital needed  
to improve the systems, and to serious problem s in hum an resources -  
whether in terms o f  high turnover rates or lack o f  professionalism . This 
problem  is aggravated by the reluctance o f  local authorities themselves 
to improve the effectiveness o f  tax adm inistration, given their close 
relationship with local power structures.
Past experience with overindebtedness by local governm ents has em pha­
sized the need to establish alternative criteria to avoid im pacts on national 
finances. The areas covered by the criteria range from  coordination with 
the central governm ent to the application o f  quantitative guidelines as 
part o f  fiscal responsibility legislation. Suffice it to  say that the problem  
o f  indebtedness has not been exclusively a local governm ent problem , but 
also involves action at the central level, particularly in light o f  the fact that 
various functions have been transferred to the subnational levels w ithout 
providing the current resources needed to finance them.
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1. Although most Latin American countries have intergovernmental transfer systems 
that are vital to financing the subnational governments, this chapter focuses on other 
alternatives to obtain resources. For an exhaustive review concerning intergovern­
mental transfers in Latin America, see Rezende and Veloso (ch. 8 in this volume) and 
Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda (ch. 9 in this volume).
2. Leaving aside Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), which is not included in this
analysis.
3. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the constitutional organization of the
region’s countries, see Gargarella and Arballo (ch. 2 in this volume).
4. For a detailed analysis of the transfer systems used in each of the region’s countries, see 
Jiménez and Podestá (2009).
5. Data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru from the year 2006.
6. For a detailed analysis of the functioning, composition and distribution of this Fund, 
see the SUBDERE National Municipal Information System (SINIM), Chile, available 
at: http://www.sinim.gov.cl/desarrollo_local/selfcm.htm.
7. For more details on the performance of property taxes in Latin America, see Sepulveda 
and Martinez-Vazquez, (ch. 7 in this volume).
8. Calculations of the subnational tax burden in Chile used the DIPRES (Dirección de 
Presupuestos-Chile) methodology, which eliminates duplications involved in using the 
FCM. Thus, adding the residual difference to the respective taxes that make up the 
Fund, one can see exactly how much is collected in each operational revenue category, 
although this does not track information on what each municipality receives through its 
participation in the Fund.
9. There is also a ‘construction tax’ of 1% of the budgeted value, payable by the owner of 
the building being built or remodeled.
10. However, as De Cesare and Lazo Marin (2008) explain, municipalities must submit 
to their respective state congresses annual proposals of their rates and value-per-unit 
tables for land and construction.
11. Some municipalities, however, may establish rates and exceptions.
12. For a detailed analysis of this tax, a recommended source is Bruno de Carvalho (2006).
13. According to disaggregated data from the National Statistical and Geographical 
Institute (INEGI, 2009).
14. Half of the revenue from the Vehicle Transfer Tax is also transferred, on a shared basis, 
to the FCM, but this accounted for only 3% of the Fund in 2008.
NOTES
REFERENCES
Aghón, G. and H. Edling (eds) (1997), ‘Descentralización Fiscal en América 
Latina: Nuevos Desafíos y Agenda de Trabajo’, Regional Project of Fiscal 
Decentralization, CEPALGTZ. LC/L.1051, Santiago, Chile, August.
Álvarez Estrada, D. (2009), ‘Tributación directa en América Latina: Equidad y
170 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
desafíos. Estudio del caso de México’, Serie Macroeconomia del Desarrollo, 
No. 91, Proyecto CEPAL-GTZ (LC/L.3093-P), Santiago, Chile, August.
Ambrosanio, M.F. and M. Bordignon (2006), ‘Normative versus positive theo­
ries of revenue assignments in federations’, in G. Brosio and E. Ahmad (eds), 
Handbook o f Fiscal Federalism, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 306-38.
Brennan, G. and J. Buchanan (1985), The Reason o f Rules: Constitutional Political 
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bruno de Carvalho Jr, P. (2006), ‘IPTU no Brasil: Progressividade, Arrecada<;ao 
E Aspectos Extra-Fiscais’, Discussion Paper 1251, Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econòmica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasilia, December, available at: http://www.ipea. 
gov.br/082/08201008. jsp? ttCD_CHAVE=2738 (accessed March 2011).
Cetràngolo, O., J.P. Jiménez and A. Goldschmit (2009), ‘El financiamiento 
de políticas para la cohesión social y descentralización en América Latina’, 
URBAL project (regional cooperation program of the European Commission 
with Latin America).
De Cesare, C. and J.F Lazo Marin (2008), ‘Impuestos a los patrimonios en 
América Latina’, Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo, No., CEPAL, Santiago, 
Chile.
Eguino, H., J.A. Pérez, F. Pinto and A. Perrazo (2002), ‘Ingresos Municipales 
en Centroamérica. Situación actual y perspectivas de modernización’, 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Federación de Municipios del Istmo 
Centroamericano (FEMICA), Guatemala.
Gamarra Huayapa, M. (2001), ‘Experiencia de Contribución de Mejoras en el 
Perú’, Research Report LP01Z03, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, 
MA.
Gómez Sabaini, J.C., J.P. Jiménez and A. Podestà (2010), ‘Evasión y Equidad en 
América Latina’, Project document, CEPAL-GTZ (LC/W.309), Santiago de 
Chile, January.
Horst, B. (2009), ‘Fuentes de financiamiento para gobiernos subnacionales y 
descentralización fiscal’, in Un Mejor Estado: Propuestas de Modernización y  
Reforma, Consortium for State Reform, Santiago, Chile, available at: http:// 
www.reformadelestado.cl/media/archivos/20100114140300. pdf (accessed 
March 2011).
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (2009), ‘Finanzas públicas 
estatales y municipales de México 2005-2008’, INEGI, México, available at: 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/sisnav/default.aspx7pr 
oy=finanzas&edi=0000&ent=00 (accessed April 2011).
Jiménez, J.P. and A. Podestà (2009), ‘Las relaciones fiscales intergubemamentales 
y las finanzas subnacionales ante la crisis’, LC/R.2155, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile, 
September.
Jiménez, J.P. and J. Viñuela (2004), ‘Marco institucional para la gestión del 
gasto público en países descentralizados’, Departamento de Finanzas Públicas, 
International Monetary Fund.
Larios, J., B. Alvarado and E. Conterno (eds) (2004), ‘Descentralización Fiscal. 
Análisis Conceptual y Revisión de Experiencias de Nueve Países’, Technical 
Paper 7, PRODES-USAID, Lima, January.
Macón, J. and J. Merino-Mañón (1976), ‘Contribución de mejoras en América 
Latina’, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
México.
Financing o f  subnational governm ents 171
Musgrave, R. (1967), Classics in the Theory o f Public Finance, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. .
Oates, W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
OECD (2003), ‘Fiscal Relations across levels of government’, in Economic 
Outlook, Ch. V, Paris.
Pérez, R. (2010), ‘Estadísticas de los Gobiernos Seccionales y Provinciales en el 
Ecuador: 2000-2008’, Dirección General de Estudios Apuntes de Economía No. 
58, Banco Central de Ecuador, April.
Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo (SUBDERE) (2009), 
‘Descentralización en América Latina: Un análisis comparado de los casos de 
Colombia, Bolivia, Perú, Brasil y Argentina’, Ministerio del Interior, Santiago 
de Chile, February.
Uribe, M.C. and J.C. Bejarano (2008), ‘Annotated bibliography on property tax in 
Latin America’, Working Paper WP09MU1, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 
Cambridge, MA.
Vejarano, M.C. (2008), ‘Bogotá, D.C.: Primera Experiencia de Recuperación de 
la Plusvalía Urbana para la Colectividad, en el Marco de la Ley de Desarrollo 
Territorial’, ACE  3 (7), Departamento de Urbanismo, Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, June.
Zapata, J.A. (2007), ‘Descentralización en Bolivia’, Technical Note, Southern 
Cone Reference Note Series, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Universidad 
Nacional de Cuyo.
7. Explaining property tax collections 
in developing countries: the case of 
Latin America
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Jorge Martinez-Vazquez*
1 INTRODUCTION
The property tax is arguably the m ost im portant source o f  own revenues 
for local governm ents around the world. M any fiscally decentralized econ ­
om ies as well as an increasing number o f  countries that have em barked  
upon a decentralization process look  at the property tax as the main  
source o f  revenue autonom y for their subnational governm ents. This prac­
tice is well m atched with policy principles. There is widespread agreement 
am ong econom ists and decentralization experts that, although not entirely  
perfect, the property tax possesses several characteristics that are desirable 
in the context o f  subnational governm ent finance.
Besides its theoretical advantages, however, in practice all is not well 
with the property tax. It is difficult to im plem ent, costly to  administer, and 
unpopular am ong taxpayers. It is well known that m any countries around  
the world struggle to produce any significant am ounts o f  revenue from  
this tax source. These difficulties are more prevalent am ong developing  
countries and, particularly in Latin America, the property tax continues 
to be a predom inant policy concern am ong policy makers. W ith very 
few exceptions, Latin American countries have not been able to  develop  
revenue-productive property tax systems. M oreover, Latin Am erica has 
been identified in the econom ic literature as a region with relatively low  tax 
effort (Bird et al., 2006), and with a level o f  tax revenue performance that 
is lower than the average in developing and transition countries (Ahm ad  
and Brosio, 2008; Bird et al., 2008). The problem s o f  low  tax effort and 
revenue perform ance are especially acute and challenging in the case o f  
the property tax.
The main objective o f  this chapter is to analyze the causes o f  the poor 
tax performance o f  the property tax in Latin Am erica and to identify
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policies that could help with the current impasse. Part o f  w hat we find is 
conventional w isdom . The lack o f  financial and technical m eans to assem ­
ble accurate, com prehensive and updated cadastres (property registers) 
is clearly one o f  the main reasons explaining the lackluster performance 
o f  the property tax. In fact, there is an extensive literature addressing 
these issues and suggesting m ore feasible alternatives to the assessm ent o f  
property values. A ll these lessons are relevant to Latin Am erica and they  
should be internalized by policy makers. But we also arrive at less conven­
tional findings. Previous analyses o f  the performance o f  the property tax  
have given much less attention to the design o f  the fiscal decentralization  
system within which the property tax m ust operate. The arrangement o f  
fiscal incentives in the decentralization system, we contend, can also play  
a crucial role in determ ining the extent to  which the property tax is used  
in practice. W e argue that the realignment o f  fiscal incentives m ust be an 
im portant part o f  the solution for a m ore effective use o f  the property tax 
in the region.
W e em phasize the m utual dependence between a sound fiscal decen­
tralization process and the successful devolution o f the property tax to 
local governm ents. In order to becom e a productive revenue source, the 
decentralization o f  the property tax also requires that local authorities 
be politically accountable to  their com m unities, be endowed with a sig­
nificant degree o f  fiscal autonom y, face the correct incentives within the 
context o f  central governm ent policies, and have sufficient administrative 
capacity to carry out tax and expenditure policies.
A  few words on  the scope o f  the chapter are in order. The concept o f  
property is a broad one, encom passing different forms o f  wealth over 
which different taxes can be applied. In general, we can differentiate 
between real or im m ovable property, which includes land and structures, 
from personal property, consisting o f  those tangible and intangible assets 
that are not attached to  the land. In addition, taxes can be applied to the 
stock o f  properties, their transfer, or the capital gains realized on their 
sale. This chapter focuses on the annual taxation o f  the stock o f  im m ov­
able property, which is generally considered am ong the m ost efficient 
m odes o f  property taxation and constitutes the bulk o f  property tax 
revenues around the w orld .1
In this chapter we also distinguish between the analysis o f  property 
tax collections at the subnational level within a country and that across 
countries. W e explain that certain variables that are exogenous for sub­
national governm ents within a country, such as the legal and institutional 
frameworks, are likely to be endogenously determined at the country level, 
and thus they should also be considered as com ponents o f  the national 
tax effort. U nfortunately, the inform ation available at the subnational
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governm ent level is, in general, still very limited, so the econom etric  
analysis tends to be m ore informative at the international level. M oreover, 
even in that case, the data available for Latin Am erican countries are 
quite incom plete, which naturally limits the validity o f  our results. Our 
dataset consists o f  an unbalanced panel o f  nine countries with years o f  
observation covering the 1990-2007 period.
W e suggest that the im provem ent o f  property tax collections and the 
realization o f  effective revenue autonom y m ay require, paradoxically, a 
m ore active involvem ent o f  the central government in the im plem entation, 
administration and collection o f  the property tax. The central govern­
m ents in the region m ight provide technical and financial assistance to  
the less administratively developed local governm ents, and in som e cases 
m ight temporarily retain som e responsibilities over different aspects o f  
this revenue source. In addition, the central governm ent could contribute 
by helping to strengthen the relationship between autonom y and account­
ability at the subnational level, and by redesigning the intergovernm en­
tal transfer systems in a way that does not provide incentives to reduce 
subnational ow n-tax collections.
The rest o f  the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide 
an overview o f the main characteristics and im portance o f  the property 
tax in Latin Am erica. In Section 3 we evaluate the property tax in terms o f  
the desirable properties o f  a good  subnational tax. In Section 4 we develop  
an analytical fram ework in which we identify the determining factors o f  
tax collection perform ance o f  subnational governm ents. This analytical 
framework provides a sounder basis for the com parison o f  perform ­
ances o f  subnational governm ents within a country and across different 
countries, where performance is measured on the basis o f  actual revenue 
collections vis-à-vis the potential collections reflected by existing fiscal 
capacities. In Section 5 we present the empirical analysis. The last section  
concludes.
2 PROPERTY TAXATION IN LATIN AMERICA
D espite the generally accepted potential o f  property taxes in tax systems 
all over the world, in practice they are a minor source o f  public revenues, 
specially by com parison to other taxes also com m only used worldwide 
such as incom e taxes, V A T or sales taxes. The property tax is especially 
far from being a m ainstay o f  the revenue system  in developing and 
transitional countries.
To put the performance o f  property taxes in Latin America into per­
spective, we com pare it with the performance o f  other regions o f  the
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Table 7.1 P roperty tax  as a share o f  G D P in representative groups o f  
countries (% )
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s*
All countries 0.77 0.73 0.75 1.04
(number of countries) (37) (49) (59) (65)
OECD countries 1.24 1.31 1.44 2.12
(number of countries) (16) (18) (16) (18)
Transition countries 0.34 0.59 0.54 0.68
(number of countries) (1) (4) (20) (18)
Developing countries 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.60
(number of countries) (20) (27) (23) (29)
Latin American countries - - 0.36 0.37
(number of countries) - - (8) (10)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of countries considered in each
computation.
* The data for 2000s are for five years from 2000 to 2004.
Sources: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and CEPAL.
world. A s shown in Table 7.1, property taxes in developing and transi­
tional countries raise less revenue relative to G D P  than O E C D  countries. 
In the early 2000s property taxes in O E CD  countries represented 2.12 
percent o f  G D P, while for developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent 
and, for transition countries, 0.68 percent. The trend for revenues in all 
three groups o f  countries has been slightly upwards since the 1970s. The 
figures in Table 7.1 suggest that the overall performance o f  the property 
tax in terms o f  G D P  is associated with the level o f  econom ic development; 
for exam ple, O E C D  countries rely m ore on the property tax than do devel­
oping countries. H ow ever, that relationship is not necessarily m onotonic  
and Latin Am erican countries are found to perform less well than the 
average developing country.
Table 7.2 presents the measures o f  property tax performance for some 
Latin American countries. Even though the reliance on the property tax 
is low, there is still a significant degree o f  variation across countries. For 
example, in Peru property tax revenues in recent years (2005-07) repre­
sent 0.16 percent o f  G D P, while in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) for 
the same period that figure is about four times larger, at 0.62 percent o f  
G D P. There is no clear trend over time but on average the relative im por­
tance o f  property taxes has decreased. There are also som e cases where 
property tax performance has consistently increased over time, such as 
in Brazil, C olom bia, Ecuador and Guatemala; while in M exico property
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Table 7.2 Reliance on the p roperty  tax  as a share o f  G D P  in Latin  
Am erican countries
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07
Argentina 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.44
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) - - 0.69 0.62
Brazil 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.44
Chile 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.59
Colombia 0.25 0.46 0.48 0.54
Ecuador 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Guatemala 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.16
Mexico 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Paraguay - 0.36 0.39 -
Peru - - 0.17 0.16
Uruguay 0.52 0.70 0.71 -
Latin American countries 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.36
Source: CEPAL.
taxes have represented 0.18 percent o f  G D P, w ithout changing since the 
early 1990s.
Central to this chapter is the question o f  which factors may help explain  
variations in the use o f  property taxes in Latin Am erica. It seems quite 
certain that property taxes remain the great unrealized prom ise for local 
tax autonom y. Like in som e other regions o f  the w orld, the yield o f  the 
property tax remains lower than its potential; but in Latin America  
the distance between potential and reality appears to be much larger, 
and the reasons for this are multiple. In this chapter we explore several 
o f  these, including low  political will and disincentive effects o f  revenue 
sharing and transfers, and outdated and poorly equipped tax administra­
tions. These factors w ould seem to translate into generous exem ptions 
and low  tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value assessm ents, 
incom plete registries and cadastres and lack o f  w illingness and m eans o f  
enforcing collections.
This lackluster performance o f  property taxes in Latin Am erica and 
the differences observed am ong countries are likely to  be related to the 
different arrangements for discretion on rate setting or adm inistration o f  
the property tax. Some o f  the m ain institutional features in the assign­
m ent and adm inistration o f  the property tax across Latin American  
countries are presented in Appendix Table 7A .1 .2 For the m ost part, Latin 
American countries assign the property tax to m unicipal governm ents, 
although there are ‘full’ exceptions such as the case o f  the D om inican
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R epublic where this tax remains a central tax, and ‘partial’ exceptions 
where som e authority over taxes remains at the central level (for example, 
Brazil for rural taxes, G uatem ala, and Panam a) or at the provincial level 
(Argentina). In m ost cases, m unicipalities are also given some authority to  
change tax rates, at times within legislated lim its, but here there are also  
exceptions. For exam ple, Chile does n ot give that authority to the m unici­
palities, and the states or provinces in M exico and Argentina also share in 
that authority. For the adm inistration o f  the tax, the central governm ents 
(the provinces in the case o f  Argentina) are m ost frequently responsible for 
updating the cadastre-, in C osta R ica, Honduras, and M exico the cadastre 
is a m unicipal function. In terms o f  assigning the responsibility for billing 
and collections there are a large variety o f  practices with these functions 
at times exclusively assigned to the central or m unicipal governm ents and 
other times shared by different levels o f  governm ent. Finally, the predom i­
nant approach to the assessm ent o f  properties is market valuation.
A  priori, we can theorize on the positive and negative aspects o f  the 
assignm ent o f  specific functions vis-à-vis the revenue productivity o f  prop­
erty taxes. For exam ple, the assignment o f  administrative functions at the 
m unicipal level m ay have certain advantages, such as better inform ation  
about the properties and potentially stronger incentives to collect taxes, 
but the central authorities m ight also have advantages, such as better- 
skilled and better-remunerated officials and stronger authority to make 
things happen. In the next section we explore in m ore depth the role o f  
property taxation in financing local governm ents and the advantages 
and disadvantages o f  different administrative schemes. U ltim ately, we 
shall rely on our empirical analysis to discern the direction and statistical 
significance o f  the effects o f  different administrative arrangements on tax 
collections from  the property tax.
3 THE ROLE OF PROPERTY TAXATION ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCING
There is widespread agreement am ong econom ists and policy makers 
about the appropriateness and convenience o f  assigning the property 
tax to local governm ents. Indeed, while the theoretical norm ative analy­
ses developed in the econom ic literature suggest that the property tax 
is a good  source o f  local governm ent revenue, in practice m ost o f  the 
decentralized econom ies in the world have assigned, at least partially, the 
responsibility over the property tax to local governments. This m atching  
o f  theory and practice, however, does not im ply that the decentralization  
o f  the property tax has always been carried out in accordance with the
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norm ative prescriptions developed in the econom ic literature. In many  
cases, either because o f  the difficulties associated with its im plem entation, 
or because o f  poorly designed incentives, the property tax has not becom e 
a significant source o f  revenues.
The econom ic role currently assigned to property taxation has been 
shaped by a vast and longstanding literature analyzing the advantages and 
disadvantages o f  alternative tax revenue sources. In this section we briefly 
describe the econom ic arguments used to recom m end the property tax 
as one o f  the major sources o f  own local governm ent revenues. W e start 
by discussing the general characteristics o f  good  tax revenue sources, in 
general and at the local level, and then we briefly stress the im portance o f  
tax revenue autonom y in a decentralized system  o f governm ent.
A Preliminary Evaluation of Subnational Property Taxation
Tax policy is carried out in com plex environm ents where institutional, 
cultural, political, and econom ic variables interact in order to determine 
not only the econom ic effects o f  certain tax instruments, but also their fea­
sibility as policy tools. In reality, there are no easy answers regarding the 
desirability o f  one tax instrument over another, and econom ists usually 
rely on a set o f  widely accepted criteria or principles in order to describe a 
‘good  tax’ and evaluate the appropriateness o f  alternative tax instruments. 
A m ong the m ost com m only used principles we find the following:
•  Efficiency A  tax should not induce significant behavioral responses 
o f  individuals and firms; in other words, it should not distort the 
adequate allocation o f  resources in the econom y. W hen taxpayers 
bear their burden in accordance with the benefit they receive (that 
is, when the ‘benefit principle’ is fulfilled) then the tax approxim ates 
the role o f  a user fee and is considered as an efficient tax. Indeed, 
the behavioral responses induced by (rightly set) user fees can be 
interpreted as the result o f  a correcting incentive (similar to what 
happens in private markets), because the adjustm ent in the behavior 
o f  the individual or the firm is m ade in order to pay the correct price 
o f  the public good.
•  E quity and fa irness  The principle o f  horizontal equity calls for (or 
regards as fair) an equal treatment o f  taxpayers in identical condi­
tions. In contrast, the concept o f  vertical equity allows for several 
possible arrangements in which a tax can be said to be regressive, 
proportional or progressive as long as the tax burden increases in 
a lower, equal or higher proportion with the ability to pay. The 
ability-to-pay principle states that taxpayers with greater ability to
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pay should bear a greater tax burden, but the judgm ent on w hat is 
to be considered fair is a matter to be solved by each com m unity or 
society. In any case, in order to becom e a good  revenue source, a tax  
should be considered fair by the taxpayers.
•  Revenue adequacy A  tax should raise a significant am ount o f  rev­
enues relative to the costs o f  collection and expenditure needs o f  a 
governm ent. In addition, the tax base should be stable and rather 
insensitive to cyclical fluctuations.
•  Low  costs o f  administration and compliance Adm inistration costs 
reduce the share o f  tax collections available to finance public goods  
and services. Similarly, com pliance costs reduce the share o f  taxpay­
ers’ incom e available for private consum ption. I f  these costs are 
relatively high then other tax revenue sources m ight be preferable.
•  Political acceptability  A  tax that is not acceptable either to the tax­
payers or to a significant portion o f  the political class might simply 
be im possible to im plement. Even if  it is im plem ented, in order to be 
successful, a tax requires a high degree o f  cooperation o f  all relevant 
agents and institutions. Failing to reach this cooperation might 
result in low  voluntary com pliance, inadequate or unrealistic laws, 
and deficient enforcem ent.
•  M inim ize tax  avoidance and tax evasion  A  tax should not induce 
significant, legal or illegal, efforts to elude the tax burden. Both  
types o f  responses erode the tax base, create deviations from the tar­
geted incidence, distort the relative prices in the econom y and might 
aggravate problem s in horizontal and vertical equity.
N o  tax instrument perfectly fulfills all these principles nor could it be 
considered as superior to  all alternative tax instruments in all conditions. 
In reality, although these principles o f  taxation serve as a guide to describe 
the characteristics o f  a ‘good ’ tax instrument, they m ust be evaluated  
in the specific context where a tax is im plem ented. A  general evaluation  
o f  the property tax, therefore, can be expected to  lead to different conclu­
sions depending on  its structure, whether the property tax is assigned to  
the central governm ent or to the local governm ents, and so on.
Table 7.3 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages o f  
assigning the property tax to the central or to the local governm ents.3 
Local governm ents have an advantage in terms o f  econom ic efficiency 
because their proxim ity to the taxpayers allow s them to better fulfill the 
benefit principle. Indeed, the central governm ent is m ore subject to  
the ‘com m on pool problem ’, by which those w ho contribute to financing  
the public goods (the country as a w hole if  the tax is assigned to the center) 
are not necessarily the beneficiaries o f  public expenditures. In general, the
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Table 7.3 Com parative analysis o f  property taxation a t the central and  
local levels o f  government
Principle Property tax as a central 
government tax














with the size of the 
government 
Advantage: both vertical 
and horizontal 
disparities can be 
addressed at a national 
level
Advantage: less mobility 






of scale might not be 
substantial
(Depend on the complexity 
taxpayers’ willingness to 
Disadvantage: the 
property tax is very 
visible
Disadvantage: inflexible 
terms and ‘common 
good problem’ 
reduce willingness to 
contribute
Advantage', the property 
tax approximates a user 
fee, especially as the 
jurisdiction size decreases
Disadvantage: 
heterogeneity and different 
tax bases impose unequal 
conditions in different 
jurisdictions 
Disadvantage: revenues can 




might simply be 
unaffordable 
Advantage', first-hand 
knowledge of the 
taxpayers and the tax base 
of the system and the 
contribute)
Advantage: visibility
helps to link taxation with 
public goods benefits and 
increases accountability 
Advantage: closer match of 
taxpayers’ preferences and 
better knowledge of their 
ability to pay
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
lower the size o f  the jurisdiction and the greater the share o f  the property 
tax on local revenues, the greater the ability o f  local governm ents to use 
property taxation as a benefit tax.
The central governm ent seems to have a clear advantage in terms o f  
the ability to address the problem s o f  horizontal and vertical equity and
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fairness. Since M usgrave (1959) the econom ic literature distinguishes m ac­
roeconom ic stability, an equitable distribution o f  incom e and the efficient 
allocation o f resources as the three fundam ental econom ic objectives o f  
the (general) governm ent, and broadly accepts that local involvem ent 
should be restricted only (or m ostly) to contribute to the objective o f  
allocation efficiency. The reason is that local authorities cannot consider 
the m acroeconom ic consequences o f  their decisions, nor are they capable 
of, or interested in, ensuring fairness in the national context. According  
to this argument, local governm ents should not even intervene in redis­
tributive policies w ithin their ow n jurisdictions, but rather m ight limit 
them selves to avoiding worsening the distribution o f  incom e at the local 
level.4 This consideration is especially relevant in Latin Am erica, a region  
where the distribution o f  incom e is am ong the worst in the world (Lopez 
and Perry, 2008).5
Independently from  the relative m agnitude o f  property tax collections, 
the fact that m obility is lower at the national level im plies that the prop­
erty tax collections w ould be m ore stable for the central governm ent. At 
the local level individual taxpayers can m ove out as a response to exces­
sive tax rates and lower the market value o f  properties. Firms m ight also 
decide to leave the jurisdiction and in that case, in addition to  the property  
value effect, the loss in tax collections would be greater if  com m ercial use 
is taxed m ore heavily than residential use.
D ue to their potentially significant m agnitude, the adm inistration costs 
play a crucial role in  determining the ability o f  a governm ent to adequately  
im plem ent and collect the property tax. In particular, the assessm ent o f  
property values is com plex and requires well-prepared personnel; building 
a com plete cadastre  is a long and expensive task. In this context the central 
governm ent usually has advantages in terms o f  its ability to finance and 
develop com prehensive cadastres. M oreover, local authorities in develop­
ing countries usually lack the enforcem ent m echanism s available to central 
governm ents, such as legal staff, the police, and other m eans to take 
advantage o f  their proxim ity to tax officials and taxpayers.
Im portantly, local property taxation m ight also have an advantage in 
terms o f  the political acceptability. One paym ent (or a few) per year o f  a 
relatively large am ount o f  m oney makes the property tax a visible and an 
unpopular revenue source. Local authorities are in a better position than  
the central governm ent to show the taxpayers the way in which property 
tax revenues are used to finance public services, and therefore to justify the 
tax paym ents as a fair price for the benefits received. If local authorities 
m anage to effectively m atch public service provision with the preferences 
o f  the com m unity, then the taxpayers might well feel inclined to voluntar­
ily com ply with the tax law, reducing the practice o f  tax evasion. In this
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sense, an adequate supply o f  public services might provide incentives to  
taxpayers to remain in the jurisdiction even if  tax rates are relatively high  
with respect to neighboring areas. The local authorities also have a better 
knowledge o f  the taxpayers’ ability to pay inside the jurisdiction; thus they  
might be able to better m onitor and enforce com pliance as well as make 
proper adjustments to the local tax policy. Torgler (2005b) finds that the 
size o f  the inform al sector is an im portant determinant o f  tax com pliance  
in Latin America. The informal sector represents an im portant share o f  
the econom y in developing countries, and in Latin Am erica is estim ated  
to be around 41 percent o f  the G N P  (Aim  and M artinez-Vazquez, 2007). 
The question is whether local governm ents can exploit their advantage o f  
being ‘closer’ to the constituencies in order to bring m ore activities into 
the formal sector and encourage increased voluntary com pliance. Little 
research has been done on  this issue.
In summary, both central and local governm ents have advantages and 
disadvantages for administering the property tax, and it is not possible 
to assert a priori which level will perform better. In practice, however, 
their strengths can be com bined in m ixed arrangements o f  authority and 
responsibilities. On the one hand, the visibility o f  the property tax, usually 
considered as a disadvantage for the central governm ent, is a key aspect o f  
the problem  that calls for a keen participation o f  local authorities in rate 
setting and also in the adm inistration o f  the property tax. A t the local level 
the tax authorities m ight be able to use such visibility to present the prop­
erty tax as a benefit tax, enhancing political acceptability and taxpayers’ 
participation in local decisions, and potentially reducing non-com pliance. 
On the other hand, central governm ent intervention m ight be helpful to  
develop com prehensive cadastres, to assist in the form ation o f  administra­
tive capacity and to provide policy parameters within which the creation  
o f  inefficiencies can be contained.
The literature has identified a number o f  additional desirable features o f  
a ‘good local tax’.6 A m ong these features we count, again, the correspond­
ence between tax paym ents and benefits received (benefit principle), the 
perception o f  fairness, and the stability o f  revenue collections. In addition, 
and pondering som e o f  the arguments provided earlier in this section, 
the visibility o f  the tax instrument is considered as a good  characteristic 
o f  local taxation. Other desirable features that are applicable specifically 
within the local context are:
•  The tax base should be relatively imm ovable A ccording to the 
Tiebout’s (1956) hypothesis, taxpayers would ‘vote with their feet’ 
and efficiently reallocate themselves after considering the com bina­
tion o f  taxes and services offered by different local governments.
E xplaining p ro p erty  ta x  collections in developing countries 183
In practice, however, tax com petition am ong subnational govern­
m ents might also lead to a ‘race to the b ottom ’, if  local governm ents 
are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to retain the taxpayers 
inside the jurisdiction. A s a result, the overall am ount o f  subnational 
public expenditures m ay remain at a suboptimal level.7 A  con ­
sensual, but rather conservative, position  to  deal with the unclear 
effects o f  m obility in econom ic efficiency consists o f  assum ing that 
any fiscally induced change in taxpayers’ behavior represents a dis­
tortion o f  the efficient allocation o f  resources in the econom y and 
consequently reduces econom ic welfare. M oreover, it is clear that 
a relatively im m ovable tax base w ould allow for m ore room  in tax 
policy decisions.
•  The tax should be geographically neutral Taxes should not interfere 
with the com m ercial flow o f  goods and services and business loca­
tion decisions across the jurisdictions. In this case we again assume 
that tax-induced changes o f  taxpayers’ behavior should be avoided.
•  Taxes should not be easily exported  The benefit principle does not 
hold if  non-residents are charged for the provision o f  local services. 
In addition, such a situation implies that the costs assumed locally  
are reduced, which m ight also lead to overprovision o f  public 
services.
•  Significant tax  revenue sources should be evenly distributed among 
jurisdictions Sizable variations in the size o f  the tax base create 
high fiscal disparities am ong jurisdictions and im pose undesirable 
differences in the degree o f  revenue autonom y. In general, local gov­
ernments with m ore (less) revenue autonom y are also able to exert 
more (less) discretion in their expenditure decisions, and this might 
translate into greater (lower) ability to  tailor the public service pro­
vision to the preferences o f  the com m unity. Great differences in the 
size o f  the tax base, therefore, m ight generate discontent and even  
confusion regarding the im portance o f  own-revenue collections and, 
in general, the role o f  local governm ents in a decentralized system.
The extent to which these conditions hold, or are adhered to  in practice, 
is likely to vary from  one tax instrument to another. In general, it seems 
reasonable to expect that only som e taxes, if  any, will satisfy all o f  them. 
For instance, there are few taxes that satisfy the benefit principle and are 
not exportable, am ong which the property tax and the tax on vehicles 
stand as the m ost typical exam ples. H ow ever, both  o f  these are subject 
to tax com petition, which can create econom ic inefficiencies and erode 
the tax bases. In addition, in m ost cases the m agnitude o f  the tax base 
varies significantly across jurisdictions, particularly between urban and
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rural areas. In this sense, we can also expect a certain degree o f  correlation  
between the size o f  the tax base and the adm inistrative capacity o f  the local 
governm ent, such that the initial disparities are aggravated by the relative 
difficulties in raising local revenues.
A ll things considered, the property tax represents a prom ising but still 
imperfect source o f  own revenues at the local level. Even with significant 
decentralization o f  the property tax, poorer local governm ents will likely 
remain dependent on alternative sources o f  revenues, notably intergov­
ernmental transfers. In addition, special attention will be required to  
create a tradition o f  taxpayers’ participation and voluntary com pliance, 
and to provide the right incentives for efficient levels o f  tax effort by local 
governments.
The Importance of Tax Revenue Autonomy
The decentralization theorem  (Oates, 1972) states that if  the decisions 
about the type and am ount o f  public goods are allow ed to be m ade locally, 
then the level o f  social welfare w ould be greater w ith respect to a situa­
tion where public goods are centrally, and uniform ly, determined for all 
localities. The reason is sim ply that the local governm ents are better able 
to tailor public goods provision to the particular needs and preferences o f  
each jurisdiction.8
In order to adapt the type and am ount o f  public goods to local needs 
and preferences, the local authorities require, by necessity, a certain degree 
o f  autonom y on their expenditure decisions. But even if  granted by law, 
the expenditure autonom y cannot be practiced w ithout sufficient techni­
cal and administrative capacity and the ability to discretionally increase 
the am ount o f  local revenues. The existence o f  effective expenditure 
and revenue autonom y is widely recognized in the literature as a basic 
requirement for realizing the welfare gains o f  fiscal decentralization. 
U nfortunately, this econom ic prescription does n ot always concur, and 
m ight even collide with, the practical drivers o f  decentralization. The inter­
national m ovem ent towards greater fiscal decentralization has responded  
m ore to political forces such as the dem and for deeper dem ocratization, 
the resolution o f  ethnic conflicts, or the failure o f  central governm ents in 
securing national objectives, than to a search for greater econom ic effi­
ciency as portrayed in the decentralization theorem .9 In m any countries 
the im plem entation o f  an econom ically efficient decentralization design, 
although desirable, m ight well not be a priority.
A ccording to Ahm ad and Brosio (2008), one o f  the m ain factors w eak­
ening the decentralization process in Latin America has been the lack o f  
attention given to the subnational revenue assignm ents. In this context, it
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does not seem too audacious to suggest that the widespread decentraliza­
tion o f  the property tax is partially explained by the fact that the central 
authorities have several m ore efficient, easier to administer, and less 
unpopular revenue sources under their control. Similarly, central authori­
ties are usually reluctant to devolve effective autonom y to the subnational 
governm ents in m ost areas o f  taxation. The reason for this m ay be the 
lack o f  technical and adm inistrative capacity at the subnational level, but 
it is also reasonable to presume that central authorities are not willing to 
renounce their power over budgetary decisions.
In short, even though the choice o f  the property tax as a main source 
o f  local own revenues seems to be correct from  an econom ic perspective, 
the assignment o f  this revenue source to the local governm ents by no 
m eans guarantees that local governm ents will be able to  exert expenditure 
autonom y in the m argin and to realize the benefits o f  decentralization.
4 EXPLAINING PROPERTY TAX COLLECTIONS: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The am ount o f  property tax revenues that governments are able to collect 
varies widely across nations and across jurisdictions within any country, 
and depends on a w ide range o f  institutional, cultural, political and eco­
nom ic factors. The problem  o f  property tax collections (or the lack thereof) 
has been extensively analyzed in the econom ic literature. The com plexities 
o f  the problem and data lim itations, however, still im pose severe restric­
tions on the empirical analyses; as a result, no conclusive answers have been  
reached about the factors determining property tax collections.
In this section we develop a m odel o f  property tax collections, show  
their dependency on the concept o f  tax effort, and explain how  the design  
and im plem entation o f  the fiscal decentralization process can affect 
the performance o f  the property tax. W e begin by presenting a general 
m odel o f  revenue collections and then we analyze, separately, the revenue 
collection problem  at the subnational and national levels.
A Simple Model of Property Tax Collections
Follow ing Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008), and assum ing that the 
property value assessm ent is based on market value, the am ount o f  
property tax collections (T C ) can be defined as:10
TL T A V  T M V  M V  ’ v '
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where
TL  : property tax liability,
TA V  : taxable assessed value,
T M V  : taxable market value,
M V  : full market value.
The first term on the right-hand side, property tax collections over tax lia­
bility, corresponds to the collection ratio. In the ideal case the am ount o f  
tax collections should be identical to the tax liabilities and this term w ould  
be equal to one. In practice, however, either the tax authorities m ight fail 
to properly enforce the tax law  or the taxpayers m ight fail to com ply with 
it; thus the collection ratio is norm ally lower than one. The value o f  the 
collection ratio can be interpreted as a measure o f  the observance o f  the 
tax law and the ability o f  the authorities to enforce it through tines or even  
jail sentences. According to Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008), a normal 
value for the collection ratio in developing countries is around 50 percent, 
which is explained as m ainly due to lax tax enforcem ent, and in som e cases 
can even be as low  as 20 percent.
The second term on the right-hand side o f  equation (7.1), the share o f  tax 
liabilities over taxable assessed value, is the statutory tax rate, usually set 
at some value lower than 1 percent. The third term represents the assess­
ment ratio, the share o f  taxable assessed value on taxable market value, by 
which the law establishes the share o f  the taxable market value over which  
the tax liability is actually going to be com puted. W hen the assessm ent 
ratio is specified by law, then it norm ally takes a value between zero and  
one, but if  it is not specified, then its implicit value is one. The assessm ent 
ratio is nothing m ore than an adjustment to the statutory tax rate and it is 
used to induce acceptability o f  the tax system and reduce com plaints about 
the assessm ent criteria, because it gives taxpayers the impression that they 
are not being taxed for the full value o f  their property.11 Finally, the fourth  
and fifth terms on the right-hand side o f  equation (7.1) jointly represent 
the tax base ( TB) that is actually available for taxation. The fourth term is 
the ratio o f  taxable market value over (full) market value, and summarizes 
all the effects o f  preferential treatments, exem ptions on the tax base, and 
errors in assessing the true market value o f  the property (the last term in 
the equation). Equation (7.1) can now  be rewritten as:
TC
T C  =  —  ■ r  • TB, (7.2)
1 L i
where ta is the statutory tax rate ‘adjusted’ by the assessm ent ratio.
A s explained, the collection ratio measures the degree o f  observance o f
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the tax law, and can be different from one only in the presence o f  ‘distor­
tions’ im posed by the behavior o f  governm ent authorities or taxpayers. 
There are several possible sources o f  distortions that can explain a low  
degree o f  observance o f  the tax law. On the governm ent side, the tax law  
can be deficiently enforced (D E ) if  the tax authorities are either unable 
or unwilling to capture the w hole revenue potential o f  the property tax. 
W e m ight also be in the presence o f  corruption (C), in which case the tax 
authorities appropriate for themselves a share o f  the revenues collected.
On the taxpayers’ side, revenues m ight be lost due to tax evasion (E) , 
generally defined as any illegal form  o f  taxpayers’ non-com pliance.12 The 
traditional m odel o f  tax evasion explains taxpayers’ non-com pliance by 
considering the probability o f  auditing and detection, the cost o f  enforce­
m ent and the costs o f  non-com pliance, which can be summarized under 
the concept o f  penalties (F ).13 In the case o f  the property tax, however, 
illegal non-com pliance is lim ited by the very nature o f  the tax base. If 
properties are im m ovable, then they cannot easily be hidden from  the 
tax authorities. A s a result, tax evasion can take place only under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the taxpayers m ight take advantage o f  the 
inability or unwillingness o f  the tax authorities to correctly assess the value 
o f  the property, or m ight also attempt to lie in order to qualify for pref­
erential treatments and exem ptions. In these cases the factor explaining  
tax evasion is deficient enforcem ent. Alternatively, corrupt tax authorities 
m ight accept bribes for reducing taxpayers’ tax bills.
Another possible form  o f  tax evasion consists o f  simply refusing to pay  
the tax liabilities. This decision w ould be econom ically rational and even 
becom e a com m on practice, if  taxpayers perceive that the tax law  is not 
enforced or if the costs o f  tax evasion are relatively low. In contrast, i f  the 
tax law  specifies high penalties and is being properly enforced, then tax 
evasion would certainly be too  costly and eventually lead to the expropria­
tion o f  the property; thus it is less likely that the taxpayers w ould choose  
this strategy.
The econom ic literature has recently incorporated the concept o f  tax 
m orale ( T M ) in order to  account for the fact that taxpayers are usually  
inclined to voluntarily com ply with the tax law even in the absence o f  effec­
tive enforcem ent.14 A nalyzing opinion survey data from the U nited States 
and Turkey, Torgler et al. (2008) find that positive attitudes towards the 
tax authorities and the tax system as well as trust in public officials sig­
nificantly increase tax m orale, while the perception o f  corruption has the 
opposite effect. A dditionally, Torgler (2005a) shows that the willingness to  
pay taxes increases with the level o f  direct dem ocracy in a jurisdiction. The 
evidence provided by the tax m orale literature suggests, therefore, that tax 
evasion also depends on  the taxpayers’ perception about the behavior and
188 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
performance o f  the tax authorities, and the extent to which they conform  
to the preferences o f  the com m unity. In our m odel we summarize these 
determinants o f  tax m orale with the concepts o f  corruption and govern­
m ent responsiveness (R ). Tax m orale is expected to decrease (and tax 
evasion to increase) with a higher perception o f  corruption; the opposite  
would occur if  the tax authorities are truthfully responsive to the prefer­
ences o f  the taxpayers.
Summarizing, tax evasion can be said to respond positively to deficient 
enforcem ent and negatively to the size o f  penalties and tax m orale, and 
we can write in shorthand that E  =  E [D E , P, T M (C , R) ] . Furthermore, 
the am ount o f  tax liabilities (TL ) can be decom posed into the observance 
o f  the tax law, represented by tax collections TC, and the non-observance 
o f  the tax law, represented by the tax revenues forgone due to deficient 
enforcem ent D E , corruption C, and tax evasion E:
T L =  T C  +  D E  +  C  +  E [D E , P, T M {C , R )] .  (7.3)
Solving this equation for T C  and dividing by TL, we can introduce it into  
equation (7.2) to express the am ount o f  tax collections as:
{  TL TL TL  J
where tax collections appear to be a function o f  deficient enforcem ent, cor­
ruption, penalties o f  tax evasion, governm ent responsiveness, the adjusted 
statutory tax rate, and the size o f  the tax base. The analytical advantage 
o f  equation (7.4) is that now  tax collections are exclusively expressed as a 
function o f  exogenous variables, which allows us to  m ore easily identify 
the factors that determine the actual am ount o f  tax revenue collections.
The am ount o f  taxes a governm ent is able to collect largely depends on 
policy variables that can be influenced either by the tax law or by the tax 
authorities. This conclusion stresses the role o f  the tax laws and the respon­
sible governm ent authorities as opposed to the role o f  taxpayers in explain­
ing tax collections. A  government in need o f  rising additional revenues is 
not limited to legally determining the tax rate and the tax base. In reality, 
several alternative channels might serve the same purpose. For instance, 
the tax law m ight incorporate measures to minimize and sanction corrup­
tion, set adequate levels o f  penalties for evasion, and restrict preferential 
treatments and exem ptions. Alternatively, the tax authorities m ight choose 
to effectively enforce the tax law, improve the assessm ent process in order 
to more accurately measure the tax base, and to deepen the involvem ent 
o f  taxpayers in the public spending decisions. A s D e Cesare (2002, p. 11)
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points out in the context o f  a review o f several independent experiences in 
Latin America, ‘it [is] clear that the political will is the principal element for 
explaining differences in the performance o f  property taxes’.
So far the discussion about the basic determinants o f  tax collections has 
not distinguished between the levels o f  governm ent responsible for collect­
ing the property tax. This distinction is im portant because different levels 
o f  governm ent are given different responsibilities and decision-m aking  
powers, and also because typically they possess dissimilar levels o f  adm in­
istrative capacity. In principle, the m ore discretion a subnational govern­
ment is allowed, the greater the influence it can exert on the variables 
determining the am ount o f  tax collections. In any case, equation (7.4) also  
shows that even with lim ited power over the design o f  the tax policy, a 
subnational governm ent has a wide variety o f  channels available to  alter 
the am ount o f  tax collections. Indeed, due to their proxim ity to the collec­
tion process and to the taxpayers, the subnational authorities could enjoy 
som e advantages with respect to the central governm ent. Corruption, for 
instance, m ight be easier to detect and correct at the local level; strength­
ening the enforcem ent o f  the law and reducing tax evasion m ight well be 
facilitated by enhancing the taxpayers’ participation in local expenditure 
decisions. A lthough n ot conclusive, the econom ic literature provides 
som e evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization reduces the level o f  
corruption in a country. W hen authorities enjoy a significant degree o f  
autonom y they not only have m ore ability to correct the distortions that 
reduce the level o f  tax collections, but they also are m ore accountable to 
the com m unity.15
Comparing Tax Collection Performance at the Subnational Level
A  subnational governm ent responsible for collecting certain taxes would  
likely have som e degree o f  discretion over several, and m aybe all, o f  the 
explanatory variables described in equation (7.4). In this context, tax  
performance can be evaluated by com paring the am ount o f  taxes co l­
lected by different subnational governm ents under similar conditions. A  
good  (poor) level o f  perform ance would consist in collecting a relatively 
high (low) am ount o f  tax revenues with respect to other subnational 
governm ents that face a com parable tax base and enjoy a similar level o f  
discretion.
The natural question is what am ount o f  tax collections should be 
considered as the benchm ark to distinguish between good and poor per­
formance. In principle, for each level o f  governm ent, the total am ount 
o f revenues raised should be able to cover all the expenditure needs. 
Therefore, in a decentralized system o f  governm ent the benchmarking
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am ount o f  tax collections can be defined, jointly for all tax instruments 
available, as the share o f  expenditure needs that remain unfunded after 
the vertical im balance has been corrected via intergovernm ental transfers. 
Unfortunately, this benchmark requires a precise m easure o f  the vertical 
imbalance, which in practice is difficult to obtain. A  m ore feasible alterna­
tive is to set the benchmark at the average effective tax rate, f ,  such that 
any governm ent w hose effective tax rate is higher (lower) than the average 
would be said to exert a relatively high (low) ‘statutory’ tax effort.16
N ow  we can m ultiply both the numerator and the denom inator o f  the 
right-hand side o f  equation (7.4) by f ,  and rewrite the equation to  describe 
the tax collections o f  any jurisdiction i as:
( C, D E  E \D E t, P, T M fC  A,) ] j f  -
TC t =  U  -  - f  -  — 1 -  — ----- -— — — -— —  > =  •/«• T B , (7.5)
' I  T L , TLf TL, J f  ‘ '
N ote that P  and f  are the only variables not determined inside the juris­
diction. In general, the tax law assigns different responsibilities to the 
different levels o f  governm ent, and authority over variables such as the 
penalties o f  tax evasion m ight be reserved to the central governm ent or 
even be an exclusive prerogative o f  the congress. Because o f  this, the pen­
alties o f  tax evasion as well as any policy variables that are not under the 
authority o f  subnational governm ents can be considered to be determined  
exogenously.
On the right-hand side o f  equation (7.5), the product o f  the terms inside 
the bracket and the ratio o f  adjusted statutory tax rate over the average 
(benchmark) effective tax rate represents a ‘relative effective tax rate’, 
which takes a value greater than, equal to or lower than one as long as 
the tax rate effectively applied on the governm ent unit i is greater than, 
equal to or lower than the sample average. This is precisely the definition  
o f  what the econom ic literature refers to as the tax effort (TE ) exerted by a 
particular government. M oreover, the product o f  the last two terms in the 
equation, the average (benchmark) effective tax rate times the tax base o f  
the governm ent unit /, describes the concept o f  fiscal capacity (FC), which  
is usually defined as the am ount o f  tax revenues that could be collected if a 
given level o f  effort were applied to the available tax base. Equation (7.5) 
can therefore be reduced to the follow ing identity:
TCi =  TEj- FCj, (7.6)
where the taxes collected by a governm ent i are defined as the am ount 
o f revenues obtained by applying the level o f  effort exerted by that 
governm ent to a ‘fair’ measure o f  its potential tax revenues.
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By expressing the am ount o f  tax collections as a function o f  the level o f  
tax effort, equation (7.6) stresses the fact that, given the size o f  the avail­
able tax base, and a certain degree o f  fiscal autonom y, each subnational 
governm ent is largely responsible for the am ount o f  taxes actually co l­
lected within its jurisdiction. In this sense, tax effort is a choice variable 
that can be altered by voluntary decisions o f  subnational authorities and  
those o f  taxpayers, and therefore it can be used as a measure o f  tax co l­
lection performance. Equation (7.6) im plies that we can estim ate the tax  
effort o f  a subnational governm ent as the ratio o f  its actual tax collections 
over its fiscal capacity:
TC,
TEi =  (7.7)
In order to evaluate the performance o f  each subnational governm ent 
we only need to com pare its tax effort with the tax effort o f  the other 
subnational governm ents o f  the same level. M oreover, since data about 
subnational revenue collections are usually available for m ost countries, 
the m ain challenge lies in estim ating fiscal capacity.
A  correct interpretation o f  the concept o f  tax effort requires a careful 
consideration o f  the actual degree o f  fiscal autonom y enjoyed in each  
jurisdiction. I f  all subnational governm ents enjoy the same degree o f  
(significant) fiscal autonom y, then a relatively high (low) level o f  fiscal 
effort m ight sim ply suggest that the jurisdiction’s residents are dem anding 
a relatively large (small) am ount o f  subnational services. G iven that the 
efficiency gains o f  fiscal decentralization arise from  tailoring the provision  
o f  public services to  the needs and preferences o f  each com m unity, then 
even a very low  level o f  tax effort could be regarded as optim al. Indeed, 
if  the system  o f intergovernm ental fiscal relations is properly functioning  
then there w ould be nothing right (wrong) with a high (low) level o f  tax 
effort, and no reward (penalty) w ould be justified. In practice, however, 
and especially in the initial states o f  a fiscal decentralization reform, sub­
national fiscal autonom y m ight be limited by several factors. For instance, 
there m ight not be a longstanding tradition o f  taxpayers’ contributions 
to the public sector, and thus taxpayers m ight not be willing to volun­
tarily com ply with the law and nor would the tax authorities be willing 
to enforce it. D ecentralization reform, in this sense, can actually imply 
a radical cultural change for som e com m unities. A nother lim itation, 
very com m on am ong poor jurisdictions, is that o f  the lack o f  technical 
and administrative capacity to m anage subnational finances and collect 
the taxes. A  subnational governm ent cannot be expected to  assess the 
tax base, com pute the tax liability and collect the taxes w ithout proper 
m eans to carry out these functions. But this basic contradiction is a rather
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com m on occurrence am ong subnational governm ents in Latin America, 
especially in the rural areas. In order to address this problem  either an 
asymmetric decentralization o f  public functions or central government 
assistance to develop adequate capacity w ould be required.
Given that the factors lim iting subnational fiscal autonom y usually  
affect different jurisdictions unevenly, the observed variations in tax effort 
and performance m ay no longer be the result o f  subnational choices. It 
follow s that in order to m ake the subnational authorities (and the com ­
m unities) fully liable for the differences in tax effort then they should enjoy 
equal, or at least com parable, levels o f  effective fiscal autonom y.
In spite o f  this argument, in order to increase own-revenue collections, 
som e countries decide to reward high tax effort with additional intergov­
ernmental transfers, and sanction low  tax effort with no additional, or 
fewer, intergovernm ental transfers. These incentives m ight serve as an 
effective tool to encourage greater subnational tax collections, but it is 
im portant to recognize that they would plausibly lead to counterproduc­
tive results. The reason for this is very simple and deals with the trade-off 
faced at the subnational level between own-revenue sources and intergov­
ernmental transfers. A ssum ing that there are no savings, the total am ount 
o f governm ent expenditures in public services (G) is equal to own-tax  
collections plus the am ount received in the form o f  intergovernmental 
transfers (T ),17 thus for any subnational governm ent i we can write the 
budget constraint as:
G, =  TC¡ +  T„ (7.8)
from  which it is clear that subnational expenditures can be expressed as a 
function o f  intergovernm ental transfers, G¡ =  G \T } .  R eplacing TC¡ by its 
definition in equation (7.6), dividing by fiscal capacity FC¡ and solving for 
the level o f  tax effort TE¡, we find that:
G,[T,\ -  T,
TE-, =  ~ ^ ~ L, (7.9)
such that the tax effort exerted by the subnational governm ent i is equal 
to the difference between the total am ount o f  public expenditures and the 
intergovernmental transfers received, over the fiscal capacity o f  the juris­
diction. In other words, tax effort corresponds to the extent to which a 
subnational governm ent exhausts its own tax base.
According to equation (7.9) the direct effect o f  intergovernmental 
transfers, with a negative sign, is to reduce tax effort. A n  additional effect, 
however, can be observed in the am ount o f  public goods and services
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provided. Considering fiscal capacity as exogenous, the net effect o f  trans­
fers on tax effort will depend on whether public expenditures will increase 
in a greater, equal or lower proportion than the transfers received. A s a 
consequence, the final effect o f  intergovernmental transfers on tax effort 
will ultim ately depend on the elasticity o f  public goods provision with 
respect to a m arginal increase o f  the subnational budget. Jurisdictions 
where public goods are elastic will respond to additional intergovernm en­
tal transfers by increasing the level o f  tax effort, but those where public 
goods are inelastic, or com paratively less desirable, will reduce their 
tax effort.18 This im plies that, regardless o f  the level o f  fiscal autonom y  
o f  subnational governm ents, tax effort can certainly be affected by 
intergovernm ental transfers.
This analysis m ight suggest that the final effect o f  intergovernmental 
transfers on tax effort is efficient in the sense that it responds to the demand  
o f  public services w ithin each jurisdiction. H owever, this conclusion is not 
necessarily correct. The dem and for public services is affected by prefer­
ences and also by the quality o f  public services, and in turn this quality can  
be expected to vary across jurisdictions.19 Some local governm ents m ight 
not be able to provide public services with desirable standards o f  quality, 
which w ould reduce their dem and and the resultant level o f  tax effort. The 
obvious equity problem s that arise will have to be solved in accordance 
with the national preferences for redistribution.
Estimating Fiscal Capacity of Subnational Governments
For the m ost part, the empirical literature on the property tax has focused  
on measuring tax effort at the subnational level by considering fiscal 
capacity as an exogenous factor with respect to the tax revenue perform ­
ance o f  subnational units. The reason for this is that any exercise o f  
discretion im plies a certain degree o f  responsibility and thus allow s us to 
evaluate tax performance on the basis o f  effective power over tax collec­
tions. In this sense, subnational governm ents are by presum ption passive 
with respect to their fiscal capacity and this concept can be regarded as 
irrelevant for performance evaluations.
In the previous discussion we showed, however, that a good measure 
o f  fiscal capacity is critical to accurately estim ate the tax effort and evalu­
ate their tax performance. M easuring the fiscal capacity with respect to 
the property tax is particularly difficult because o f  the great financial, 
technical and adm inistrative requirements for developing com prehensive 
cadastres  o f  im m ovable properties. A ny measure other than the cadas­
tre, and independent from  the actual value o f  properties, will provide a 
questionable estim ation o f  the potential property tax base.
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U nfortunately, developing countries struggle with the com plexity and 
costs associated with the construction o f  the cadastre, but still the prospect 
o f  not taxing properties seems to be a much worse solution. In practice, 
the use o f  indirect m ethodologies for estim ating the fiscal capacity associ­
ated with the property tax can help to partially solve this problem . The 
literature has described a number o f  these m ethodologies, which have been 
designed to do as m uch as the availability o f  inform ation allows.
One o f  the sim plest m ethodologies consists o f  using historical prop­
erty tax collections from one or several past periods. This m ethodology  
assumes that past collections can be representative o f  the fiscal capacity  
o f  local governm ents. H ow ever, there are several factors that m ight create 
a difference between potential and actual tax collections. The presence o f  
centrally im posed exem ptions eroding the tax base, or greater adm inistra­
tive and com pliance costs, and the taxpayers’ willingness to contribute to  
the provision o f  public goods, are som e exam ples o f  factors that might 
truly reduce fiscal disparities. But historically low  tax collections might 
also be caused by inefficiency, political favors and corruption. In this 
context, it is desirable to have som e inform ation about the determinants 
o f  fiscal capacity. For instance, we m ight expect that measures o f  incom e, 
production or consum ption could be related to the size o f  the tax base, 
including the property tax base. In general, the use o f  this type o f  ‘proxies’ 
is preferable to the use o f  historical data, but in developing countries we 
can rarely count on this inform ation at the local level.
There are several additional m ethodologies for estim ating fiscal capac­
ity and their usefulness, o f  course, depends on whether the data are avail­
able or not.20 In any case, it is im portant to stress the fact that deficient 
measures o f  fiscal capacity lead, necessarily, to equally deficient estim ates 
o f  tax effort.
Comparing Tax Collection Performance across Countries
The com parison o f  property tax performance across countries follow s the 
same logic as the com parison o f  subnational tax perform ance. M aybe the 
m ost im portant difference consists o f  which institutions are ultimately  
responsible for the relative variations in tax performance. In the analysis 
o f  subnational tax collections, subnational governm ents are responsible 
for their performance up to the point where they do n ot have further dis­
cretion to affect tax collections. Such a limit is im posed, for instance, by the 
tax law, which can usually be regarded as exogenous for any subnational 
governm ent and even for the central governm ent. In contrast, regardless 
o f  which level o f  governm ent is responsible for adm inistering a tax source, 
at the country level the tax law and the public policies in general should
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be considered as endogenous and other national institutions such as the 
congress and the judiciary system also becom e responsible for the result­
ant level o f  national tax performance.
In this cross-country context, m ost o f  the variables determining prop­
erty tax collections can be considered to  be endogenous, and we can define 
the total am ount o f  tax collections for any country j  as:
, DEj q  Ej[D Ep Pp T M j(C ; R )  ] I 
TC, =  U  -  - p -  -  - r T  ------— ‘ T - - L— i—  } -t°-  TB„ (7.10)
J 1 EL- TLj TLj 1 p v 7
where besides the change in subscripts the only difference with respect to  
the subnational case is that the penalties for tax evasion (as well as any 
other determinant that m ight be exogenously im posed by the tax law) are 
expressed as endogenous (choice) variables. 21 
M oreover, given that a country has full discretion to define the tax base, 
and provided that the market value o f  all land and structures (F;) is avail­
able for taxation in the national territory, then the share o f  the actual tax 
base over Vj becom es by itself a com ponent o f  the national tax effort. A s a 
consequence, the country has discretion over all the variables in the right- 
hand side o f  the equation, and tax effort can be defined simply as:
TC,
TEj =  —r r .  (7.11)
i
This equation states that national tax effort can be estim ated as the ratio 
between actual tax collections and the market value o f  lands and structures 
available for taxation within a country, while the last term determines the 
potential tax collections or fiscal capacity o f  the country. In turn, cross­
country com parisons can be carried out by sim ply com paring the values 
o f  national tax effort.
O f course, as in the case o f  subnational tax performance, the m ain chal­
lenge with estim ating national tax effort is m easuring the fiscal capacity o f  
the country. If this is possible, however, the cross-country analysis o f  tax 
effort and performance offers im portant advantages in terms o f  data avail­
ability, because m uch m ore data about institutional, political, cultural and 
econom ic variables are available at the country level.
G iven that each country defines its own property tax base and might 
use different valuation m ethods to  estim ate the tax base, a wide variation  
o f  financial and technical arrangements can be observed am ong different 
countries. A s a consequence, even if available, national estim ates o f  the 
property tax base are not com parable. Bahl and W allace (2010) suggest 
a standardized approach in order to solve this problem: The measures o f
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national wealth provided by the W orld Bank (2006) can be used to esti­
m ate the size o f  the potential property tax base under a single criterion  
and for a large number o f  countries. In Appendix Table 7A.2 we present 
the estimates o f  the potential property tax bases for a number o f  Latin 
American countries. U nfortunately, the measures o f  national wealth are 
currently available only for the year 2000; thus even if  useful, they do not 
provide inform ation about how  tax bases vary across time. In the next 
section we use these estim ates in the econom etric analysis o f  international 
property tax performance.
5 THE DETERMINANTS OF PROPERTY TAX 
COLLECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
A n empirical test o f  the m ain propositions o f  our analysis requires infor­
m ation that, in general, is not available at the subnational level in Latin 
American countries, so we are not able to properly account for the deter­
m inants o f  property tax collections at the within-country level. For this 
reason, we begin with a simple OLS regression analysis in order to verify 
how  intergovernmental transfers received by local governm ents in Brazil 
and Peru (in national currency) are correlated with per capita property tax 
collections.22
The results are presented in Table 7.4. Because o f  data availability, 
we are able to include only a few other control variables to get a clearer 
picture o f  the potential im pact o f  intergovernmental transfers on property  
tax collections. These control variables are the total am ount o f  current 
revenues in each jurisdiction, revenue autonom y (defined as own taxes 
over total revenues), population, regional G D P  in the case o f  Brazil, and 
the relative incidence o f  poverty and the percent o f  urban population in 
the case o f  Peru. W e should also note that total current revenues and 
revenue autonom y should be expected to be endogenous with property 
tax collections; however, lacking valid instruments we cannot correct this 
problem. Nevertheless, a few interesting observations m ay be drawn from  
the results.
The m ost relevant result in Table 7.4 is that current intergovernmental 
transfers per capita are negatively and significantly correlated with prop­
erty tax collections per capita in the two countries. This would seem to  
suggest that on average current transfers act as a disincentive for property 
tax collections. H owever, we need to interpret this result w ith caution. 
There m ay be an endogeneity bias in these estim ates because lower prop­
erty tax revenues per capita may also induce larger current intergovern­
mental transfers per capita. On the other hand, the coefficients o f  capital
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Table 7.4 D eterm inants o f  p roperty  tax  collections in B razil and Peru  
(dependent variable: per  capita property tax  collections)
OLS regression: Brazil OLS regression: Peru
Current transfers per capita -0.1124*** -0.2263***
(0.0237) (0.0130)
Capital transfers per capita 0.0058 -0.0080
(0.0063) (0.0191)
Current revenues per capita 0.1081*** 0.2165***
(0.0223) (0.0123)
Revenue autonomy (%) 2.5051*** 1.6772***
(64.9611) (49.8014)




Urban population (%) -0.1065***
(0.0390)







Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
intergovernmental transfers are not statistically significant, suggesting 
that the distribution o f  this revenue source because o f  its unpredictability  
or periodicity does not affect local property tax collection performance.
The coefficients o f  total current revenues and revenue autonom y are 
positive and statistically significant. But these results are expected due to  
the construction o f  those variables; by definition the larger the property 
tax collections the larger will be the am ount o f  current revenues as well as 
the share o f  own revenues in the local budgets. However, they m ight also 
suggest, subject again to a possible endogeneity bias, that local govern­
m ents with larger budgets and m ore revenue autonom y m ight be better 
able to collect property taxes.
The regressions also include proxies for local fiscal capacity, which help  
to estim ate the relative size o f  the property tax base as well as the adm in­
istrative capacity o f  local governm ents. The per capita G D P  variable is
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available for Brazilian local governments. Its coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. This result is contrary to our 
expectations, as long as G D P  per capita is expected to be highly correlated  
with the property tax base; but it could also be that a higher G D P  per 
capita signals the availability o f  other tax bases, such as Brazil’s ISS (local 
tax on services), which is relatively m ore im portant than the property tax 
in local budgets. The availability o f  other tax sources m ay push down  
local efforts to collect the m ore difficult and unpopular property tax.23 
However, we m ust note that the estim ated coefficient is relatively unim ­
portant in terms o f  m agnitude, im plying that property tax collections are 
not that responsive to this factor. In the case o f  Peru there are no measures 
o f  G D P  at the local level. Instead, we use a measure o f  poverty defined as 
the share o f  the population under the poverty line; this variable displays 
no significant correlation with property taxes. In addition, we consider 
the share o f  the population living in urban areas, which is expected to be 
directly related with the size o f  the property tax base; however, here again  
the coefficient is instead negative and statistically significant, perhaps sign­
aling the availability o f  other m ore ‘convenient’ revenue sources in urban 
areas.
Finally, the regressions also include population as a control for the 
jurisdiction size. In both cases the coefficient is negative, but it is sig­
nificant only for Peruvian municipalities. This is som ewhat surprising 
because we w ould expect to observe econom ies o f  scale in property tax 
collections. H owever, this result m ight be explained, for instance, by the 
presence o f  econom ies o f  scale on the expenditure side; or, alternatively, 
by a positive correlation between the extent o f  inform al properties and the 
jurisdictional size.
The empirical analysis o f  property tax collections at the local level is still 
subject to very im portant data lim itations, and the inability to properly  
control for other determinants can easily lead to significant om itted vari­
able bias. In contrast, even though at the international level the data are 
also limited, there are several additional variables that allow  us to control 
for m acroeconom ic, political and institutional factors that are relevant in 
determining property tax collections. In the end, however, there is a clear 
trade-off since using international cross-country data is also subject to 
aggregation biases and om itted country fixed effects.
The cross-country analysis o f  the determinants o f  property tax collec­
tions considers nine Latin Am erican countries for which relevant data are 
partially available for the 1990-2007 period: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colom bia, Ecuador, M exico, Paraguay, and Peru. The dependent 
variable, property tax collections, is defined as the share o f  property tax 
collections in G D P. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we
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expect property tax collections to decrease with deficient enforcem ent, 
corruption, tax evasion and the predom inance o f  transfers, and to increase 
with the size o f  the property tax base, governm ent responsiveness, and the 
average tax rate. Even though there are direct measures o f  all these vari­
ables, som e o f  them  are not available for long periods o f  time for all Latin  
Am erican countries. In order to  m axim ize the number o f  observations, 
we use alternative (more com m on) variables as proxies o f  our variables o f  
interest.
We consider a variety o f  factors accounting for the design o f  fiscal 
arrangements, the level o f  developm ent, the size o f  the property tax base, 
relevant differences in the im plem entation o f  the property tax, and basic 
characteristics o f  the political system .24 The structure o f  fiscal arrange­
m ents is described through measures o f  fiscal decentralization, the level o f  
transfer dependency, and the size o f  governm ent. Fiscal decentralization  
is defined as the share o f  subnational expenditures over total governm ent 
expenditures, and it is used to represent the extent o f  the fiscal devolution  
to the subnational governm ents.25 The dependency on transfers is defined 
as the share o f  intergovernm ental transfers in total subnational revenues. 
As explained, intergovernm ental transfers reduce the need for collecting  
own revenues and, therefore, m ight reduce tax effort and the collections 
o f  the property tax. Finally, governm ent size is used to account for the 
relative m agnitude and relevancy o f  the public sector and its com ponents, 
including transfer programs, in the overall econom y.
The level o f  developm ent is represented by the per capita G D P. This 
variable provides inform ation, am ong other things, on the levels o f  accu­
m ulated physical and hum an capital. For exam ple, local governm ents in 
richer countries m ight have access to highly skilled personnel and m ore 
sophisticated equipm ent, so that their ability to administer and collect 
taxes is greater than that o f  less-developed countries. H ow ever, different 
levels o f  developm ent can also be related to diverse patterns o f  subnational 
governm ents’ financing, and thus the sign o f  the influence on  property tax 
collections remains uncertain.
Property tax collections also depend on the value o f  land and struc­
tures in a country, which accounts for the potential property tax base. 
W e approxim ate this value, follow ing Bahl and W allace (2010), with 
estim ations com puted on the basis o f  national wealth data provided by 
the W orld Bank (2006) (see Appendix Table 7A .2). W e also control for 
the share o f  the urban population, because the size and com position  o f  the 
tax base as well as the am ount o f  property tax collections can be expected  
to  be quite different in rural and urban areas. In addition, we include two  
dum m y variables to control for the specific characteristics o f  Chile, where 
the adm inistration and the authority over the property tax remain fully
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centralized, and o f  Ecuador and M exico, the only countries in the sample 
where the cadastre  is developed by the subnational governm ents (see 
A ppendix Table 7A.1).
In practice, subnational governm ents can effectively enjoy additional 
fiscal autonom y only if  the decentralization process also enhances the 
political representation o f  the population. Indeed, the share o f  local gov­
ernment expenditure over total governm ent expenditures does not say 
m uch about the ability o f  taxpayers to choose their representatives and 
express their preferences for public goods, which, in turn, determines the 
extent o f  effective accountability o f  governm ent officials and the degree 
o f  responsiveness to taxpayers’ preferences. In order to account for these 
factors we consider two variables: the com petition for public positions and 
an index o f  democracy. The degree o f  com petition for public positions, 
we argue, serves to limit the ability o f  local authorities to take advantage 
o f  their political power, and thus helps to increase accountability and to  
contain corruption. Com plem entarily, the index o f  dem ocracy serves to 
represent the ability o f  taxpayers to truly express their preferences.
Table 7.5 presents the results o f  our empirical analysis. The first regres­
sion (1) uses a fixed effects m odel in order to control in the estim ation for 
all unobserved specific-country characteristics. A s we m ight expect, the 
coefficient o f  fiscal decentralization is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. A  greater devolution o f  expenditure responsibilities 
to subnational governm ents requires relatively m ore revenues, provid­
ing incentives for greater property tax collections. The coefficient for 
the dependency on transfers takes a negative sign, and thus is negatively  
related to property tax collections, and it is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. This result is im portant because it supports our conjecture 
that the predom inance o f  transfers can have a negative effect on tax effort. 
In order to  control for the relative m agnitude o f  intergovernm ental trans­
fers we also include an interaction term between transfers and the size o f  
the (general) governm ent with respect to the G D P. The coefficient o f  this 
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative effect o f  
transfers o f  property tax collections is reduced as the size o f  the govern­
m ent increases. A  bigger public sector might need to count on other (than 
property) tax sources, and m ight also be better able to im prove tax adm in­
istration at every level and to im plem ent ‘non-distorting’ or ‘incentive- 
neutral’ transfer programs. On average, the net effect o f  transfers on  
property tax collections becom es positive when the size o f  the public sector 
corresponds to 17.7 percent o f  the econom y (displayed at the bottom  o f  
Table 7.5).
The level o f  developm ent, represented by the G D P  per capita, has a neg­
ative effect on property tax collections, which is significant at the 1 percent
Table 7.5 D eterm inants o f  property tax  collections ( dependent variable: p roperty  tax  collections ( P T C ) as a share o f  
G D P)
Fiscal decentralization (%)
Dependency on transfers (%)
Interaction term (dep. on transfers x 
government size)
Government size (% GDP)
Log of per capita GDP
Log of per capita GDP squared
Log of estimated property tax base 




Competition for public positions
Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Random effects IVa 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.00919*** 0.01617*** 0.01445*** 0.03038***
(0.00242) (0.00150) (0.00135) (0.00637)
-0.01047** -0.01053*** -0.00502** -0.02031***
(0.00509) (0.00234) (0.00255) (0.00697)
0.00059** 0.00072*** 0.00043*** 0.00086***
(0.00028) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00029)
-0.01288 -0.02731*** -0.00776 -0.04679**
(0.01554) (0.00901) (0.00952) (0.01991)







0.00438 -0.01564*** -0.01050*** -0.04710***





0.09501*** 0.12712*** 0.12667*** 0.14642***









Random effects IVa 
(4)
Index of democracy -0.03259*** -0.05281*** -0.05330*** -0.08504***
(0.00727) (0.00804) (0.00702) (0.01904)
Constant 1.68607*** 3.53144*** 13.66880*** 4.51384***
(0.63587) (0.45747) (3.72743) (0.74078)
Observations 115 115 115 115
Number of countries 9 9 9 9
/(-squared within 0.5913 0.4667 0.4487 0.1603
/(-squared between 0.1392 0.9795 0.9921 0.9252
/(-squared overall 0.1288 0.9332 0.9396 0.8367
Test of overidentifying restrictions 0.233
/»-value 0.6294
The mg. effect of GDP on PTC turns positive 28,892
when GDP per capita is;
The mg. effect of transfers on PTC turns 17.7 14.6 11.7 23.6
positive when government size is:
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
AU regressions include time period dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between the later and government size. 
The instruments are log of population, political competition, openness to international trade and the price level of government expenditures.
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level. This result m ight appear as counterintuitive, because a greater level 
o f  developm ent is usually associated not only with im proved tax bases and 
administrative and tax collection capacity, but also with greater ability  
(and m aybe willingness) to pay property taxes. A n alternative explanation  
o f this result w ould go along the same lines discussed above for the case 
o f Brazil; higher G D P  per capita m ay signal the availability o f  other tax 
sources o f  som e significance and therefore a relative decrease in the reli­
ance on property taxes as a source o f  local revenue. A  simple analysis o f  
the subnational tax m ix and G D P  per capita w ould seem to point in that 
direction; Figure 7.1(a) plots property tax collections as a share o f  subna­
tional taxes against G D P  per capita. There appears to be a clear negative 
relationship between these variables, suggesting that the relative im por­
tance o f  the property in subnational governm ents’ financing decreases as 
the country G D P  per capita increases.26
Finally, am ong the other controls only com petition for public p osi­
tions and the index o f  dem ocracy are statistically significant. A s expected, 
the variable used to represent accountability and the limits to corruption  
-  com petition for public positions, is positively related to property tax 
collections. In contrast, the coefficient o f  the index o f  dem ocracy has a 
negative sign, suggesting that the property tax m ight not enjoy political 
acceptability.27
The second colum n o f  Table 7.5 presents the results o f  a random  effects 
m odel in which we are able to include tim e-constant variables, at the same 
time partially controlling for country-specific effects. The results under 
this specification are fairly consistent with the findings under fixed effects, 
but all controls are now  significant at the 1 percent level. In particular, 
governm ent size and the percentage o f  urban population appear to be 
negatively correlated with property tax collections.
The time-invariant variables that are included in this estim ation are 
(the logarithm  of) the estim ated size o f  the potential tax base, a dum m y  
that takes the value o f  one for Chile, and a dum m y that assigns a value o f  
one to the two countries o f  the sam ple in which the cadastre is developed  
locally, Ecuador and M exico. The signs o f  the coefficients o f  the time- 
constant variables are in line with our expectations. The greater the size 
o f  the potential tax base the greater the relative am ount o f  property tax 
collections.28 On the other hand, Ecuador and M exico appear as collecting  
fewer taxes due to the reliance on, presumably ill-equipped, subnational 
tax administration; Chile performs better than the average o f  the sample 
due to the opposite reason.
Regression (3) in Table 7.5 introduces the square o f  the G D P  per capita 
in order to  allow for a non-linear influence on property tax collections. 
The general results do not significantly differ from  the previous regression,
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a) Share of property taxes over subnational tax 
collections and GDP per capita
GDP per capita
b) Property tax collections and corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index (decreases to the right)
Sources: (a) ECLAC (property taxes and subnational tax collections) and Penn World 
Table (GDP per capita); (b) ECLAC (property taxes) and Transparency international 
(Corruption Perceptions Index).
Figure 7.1 Relationship o f  property  tax  collections with G D P p er  capita  
and corruption
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and the square o f  the G D P  per capita is positive and statistically signifi­
cant at the 1 percent level; im plying that the negative marginal effect o f  
developm ent on property tax collection decreases with per capita G D P .29
A  relevant concern about the econom etric specification is the existence 
o f  an endogenous relationship between som e o f  the explanatory variables 
and property tax collections. In particular we m ay expect a certain degree 
o f  reverse causality; that is, we can expect the extent o f  fiscal decentraliza­
tion  and the am ount o f  transfers to be influenced by the level o f  property  
tax collections. In order to address this problem , in regression (4) we use 
a generalized two-stage least squares (G 2SLS) random  effects m odel, 
where w e introduce instrumental variables (IV) to correct possible biases 
in the estim ators. The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, 
dependency on  transfers, and the interaction term between dependency  
on transfers and the size o f  governm ent. A s instruments we choose the 
log o f  population, the degree o f  political (party) com petition, openness 
to international trade and the price level o f  governm ent expenditures.30 
The set o f  instruments is highly correlated with the three endogenous vari­
ables but uncorrelated with property tax collections. M oreover, the test 
o f  overidentifying restrictions (in the table) fails to reject the null that the 
set o f  excluded variables are valid instrum ents.31 In general, although the 
m agnitude o f  the coefficients exhibit relevant corrections, their signs and 
statistical significance remain roughly unaffected.32
Summarizing, property tax revenue performance im proves with the 
extent o f  fiscal decentralization, the presence o f  accountability m echa­
nisms, and the size o f  the potential tax base. In contrast, tax collections 
decrease with the index o f  dem ocracy, higher dependency on transfers, 
and the fact that the cadastre  is administered locally.
Finally, a variable that we have considered as a potentially im portant 
determinant o f  property tax collections is the perception o f  corruption, 
which even if available, has been excluded from  the econom etric analysis 
due to the small number o f  observations. Figure 7.1(b) presents a scatter 
plot where we verify an apparent correlation between property tax co l­
lections as a share o f  G D P  and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The 
Corruption Perceptions Index assigns a greater value to  those countries 
that are less corrupt, thus the positively sloped trend line suggests that less 
corrupt countries are, on average, able to collect m ore property taxes.33
This analysis provides im portant insights about the determ inants o f  
property tax co llections in Latin A m erica. In principle, given that we 
do n ot have inform ation  about w hat the ‘correct’ level o f  property tax  
collections is, w e cannot say a priori whether increasing tax collections  
is a desirable thing. H ow ever, it is well know n that L atin  A m erican  
countries perform  b elow  international standards, and since w e have no
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reason to presum e that their subnational expenditure needs are par­
ticularly low , then we can conclude that certain factors have an exces­
sively (undesirable) negative influence on  property tax collections. The 
dependency on  transfers and local responsibility for the im plem entation  
o f  the cadastre are tw o relevant factors in reducing property tax co llec­
tions and over w hich the authorities m ight have som e degree o f  control. 
For instance, the design o f  the fiscal decentralization m ight incorporate 
new  subnational ow n-revenue sources, such that the local authorities 
and their constituencies internalize the value o f  revenue au tonom y and  
start exercising higher tax effort in order to finance expanded local 
services. N evertheless, greater autonom y at the local level does not 
m ean that com plex, long-lasting and expensive tasks such as building  
a com plete cadastre  o f  properties can be undertaken w ithout assistance 
from  the central governm ent. The m ovem ent tow ards greater revenue 
collections and autonom y, especially in developing countries, m ust be 
gradual, w ith a central governm ent that is able to  support and assist 
local adm inistrations in their transition to m ore decentralized and  
efficient arrangem ents.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Successful decentralization in terms o f  efficiency and fiscal responsibil­
ity depends critically on the provision o f  adequate revenue autonom y to 
subnational governm ents. The property tax is w idely considered as the 
m ost appropriate instrument to prom ote tax autonom y at the local level, 
while other taxes such as vehicle taxes, local excise, piggyback personal 
incom e taxes, or business permit taxes should also play an im portant role 
in the prom otion o f  local tax autonom y. However, it is difficult to argue 
strongly for greater property tax autonom y when m any local governm ents 
in Latin Am erica appear not to be taking advantage o f  the autonom y  
that is currently granted in the laws. A n im portant piece o f  any potential 
indictment is that, judging from  what is collected in other regions o f  the 
world, actual property tax collections in the region are a small fraction o f  
what appears to be the revenue potential. In this context, any attempts 
to achieve m ore efficient forms o f  decentralization in the Latin American  
region via increased revenue autonom y for local governm ents w ould need 
to grapple with the question o f  how  to achieve significant im provem ent in 
local property tax collections.
Property tax collections are determined by a wide array o f  factors. These 
factors include, am ong others, the extent or depth o f  fiscal decentralization
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reforms, the structure o f  subnational financing, the level o f  developm ent, 
the potential size o f  the property tax base, and basic institutional charac­
teristics o f  the public sector. In particular, we find that the predom inance 
o f  intergovernm ental transfers in the subnational finance systems have 
a negative effect on  property tax collections and that, for the m ost part, 
subnational governm ents are unwilling or do not seem capable o f  taking  
advantage o f  the devolution o f  this revenue source. In this context, getting  
the property tax to perform  correctly m ay take m ore than just addressing 
the issues, com plex on their own, o f  designing, administering and enforc­
ing the property tax itself. For instance, we argue that governm ent respon­
siveness towards taxpayers’ needs and im provem ents in cultural factors 
such as tax m orale m ight be necessary to increase property tax collections.
Effective devolution o f  the property tax to subnational governments 
should be accom panied by certain preconditions. Som e o f  these precondi­
tions are not currently met by som e Latin American countries, and thus 
provide a good  starting point to  draw m eaningful policy recom m enda­
tions to guide future reforms. O f course, country circum stances and con ­
ditions differ, so n ot all recom m endations should be expected to apply to  
each case.
There is a clear need for m ost local governm ents to develop their adm in­
istrative and technical capacities. This rather obvious recom m endation  
has long been recognized in the literature, but it remains as an unavoidable 
and pending task. T w o possible strategies to m ove forward in this regard 
are the im plem entation o f  asym metric property tax assignm ents and the 
provision o f  technical and financial assistance to those local governm ents 
with lower adm inistrative capacity. M oreover, im proving the performance 
o f the property tax in the region would also benefit from  strengthening 
institutions and reshaping cultural attitudes. In particular, it is necessary 
to m ake local authorities understand the im portance o f  ow n-tax revenues 
and to show taxpayers the connection between property tax payments 
and local services. This will not be an easy task, but successful experiences 
such as those provided by the cities o f  Bogota and Lima m ight serve as 
relevant exam ples (see M artinez-Vazquez, 2010). Finally, som e reforms to 
the intergovernm ental finance system  m ay be necessary. It is particularly 
important to correct the incentives provided by the system  o f  transfers. 
In this chapter we provide som e evidence o f  a potential negative effect o f  
intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These issues still 
need to be carefully investigated.
Overall, and som ewhat paradoxically, greater revenue autonom y for 
Latin American local governments in the form o f  a m ore effective use o f  
the property tax m ight depend in som e cases on  a deeper involvem ent o f  
the central governm ent in the adm inistration, collection and enforcem ent
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o f  the property tax. M aking property taxes work m ore effectively will 
continue to be a com plex challenge and no simple ‘silver bullet’ simple 
solutions are in sight. A ttention  must be given to ‘internal’ factors, includ­
ing issues o f  adm inistration and local capacity, but equal attention must 
also be given to an array o f  factors that are ‘external’ to  the property tax 
collection process itself.
NOTES
* We are thankful to ECLAC for financial support and Juan Pablo Jiménez and Gustavo 
Canavire-Bacarreza for helpful comments. We are also thankful to Andrea Podestá for 
useful research assistance.
1. The taxation of property comes in many different modalities and within each one of 
them different approaches have been used in the international practice, all of which 
offer different advantages and disadvantages. Many of these are reviewed in Bird and 
Slack (2004) and Bahl et al. (2008a, 2010).
2. For a detailed description of property tax systems in Latin America, see De Cesare and 
Lazo Marin (2008).
3. The advantages of the property tax as a local tax are reviewed, among many others, in 
Oates (1999), Bird (2006), and Bahl et al. (2008b).
4. The concept of equity in the distribution of income ultimately deals with who bears the 
burden of the tax, or the incidence of the tax. Zodrow (2007) provides a brief review of 
the property tax incidence literature.
5. Based on an empirical analysis encompassing 34 developing countries and 22 developed 
countries, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) suggest that the local governments 
might actually contribute to improving the distribution of income. However, this con­
clusion is subject to a public sector playing a significant role in the economy (more than 
20% of the GDP), a condition that is not observed in Latin American countries, where 
total expenditures of the general government represent, on average during 2007, less 
than 15% of the GDP (Penn World Table, Heston et al., 2009).
6. Discussions about the property tax and the characteristics of a good local tax 
are discussed, for instance, in McLure (1994), McCluskey and Williams (1999), 
McCluskey and Plimmer (2007), Bahl and Bird (2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
(2010).
7. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that tax competition has a corrective effect on 
the overall amount of public expenditures, because it limits the natural tendency of 
governments to spend more than the efficient amount.
8. Oates (2006) provides a more recent discussion about the decentralization theorem 
and the channels through which fiscal decentralization can lead to net welfare gains for 
society.
9. See Shah (2004) for a discussion about the possible factors explaining the widespread 
decentralization movement among developing and transition countries.
10. In the equality provided by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) both sides of the iden­
tity are divided by the GDP. By doing this, the tax collections are expressed in relative 
terms, thus the figures for different countries are comparable and the analysis can 
be carried out on a cross-sectional basis. This equality was previously presented, for 
instance, in Bahl (1979).
11. If the collection ratio is assumed to be set at 1 by the tax authorities, then this term 
might still have a value different from one, which could be interpreted as a devia­
tion of the ‘true’ market value of taxable properties due to an inaccurate assessment 
of the value of taxable properties. In this framework, however, we assume that the
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market value is correctly measured and that the collection ratio serves only as a policy 
instrument.
12. The literature reserves the term ‘tax avoidance’ to refer to any legal form of non­
compliance. Tax avoidance corresponds to the taxpayers’ initiatives to minimize their 
tax burden by taking advantage of preferential treatments and exemptions contem­
plated in the law. In this model, tax avoidance is accounted for as a reduction of taxable 
market value of properties, and thus a reduction of the property tax base.
13. The basic structure of the traditional tax evasion model is developed by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), and the cost of enforcement is incorporated by 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Two surveys on the theory of tax compliance are pro­
vided by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2005).
14. A comprehensive review of the concept of tax morale and the relevant literature is pro­
vided by Torgler (2007).
15. See, for instance, Fisman and Gatti (2002) for an empirical analysis providing strong 
support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption.
16. f  can be computed as the total amount of taxes actually collected among all govern­
ment units divided by the overall tax base. This definition corresponds to the weighted 
average of the effective tax rate for all government units. A different alternative, not 
less convenient, consists in computing the benchmark as the simple average of the effec­
tive tax rates for the available sample (of countries or subnational governments). The 
weighted average will be expected to be greater (smaller) than the simple average as long 
as per capita collections tend to increase (decrease) with the jurisdiction size.
17. Other sources of own-revenue collections (for example, fees and financial debt) are 
excluded, without loss of generality, in order to simplify the analysis. Here we also dis­
regard whether the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked or not, but this does not 
alter the fact that any degree of discretion over own-revenue collections translates into 
discretion ‘in the margin’ over the total amount of government expenditures.
18. As a corollary of this result we could say that if intergovernmental transfers increase, 
do not change, or decrease tax effort in a jurisdiction, then the demand for public goods 
within that jurisdiction has been revealed to be elastic, have unitary elasticity, or be 
inelastic.
19. Equation (7.8) corresponds to a strictly budgetary identity, but it can be modified in 
order to model the supply and demand for subnational public goods and services. The 
left-hand side would have to incorporate a production function describing the amount 
and quality of public goods and services, and in the right-hand side the tax collections 
would represent the willingness to pay for these outputs.
20. For a review and an extensive discussion about the alternative methodologies available 
to measure fiscal capacity see, for instance, US ACIR (1986) and Boex and Martinez- 
Vazquez (2007).
21. One might argue that foreign tax policies also affect tax collections because they can 
induce the taxpayers to emigrate in order to capitalize on tax advantages. This is espe­
cially relevant in cases where taxpayers are very mobile, as in corporations. In any case, 
mobility is fully accounted for in this equation by a decrease in the size of the tax base. 
Another way in which foreign tax policies may also affect tax collections is through 
spatial tax competition across countries. In this case tax rates and other policies set in 
foreign countries can affect the tax policy choice in any one country.
22. The choice of these countries responds to data availability. Both Brazil and Peru 
provide public information about subnational finances and basic demographic and 
development indicators. The main data sources are the National Treasury of Brazil and 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru.
23. A similar result is found in the analysis of property tax collections at the international 
level, which is presented later in this section, and where we discuss possible interpreta­
tions in more detail.
24. The description and sources of the variables used in the analysis, as well as the summary 
statistics, are presented in Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4, respectively.
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25. Even though this variable does not capture the effective autonomy of subnational 
government, lacking any better option we follow the most common practice in 
the decentralization literature and use this variable to proxy for the level of fiscal 
decentralization.
26. The data for Chile, within the oval in Figure 7.1(a), exhibit a distinctive pattern, which 
has been accounted for by the country dummy in the econometric specification.
27. In order to account for additional country-specific characteristics we also considered 
regional disparities in GDP per capita as an additional control variable. The correla­
tion between this variable and property tax collections as a share of GDP is -0.686, 
suggesting that countries with greater regional disparities tend to collect fewer property 
taxes. However, we do not present the results for this variable because its inclusion in 
the estimating equations drastically reduces the number of observations.
28. The explicit consideration of the potential tax base might also help to explain the nega­
tive sign of the urban population’s coefficient. Once the size of the tax base has been 
accounted for, a negative relationship between urban population and property tax 
collections might suggest that urban areas have a greater concentration of unregistered 
properties and exempted taxpayers than is the case in rural areas.
29. The average effect of development on property tax collections turns out to be positive 
when the GDP per capita is US$28,892. That point, however, is irrelevant because no 
country in the sample reaches that value.
30. See Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4 for a description of the variables used and 
summary statistics.
31. The test of overidentifying restrictions was developed for Stata by Schaffer and Stillman 
(2006).
32. The only exception is the level of development, which turns out to be statistically insig­
nificant. We cannot know, however, if this change is due to the correction of a bias 
or due to possible collinearity introduced by the instrumentation for the endogenous 
variables.
33. The Corruption Perceptions Index is prepared by Transparency International, 
and the data can be retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ 
surveys_indices/cpi.
REFERENCES
Ahmad, Ehtisham and Giorgio Brosio (2008), ‘Political economy of multi-level tax 
assignments in Latin American countries: earmarked revenue versus tax auton­
omy’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 71, Washington, DC.
Allingham, Michael and Agnar Sandmo (1972), ‘Income tax evasion: a theoretical 
analysis’. Journal o f Public Economics, 1: 323-38.
Aim, James and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2007), ‘Tax morale and tax evasion in 
Latin America’, International Studies Program Working Paper No. 4, Andrew 
Young School o f Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein (1998), ‘Tax compliance’, 
Journal o f Economic Literature, 36 (2): 818-60.
Bahl, Roy (1979), ‘The practice of urban property taxation in less developed coun­
tries’, in Bahl (ed.), The Taxation o f Urban Property in Less Developed Countries, 
Madison, Wl: University of Wisconsin Press pp. 9-47.
Bahl, Roy and Richard Bird (2008), ‘Subnational taxes in developing countries: 
the way forward’, Public Budgeting & Finance, 28 (4): 1-25.
Bahl, Roy and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2008), ‘The determinants of revenue per­
formance’, in Bahl et al. (eds) (2008a), pp. 35-57.
Explain ing p ro p erty  ta x  collections in developing countries 211
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Joan Youngman (eds) (2008a), Making 
the Property Tax Work: Experiences in Developing and Transitional Countries, 
Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policies.
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Joan Youngman (2008b), ‘The property 
tax in practice’, in Bahl et al. (eds) (2008a), pp. 3-16.
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Joan Youngman (eds) (2010), Challenging 
the Conventional Wisdom on the Property Tax, Cambridge, MA: Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policies.
Bahl, Roy and Sally Wallace (2010), ‘A new paradigm for property taxation in 
developing countries’, in Bahl et al. (eds), pp. 165-201.
Bird, Richard (2006), ‘Local and regional revenues: realities and prospects’, in 
R. Bird and F. Vaillancourt (eds), Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism, Washington, 
DC: World Bank, pp. 165-201.
Bird, Richard, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Benno Torgler (2006), ‘Societal insti­
tutions and tax effort in developing countries’, in J. Aim, J. Martinez-Vazquez 
and M. Rider (eds), The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy, New 
York: Springer, pp. 283-338.
Bird, Richard, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Benno Torgler (2008), ‘Tax effort in 
developing countries and high income countries: the impact of corruption, voice 
and accountability’, Economic Analysis & Policy, 38 (1): 55-71.
Bird, Richard and Enid Slack (eds) (2004), International Handbook o f Land 
Property Taxation, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward 
Elgar.
Boex, Jamie and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2007), ‘Designing intergovernmental 
equalization transfers with imperfect data: concepts, practices, and lessons’, in 
J. Martinez-Vazquez and R. Searle (eds), The Design o f Equalization Transfers, 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 291-343.
Brennan, Geoffrey and James Buchanan (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Cesare, Claudia (2002), ‘Toward more effective property tax systems in Latin 
America’, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Land Lines, 14 (1): 9-11.
De Cesare, Claudia and José Francisco Lazo Marin (2008), ‘Impuestos a los 
Patrimonios en América Latina’, Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo No. 66, 
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Naciones 
Unidas.
Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti (2002), ‘Decentralization and corruption: 
evidence across countries’, Journal of Public Economics, 83 (3): 325-45.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten (2009), Penn World Table 
Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and 
Prices, University o f Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
Kunte, A., K. Hamilton, J. Dixon and M. Clemens (1998), ‘Estimating national 
wealth: methodology and results’, Environment Department Paper 57, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
Lopez, J. Humberto and Guillermo Perry (2008), ‘Inequality in Latin America: 
determinants and consequences’, Policy Research Working Paper 4504, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge (2010), ‘Municipal finance in Latin America’, 
International Studies Program Working Paper, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, Luc Noiset and Mark Rider (2010), ‘Assignment of the
212 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
property tax: should developing countries follow the conventional wisdom?’, in 
Bahl et al. (eds), pp. 299-349.
McCluskey, William and Frances Plimmer (2007), ‘The potential for the prop­
erty tax in the 2004 accession countries o f Central and Eastern Europe’, RICS 
Foundation Research Paper Series, London, Vol. 7, No. 17.
McCluskey, William and Brendan Williams (1999), ‘Introduction: a com­
parative evaluation’, in W. McCluskey (ed.), Property Taxation: An 
International Comparative Review, Aldershot, UK  and Brookfield, VT: 
Ashgate, pp. 1-31.
McLure, Charles (1994), ‘The tax assignment problem: ends, means, and con­
straints’, Australian Tax Forum, 11: 153-83.
Musgrave, Richard (1959), The Theory o f  Public Finance, New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Oates, Wallace (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates, Wallace (1999), ‘Local property taxation: an assessment’, Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy, Land Lines, 11 (3): 1-3.
Oates, Wallace (2006), ‘On the theory and practice of fiscal decentralization’, 
Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (IFIR) Working 
Paper 05, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.
Sandmo, Agnar (2005), ‘The theory of tax evasion: a retrospective view’, National 
Tax Journal, 58 (4): 643-63.
Schaffer, Mark and Steven Stillman (2006), ‘xtoverid: Stata module to calculate 
tests of overidentifying restrictions after xtreg, xtivreg, xtivreg2 and xthtaylor’, 
available at: http://ideas.repec.Org/c/boc/bocode/s456779.html (accessed May 
10, 2010).
Sepulveda, Cristian and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (2011), ‘The consequences of 
fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequality’, Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 29 (2), 321-43.
Shah, Anwar (2004), ‘Fiscal decentralization in developing and transitional econo­
mies: progress, problems and promise’, Policy Research Working Paper 3282, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki (1987), ‘The optimal size of a tax collection 
agency’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89 (2): 183-92.
Srinivasan, T.N. (1973), ‘Tax evasion: a model’, Journal of Public Economics, 2: 
339-46.
Tiebout, Charles (1956), ‘A pure theory of local expenditures’, Journal o f Political 
Economy, 64 (5): 416-24.
Torgler, Benno (2005a), ‘Tax morale and direct democracy’, European Journal of 
Political Economy, 21 (2): 525-31.
Torgler, Benno (2005b), ‘Tax morale in Latin America’, Public Choice, 122: 
133-57. '
Torgler, Benno (2007), Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward 
Elgar.
Torgler, Benno, Ihsan C. Demir, Alison Macintyre and Markus Schaffner (2008), 
‘Causes and consequences of tax morale: an empirical investigation’, Economic 
Analysis & Policy, 38 (2): 313-39.
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 
(1986), ‘Measuring State Fiscal Capacity: Alternative Methods and their Uses’, 
Information Report M-150, ACIR, Washington, DC.
Explain ing p ro p erty  ta x  collections in developing countries 213
World Bank (2006), Where Is the Wealth o f  Nations? Measuring Capitalfor the 21st 
Century, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zodrow, George (2007), ‘The property tax incidence debate and the mix of state 
and local finance o f local public expenditures’, CESifo Economic Studies, 53 (4): 
495-521.
APPENDIX 7A
T a b le  7A . 1 M a in  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  p r o p e r ty  ta x  s y s te m s  in L a tin  A m e r ic a
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Table 7A.2 E stim ates o fp o ten tia l p roperty  tax base by country and 
region, 2000 ( in US$ per capita)

















Argentina 3,632 2,754 6,386 18,301 24,687
CA Belize 5,201 133 5,334 9,298 14,632




Brazil 1,998 1,311 3,309 9,234 12,543
SA Chile 2,443 1,001 3,444 10,235 13,679
SA Colombia 1,911 978 2,889 4,665 7,554
CA Costa Rica 5,811 1,310 7,121 7,989 15,110
SA Ecuador 5,263 1,065 6,328 2,721 9,049
CA El Salvador 404 395 799 3,935 4,734
CA Guatemala 1,697 218 1,915 2,967 4,882
SA Guyana 5,324 252 5,576 3,192 8,768
CA Honduras 1,189 595 1,784 2,934 4,718
NA Mexico 1,195 721 1,916 18,155 20,071
CA Nicaragua 867 410 1,277 1,646 2,923
CA Panama 3,256 664 3,920 10,551 14,471
SA Paraguay 2,193 1,215 3,408 4,290 7,698
SA Peru 1,480 341 1,821 5,326 7,147
SA Suriname 2,113 210 2,323 5,571 7,894
SA Uruguay 3,621 5,549 9,170 10,330 19,500




Antigua and 1,003 468 1,471 37,151 38,622
Barbuda
Barbados 190 210 400 17,398 17,798
Dominica 5,274 553 5,827 14,661 20,488
Dominican 1,980 386 2,366 5,480 7,846
Republic
Grenada 572 67 639 15,444 16,083
Haiti 668 112 780 576 1,356
Jamaica 824 152 976 9,723 10,699
St. Kitts and 0 0 0 34,197 34,197
Nevis 
St. Lucia 3,394 108 3,502 13,018 16,520
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Table 7A.2 (continued)

















St. Vincent 2,106 109 2,215 10,041 12,256
Trinidad and 444 54 498 13,871 14,369
Tobago
Regional averages
Latin America 1,973 1,114 3,086 10,608 13,695
Central America (CA) 1,848 493 2,342 4,116 6,458
South and North 1,983 1,164 3,147 11,137 14,284
America (SA and
NA)
The Caribbean 1,232 226 1,458 5,139 6,596
Note: *As computed by Bahl and Wallace (2010). The tax base reported by the WB
includes other produced capital that we would not tax (durable goods for example). The 
WB report follows Kunte et al. (1998), who assume that urban land corresponds to 33% of 
the value of structures and, in turn, that structures correspond to 72% of the value of total 
capital.
Source: W orld Bank (2006).
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Table 7A.3 Variable description and data sources








Log of per capita 
GDP







Share of property tax collections over GDP (in percentage) 
Source: CEPAL
Share of subnational expenditures over total government 
expenditures (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Share of intergovernmental transfers over total subnational 
revenues (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Government share of real GDP per capita (in percentage) 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
Based on per capita real GDP (in purchasing power parity, 
PPP)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
Based on the sum of the potential property tax base 
for rural and urban areas, as computed in Appendix 
Table 7A.2 with data from World Bank (2006). Figures 
correspond to year 2000, and are expressed on SUS per 
capita
Share of the total population living in urban areas (in 
percentage)
Source: World Development Indicators 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: extent to 
which subordinates enjoy equal opportunities to become 
superordinates 
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, University of Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm 
POLITY2 is a modified version of the POLITY, which 
is obtained by subtracting the value of the scaled value 
representing AUTOCRATIC (range 0-10) from the 
value of DEMOCRATIC (range 0-10) in order to 
provide a unified polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, University of Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/inscr/polity/index, htm 
Based on population (thousands)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al.
(2009)
Table 7A.3  (continued)
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Price of government 
expenditures
It combines two concepts: the degree of 
institutionalization, or regulation, o f political 
competition, and the extent of government restriction 
on political competition. It ranges from 1 (suppressed 
competition) to 10 (institutionalized electoral)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, University of Maryland, 
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ 
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm 
Openness in constant prices: exports plus imports divided 
by real GDP per capita; Laspeyres (in percentage) 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009) 
PPP over government consumption 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)
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Table 7A .4 Sum m ary sta tistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max Observations
Property tax overall 0.39 0.21 0.06 0.74 N = 115
collections between 0.20 0.12 0.64 n = 9
within 0.06 0.16 0.52 T-bar = 12.8
Fiscal overall 21.93 13.86 0.65 47.16 N = 115
decentralization between 13.71 1.17 44.76 n = 9
within 3.78 5.65 30.15 T-bar = 12.8
Dependency on overall 58.62 19.09 20.53 93.04 N = 115
transfers between 19.03 23.16 89.46 n = 9
within 4.21 39.44 69.23 T-bar = 12.8
Government size overall 15.22 2.92 11.39 22.55 N = 115
between 2.55 12.47 18.88 n = 9
within 1.74 8.83 19.74 T-bar = 12.8
Log of per capita overall 8.86 0.42 8.06 9.98 N = 115
GDP (PPP) between 0.41 8.20 9.36 n = 9
within 0.19 8.37 9.48 T-bar = 12.8
Per capita GDP overall 7,690 3,511 3,164 21,548 N = 115
(PPP) between 2,998 3,639 12,189 n = 9
within 1,981 2,600 17,050 T-bar = 12.8
Log of estimated overall 2.48 0.50 1.41 3.21 N = 115
property tax base between 0.56 1.41 3.21 n = 9
(per capita US$ within 0.00 2.48 2.48 T-bar = 12.8
of year 2000)
Urban overall 74.21 11,21 54.66 91.80 N = 115
population between 11.36 57.21 89.59 n = 9
within 1.81 69.54 79.36 T-bar = 12.8
Competition for overall 2.71 0.53 1.00 3.00 N = 115
political positions between 0.30 2.22 3.00 n = 9
within 0.44 1.49 3.49 T-bar = 12.8
Index of overall 7.44 1.81 0.00 10.00 N = 115
democracy between 1.06 5.22 9.00 n = 9
within 1.46 2.22 10.22 T-bar = 12.8
Log of overall 10.27 0.96 8.60 12.15 N = 115
population between 1.11 8.71 12.10 n = 9
within 0.07 10.11 10.43 T-bar = 12.8
Political overall 8.27 0.99 7.00 10.00 N = 115
competition between 0.87 7.00 9.13 n = 9
within 0.67 7.16 9.71 T-bar = 12.8
Openness to overall 50.74 21.99 21.22 138.80 N = 115
trade between 24.44 23.54 107.66 n = 9
within 8.86 28.20 81.89 T-bar = 12.8
Price level of govt overall 40.02 15.67 14.04 75.44 N = 115
expenditures between 11.87 18.07 55.91 n = 9
within 10.76 6.34 66.38 T-bar = 12.8
8. Intergovernmental transfers in 
subnational finances
Fernando Rezende and Joao Veloso
1 INTRODUCTION
Over time, fiscal decentralization in Latin Am erica has been accom panied  
by the growing im portance o f  intergovernmental transfers in subnational 
finances. There are three main explanations for this: first, the impact o f  
global markets and technological advances on the m obility o f  the tax 
base traditionally tapped into at the subnational level, which has im posed  
additional constraints on the decentralization o f  tax powers; second, the 
increasing role played by provincial and local governm ents with regard to 
the provision o f  urban and social services, as well as in public investments 
that are essential to  prom ote econom ic developm ent and im prove social 
well-being, such as education, health and urban infrastructure; and third, 
a rise in costs to fulfill subnational governm ents’ responsibilities, which 
reflect societies’ dem ands for a higher standard in the provision o f  public 
services together w ith the need to  apply costly solutions to tackle urban 
and social problem s in a highly dense and unequal environment.
The outcom e o f  contradictory m oves -  greater spending responsibili­
ties in a context o f  higher producing costs and less room  for raising own  
revenues through taxes -  is an increasing financial gap. Furthermore, 
when regional and social disparities are high, as is the case in m ost Latin  
A m erican countries, huge differences arise with respect to the financial gap 
faced by distinct jurisdictions (the so-called ‘horizontal disparities’); that 
is, it is not possible to deal properly with this situation by attem pting to  
bypass the lim itations to raising taxes at the subnational level.
R eliance on transfers is indispensable, besides being necessary, even  
though it leaves subnational governm ents vulnerable to external events, 
such as cuts induced by m acroeconom ic fiscal adjustment needs, the 
impact o f  an econom ic downturn on budgetary receipts, the likelihood o f  
restrictions being im posed on the use o f  transfer-originated resources, and 
the fact that central governm ent financial authorities prefer to  raise taxes 
not included in the transfer system.
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The financial risks subnational governm ents face by relying on transfers 
are not only related to their m agnitude. M ore im portant are the character­
istics o f  the transfer system and the rules governing its operation. A s such, 
a high share o f  transfers in total revenues should not be seen as inferior 
com pared to another case that shows a lower ratio. Each case should be 
exam ined before conclusions are reached about the quality o f  the national 
finances.
W hat, then, are the characteristics that a transfer system  should exhibit 
to be seen as favorable from the viewpoint o f  the financial needs o f  sub­
national governments? H ow  can the situation encountered in a handful o f  
Latin Am erican countries be appraised in the light o f  such an approach? 
To what extent is the adherence to som e basic principles -  which should  
be observed in the design and operation o f  intergovernm ental transfers -  
im portant to reduce distortions, diminish risks and avoid  setbacks?
Such questions point to a new approach to appraise the quality o f  
subnational finances. Should the focus be primarily concerned with the 
need to reduce the weight o f  transfers on subnational revenues, or should  
due attention be paid to the identification o f  how  far rem oved existing  
regimes are from  the basic principles o f  a sound intergovernm ental trans­
fer system? To what extent can the latter provoke a debate that m ay lead  
to the recognition o f  the im portance o f  substituting a thorough reform for 
piecem eal adjustm ents in order to overcom e the w ell-know n flaws o f  m ost 
regimes?
This chapter opts for this new approach. It begins w ith a short summary 
o f  the main characteristics exhibited by the transfer regimes o f  eight Latin  
American countries, highlights changes provoked by reactions to the eco­
nom ic crisis o f  the 1990s, points to the main flaws and concludes with a 
proposal for an agenda to reform these regimes in order to rem ove their 
flaws and m ake them  com patible with today’s needs.
2 TAX AND TRANSFERS IN SUBNATIONAL 
FINANCES
G óm ez Sabaini and Jiménez (ch. 6 in this volum e) stressed the im portance 
that intergovernm ental resource transfers play in subnational budgets. 
A m ong the eight countries surveyed in this chapter, Brazil shows the 
lowest transfers/total revenues ratio, while M exico exhibits the highest. 
Contradicting com m on sense, differences are not explained by the political 
organization o f  the state or the country size. Subnational governm ents in 
Argentina, C olom bia and Bolivia (Plurinational State of), like M exico, are 
dependent on transfers. The timing o f  the fiscal decentralization process is
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a n  im p o r ta n t  fa c to r  to  e x p la in  th e  d ifferences , as th e  th re e  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  
e m b a rk e d  o n  a  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  sp ree  in  th e  1980s -  B raz il, C o lo m b ia  
a n d  A rg e n tin a  -  sh o w  th e  lo w er ra t io s . B o liv ia  (P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  of), 
w h ic h  w a s  n o t  a m o n g  th e  fo r e ru n n e rs , h a s  re cen tly  m a d e  ra p id  p ro g re s s  in  
sh if tin g  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  a n d  re so u rc e s  to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts .
T h e  firs t w ave  o f  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n , w h ich  g a in e d  im p e tu s  in  th e  la te  
1980s, w as a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  a  w id e sp re a d  d e fen se  o f  th e  v ir tu e s  o f  fa m ilia r ­
iz in g  g o v e rn m e n ts  w ith  th e ir  c o n s titu e n c ie s , so  as to  im p ro v e  efficiency in  
m a n a g in g  p u b lic  re so u rc e s , ach iev e  efficacy b y  a d ju s tin g  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  
p u b lic  serv ices to  lo c a l p r io r it ie s , a n d  a llo w in g  fo r  a c c o u n ta b ili ty  o f  th e  
g o v e rn m e n ta l a u th o r it ie s . T h is  sh o u ld  a lso  e n h a n c e  d e m o c ra c y  fo llo w in g  
th e  dem ise  o f  a u th o r i ta r ia n  reg im es in  som e p a r ts  o f  L a t in  A m erica .
T ra n s f e r  sy s tem s p u t  in  p la c e  a t  th a t  tim e  w e re  d es ig n ed  in  a c c o rd a n c e  
w ith  th e  e x p ec ted  b en efits  o f  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n . T h e  b a s is  o f  th e  in te r ­
g o v e rn m e n ta l tr a n s fe r  sy s tem s in  B raz il a n d  A rg e n tin a  w as a  re v e n u e ­
sh a r in g  reg im e  d e s ig n e d  to  re d u c e  fisca l d ise q u ilib ria . T h e y  in c lu d e d  
p ro v is io n s  to  e n su re  th e  a u to m a tic  o p e ra t io n  o f  su ch  a  reg im e  a n d  gave  
su b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  fre e d o m  to  m a k e  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  d ec is io n s 
c o n c e rn in g  th e  u se  o f  re so u rce s . C o lo m b ia  a lso  in tro d u c e d  ch an g es  to  
im p ro v e  th e  q u a li ty  o f  its  sy s tem  b u t  k e p t d ec is io n s  o n  th e  u se  o f  re so u rce s  
in  th e  h a n d s  o f  th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t.
H o w e v e r , th e  s i tu a t io n  o f  th e  1980s d id  n o t  la s t  lo n g . T h e  in te rn a ­
tio n a l e c o n o m ic  c ris is  th a t  h i t  th e  re g io n  in  th e  la te  1990s c o n tr ib u te d  to  
its  p re m a tu re  dem ise . T h e  e n su in g  n eed  to  a d ju s t  th e  fiscal a c c o u n ts  a n d  
re s to re  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  s ta b il ity  led  to  su b s ta n tia l  c h an g es  th a t  im p in g e d  
o n  th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f  fiscal re so u rc e s  a t  th e  s u b n a t io n a l level by  a d d in g  
in s ta b ili ty  a n d  in t ro d u c in g  c o n d it io n s  in  th e  u se  o f  tra n s fe rs .
O n  th e  p o litic a l side , th e  m e a su re s  a d o p te d  to  re s to re  fiscal d isc ip lin e  
a lso  re d u c e d  th e  p o ss ib il ity  th a t  th o s e  g o v e rn m e n ts  th a t  h a d  to  a p p ly  
u n p o p u la r  po lic ie s  w o u ld  s tay  in  p o w er. T h e re fo re , th e  se c o n d  w av e  o f  
fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n  w as a c c o m p a n ie d  by  a  s tro n g  ca ll fo r  th e  n ew  lead e rs  
to  g ive to p  p r io r i ty  to  p o lic ie s  a im e d  a t  re d u c in g  in c o m e  in e q u a litie s  a n d  
im p ro v in g  th e  liv in g  s ta n d a rd s  o f  th e  p o o r .
T h u s  th e  seco n d  w av e  to o k  a  d iffe ren t a p p ro a c h . I t  m o v e d  a w a y  fro m  
th e  p re v a ilin g  re v e n u e -sh a r in g  reg im e  a n d  gave  p re fe re n c e  to  c h a n n e lin g  
fe d e ra l re so u rc e s  to  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , e a rm a rk e d  fo r  e d u c a t io n  
a n d  h e a lth . T h is  w as  seen  n o t  o n ly  a s  a  m e a n s  to  re d u c e  so c ia l in e q u a li­
ties, b u t  a lso  a s  a n  im p o r ta n t  in s tru m e n t fo r  ra is in g  th e  p ro s p e c ts  o f  
e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t. A  d ire c t a p p o r t io n m e n t  o f  c a sh  to  fam ilies  th a t  
a re  b e lo w  th e  p o v e r ty  line , e ith e r  d irec tly  o r  w ith  th e  h e lp  o f  su b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts , w as a lso  fav o red .
H o w e v e r , th is  s e c o n d  w av e  o f  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  d id  n o t  re p la c e
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th e  p re v io u s  o n e . I t  m o d if ie d  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  e a r l ie r  reg im es  a n d  a d d e d  
n ew  so u rce s  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  t r a n s fe r s  o n  to p  o f  th e  e x is tin g  o n es , 
le a d in g  to  a  f r a g m e n ta t io n  th a t  a d d e d  fu r th e r  d is to r t io n s . T h e se  w ill be 
a n a ly z e d  in  d e ta il  in  th e  n e x t sec tio n . T h e  p o in t  b e in g  m a d e  h e re  is th a t  
th e  effect o f  th e  a c c u m u la tio n  o f  d is tin c t a p p ro a c h e s  w a s  a n  in c re a s in g  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  tra n s fe r s  in  s u b n a t io n a l  f in an ces  (J im e n e z  a n d  G o m e z  
S a b a in i, 2009).
A  s tro n g  re lian ce  o n  tra n s fe r s  led  to  severa l c ritic ism s  o f  fisca l d e c e n ­
tra liz a tio n  (P r u d ’h o m m e , 1995). T h is  m e th o d  o f  f in a n c in g  th e  tr a n s fe r  o f  
re sp o n s ib ilitie s  to  lo w e r levels o f  g o v e rn m e n t w as  sa id  to  h in d e r  efficiency 
in  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  p u b lic  serv ices, im p in g e  o n  th e  a c c o u n ta b il i ty  o f  lo ca l 
p o li tic ia n s  a n d  r isk  je o p a rd iz in g  th e  g o a l o f  su s ta in in g  a  so u n d  m a n a g e ­
m e n t o f  th e  fiscal a c c o u n ts  a t  th e  n a t io n a l  level. E ffo r ts  to  re d u c e  th e  
su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ d e p e n d e n c e  o n  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tra n s fe r s  by  
in c rea s in g  th e ir  a b il ity  to  ta x  sh o u ld , th e re fo re , b e  e n c o u ra g e d .
S u ch  c ritic ism s a re  n o  d o u b t  w o r th y  o f  se r io u s  c o n c e rn . H o w e v e r, w e 
sh o u ld  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t w h a t c a n  rea lis tic a lly  b e  d o n e  to  d ea l w ith  th e  
p ro b le m s  w e face  n o w a d a y s  in  f in a n c in g  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  re s p o n s i­
b ilities  to  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , fo r  ex am p le , n ew  lim its  o n  in c re a s in g  
th e  ab ility  to  ta x  a t  th e  lo ca l level.
In  a  p a p e r  th a t  ex p lo re s  th e se  lim its , V ito  T a n z i (T a n z i, 2005) ra ises  
im p o r ta n t  issues th a t  p o in t  to  fu r th e r  c o n s tra in ts  o n  ra is in g  o w n  tax es 
a t  th e  s u b n a t io n a l level, in  a d d it io n  to  th o se  th a t  a re  re la te d  to  so c io eco ­
n o m ic  (sm all b as is ) o r  p o li tic a l re a s o n s  (lo ca l a u th o r it ie s  u n w illin g  to  ta x  
w e a lth y  re s id e n ts ) . T h ese  n ew  lim its  re fe r to  th e  u n p re c e d e n te d  m o b ili ty  
o f  th e  ta x  b a se  c o m m o n ly  ta p p e d  in to  a t  th e  s u b n a t io n a l level, a c q u ire d  
recen tly  a s  a  re s u lt o f  th e  im p a c t o f  g lo b a liz a tio n  a n d  th e  in c o r p o ra t io n  o f  
n ew  tech n o lo g ie s  in to  th e  p ro d u c t io n  p ro cess .
In  a d d it io n  to  re a l e s ta te , w h ich  c a n n o t  m o v e  (a l th o u g h  th e  re s id en ts  
can ) a n d  p e rs o n a l serv ices, a ll o th e r  a c tiv itie s  b e c a m e  v e ry  sen sitiv e  to  
ta x a t io n  co s ts ; th a t  is, a t te m p ts  to  im p o se  a  h ig h  b u rd e n  m a y  fo rce  p eo p le  
to  m o v e  aw ay , o r  ev en  a b ro a d . In  som e cases , g e o g ra p h y  p o se s  b a rr ie rs  
to  leav in g , b u t  th e  r a p id  im p ro v e m e n t in  th e  sp eed  o f  m o v in g  g o o d s , even  
h e a v y  ones, a ro u n d  th e  w o rld  is re d u c in g  th e  p ro te c t io n  th a t  g e o g ra p h y  
c a n  offer. B e tte r  m e a n s  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  m a d e  ta x a t io n  o f  serv ices even  
m o re  sensitive  to  ta x  b u rd e n s , w h ich  in  th e  case  o f  f in a n c ia l serv ices is a lso  
e n h a n c e d  b y  th e  p ro l ife r a tio n  o f  ta x  h a v en s .
F ro m  a  n a t io n a l  p e rsp e c tiv e , th e  id e a  o f  h a v in g  d is tin c t  ju r isd ic tio n s  
im p o s in g  d if fe re n t b u rd e n s  o n  th e  sam e  g o o d s  a n d  serv ices is fa r fe tc h e d , 
since it m a y  in c rea se  re g io n a l d isp a ritie s , p ro v o k e  a n ta g o n is m s  a n d  je o p ­
a rd iz e  p o li tic a l u n ity . T h e  a lte rn a tiv e  to  th is  is a  fu lly  h a rm o n iz e d  tax  
sy s tem , in  w h ic h  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  m a y  sh a re  th e  p ro c e e d s  o f
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n a tio n a l tax es , b u t  m a y  n o t  d isp o se  o f  an y  d eg ree  o f  fre e d o m  to  e s ta b lish  
th e  ru le s  a p p lie d  to  th e  im p o s itio n  o f  th ese  taxes.
O f  co u rse , b e tw e e n  th ese  e x trem es th e re  a re  o th e r  o p tio n s , su ch  as 
a llo w in g  ta x p a y e rs  to  d e d u c t a ll o r  p a r t  o f  th e ir  p ro p e r ty  ta x  liab ilitie s  
f ro m  th e  n a tio n a l in c o m e  ta x , o r  a llo w in g  fo r  so m e  fo rm  o f  d u a l V A T  to  
b e  a d o p te d  a t  th e  p ro v in c ia l level. R e c o u rse  to  u se r c h a rg e s  c a n  a lso  be  
c o n s id e re d . H o w e v e r, it  is n o t  in  th e  scope  o f  th is  c h a p te r  to  d w ell o n  su ch  
o p tio n s . T h e  m essag e  th a t  th e se  re fe ren ces  to  fu r th e r  lim itin g  s u b n a tio n a l 
ta x a t io n  co n v ey s  is th e  n eed  to  fo cu s  o n  th e  d e s ig n  o f  th e  in te rg o v e rn ­
m e n ta l  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem s to  im p ro v e  th e  q u a li ty  o f  su b n a tio n a l fin an ces. 
M u c h  c a n  be  a c h ie v e d  w ith  re g a rd  to  th is  o b jec tiv e  b y  a d h e r in g  to  som e 
p rin c ip le s  o f  a  g o o d  tr a n s fe r  reg im e, even  if  it  is n o t  p o ss ib le  to  red u ce  th e ir  
im p o r ta n c e  in  th e  s u b n a t io n a l b u d g e ts . A  firs t s tep  in  th a t  d ire c tio n  is to  
p re s e n t th e  m a in  flaw s o f  th e  c u r r e n t  reg im es.
3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN LATIN 
AMERICA: MAIN FLAWS
T h e  m a in  flaw s o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tr a n s fe r  reg im es o f  th e  c o u n tr ie s  
in c lu d e d  in  th is  s tu d y  a re  lis te d  b e lo w . T h is  lis t d o es  n o t  im p ly  th a t  all 
o f  th e m  a re  a ffec ted  eq u a lly  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e se  flaw s, a lth o u g h  every  
c o u n try  h a s  c e r ta in  e lem en ts  o f  e a c h , a lb e i t  to  a  d if fe re n t deg ree:
1. ab se n c e  o f  a  t r a n s fe r  sy s tem  o rg a n iz e d  u n d e r  p r in c ip le s  a n d  o b jec tiv es  
c le a rly  s ta te d ;
2. m u ltip lic ity  o f  tr a n s fe r  so u rce s  a n d  d is tin c t c r i te r ia  a p p lie d  to  th e  
s h a r in g  o f  fu n d s ;
3. in s ta b ili ty  o f  th e  ru le s  th a t  g o v e rn  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  e ach  c o m p o n e n t o f  
th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e;
4. h ig h , a n d  g ro w in g , in te rfe re n c e  in  th e  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts ’ use  
o f  th e ir  b u d g e ta ry  rev en u es; a n d
5. a b sen ce  o f  p ro v is io n s  fo r  a  p e rio d ic a l rev is io n  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e.
T o  a  g re a t e x te n t, th ese  flaw s w ere  th e  o u tc o m e  o f  c h an g es  in tro d u c e d  
o v e r tim e  in  re s p o n se  to  p re s su re s  to  red u ce  fiscal defic its a t  th e  n a tio n a l 
level fo r  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  re a s o n s , a n d  to  im p o se  c o n d it io n s  o n  th e  u se  o f  
th e  re so u rc e s  to  in d u c e  th e  a d h e re n c e  o f  s u b n a t io n a l sp e n d in g  to  n a tio n a l 
p rio ritie s .
M a c ro e c o n o m ic  p re s su re s  h a d  a  g re a te r  in flu en ce  in  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  
e m b a rk e d  o n  a  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  b in g e  in  th e  1980s fo llo w in g  re d e ­
m o c ra tiz a tio n . A t th a t  tim e , fiscal re fo rm s  a im e d  a t  in c re a s in g  tra n s fe rs ,
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e n h a n c e  s ta b il ity  in  th e  flo w  o f  re so u rc e s  to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , give 
a u to n o m y  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e i r  u se  a n d  a p p ly  c r i te r ia  th a t  w ere  in te n d e d  
to  red ress  v e rtic a l a n d  h o r iz o n ta l  d isp a rit ie s  in  fisca l c a p a b ilitie s . S uch  
w as  th e  case  in  A rg e n tin a , w h ic h  im p le m e n te d  ch a n g e s  in  th e  c o p a r t ic ip a ­
tio n  reg im e  in  1988, in  B raz il, w ith  th e  1988 c o n s t i tu tio n a l re fo rm  in  th e  
re v e n u e -sh a rin g  sy s tem , in  M ex ico , as a  re s u lt o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  a m e n d ­
m e n ts  a d o p te d  in  1983, a n d  in  C o lo m b ia , w h ere  a  p a r t ia l  re fo rm  im p le ­
m e n te d  in  1986 led  to  th e  n ew  sys tem  a d o p te d  by  th e  1991 C o n s ti tu t io n .
T h e  ex p ec ted  re su lts  o f  su c h  ch an g es  d id  n o t  m a te r ia liz e . T h e  o u tb re a k  
o f  a n  e c o n o m ic  c ris is  th a t  re a c h e d  L a tin  A m e ric a  a  few  y ea rs  la te r  fo rc e d  
a  c h a n g e  o f  c o u rse . In  g en e ra l, th e  m e a su re s  a d o p te d  re d u c e d  th e  a m o u n t  
o f  m o n e y  c h a n n e le d  in to  th e  s u b n a tio n a l co ffers a n d  m o v e d  aw ay  fro m  
a  reg im e  th a t  p re s e n te d  so m e  g o o d  fe a tu re s , su b s ti tu tin g  tr a n s i to ry  ru le s  
t h a t  la te r  b ecam e  p e rm a n e n t.
A  n ew  e c o n o m ic  sc e n a r io  c o u ld  h a v e  a llo w ed  fo r  a  r e tu rn  to  th e  fo rm e r  
p a th , b u t so m e h o w  th e  e n c h a n tm e n t w ith  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  id ea l seem s 
to  h av e  fa d e d . A s c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t ta x  rev en u es  re c o v e re d  a lo n g s id e  
a  r e tu rn  to  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th , th e  m e a su re s  a d o p te d  to  d e a l w ith  a n  
em erg en cy  c o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  rev e rsed , b u t  w ere  n o t.
In  a  w ay , a  p o li tic a l re a lig n m e n t ex p la in s  th e  new  o r ie n ta t io n , as th e  
fo rces  th a t  su p p o r te d  th e  re fo rm s  im p le m e n te d  in  th e  1980s lo s t th e i r  g rip  
o n  n a tio n a l p o litic s . In c re a s in g  soc ia l d isp a ritie s  c h a n g e d  th e  b a la n c e  o f  
p o w e r  to w a rd s  p o li tic ia n s  w h o  e m b ra c e d  a  c r itic a l v iew  o f  p a s t  eco n o m ic  
p o lic ie s  o n  th e  a s s u m p tio n  th a t  su ch  p o lic ie s  d is re g a rd e d  th e  n e e d s  o f  th e  
p o o r .  T h e  in a u g u r a t io n  o f  g o v e rn m e n ts  a lig n ed  w ith  su c h  a  p o s i tio n  led  to  
a  new  a p p ro a c h  in  th e  fie ld  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe rs .
T h is  n ew  a p p ro a c h  fo c u se d  o n  th e  u se  o f  tr a n s fe r s  to  s u p p o r t  n a tio n a l 
p o lic ies  o r ie n te d  to w a rd s  p ro g ra m s  th a t  e x e rt a  d ire c t  im p a c t o n  th e  
liv in g  s ta n d a rd s  o f  th e  p o o r ,  n a m e ly  e d u c a tio n , h e a lth  a n d  u rb a n  in f ra ­
s tru c tu re . 1 T h is  led  to  g re a t in te rfe re n c e  b y  th e  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t in  th e  
a llo c a tio n  o f  s u b n a tio n a l rev en u es  b y  m e a n s  o f  e s ta b lish in g  c o n d it io n s  fo r 
th e  use  o f  tra n s fe rs , sh iftin g  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  to  lo w e r leve ls o f  g o v e rn m e n t, 
o r  th ro u g h  a n  in c re a se  in  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  e a rm a rk e d  rev en u es  in  th e  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tr a n s fe r  reg im e.
A  sim ila r p a t te rn  c a n  be  o b se rv e d  in  cases  w h e re  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
is a  m o re  re c e n t p h e n o m e n o n . T h is  is, fo r  in s ta n c e , th e  c ase  in  th e  A n d e a n  
c o u n tr ie s  -  B o liv ia  (P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f), P e ru  a n d  E c u a d o r  -  a s  w ell as, 
a lb e it o n  a  sm a lle r  scale , in  C h ile . In  th o s e  c o u n tr ie s , a  su rg e  in  th e  p rice  
o f  m in e ra l c o m m o d itie s  a llo w ed  fo r  a n  in c rease  in  c e n tr a l  g o v e rn m e n t 
rev en u es , w h ich  w as  tr a n s la te d  in to  a  s ig n ifican t in c re m e n t in  tr a n s fe r s  to  
su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  so c ia l p ro g ra m s  c a rr ie d  o u t a t  the  
re g io n a l a n d  lo ca l levels.
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A s ev id en ce  in  th e  a v a ila b le  l i te ra tu re  sh o w s, ev en  th o u g h  th e  re la tiv e  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe r s  in  s u b n a tio n a l rev en u es  v a rie s  
to  a  s ig n ific an t d eg ree , re flec tin g  h is to r ic a l, in s ti tu t io n a l,  g e o g ra p h ic a l a n d  
p o li tic a l fa c to rs , d if fe re n t ro u te s  fo llo w ed  d id  n o t  p re c lu d e  th e  tr a n s fe r  
reg im es  o f  th e  d is t in c t  c o u n tr ie s  rev iew ed  in  th is  c h a p te r  f ro m  ev o lv in g  
in  su ch  a  w ay  as to  e x h ib it s im ila r g en e ra l tr a i ts ,  as p o in te d  o u t e a rlie r , 
sh o w in g  a  d is re g a rd  fo r  w e ll-e s ta b lish ed  p rin c ip le s  se t u p  in  th e  li te ra tu re  
a n d  fo r  g o o d -p ra c tic e  s ta n d a rd s  a p p lie d  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  (B o a d w a y  a n d  
S h a h , 2007).
T h e  m u ltip lic a tio n  o f  tr a n s fe r  so u rce s  th a t  re su lte d  f ro m  th e  a c c u ­
m u la tio n  o f  in itia tiv e s  a d o p te d  in  d iffe ren t p e r io d s  a n d  a s  a  re a c t io n  to  
p a r t ic u la r  p re s su re s , to g e th e r  w ith  th e  o v e r la p p in g  o f  ru le s  th a t  g o v e rn  
th e  a c tu a l  w o rk in g  o f  th e se  reg im es, a re  th e  m o s t s ig n ifican t ev id en ce  o f  
t h a t  d is re g a rd . T h e re fo re , a  s im ila r g e n e ra l p a t te rn  is a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  
im p o r ta n t  d iffe rences w ith  re sp e c t to  d e ta ils . J im én ez  a n d  P o d e s tà  (2009) 
d e sc r ib e  th e  m o s a ic  o f  fe a tu re s  e x h ib ite d  b y  11 L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  
w ith  re s p e c t to  so u rc e s , ru le  s h a r in g  o b lig a tio n s  a n d  th e  m a in  re c ip ie n ts  o f  
c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t m a n a g e d  fu n d s .
T h e  d is re g a rd  fo r  p r in c ip le s  is a lso  re flec ted  in  fiscal d isp a ritie s , m a in ly  
th e  so -ca lle d  ‘h o r iz o n ta l  d is p a r it ie s ’, th a t  is, th o s e  th a t  p re s e n t h u g e  d if­
fe ren ces  in  th e  f in a n c ia l c a p a b ilit ie s  o f  in d e p e n d e n t u n its  o f  a  sam e  level 
o f  g o v e rn m e n t, w h e th e r  s ta te s , p ro v in c e s , d e p a r tm e n ts  o r  m u n ic ip a litie s  
(C e trà n g o lo  a n d  G o ld sc h m id t , ch . 3 in  th is  v o lu m e).
D isp a r itie s  in  f in a n c ia l c a p a b ilitie s  a re  n o t  th e  o n ly  p ro b le m . W o rse  still 
is th e  m ism a tc h  b e tw e e n  th e  te r r i to r ia l  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  fiscal re so u rce s  
a n d  th e  c o r re s p o n d in g  lo c a liz a tio n  o f  th e  d e m a n d s  fo r  g o v e rn m e n t-  
s p o n s o re d  ac tiv itie s , w h ich  a rises  f ro m  th e  o v e rla p  o f  d is tin c t c r i te r ia  
a p p lie d  to  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  each  specific tra n s fe r . T h e  e n su in g  ineffi­
c iency  in  th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f  p o lic ie s  c a rr ie d  o u t  a t  th e  s u b n a tio n a l level 
g e n e ra te s  w aste  a n d  d o e s  n o t  c o n tr ib u te  to  b e t te r  o u tco m es .
T h e  en d less  p ro r o g a t io n  o f  p ro v is o ry  ru le s  re in fo rce s  d is to r t io n s  g e n e r­
a te d  b y  th e  m u ltip lic ity  o f  tr a n s fe r  so u rces. A s th e  speed  w ith  w h ich  th e  
so c io e c o n o m ic  d y n a m ic  ch an g es  th e  w ay  in  w h ich  e c o n o m ic  ac tiv ity  a n d  
p o p u la t io n  m o v e  a ro u n d  th e  n a t io n a l  te r r i to ry  g a in s  m o m e n tu m , d ifficu l­
ties in  re c o n s id e r in g  d ec is io n s  a d o p te d  in  th e  p a s t ,  even  n o t  so  lo n g  a g o , 
le a d  to  fu r th e r  im b a la n c e s  in  th e  lo c a liz a tio n  o f  th e  fiscal re so u rc e s  a n d  
th e  c o rre s p o n d in g  lo c a liz a tio n  o f  th e  d e m a n d s  fa c e d  b y  s u b n a tio n a l g o v ­
e rn m e n ts . M o u n t in g  co n flic ts  m a k e  i t  h a rd e r  to  re c o n s id e r  p a s t  d ec is io n s , 
esp ec ia lly  a s  m o re  tim e  e lap ses  since  th e  d ec is io n s  w ere  m a d e , d u e  to  th e  
m u ltip lic ity  o f  in te re s ts  th a t  h a v e  to  b e  d e a lt w ith  in  p o li tic a l n e g o tia tio n .
T h e  A rg e n tin e  ca se  p ro v id e s  th e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  ev id en ce  o f  th e  p o li t i­
ca l d ifficu lties faced  in  m o v in g  f ro m  a  successive p ro r o g a t io n  o f  p ro v iso ry
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n o rm s  c o u p le d  w ith  a n  a d  h o c  a d ju s tm e n ts  t r a p . B raz il fo llow s c lo se ly  
since th e  p ro v iso ry  ru le s  a d o p te d  in  1989 to  d is tr ib u te  th e  sh a re  o f  fed e ra l 
tax es  to  s ta te s  a n d  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  h a s  la s te d  fo r  m o re  th a n  tw o  d e c a d e s .2 
T h e  p ro v iso ry  reg im e  a d o p te d  in  C o lo m b ia  is n o w  sc h e d u le d  to  en d  in 
2017 (e ig h t y e a rs  a f te r  th e  o r ig in a l d a te )  w h en  a n ew  ru le  w ill a p p ly .3 W e 
sh a ll h av e  to  w a it to  see w h e th e r  E c u a d o r  w ill be ab le  to  a v o id  su ch  a  tr a p .
A n o th e r  p ro b le m  arise s  as a re su lt o f  h o w  c o n d it io n s  a re  im p o se d  o n  th e  
s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ u se  o f  tra n s fe rs . A s so c io e c o n o m ic  d isp a rit ie s  
a re  u su a lly  h ig h , a sy m m e tric  ru le s  sh o u ld  be  p re fe rre d  to  m a k e  it  e a sy  to  
a d ju s t  s u b n a tio n a l b u d g e ts  to  lo ca l p re fe ren ces , b u t  p o li tic a l c o n s tra in ts  
ra re ly  fa v o r  su ch  a n  a p p ro a c h . S y m m etric  n o rm s  m e a n  th a t  it  is h ig h ly  
u n lik e ly  th a t  th e  m o n e y  w ill b e  d is tr ib u te d  in  a  w ay  th a t  re flec ts  p a r t ic u la r  
n eed s, e sp ec ia lly  i f  o n e  ta k e s  in to  a c c o u n t th e  fa c t th a t  e a c h  se c to r  d iffers 
w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  d eg ree  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  th a t  b es t su its  its  specific case .
In te rg o v e rn m e n ta l c o o p e ra t io n  in  p u b lic  in v e s tm e n ts  a n d  serv ices p r o ­
v is io n  c o u ld  m itig a te  th e  p ro b le m s  g e n e ra te d  b y  a  h ig h  d eg ree  o f  d is p a r ity  
in  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  fisca l re so u rc e s , b u t  it  is h ig h ly  u n lik e ly  th a t  c o o p e ra ­
t io n  w ill em erg e  in  th e  ab se n c e  o f  in cen tiv es  d u e  to  p o li tic a l riv a lrie s  th a t  
a re  fo s te re d  in  a  c o n te x t o f  h u g e  d isp a ritie s . F u r th e rm o re , c o o p e ra t io n  
is a lso  h in d e re d  w h e n  a n  u n s ta b le  reg im e  lead s  to  u n c e r ta in t ie s  c o n c e rn ­
in g  th e  in flow  o f  re so u rc e s , e ith e r  th e  a m o u n t  o r  w h en  th e y  a re  ex p ec ted , 
m a in ly  w h en  c o o p e ra t io n  im p lie s  o b lig a tio n s  to  b e  sa tis f ied  in  th e  m e d iu m  
a n d  lo n g  te rm s.
4 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
Principles
T h e  flaw s a c c u m u la te d  o v e r  tim e  reflec t a  p ro g re ss iv e  a b a n d o n m e n t o f  
som e p rin c ip le s  th a t  s h o u ld  be  o b se rv e d  in  th e  d e s ig n  o f  in te rg o v e rn ­
m e n ta l tra n s fe rs . T h e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  re fe rs  to  th e  p ro p o s i t io n  th a t  every  
n a tio n a l c itiz en  s h o u ld  be  e n a b le d  to  m o v e  u p  th e  so c ia l la d d e r  reg a rd le ss  
o f  b ir th  o r  w h e re  h e /sh e  lives. I t  sh o u ld  b e  th e  s ta te ’s re s p o n s ib ili ty  to  g ive 
th e  u n d e rp r iv ile g e d  access  to  th e  b as ic  serv ices th a t  a re  n e ce ssa ry  to  fulfill 
su ch  c o n d itio n s . B ecau se  in  m o s t cases th is  re s p o n s ib ili ty  h a s  b een  sh ifted  
to  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , w h ich  d e p e n d  o n  tra n s fe r s  to  e n a b le  th e m  
to  fu lfill th e ir  d u tie s  effic ien tly , th e  d esig n  o f  tra n s fe rs  s h o u ld  o b se rv e  th e  
fo llow ing :
1. e n su re  a  re a s o n a b le  b a la n c e  a m o n g  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  fiscal 
re so u rc e s  a n d  th e  c o rre s p o n d in g  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  d e m a n d s  to  b e  m e t
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b y  e a c h  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t w ith in  th e  b o u n d a r ie s  o f  th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  
ju r isd ic tio n s ;
2. a llo w  fo r  a  re a s o n a b le  deg ree  o f  flex ib ility  w ith  r e g a rd  to  th e  u se  o f  
tra n s fe rs  a t  th e  s u b n a t io n a l level so th a t  d ec is io n s  re la tin g  to  th e  u se  o f  
tra n s fe rs  c a n  re flec t d iffe ren ces in  d e m a n d  p a t te rn s  a c ro s s  th e  n a tio n ;
3. in s e r t p ro v is io n s  th a t  e n a b le  th e  sy s tem  to  p e rio d ic a lly  a d a p t  to  
ch a n g in g  so c io e c o n o m ic  c irc u m s ta n c e s  th a t  a lte r  th e  lo c a l iz a t io n  o f  
fisca l re so u rc e s  a n d  lo ca l d e m a n d s  in  th e  n a t io n a l  te r r i to ry ;
4. p ro v id e  s ta b il ity  in  th e  flow  o f  re so u rc e s  th a t  c o m p r ise  th e  s u b n a tio n a l 
b u d g e ts  to  g ive lo c a l a d m in is tra to rs  th e  n e c e ssa ry  c o n d it io n s  to  b e tte r  
m a n a g e  th e ir  re sp o n s ib ilitie s ; a n d
5. a v o id  s i tu a t io n s  th a t  ra ise  th e  v o la til ity  o f  tra n s fe r s  d u e  to  e c o n o m ic  
o r  p o li tic a l re a so n s .
F lex ib ility  c o n c e rn in g  th e  u se  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe r s  c a n n o t  b e  
u n lim ite d , i f  th e  b a s ic  p rin c ip le  (to  en su re  th a t  ev e ry  c itizen , reg a rd le ss  o f  
w h e re  in  th e  n a tio n a l te r r i to ry  h e /sh e  lives, h a s  e q u a l access to  b a s ic  n eed s) 
is to  be  o b se rv ed . F le x ib ility  sh o u ld  b e  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  e q u il ib r iu m , 
w h ich  a lso  d e p e n d s  o n  p ro v is io n s  fo r  a  p e r io d ic  a d ju s tm e n t to  c h a n g in g  
c irc u m sta n c e s . A d a p ta t io n  to  a  n ew  e n v iro n m e n t m a y  n o t  im p ly  in s ta b i l­
ity  c o n c e rn in g  th e  flow  o f  re so u rc e s  to  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , w h e rea s  
a  less v u ln e ra b le  t r a n s fe r  b a se  is im p o r ta n t  to  a v o id  a  lo ss  in  flex ib ility  th a t  
re su lts  f r o m  less ro o m  fo r  m a n e u v e r  in  a n  e c o n o m ic  d o w n tu rn .
T h e  w ay  in  w h ich  e a c h  c o u n tr y ’s tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  c o m b in e s  th e  five e le ­
m e n ts  s ta te d  a b o v e  d e te rm in e s  th e  d eg ree  o f  re s ilien ce  o f  th e  s u b n a tio n a l 
f in an ces  to  c h a n g in g  so c io e c o n o m ic  c irc u m sta n c e s . A  sy s tem  th a t  d o es  n o t 
p ro m o te  e q u il ib r iu m , h a s  very  litt le  flex ib ility , c a n n o t b e  easily  a d a p te d  
a n d  d o es  n o t  g ive co n fid en ce  to  s u b n a t io n a l m a n a g e rs  w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  
in flow  o f  tra n s fe rs , w ill b e  p o o r ly  r a te d  f ro m  th e  re s ilien ce  p e rsp e c tiv e  a n d  
th e re fo re , w ill n o t  c re a te  m o re  fa v o ra b le  c o n d it io n s  fo r  th e  efficiency a n d  
efficacy o f  soc ia l p o lic ie s  c a rr ie d  o u t a t  th e  s u b n a tio n a l level. T h e re  a re , o f  
c o u rse , n o  c le a r-c u t fo rm u la s  fo r  a p p ra is in g  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  e a c h  case  
b e tte r  a d h e re s  to  th e  p r in c ip le s  re fe rre d  to  ab o v e , b u t  a  q u a li ta t iv e  an a ly s is  
o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  e n c o u n te re d  in  d if fe re n t c o u n tr ie s  m a y  th ro w  som e lig h t 
o n  o n e  im p o r ta n t  a sp e c t o f  su b n a tio n a l fin an ces.
T h e  a v a ila b le  l i te r a tu re  o n  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tr a n s fe r  reg im es in  p la c e  
in  d iffe ren t L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  p re se n ts  ev id en ce  th a t  sh o w s h o w  
fa r  th e y  a re  fro m  m e e tin g  th ese  p re s c r ip tio n s . T a k e  firs t th e  n e e d  fo r  e q u i­
l ib r iu m  b e tw een  re so u rc e s  a n d  re sp o n s ib ilitie s . A s  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  fisca l 
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  b e g a n  to  fo c u s  o n  so c ia l sec to rs  -  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth , 
m a in ly , b u t  a lso  u rb a n  in f ra s t ru c tu re  -  it  b e c a m e  ev en  m o re  d ifficu lt to  
ach iev e  e q u ilib r iu m , g iv en  th e  d iv e rs ity  o f  fa c to rs  in  th e  lo c a liz a tio n  o f
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f in an c ia l n eed s , m a k in g  i t  h a r d  to  dea l w ith  g iven  th e  f ra g m e n te d  reg im e  in  
th e  ab se n c e  o f  g u id e lin e s  th a t  p a y  d u e  a t te n t io n  to  specific  n eed s.
T h e  p re v io u s  se c tio n  p o in te d  to  th e  p ro l ife r a tio n  o f  t r a n s fe r  reg im es. 
B raz il s ta n d s  o u t  in  th is  re sp e c t. A lto g e th e r  th e re  a re  n o w  19 reg im es  c o m ­
b in in g  o ld  re v e n u e -sh a r in g  m e c h a n ism s , h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  e a rm a rk e d  
tra n s fe rs  to  s u p p o r t  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  su ch  serv ices, c o m p e n s a ­
tio n  fo r  e x e m p tin g  e x p o r ts  f ro m  th e  s ta te  v a lu e  a d d e d  ta x , s u b n a t io n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts ’ sh a re  o f  th e  p ro c e e d s  o f  ro y a ltie s  f ro m  th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  
o f  n a tu r a l  re s o u rc e s  (o il) a n d  a n n u a l a llo c a tio n  o f  fu n d s  in  th e  fe d e ra l 
b u d g e t. I n  c o n tr a s t ,  A rg e n tin a  sh o w s a  lo w e r d eg ree  o f  f r a g m e n ta t io n  
since  its  c o p a r t ic ip a t io n  reg im e  re s p o n d s  to  th e  b u lk  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  
tra n s fe rs .
F isc a l d isp a rit ie s  th a t  m o u n te d  in  th e  w ak e  o f  th e  p ro l if e r a tio n  o f  t r a n s ­
fe r  reg im es m a d e  i t  h a rd  to  fo llo w  th e  p re s c r ip tio n s . A s  se c to r-o r ie n te d  
tr a n s fe r s  g a in e d  im p o rta n c e , th e  sy s tem s b ecam e  less c a p a b le  o f  a d a p tin g  
to  so c io e c o n o m ic  d y n a m ic s  since th e  e a rm a rk in g  o f  re so u rc e s  e n ta ils  th e  
c o n so lid a t io n  o f  lo b b ie s  th a t  re s is t c h an g es . In  a d d it io n , m u ltip le  reg im es 
m e a n  a  d iv e rs if ic a tio n  o f  in te re s ts , im p ly in g  a  m o re  co m p lex  s i tu a t io n  to  
o b ta in  p o litic a l s u p p o r t  fo r  b ro a d e r  re fo rm s , w ith  p iece m ea l a d ju s tm e n ts  
b e in g  in c a p a b le  o f  ach ie v in g  m u c h  gain .
A n  in c re a se  in  tr a n s fe r s  e a rm a rk e d  to  soc ia l s ec to rs  a lso  im p in g e d  o n  
th e  flex ib ility  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem , a s  a  s ig n ifican t p a r t  o f  th e  re so u rc e s  
a re  su b jec t to  ru le s  d e s ig n e d  a t  th e  n a tio n a l level w ith  little  ro o m  to  a d a p t  
to  th e  specific n eed s  o f  d is tin c t su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts .
T h e  c o m p o u n d e d  effect o f  th e  m u ltip lic ity  o f  reg im es , la c k  o f  c o n d it io n s  
to  a d a p t  to  c h a n g in g  c irc u m s ta n c e s  a n d  a  lo w  d eg ree  o f  f lex ib ility  re s o n a te  
o n  th e  ca ll fo r  s ta b ility . D is t in c t ru le s  a p p lie d  to  sev e ra l p a r t ic u la r  o b je c ­
tives m e a n  th a t  c h a n g e s  in  an y  p a r t ic u la r  so u rce  o f  t r a n s fe r s  c a n  b e  c a rr ie d  
o u t  reg a rd le ss  o f  its  im p a c t o n  th e  w ho le . In d e p e n d e n t ch an g es  o n  an y  
c o m p o n e n t o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  m a y  h a v e  side-effec ts  th a t  re d u c e  th e  
re so u rc e s  n e e d e d  to  m e e t o th e r  o b jec tiv es . A s  e a rm a rk e d  tra n s fe r s  ta k e  a 
h ig h e r  sh a re  o f  th e  p ie  th e y  c ro w d  o u t  th o s e  ac tiv itie s  th a t  d o  n o t  re ly  o n  
so m e  k in d  o f  p ro te c tio n .
T h is  in c rea se s  th e  v u ln e ra b il ity  o f  s u b n a tio n a l fin an ces  since  it  is p o li t i­
ca lly  h a r d  to  c u t  sp e n d in g  in  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  in  th e  e v e n t o f  a  fa ll in  
rev en u es . A ll th e  o th e r  a c tiv itie s  th a t  a re  c a r r ie d  o u t  a t  th e  s u b n a tio n a l 
level ex p e rien ce  d ifficu lties, e spec ia lly  w h en , a s  is th e  case  o f  th e  A n d e a n  
c o u n tr ie s , m o s t o f  th e  re so u rce s  th a t  s u p p o r t  th e  tra n s fe rs  a re  b a se d  o n  
tax es  th a t  a re  h ig h ly  sens itive  to  ch an g es  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l  e c o n o m ic  
scen a rio .
W h a t fo llo w s h ig h lig h ts  so m e  a sp ec ts  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im es  o f  each  
c o u n try  c o v e re d  in  th is  c h a p te r , e x tra c te d  fro m  th e  in fo rm a t io n  g a th e re d
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in  A p p e n d ix  8A , w h ic h  sh o w s to  w h a t e x te n t th e y  o b se rv e  o r  ig n o re  th e  
a b o v e -m e n tio n e d  p rin c ip le s .
Practices 
M exico
T h e  M e x ic a n  case  is th e  o n ly  o n e  in  th e  g ro u p  th a t  c le a rly  s ta te s  th e  co ex ­
is ten ce  o f  tw o  reg im es -  R a m o  28 a n d  R a m o  33 -  w h ic h  sh a re  a lm o s t 
e q u a lly  th e  re so u rc e s  a llo c a te d  to  tra n s fe rs . T h e  firs t im p o ses  n o  c o n d i­
tio n s  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  u se  o f  re so u rc e s , w h e re a s  th e  seco n d  is m a in ly  
e a rm a rk e d  fo r  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth  sp e n d in g . I f  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e se  
tw o  reg im es a t te m p te d  to  c o m b in e  th e  re d u c t io n  o f  fiscal d isp a rit ie s  w ith  
th e  specific n eed s  o f  e a c h  sec to r, th e  M e x ic a n  case  c o u ld  b e  re g a rd e d  as 
p re s e n tin g  a  re a s o n a b le  a d h e re n c e  to  th e  p rin c ip le s  m e n tio n e d  ab o v e , 
b u t  th a t  is n o t  th e  case . In s te a d  o f  re d u c in g  fisca l d isp a rit ie s , th e  c r i te r ia  
a p p lie d  to  th e  u n b o u n d e d  tra n s fe rs  le a d  to  th e  o p p o s ite  re s u lt -  90 p e rc e n t 
o f  R a m o  28 tr a n s fe r s  b en e fit th e  r ic h e r  a n d  m o re  h ig h ly  p o p u la te d  s ta te s . 
A s c h a n g e  c a n  o n ly  o c c u r  a t  th e  m a rg in  ( th e  n o m in a l a m o u n t  rece iv ed  in  
o n e  y e a r  c a n n o t b e  sm a lle r  th a n  th a t  in  th e  p re v io u s  y ea r)  a d ju s tm e n ts  to  
th is  s i tu a t io n  d e p e n d  o n  fa v o ra b le  e c o n o m ic  c o n d it io n s  o r  o n  in s ti tu t io n a l 
re fo rm s . A ll o th e r  th in g s  b e in g  e q u a l, re so u rc e s  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  e d u c a t io n  
a n d  h e a lth  re in fo rc e s  ex is tin g  d is to r t io n s . I n  th e  case  o f  e d u c a t io n , 95 
p e rc e n t o f  th e  re so u rc e s  a re  u sed  to  p a y  te a c h e rs ’ sa la rie s , fo llo w in g  th e  
sh iftin g  o f  re sp o n s ib ili tie s  in  th is  a re a  to  th e  s ta te s . In  h e a lth , th e  p h y s ic a l 
lo c a t io n  o f  h e a lth  u n its  c o m m a n d s  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  re so u rc e s  (C a b re ra -  
C a s te lla n o s  a n d  L o z a n o -C o r té s , 2008).
L o c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  rece ive  20 p e rc e n t o f  th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  s ta te s ’ sh a re  
in  fe d e ra l rev en u es  u n d e r  th e  sam e  schem e a n d  c o n d it io n s .4 A s such , in e ­
q u a litie s  in  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  fe d e ra l tr a n s fe r s  a m o n g  se c to rs  a n d  s ta te s  
a re  re p ro d u c e d  a t  th e  m u n ic ip a l level. F u r th e rm o re , s im ila r m u n ic ip a litie s  
in  d iffe ren t s ta te s  w ill g e t d is tin c t su m s o f  m o n e y  to  s u p p o r t  th e ir  b a s ic  
fu n c tio n s  a s  w ell a s  to  f in an ce  soc ia l p ro g ra m s . T h e  te r r i to r ia l  in e q u a litie s  
in  f in a n c ia l c a p a b ilit ie s  t r a n s la te  in to  in c o m e  d is tr ib u tio n  in e q u a lit ie s  to  
fu lfill th e ir  b a s ic  n eed s. In  a d d it io n , a s  s ta te  leg is la tio n s  e s ta b lish  th e  d is tr i ­
b u tio n  o f  th e  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ p ie , th e  l ik e lih o o d  o f  th is  le a d in g  to  g re a t 
h o r iz o n ta l  in e q u a lit ie s  a t  th e  m u n ic ip a l level is fa ir ly  h igh .
T h e  b a la n c e  a m o n g  th e  tw o  tr a n s fe r  reg im es su g g ests  th a t  th e  M ex ican  
case  sh o w s a  re a s o n a b le  deg ree  o f  flex ib ility  ( s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  
c a n  d isp o se  free ly  o f  a b o u t  40 p e rc e n t o f  fed e ra l tra n s fe rs )  a n d  s ta b il ity  
(th e  b u lk  o f  tra n s fe rs  re ly  o n  a  b ro a d  b a se ) .5 T h e  sam e  c a n n o t b e  sa id  o f  
th e  o th e r  a t t r ib u te s  th a t  a re  e sse n tia l fo r  a  so u n d  reg im e  o f  s u b n a tio n a l 
fin an ces. B esides fa ilin g  to  p ro m o te  e q u ilib r iu m , th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  p u t
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in to  p lace  in  1988 (S is tem a  N a c io n a l de  C o o rd in a c ió n  F is c a l (N a tio n a l 
S ystem  o f  F isca l C o o rd in a t io n ) :  S N C F )  la ck s  a d a p ta t io n  to  c h a n g in g  
c irc u m sta n c e s  ( tra n s fe rs  reflec t h is to r ic a l fa c ts )  a n d  p re s e n ts  a  s ig n ifican t 
deg ree  o f  v u ln e ra b ility , a s  n o n - ta x  rev en u es  (m a in ly  f ro m  o il) a c c o u n t fo r  
a  h u g e  p a r t  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  b a s e .6 G iv en  th e  d ifficu lty  o f  c u tt in g  sp e n d in g  
o n  soc ia l p ro g ra m s , th is  m a y  a lso  le a d  to  less f lex ib ility  in  s u b n a tio n a l 
b u d g e ts  since free  re so u rc e s  a re  like ly  to  b e  d iv e r te d  to  co v e r a  fa ll in  o il 
revenues .
Colombia
T h e  C o lo m b ia n  reg im e  fo cu ses o n  th e  specific n e e d s  o f  e a c h  sec to r. I ts  
m o s t im p o r ta n t  c o m p o n e n t -  th e  G e n e ra l P a r t ic ip a tio n  S y stem  (S G P  in  
S p an ish ) d is tr ib u te s  a lm o s t a ll o f  its  re so u rc e s  (85 p e rc e n t)  to  th re e  sec to rs: 
e d u c a tio n , h e a lth  a n d  in f ra s t ru c tu re .7 In  a d d it io n , th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  
ro y a ltie s  f ro m  th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  o f  n a tu r a l  re so u rc e s  a lso  p r io r it iz e s  in v e s t­
m e n ts  to  fo rce  th o se  ju r is d ic tio n s  th a t  d id  n o t  m e e t n a tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  in  
th e  sam e a re a s  to  c a tc h  u p . P e rh a p s  fo r  th a t  re a s o n , th e  C o lo m b ia n  case  
d o es  n o t lo o k  g o o d  f ro m  a  flex ib ility  p e rsp ec tiv e , since re so u rc e s  t r a n s ­
fe rre d  u n d e r  th e  S G P  as w ell a s  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  ro y a ltie s  a re  su b je c t to  
s tr in g e n t c o n d it io n s  re g a rd in g  th e ir  u ti l iz a tio n .8
T h e  C o lo m b ia n  reg im e  c o m b in e s  tr a n s fe r  to  d e p a r tm e n ts  a n d  to  
m u n ic ip a litie s  in  d iffe ren t w ay s  d e p e n d in g  o n  th e  p a r t ic u la r  a sp e c ts  o f  
e a c h  sec to r. T h e  p o r t io n  a llo c a te d  to  e a c h  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t v a rie s  
a c c o rd in g  to  th e  c o n d it io n s  fa ced  d u r in g  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  
a n d  th u s  m ig h t re flec t h is to r ic a l tre n d s . T h e  m o n e y  flow ing  to  th e  d e p a r t ­
m e n ts  seem s to  re f lec t a n  a t te m p t to  b e tte r  o rg a n iz e  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  soc ia l 
serv ices a n d  in f ra s t ru c tu re  in v e s tm e n ts  a t  th e  re g io n a l level. M o re o v e r  th e  
p o licy  a p p lie d  to  th e  d e s t in a t io n  o f  re so u rc e s  f ro m  ro y a ltie s  n o t  o n ly  a im s 
to  m a k e  la g g a rd s  c a tc h  u p  w ith  n a tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  in  th e  soc ia l a re a  b u t 
a lso  seeks a  re d u c t io n  in  re g io n a l d isp a ritie s .
P ro v iso ry  n o rm s  th a t  h a v e  b een  in  p la c e  since 2001 e s ta b lish  th a t  th e  
a m o u n t  o f  re so u rc e s  to  b e  tr a n s fe r re d  to  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  in  
C o lo m b ia  is fixed  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  p re v io u s  d a ta  a n d  a d ju s te d  to  ta k e  in to  
a c c o u n t th e  r a te  o f  in f la tio n  a n d  th e  p a c e  o f  e c o n o m ic  g ro w th . T h is  p ro v i­
so ry  reg im e  sh o u ld  h a v e  la s te d  u n til  2008, b u t  h a s  re c e n tly  b e e n  ex te n d e d  
to  2017, w h en  th e  av e ra g e  in c rea se  in  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t c u r r e n t rev en u es  
w ill b e  u se d  to  c o r re c t p re s e n t va lues.
A s th e  C o lo m b ia n  reg im e  fo cu ses o n  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a lth , a n d  th e  c r i­
te r ia  a p p lie d  to  th e  sh a r in g  o f  re so u rc e s  e a rm a rk e d  to  these  sec to rs  reflec t 
th e  lo c a t io n  o f  d e m a n d s  fo r  su ch  serv ices, it  p e r fo rm s  w ell u n d e r  th e  e q u i­
lib r iu m  c r i te r ia  i f  n o t  u n d e r  flex ib ility . S ince  ro y a ltie s  d o  n o t  p la y  a  c ru c ia l 
ro le , th e  p ro v is o ry  ru le s  p ro v id e  re a s o n a b le  s ta b il ity  w hile  a t  th e  sam e
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tim e  re d u c in g  v u ln e ra b il ity  to  a d v e rse  e c o n o m ic  c o n d itio n s . S u b n a tio n a l 
m a n a g e rs , h o w ev e r, c a n n o t  a d ju s t  th e ir  b u d g e ts  to  a  fa ll in  d o m e s tic  re v ­
en u es  o r  to  p a r t ic u la r  d e m a n d s  f ro m  th e ir  co n s titu e n c ie s .
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
V u ln e ra b ili ty  seem s to  b e  th e  m a in  c h a ra c te r is tic  o f  th e  B o liv ian  case  fro m  
th e  p e rsp e c tiv e  o f  s u b n a tio n a l fin an ces, g iven  th e  h ig h  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  oil 
a n d  gas rev en u es  in  to ta l  tra n s fe rs . I t  d o e s  n o t  p e r fo rm  w ell f ro m  th e  s ta ­
b ility  p e rsp ec tiv e , s ince  u n c e r ta in t ie s  re la te d  to  th e  o c c u rre n c e  o f  e x te rn a l 
c rises  a n d  re s tr ic tio n s  to  c o m p e n s a te  fo r  a  fa ll in  e x te rn a lly  in d u c e d  re v ­
en u es  by  m e a n s  o f  a n  in c re a se  in  d o m e s tic  o n es  d o es  n o t  g ive s u b n a tio n a l 
m a n a g e rs  a d e q u a te  m e a n s  to  su s ta in  a  s ta b le  in flo w  o f  re so u rce s .
O il a n d  gas rev en u es  -  ro y a ltie s  a n d  specific ta x e s  -  a re  th e  so le  so u rce  
o f  tra n s fe r s  to  B o liv ian  d e p a r tm e n ts . B asica lly , th e  fo rm u la  ap p lie s  a  m ix  
o f  d e v o lu tio n  a n d  d is tr ib u tiv e  c r ite r ia . S ix ty  p e rc e n t o f  th e  ro y a ltie s  a n d  
40  p e rc e n t o f  th e  rev e n u e s  f ro m  th e  h y d ro c a rb o n  ta x  a re  re tu rn e d  to  th e ir  
o rig in . L e a v in g  as id e  a  f r a c tio n  o f  th e  ta x  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  p u b lic  u n iv e rs i­
ties, w h a t is t r a n s fe r re d  to  o th e r  d e p a r tm e n ts  is a im e d  a t  re d u c in g  re g io n a l 
d isp a ritie s .
B o liv ian  m u n ic ip a litie s  sh a re  20 p e rc e n t o f  a ll n a t io n a l  tax es , ex c e p t 
th e  h y d ro c a rb o n  o n e , a n d  g e t a  little  m o re  th a n  o n e - th ird  o f  th e  la t te r  
f ro m  th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  d e p a r tm e n ts . A  m in o r  so u rce  co m es f ro m  re so u rce s  
o f  a n  in te rn a t io n a l p ro g r a m  fo r  h ig h ly  in d e b te d  p o o r  c o u n tr ie s  (H IP C ). 
B esides rece iv in g  a  la rg e  a m o u n t  o f  m o n e y , th e y  b en e fit f ro m  a  spec ia l 
fo rm u la  th a t  is a im e d  a t  re d u c in g  d isp a rit ie s  in  th e  h o r iz o n ta l  d is tr ib u ­
t io n  o f  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ p e r  c a p ita  rev en u es . C o u p le d  w ith  a tte m p ts  to  
re d u c e  re g io n a l d isp a rit ie s , a n  e q u a liz a tio n  a p p ro a c h  to  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  
th e  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ sh a re  o f  n a t io n a l  ta x e s  leaves th e  B o liv ia n  case  o n  
re a s o n a b le  te rm s  w ith  re g a rd  to  e q u ilib r iu m .
T h e  av a ila b le  ev id en c e  (see A p p e n d ix  T a b le  8A .1 ) suggests th a t  th e  
B o liv ian  reg im e  gives lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  s ig n ifican t leew ay  to  m a n a g e  
th e ir  o w n  b u sin ess; th a t  is, i t  a p p e a rs  to  p re s e n t a  re a s o n a b le  deg ree  o f  
flex ib ility  since th e  c o n d it io n s  a tta c h e d  to  th e  u se  o f  tra n s fe r s  a re  easily  
a d ju s ta b le . F ro m  a n o th e r  p e rsp ec tiv e , th e  v u ln e ra b il ity  o f  tr a n s fe r s  to  
in te rn a t io n a l  p ric e s  m e a n s  th a t  su b n a tio n a l m a n a g e rs  m a y  face  d ifficu lties 
in  a d a p tin g  to  a  fa ll in  rev en u es  d u r in g  a  d o w n tu rn  cycle i f  e d u c a t io n  a n d  
h e a lth  c la im  a  h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e ir  b u d g e ts .
Ecuador
S u b n a tio n a l f in an ces  in  E c u a d o r  m a y  g a in  m o re  s ta b ility  a s  a  re s u lt o f  
th e  ru le s  im p le m e n te d  in  2009. T h ese  ru le s  su b s ti tu te d  a  c o n so lid a te d  
reg im e  in  w h ich  a t  le a s t 15 p e rc e n t o f  th e  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t’s p e rm a n e n t
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rev en u es , p lu s  5 p e rc e n t o f  th e  te m p o ra ry  o n es , w ere  sh ifte d  to  s u b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts . S in ce  th e  G e n e ra l S ta te  B u d g e t fo r  2009 , a  t r a n s i t io n  d is ­
p o s i tio n  en title s  s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  to  rece ive  th e  sam e  a m o u n t  o f  
m o n e y  as in  2008.
B efo re  th e  re fo rm , s u b n a t io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  rece iv ed  m o n e y  f ro m  19 
d is tin c t so u rces  u n d e r  c r i te r ia  th a t  in c o rp o ra te d  p o p u la t io n  a n d  la c k  o f  
m e a n s  to  p ro v id e  access to  b a s ic  n eed s . A  g en eric  c o n d it io n  th a t  re so u rc e s  
sh o u ld  be  a lm o s t w h o lly  u se d  to  f in an ce  c a p ita l e x p e n d itu re s  a llo w e d  fo r  a 
re a s o n a b le  d eg ree  o f  f lex ib ility  in  th e  u se  o f  re so u rc e s , b u t  a  h ig h  d e p e n d ­
en ce  o n  o il re v e n u e s  c o n fe r re d  v u ln e ra b il ity  to  th e  s u b n a t io n a l  f in an ces .
T h e  n ew  reg im e  im p ro v e s  th e  E c u a d o r ia n  m o d e l o n  tw o  a c c o u n ts . A  
b ro a d  tr a n s fe r  b a se  m e a n s  b e t te r  s tab ility , w h e rea s  th e  fo rm u la  a d o p te d  
to  d is tr ib u te  th e  re so u rc e s  a m o n g  s u b n a t io n a l u n its  m ig h t re d u c e  fiscal 
d isp a ritie s  a n d  a llo w  fo r  a  d y n a m ic  a d ju s tm e n t to  c h a n g in g  c irc u m sta n c e s . 
N o te , h o w ev e r, th a t  th e se  o u tc o m e s  d e p e n d  o n  m a in ta in in g  th e  fu ll sc h e d ­
u le d  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th is  n ew  reg im e. I t  is p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  t r a n s i to ry  
p e r io d  m a y  be  p o s tp o n e d , as h a s  b een  th e  case  e lsew h ere , g iv en  th e  d if ­
ficu lties in v o lv e d  in  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  fo rm u la  fo r  sh a r in g  re so u rce s , 
w h ich  re lies o n  v a r ia b le s  th a t  a re  h a rd  to  m e a s u re  a n d  m a y  be  a  so u rc e  o f  
en d less  con flic t.
Peru
T h e  P e ru v ia n  reg im e  seem s to  re sem b le  th e  o ld  E c u a d o r ia n  m odel: 
severa l tr a n s fe r  so u rc e s  a re  g o v e rn e d  b y  in d e p e n d e n t d is tr ib u tio n  c r ite r ia . 
D e p a r tm e n ts  a n d  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  rece ive  tr a n s fe r s  f ro m  th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn ­
m e n t c u r r e n t rev en u es  a s  w ell as fro m  specific so u rce s . R e g io n a l g o v e rn ­
m e n ts  get re so u rc e s  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  re g io n a l in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts  a n d  th e  
M u n ic ip a l C o m p e n s a t io n  F u n d  (F O N C O M Ú N  in  S p a n ish )  re sem b le s  a n  
e q u a liz a tio n  reg im e  fo r  th e  m u n ic ip a litie s  w ith  n o  c o n d it io n s  a tta c h e d . 
T h e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  F O N C O M Ú N  a im s a t  g u a ra n te e in g  th a t  n o  o n e  gets 
less th a n  e ig h t U IT  (unidades impositivas tributarias) ( a b o u t  U S $ 1 ,2 0 0 ).
T h e  m a in  so u rce  o f  tra n s fe r s  in  P e ru  is th e  so -ca lle d  ‘canons’, w h ich  
tr a n s fe r  to  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  p a r t  o f  th e  rev e n u e s  f ro m  th e  e x p lo i­
ta t io n  o f  n a tu r a l  re so u rc e s , th e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  b e in g  th o s e  re la te d  to  
o il a n d  g a s ,9 w h ich  g e t 12.5 p e rc e n t o f  th e  v a lu e  o f  oil a n d  g a s  p ro d u c ­
tio n . O th e r  canons c o m p rise  50 p e rc e n t o f  th e  in c o m e  ta x  co lle c te d  fro m  
th e  re la te d  e n te rp rise s  a n d /o r  a n  e q u a l sh a re  o f  c o n c e ss io n  rig h ts . B o th  
re g io n a l a n d  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  sh a re  th ese  re so u rc e s  o n  a n  o rig in  basis ; 
th e  fo rm e r  ge ts 20 p e rc e n t a n d  th e  la t te r  75 p e rc e n t, w ith  th e  re m a in in g  
5 p e rc e n t g o in g  d ire c tly  to  p u b lic  u n iv e rs it ie s .10 T h e  c r i te r ia  a p p lie d  to  
d is tr ib u te  th e  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ sh a re  a m o n g  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c o m b in e  
p o p u la t io n  a n d  a  m e a su re  o f  u n c a te re d - fo r  b a s ic  n eed s , b esid es ap p ly in g
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a  se p a ra te  reg im e  fo r  a  sp ec ia l c a te g o ry  o f  m u n ic ip a lity  (municipios distri­
tales). T h e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  canon petrolero  fo llo w s a  c o m p lex  fo rm u la .
F o r  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts , th e  seco n d  m o s t im p o r ta n t  tr a n s fe r  so u rce  is 
th e  F O N C O M Ú N  w h o se  re so u rc e s  co m e  f ro m  n a tio n a l tax e s  e a rm a rk e d  
fo r  th is  fu n d . T h e  fu n d  a im s to  p ro v id e  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  w ith  m o n e y  to  
fu lfill th e ir  re sp o n s ib ilitie s . T h e re  is n o  sp ec ia l p ro v is io n  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
u ti liz a tio n  o f  th e se  re so u rc e s , b u t  th e  m u ltip lic ity  o f  c r i te r ia  a d o p te d  to  
d e te rm in e  e a c h  m u n ic ip a l ity  p o r t io n  in  th is  fu n d  is u n lik e ly  to  le a d  to  a 
re a s o n a b le  e q u il ib r iu m .
O n  th e  b a s is  o f  th e  co lle c te d  in fo rm a tio n , th e  P e ru v ia n  reg im e  d o es 
n o t  p e r fo rm  w ell f ro m  th e  v ie w p o in t o f  re d u c in g  fiscal d isp a ritie s  a n d  
p ro v id in g  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  w ith  a  s ta b le  so u rce  o f  rev en u es  a n d  a 
less v u ln e ra b le  in flo w  o f  re so u rc e s  d u e  to  a  h ig h  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  rev en u es  
th a t  a re  sens itive  to  in te rn a t io n a l  p rices  (C asa s , 2009). F o r  th e  sam e  
re a s o n s , th e re  is litt le  lik e lih o o d  th a t  s u b n a t io n a l m a n a g e rs  w ill a d a p t  to  
ad v e rse  e c o n o m ic  c irc u m s ta n c e s . F low ever, i t  d o e s  g ive lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  
so m e  leew ay  w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  u se  o f  tr a n s fe r  re so u rc e s , since th e  m a in  
c o n d it io n s  re fe r to  th e  o b lig a tio n  to  f in an ce  c a p ita l  ex penses .
C hile
T h e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  in  C h ile  co m b in es  a  k in d  o f  e q u a liz a tio n  p ro g ra m  
w ith  som e specific s u p p o r t  to  se lec ted  sec to rs . T h e  firs t is th e  o b je c t o f  
th e  M u n ic ip a l C o m p e n s a t io n  F u n d  (F C M  in  S p a n ish )  c o m p r is in g  a b o u t  
60 p e rc e n t rev en u es  f ro m  p ro p e r ty  a n d  v eh ic le  ta x e s  a n d  is d is tr ib u te d  
by  m e a n s  o f  a  fo rm u la  th a t  a im s a t  re d u c in g  a c tu a l fisca l d isp a ritie s . 
R e so u rc e s  f ro m  th e  F C M  a c c o u n te d  fo r  33 p e rc e n t o f  th e  m u n ic ip a l 
sp e n d in g  in  2007. T h e  seco n d  is p a r t  o f  th e  N a tio n a l  F u n d  fo r  R e g io n a l 
D e v e lo p m e n t (F N D R  in  S p a n ish )  th a t  tra n s fe r s  re so u rc e s  to  re g io n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts  b a se d  o n  p ro je c ts  a p p ro v e d  b y  re g io n a l c o u n c ils  a f te r  b e in g  
c le a re d  a t  th e  fe d e ra l level. C r ite r ia  fo r d is tr ib u tin g  F N D R  re so u rc e s  la c k  
tr a n sp a re n c y . N in e ty  p e rc e n t o f  th e  re so u rc e s  a re  a llo c a te d  a t  th e  b e g in ­
n in g  o f  th e  fiscal y e a r  ta k in g  in to  a c c o u n t p o v e r ty  a n d  in f ra s t ru c tu re  n eed s, 
th e  re m a in in g  b e in g  se t a p a r t  fo r  em erg en c ies  a n d  to  c re a te  in cen tiv e s  fo r  
efficiency. F N D R  re so u rc e s  a re  e s ta b lish e d  in  th e  n a tio n a l b u d g e t. O th e r  
m in o r  tr a n s fe r  so u rce s  m a n a g e d  b y  th e  n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n t s u p p o r t  d ay - 
to -d a y  re g io n a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ n eed s  a n d  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ d e m a n d s  to  
f in an ce  in f ra s tru c tu re  p ro je c ts , e d u c a t io n , h e a lth  a n d  c u ltu ra l  ac tiv itie s .
T h e  h ig h  deg ree  o f  c e n tra l  g o v e rn m e n t in te rfe re n c e  in  th e  m a n a g e m e n t 
o f  s u b n a t io n a l f in a n c e s  is a  d is tin c tiv e  a sp e c t o f  th e  C h ile a n  reg im e . T h is  
c o u ld  fa v o r  a  less u n e q u a l  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  re so u rc e s  if  d ec is io n s  c o n c e rn ­
in g  th e  a llo c a tio n  o f  F N D R  re so u rce s  c o u n te r a c t  th e  F C M  c o n tr ib u t io n  
to  th e  a t te n u a t io n  o f  m u n ic ip a l fiscal d isp a ritie s . S ince m u n ic ip a lit ie s  c a n
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d isp o se  o f  F C M  re s o u rc e s  a t  th e ir  o w n  d is c re tio n , th e  C h ile a n  reg im e  c a n  
b e  sa id  to  o ffe r a  re a s o n a b le  deg ree  o f  flex ib ility . F ro m  a n o th e r  p e rs p e c ­
tive , a  h ig h  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  re so u rc e s  d e fin ed  d u r in g  th e  b u d g e ta ry  p ro c e ss  
ex p o ses  th e  s u b n a t io n a l f in an ces  to  a n  u n s ta b le  sc e n a r io  b esid es b e in g  
v u ln e ra b le  to  c h a n g in g  p o li tic a l c ircu m stan ces .
Argentina
In  th e  A rg e n tin e  case , th e  m a in  p ro b le m s  fa c e d  b y  th e  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l 
tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  a re  a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f  th e  d ifficu lties fa c e d  in  su p p re ss in g  
th e  p ro v iso ry  ru le s  a p p lie d  to  th e  c o p a r t ic ip a tio n  reg im e . T h e  1988 re fo rm  
b ro a d e n e d  th e  tr a n s fe r  b a se , leav in g  a s id e  th e  fo re ig n  tr a d e  a n d  o th e r  tax e s  
th a t  a re  sh a re d  u n d e r  sp ec ia l reg im es, a n d  set a t  57 p e rc e n t th e  p o r t io n  o f  
fe d e ra l rev en u es  to  b e  sh a re d  w ith  th e  p ro v in c e s .11 I t  a lso  su b s ti tu te d  fixed  
coeffic ien ts b a s e d  o n  th e  a c tu a l  n u m b e rs  o f  th e  p re v io u s  th re e  y ea rs  fo r  
th e  o ld  c o p a r t ic ip a tio n  fo rm u la  a n d  in c lu d e d  th e  B u e n o s  A ire s  a n d  T ie r ra  
de l F u e g o  p ro v in c e s  a m o n g  th e  ben efic ia rie s  o f  th e  fed e ra l tra n s fe rs . T o  
p ro te c t  th e  p ro v in c e s  f ro m  th e  e ro s io n  o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  b a se  p ro v o k e d  by  a  
fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t re lian ce  o n  tax es  th a t  a re  n o t  in c lu d e d  in  it, th e  1988 
re fo rm  a lso  e s ta b lish e d  th a t  th e  p ro v in c ia l sh a re  c a n n o t  b e  lo w er th a n  34 
p e rc e n t o f  to ta l  ta x  rev e n u e s  co llec ted  a t  th e  n a t io n a l  level.
A s in  M ex ico , lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  in  A rg e n tin a  d o  n o t  receive  m o n e y  
d irec tly  f ro m  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t, b u t  in  c o n tr a s t  to  th e  M e x ic a n  case , 
th e re  is n o  n a t io n a l  ru le  d e fin in g  h o w  m u c h  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  m u s t rece ive  
f ro m  th e  p ro v in c ia l p ie  a n d  fo r  w h a t p u rp o s e . I t  is u p  to  th e  p ro v in c ia l leg ­
is la to rs  to  se t u p  c o p a r t ic ip a tio n  reg im es fo r  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  a n d  d esign  
th e  ru les  a p p lie d  to  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e ir  p a r t ic u la r  reg im es, p ro v id e d  th a t  
th e y  specify  h o w  th e  m o n e y  w ill be d is tr ib u te d  a n d  define  a n  a u to m a tic  
m e c h a n ism  fo r  d e liv e rin g  th e  fu n d s .
Successive m o d if ic a tio n s  in tro d u c e d  a f te rw a rd s  d id  n o t  a l te r  th e  essence  
o f  th e  A rg e n tin e  reg im e, n o r  d id  th e y  b a r  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  th e  B u e n o s  A ires  
a n d  T ie rra  del F u e g o  p ro v in c e s  a m o n g  th e  b en e fic ia r ie s  o f  th e  c o p a r t ic i­
p a tio n . T h ese  m o d if ic a tio n s  w ere  m a in ly  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  
n eed s  to  re d u c e  fiscal im b a la n c e s , g iven  th e  p re s su re s  f ro m  p ro v in c ia l g o v ­
e rn m e n ts , in  o rd e r  to  be  re w a rd e d  fro m  th e  u n ila te ra l  tr a n s fe r  o f  re s p o n ­
sib ilities to  p ro v id e  so c ia l serv ices. A d  h o c  c h an g es  in t ro d u c e d  in  re sp o n se  
to  su ch  c o n tr a d ic to ry  p re s su re s  a d d e d  fu r th e r  d is to r t io n s  th a t  d is ta n c e d  
th e  A rg e n tin e  case  fro m  th e  o b jec tiv es o f  re d u c in g  fisca l d isp a rit ie s  a n d  
g iv in g  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  som e ro o m  to  a d a p t  to  c h a n g in g  so c io ­
e c o n o m ic  c irc u m sta n c e s .
T h e  re sp o n se  to  p ro v in c ia l d e m a n d s  led  to  a  m u ltip lic a tio n  o f  sp ec ia l 
reg im es th a t  fo llo w ed  th e  re g io n a l t r e n d  o f  in c re a s in g  th e  ro le  o f  soc ia lly  
o r ie n te d  tra n s fe r s  in  th e  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tr a n s fe r  system . T h e  m o s t
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im p o r ta n t  o f  th e se  reg im es  a im e d  a t  h e lp in g  th e  p ro v in c e s  ta k e  g re a te r  
re sp o n s ib ili ty  fo r  e d u c a t io n  a n d  o th e r  so c ia l serv ices, in c lu d in g  th e  p ro v i­
s io n  o f  u rb a n  in f ra s tru c tu re . A s th e  ru le s  a p p lie d  to  th e  h o r iz o n ta l  d is tr i­
b u tio n  o f  th ese  re so u rc e s  re flec t p a s t  lo c a liz a tio n  o f  su ch  serv ices, th ese  
spec ia l reg im es d o  n o t  h av e  a  d is tr ib u tiv e  im p a c t.
N ev e rth e le ss , c o p a r t ic ip a t io n  still re p re se n ts  th e  b u lk  o f  re so u rce s  
tr a n s fe r re d  to  th e  p ro v in c e s ; th a t  is, th e y  m a y  d isp o se  o f  su c h  re so u rce s  as 
th e y  see fit. A lth o u g h  a  u n ila te ra l tr a n s fe r  o f  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t re s p o n ­
sib ilities in  th e  so c ia l a re a  im p in g e d  o n  th e  p ro v in c ia l a u to n o m y , th e  su b ­
se q u e n t a d d it io n  o f  specia l tr a n s fe r  reg im es m a d e  life  a  little  less h a rd  fo r  
th e  p ro v in c ia l g o v e rn o rs , so  th e  A rg e n tin e  case  c a n  be  a p p ra is e d  fa v o ra b ly  
f ro m  th e  v ie w p o in t o f  flex ib ility  c o m p a re d  to  th e  s i tu a t io n  fa c e d  b y  o th e r  
L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s .
A  b ro a d  tr a n s fe r  b a se  a n d  a  sa fe g u a rd  a g a in s t it  b e in g  e ro d e d  by  p o li t i­
ca l m a n e u v e r in g  a lso  p ro v id e s  a  re a s o n a b le  s ta b il ity  in  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  
re so u rc e s , b u t  h o r iz o n ta l  d isp a rit ie s  a c c u m u la te d  o v e r tim e  as  a  re su lt 
o f  th e  fixed  coeffic ien ts a p p lie d  to  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  p ro v in c ia l sh a re  
o f  th e  c o p a r t ic ip a t io n  reg im e  led  to  d iv e rse  s i tu a t io n s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
a b il ity  o f  p ro v in c ia l m a n a g e rs  to  a d a p t  th e ir  b u d g e ts  in  th e  case  o f  ad v e rse  
e c o n o m ic  c o n d itio n s , even  th o u g h  c o p a r t ic ip a tio n  is n o t  h ig h ly  v u ln e r ­
ab le  to  e x te rn a l crisis . S ince it  is u p  to  th e  p ro v in c e s  to  se t th e  ru le s  fo r  
th e  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ sh a re  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe rs , d isp a rit ie s  a t 
th e  m u n ic ip a l level w ill reflec t w h a t  o c c u rs  a t  th e  p ro v in c ia l o n e  re g a rd in g  
re so u rc e s  a n d  leg is la tio n .
Brazil
In  B raz il, th e  1988 c o n s t i tu tio n a l re fo rm  c lea red  th e  w ay  fo r  th e  p ro g re s ­
sive d is m a n tlin g  o f  th e  reg im e  d es ig n ed  in  th e  1967 C o n s ti tu t io n . T h e  
re v e n u e -sh a r in g  sy s tem  a d o p te d  in  1967 e n ti t le d  s ta te  a n d  lo ca l g o v e rn ­
m e n ts  to  receive  a n  e q u a l p o r t io n  o f  th e  tw o  m o s t im p o r ta n t  d o m e s tic  
fe d e ra l tax es , d e s ig n e d  specific fo rm u la s  fo r  d is tr ib u tin g  th ese  re so u rce s  
in  o rd e r  to  re d u c e  fisca l d isp a ritie s  a n d  e n su re d  a n  a u to m a tic  de liv e ry  o f  
fu n d s  to  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts .12
T h e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  c h a n g e  in tro d u c e d  in  1988 w as  th e  c re a t io n  o f  a 
n ew  fam ily  o f  fe d e ra l tax es  -  th e  so -ca lled  ‘so c ia l c o n tr ib u t io n s ’ -  w hose  
p ro c e e d s  a re  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  p e n s io n s , h e a lth  a n d  soc ia l a s s is ta n c e  p r o ­
g ram s. F u r th e rm o re , th e  1988 C o n s ti tu t io n  e n h a n c e d  m u n ic ip a l a u to n ­
o m y  by  g ra n t in g  lo c a l g o v e rn m e n ts  th e  s ta tu s  o f  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  B raz ilian  
fe d e ra tio n  p io n e e r in g  th e  fu ll im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a  th re e - t ie r  fe d e ra tio n .
T h ese  c h an g es  h a v e  p ro fo u n d  c o n seq u en ces  fo r  th e  w o rk in g s  o f  
th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  a n d  fo r  th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f  s u b n a tio n a l finances. 
R e g a rd in g  th e  o r ig in a l re v e n u e -sh a rin g  sy s tem , th e  fo rm u la  a p p lie d  to
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d is tr ib u te  th e  p o r t io n  o f  in c o m e  a n d  m a n u fa c tu r in g  ta x e s  sh a re d  w ith  
s ta te s  a n d  lo ca l g o v e rn m e n ts  u n d e r  specific fu n d s  (21 .5  p e rc e n t to  th e  
s ta te s  a n d  23 .5  p e rc e n t to  th e  m u n ic ip a lit ie s )13 w as  a b a n d o n e d  in  fa v o r  o f  
fixed  coeffic ien ts d ev ised  su ch  as  to  g u a ra n te e  le s s -d ev e lo p ed  s ta te s  a  la rg e r  
sh a re .14 In  p a ra lle l , th e  e v e r-g ro w in g  re lian ce  o n  th e  so c ia l c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  
fu lfill th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t f in a n c ia l n eed s  re d u c e d  th e  re v e n u e -sh a rin g  
b a se  a n d  led  to  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  tra n s fe rs  e a rm a rk e d  f o r  so c ia l expenses 
a lo n g  w ith  th e  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  o f  su ch  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  ( to g e th e r , tra n s fe rs  
to  h e a lth  a n d  e d u c a t io n  r iv a l in  size th o se  o f  th e  s ta te  p a r t ic ip a t io n  fu n d  
o n  th e  in co m e  a n d  m a n u fa c tu r in g  fe d e ra l tax es). A s  in  A rg e n tin a , a d  h o c  
m e a su re s  a d o p te d  in  re sp o n se  to  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  a n d  p o li tic a l p re ssu re s  
a d d e d  o th e r  c o m p o n e n ts  to  th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  w h ich , a lb e it  sm a lle r  in  
f in an c ia l te rm s , c o n tr ib u te d  to  e n h a n c in g  th e  d is to r t io n s .
T h e  tw o  m o s t im p o r ta n t  o u tc o m e s  o f  th e  a b o v e -m e n tio n e d  ch an g es  
w ere  a  s ig n ifican t in c re a se  in  fiscal d isp a rit ie s  a n d  a  r e d u c t io n  in  s u b n a ­
tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts ’ a b ility  to  d isp o se  o f  th e i r  b u d g e ta ry  re so u rc e s . W ith  
re sp e c t to  th e  la t te r ,  a  d is tin c tiv e  a sp ec t o f  th e  B ra z il ia n  case  is th e  e a r ­
m a rk in g  o f  s u b n a t io n a l rev en u es , in c lu d in g  th o se  f ro m  th e ir  o w n  tax es . 
T h e  c o n s t i tu tio n  m a n d a te s  th a t  s ta te s  a n d  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  m u s t a p p ly  25 
p e rc e n t o f  th e ir  rev e n u e s  to  e d u c a t io n  a n d  th a t  h e a lth  m u s t b e  a llo c a te d  
13 p e rc e n t a n d  18 p e rc e n t, resp ec tiv e ly , o f  th e  s ta te  a n d  m u n ic ip a l b u d g e ts . 
A d d e d  to  th e  in c re a se  in  fe d e ra l tra n s fe rs  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  th e se  sec to rs , th e  
B raz ilian  case  b e c a m e  fa ir ly  r ig id  fro m  th e  v ie w p o in t o f  th e  su b n a tio n a l 
fin an ces.
T h e  m u l t ip l ic a t io n  o f  t r a n s f e r  so u rc e s  c o u p le d  w ith  th e  f re e z in g  o f  
th e  co effic ien ts  a p p lie d  to  th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  tw o  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
f u n d s  a m o n g  th e  27  s ta te s  a n d  m o re  th a n  5 ,000  m u n ic ip a l i t ie s , led  
to  h u g e  h o r iz o n ta l  in e q u a lit ie s  b o th  a t  th e  s ta te  a n d  a t  th e  m u n ic ip a l  
level. F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  e a rm a rk in g  o f  u n if o rm  p e rc e n ta g e s  o f  th e  
s u b n a t io n a l  b u d g e ts  f o r  e d u c a t io n  a n d  h e a l th  sp e n d in g  w ith o u t  c o n ­
s id e rin g  th e se  in e q u a li t ie s  c o n tr ib u te d  to  a  te r r i to r i a l  m is m a tc h  a m o n g  
re s o u rc e s  e a rm a rk e d  fo r  so c ia l p ro g r a m s  a n d  th e  d e m a n d s  th a t  s u b n a ­
t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  w e re  s u p p o s e d  to  m e e t, th u s  le a d in g  to  w a s te  a n d  
ineffic iencies .
A  c o n s t i tu tio n a l a m e n d m e n t e n a c te d  in  1988 a t te m p te d  to  c o rre c t th is  
s i tu a t io n  fo r  th e  e d u c a t io n  a re a  b y  p o o lin g  s ta te  a n d  m u n ic ip a l  e a rm a rk e d  
re so u rce s  in to  a  spec ia l fu n d  (Fund fo r  the Development o f  Basic Education 
-  F U N  D E B  in  P o r tu g u e s e )15 f ro m  w h ich  e a c h  o n e  c a n  d ra w  re so u rce s  
a c c o rd in g  to  e n ro l lm e n t fig u res in  p u b lic  sch o o ls  in  o rd e r  to  co m p ly  
w ith  a  p e r  c a p ita  sp e n d in g  flo o r. T h is  p ro v is io n  a t te n u a te s  d is to r t io n s  in  
e d u c a t io n  fin an c in g , b u t  since  th e  re d is tr ib u t io n  o c c u rs  o n ly  w ith in  each  
s ta te  ju r isd ic tio n , s tu d e n ts  in  lo w -in co m e  s ta te s  a re  u n d e rp r iv ile g e d , even
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th o u g h  th e  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t m a k e s  so m e  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  co v e r th e  
re g io n a l g ap .
F u r th e rm o re , d u e  to  a  t r a d i t io n  o f  sp ec ify ing  d e ta ils  in  th e  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n , B raz il, c o m p a re d  to  o th e r  L a t in  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s , h a s  a  lim ite d  
a b il ity  to  a d a p t  to  c h a n g in g  so c io e c o n o m ic  c ircu m stan ces . A d d e d  to  th is , 
d if fe re n t c r i te r ia  a p p lie d  to  each  tr a n s fe r  so u rce  d o  n o t  g ive su b n a tio n a l 
m a n a g e rs  co n fid en ce  in  a  s tab le  in flo w  o f  f in a n c ia l re so u rce s .
Comparative Remarks
T h e  c o n d it io n s  se t o u t  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th is  sec tio n  fo r  a p p ra is in g  th e  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l re so u rc e  tr a n s fe r s  fro m  th e  v ie w p o in t o f  s u b n a tio n a l 
m a n a g e rs  c a n  n o w  be  u se d  in  a  p re lim in a ry  a t te m p t to  c o m p a re  th e  s i tu ­
a t io n  e n c o u n te re d  in  th e  e ig h t L a tin  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  su rv ey ed  in  th is  
c h a p te r . W e sh o u ld  s tress  th a t  d u e  to  th e  co m p lex ity  o f  th is  e n d e a v o r  w e 
m a y  h a v e  m is ju d g e d  specific a sp e c ts  o f  som e cases , b u t  th is  is u n lik e ly  to  
h a rm  o u r  a im  o f  p ro v o k in g  fu r th e r  d iscu ss io n s  by  fo c u s in g  o n  th e  ro le  th a t  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe r s  p la y  in  p ro ce sse s  o f  fiscal d e c e n tra liz a tio n .
T o  th a t  e n d , th e  m a in  a sp e c t o f  each  c o u n try  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  rev iew ed  
c a n  b e  ta k e n  a s  a  p re l im in a ry  q u a li ta t iv e  a p p ra is a l  o f  th e  w ay  in  w h ich  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tra n s fe r s  a ffec t th e  res ilience  o f  s u b n a t io n a l fin an ces  
to  c h a n g in g  c irc u m s ta n c e s , su ch  as e x te rn a l sh o ck s , p o li tic a l m a n e u v e r  
o r  d o m e s tic  so c io e c o n o m ic  d y n am ics . T h e  p ro p o s it io n  is th a t  re s ilien ce  is 
g re a te r  i f  th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  g u a ra n te e s  a  s tab le  flow  o f  re so u rc e s , a llow s 
fo r  a  re a s o n a b le  d eg ree  o f  flex ib ility  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  a llo c a tio n  o f  fu n d s , 
p ro m o te s  e q u il ib r iu m  in  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  re so u rc e s  a n d  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  
a n d  d o es  n o t  p re s e n t a  h ig h  d eg ree  o f  v u ln e ra b il ity  to  o u ts id e  o r  d o m e s tic  
even ts . T h e  h ig h e r  th e  v u ln e ra b ility , th e  g re a te r  is th e  n eed  fo r  a  m o re  
flex ib le  reg im e. U n fa v o ra b le  c o n d it io n s  fo r  a d a p tin g  to  c h a n g in g  c irc u m ­
s ta n c e s  d e m a n d  a  re a s o n a b le  e q u il ib r iu m , w h e re a s  s ig n ifican t in e q u a litie s  
c a ll fo r  p e r io d ic  re v is io n s  to  a v o id  d is to r t io n s .
A s th e  p re v io u s  an a ly s is  in d ic a te s  a n d  th e  in fo rm a t io n  su m m a riz e d  
in  B o x  8.1 show s, th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  o f  som e o f  th e  m o s t im p o r ta n t  
L a t in  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s  fa ils  to  p a ss  su ch  a n  e x a m in a tio n . N o n e  o f  th e  
c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  sa m p le  c a n  b e  sa id  to  fu lfill th e  c o n d it io n s  se t o u t ab o v e . 
T h o se  sy s tem s th a t  p a y  a t te n t io n  to  th e  n eed  to  red u ce  fiscal d isp a ritie s  
a n d  give so m e  d eg ree  o f  fre e d o m  to  a llo c a te  th e  re so u rc e s  (C h ile  a n d  
B o liv ia  (P lu r in a t io n a l S ta te  o f)) a re  v u ln e ra b le  to  e x te rn a l sh o ck s  a n d  
p o li tic a l in te rfe re n c e  (o r  b o th )  c re a tin g  u n c e r ta in t ie s  th a t  u n d e rm in e  
th e  a b il ity  o f  s u b n a t io n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  to  b e tte r  m a n a g e  th e ir  b u d g e ts . 
T h o se  th a t  a re  less v u ln e ra b le  a n d  re la tiv e ly  s tab le  (A rg e n tin a , B raz il a n d  
C o lo m b ia )  p re s e n t u n d e s ira b le  c h a ra c te r is tic s  f ro m  e ith e r  a n  e q u il ib r iu m
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BOX 8.1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER 
SYSTEMS FROM THE SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS’ PERSPECTIVE
Mexico
Unconditioned transfers under Ramo 28 enable subnational gov­
ernments to overcome difficulties in the event of a decrease in 
resources earmarked for social sectors (Ramo 33) due to exter­
nal shocks or domestic crises. Overall there is some flexibility, but 
the diversity of criteria to share earmarked transfers in a context 
of high vertical and horizontal disparities may create many dif­
ficulties In individual cases. A high dependence on oil and gas 
revenues creates a very unstable situation that also impinges on 
the ability to adapt to an adverse scenario.
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Fairly general conditions and rules for reducing fiscal disparities 
among local governments and departments provide a reason­
able degree of flexibility with regard to resource use and ability to 
adapt. Dependence on oil and gas revenues imparts an unstable 
characteristic to the flow of resources that under certain circum­
stances make It difficult for subnational governments to manage 
their finances.
Colombia
A highly Inflexible regime leaves subnational managers very 
little room to adapt their budgets to a fall in national revenues 
or to particular needs of their constituencies. The sectoral focus 
helps to adjust the distribution of resources to local demands, but 
does not guarantee good results from the viewpoint of regional 
disparities. The system provides a reasonable stability In the flow 
of resources, but the small amount of money transferred without 
conditions means that jurisdictions with a low tax base will face 
difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities in an economic down­
turn.
Peru
Vulnerability to external prices and a very fragmented regime with 
multiple criteria for distributing the resources contributes to fiscal 
disparities, unstable flow of resources and difficulties in adapting
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to changes. Adaptation may be favored by less-detailed condi­
tions required to allocate the resources, but is also hindered by 
political difficulties in administering gains and losses of piecemeal 
reforms.
Ecuador
It is still too early to make a full assessment of the new Ecuadorian 
regime. If the new rules were to be fully implemented, this would 
herald a considerable all-round improvement. However, the 
likelihood of Ecuador being caught in the prorogation trap may 
consolidate present distortions, namely high fiscal disparities and 
an unstable flow of resources. Under this scenario a fairly flex­
ible regime may alleviate subnational managers’ problems, but 
the consolidation of existing disparities will lead to very dissimilar 
situations.
Chile
A project-based approach to regional transfers coupled with a 
kind of equalization regime for local governments may generate 
good results from an equilibrium perspective if the former aims at 
reducing regional disparities. Flexibility seems to be high at the 
local level as money transferred to local governments with spe­
cific conditions attached is insignificant, but central government 
control over the disbursement of regional funds leads to a mixed 
situation. Likewise with regard to stability: it is reasonable for local 
governments that have exclusive transfer sources and less so for 
regional ones that depend on resources that are defined annually 
during the budgetary process. Stability and flexibility mean that 
local governments have some room to adapt to adverse situa­
tions.
Argentina
The predominance of the coparticipation regime is a plus from the 
viewpoint of providing a stable amount of resources and allow­
ing subnational governments significant leeway over the use of 
resources. However, disparities accumulated over decades of 
prorogation of provisory rules followed by fixed coefficients for 
sharing the resources among the provinces has made life harder 
for those who suffered financial losses and had to cope with the 
impact of the domestic socioeconomic dynamics on demands
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from their constituencies. Therefore, despite its flexibility, the 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances is unevenly distributed.
Brazil
Constitutional norms, fragmentation of sources and the independ­
ence of criteria for integrating the different transfer regimes make 
it extremely hard to adapt the subnational finances to changing 
circumstances, since any reform proposal becomes bogged 
down in complex conflicts of state and local government interests. 
Even though half the transfers are not earmarked, flexibility at the 
subnational level is low since they have to comply with conditions 
imposed by the federal constitution. Furthermore, huge horizon­
tal inequalities enhanced by the freezing of the coefficients for 
sharing the constitutional funds among states and municipalities 
results in a fairly uneven situation concerning the possibility of 
adapting to adverse conditions, despite a low degree of transfer 
vulnerability to external shocks.
o r  a  flex ib ility  p e rsp e c tiv e  (o r  b o th ) . A n d  th o s e  th a t  a re  fa ir ly  flex ib le  
(M ex ico  a n d  P e ru )  d o  n o t  h a v e  g o o d  c o n d it io n s  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  o th e r  
c h a ra c te r is tic s . F o r  p a r t ic u la r  re a s o n s , th o u g h , it  is w o r th  c o n te m p la t­
in g  re fo rm s  th a t  a d d  a  s u b n a tio n a l f in an c ia l m a n a g e rs ’ p e rsp ec tiv e  to  
th e  design  o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tra n s fe rs . S u g g estio n s  fo r  fo rm u la t in g  a 
re fo rm  a g e n d a  a re  th e  su b jec t o f  th e  n e x t a n d  fin a l sec tio n .
5 A REFORM AGENDA
T h e  e rra tic  p ro c e s s  fo llo w e d  b y  th e  c o u n tr ie s  su rv ey ed  in  th is  c h a p te r  to  
a d ju s t  th e ir  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tr a n s fe r  reg im es to  m a c ro e c o n o m ic  a n d  
p o li tic a l p re s su re s  m a k e s  i t  c le a r  th a t  it is tim e  to  s u b s ti tu te  a  b ro a d  re fo rm  
fo r  th e  a d  h o c  a n d  p iece m ea l m o d if ic a tio n s  a d o p te d  in  th e  re c e n t p a s t .  T h e  
2009 E c u a d o r ia n  re fo rm  is th e  so le e x c e p tio n  to  th is  p a t t e r n ,  b u t  it  is still 
to o  so o n  to  a t te m p t a n  a p p ra is a l  o f  its  resu lts .
A  c o m m o n  b a c k g ro u n d  h a s  b een  th e  a b sen ce  o f  a  c le a r  d e fin itio n  o f  th e  
p rin c ip le s  a n d  g o a ls  th a t  sh o u ld  in fo rm  a  re fo rm  p r o p o s a l  to  c o rre c t 
th e  m a in  flaw s th a t  th ese  reg im es h av e  a c c u m u la te d  o v e r  tim e. T h e re fo re  
th e  firs t s tep  is to  set in  m o t io n  a  n a tio n a l d e b a te , s u p p o r te d  b y  te c h n i­
ca l re c o m m e n d a tio n s , a im e d  a t  g a in in g  p o litic a l s u p p o r t  to  im p le m e n t a  
b ro a d  re fo rm  ag en d a .
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T h e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  to  b e  s tre ssed  c o n c e rn s  th e  re sp o n s ib ili ty  o f  th e  s ta te  
to  e n su re  th a t  ev e ry  n a tio n a l c itizen  is e x p o se d  to  s im ila r c o n d it io n s  in  
w h ich  it  is p o ss ib le  to  c lim b  th e  soc ia l la d d e r , re g a rd le ss  o f  w h e re  h e /she  
lives. T h is  d e m a n d s  th a t  access to  a  m in im u m  s ta n d a rd  o f  p ro v is io n  o f  
m e r it  g o o d s  b e  g u a ra n te e d  to  e v e ry o n e , e ith e r  by  th e  p u b lic  p ro v is io n  o f  
su c h  g o o d s  o r  b y  m e a n s  o f  c a sh  tra n s fe r s  to  p o o r  fam ilies.
T h is  p ro p o s i t io n  h ig h lig h ts  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  a  w e ll-d esig n ed  tr a n s fe r  
sy s tem . In te r -  a n d  in tra re g io n a l so c io e c o n o m ic  d isp a rit ie s  p re v e n t th is  
c o n d it io n  fro m  b e in g  fu lly  m e t b y  m e a n s  o f  a n  in c rea se  in  su b n a tio n a l 
g o v e rn m e n ts ’ ta x  p o w e rs . T h u s , th e  r e d is tr ib u t io n  o f  fiscal re so u rc e s  b y  a n  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  is re q u ire d . T h is  reg im e  sh o u ld  a d d re s s  
tw o  d im e n s io n s  o f  fisca l d isp a rity : th e  v e rtic a l, th a t  is, d isp a rit ie s  in  fiscal 
c a p a c i ty  a m o n g  d is tin c t la y e rs  o f  g o v e rn m e n t, a n d  th e  h o r iz o n ta l ,  w h ich  
d e a ls  w ith  d isp a rit ie s  a m o n g  th e  u n its  th a t  c o m p rise  th e  sam e  g o v e rn m e n t 
level.
T ra d it io n a l ly ,  th e se  tw o  d im e n s io n s  a re  d e a lt  w ith  s im u lta n e o u s ly  
b y  m e a n s  o f  a  re v e n u e -sh a r in g  reg im e  to  w h ich  a  fo rm u la  is a p p lie d  to  
a d d re s s  h o r iz o n ta l  d isp a ritie s , w h ic h  in  so m e  d e v e lo p e d  fe d e ra tio n s  ta k e s  
th e  fo rm  o f  a n  e q u a liz a tio n  m ech a n ism . O rig in a lly , b o th  th e  A rg e n tin e  
c o p a r t ic ip a tio n  reg im e  a n d  th e  B raz ilian  s ta te  a n d  m u n ic ip a l p a r t ic ip a tio n  
fu n d s  fo llo w ed  th is  p a t te rn . T h e  2009 E c u a d o r ia n  re fo rm  to o k  th e  sam e 
a p p ro a c h .
T h e  q u e s tio n  o f  w h e th e r  th is  s h o u ld  b e  th e  p a th  to  b e  fo llo w e d  in  a  
re fo rm  a g e n d a  fo r  L a t in  A m e ric a  re la te s  to  th e  p r io r ity  so c ia l g o a ls  g a in e d  
in  th e  p ro c e ss  o f  fisca l d e c e n tra liz a tio n  in  th e  reg io n . In s o fa r  as th e  d ecen ­
tra liz a tio n  o f  e d u c a t io n , h e a lth  a n d  u rb a n  in f ra s tru c tu re  p o lic ies  c a ll fo r  
th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  n a tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  in  serv ice p ro v is io n  a n d  d e m a n d  
th a t  a t te n t io n  b e  d ra w n  to  th e  specific  f in a n c ia l n eed s  o f  e a c h  case , i t  is 
v e ry  h a rd  to  a t t a in  a  s a tis fa c to ry  so lu tio n  b y  a p p ly in g  a  g en e ra l fo rm u la  
to  d ea l s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  th e  v e rtic a l a n d  h o r iz o n ta l  fisca l d isp a ritie s .
In  a  c o m b in e d  a p p ro a c h , a  re v e n u e -sh a rin g  sy s tem  sh o u ld  m ix  d e v o ­
lu t io n  a n d  e q u a liz a tio n  c r i te r ia  to  ach ieve  a  b a s ic  e q u il ib r iu m  in  th e  
v e rtic a l a n d  h o r iz o n ta l  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  fisca l re so u rc e s . F u r th e rm o re , 
su p p le m e n ta ry  reg im es  s h o u ld  fo c u s  o n  th e  specific f in an c ia l n eed s  o f  th e  
e d u c a t io n , h e a th  a n d  u rb a n  in f ra s t ru c tu re  sec to rs  to  w h ich  in cen tiv e s  fo r  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l c o o p e ra t io n  a n d  o b lig a tio n s  to  m e e t p re d e te rm in e d  
ta rg e ts  m ig h t b e  a tta c h e d .
O n e  a d d it io n a l issu e  to  b e  ta c k le d  c o n c e rn s  th e  d e fin itio n  o f  th e  a m o u n t  
o f  re so u rc e s  in v o lv ed . T h e  size o f  th e  tr a n s fe r  sy s tem  v a rie s  a c c o rd in g  to  
h o w  th e  ab ility  to  ta x  is a ss ig n ed  to  e a c h  level o f  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  to  th e  
p re v a ilin g  m a g n itu d e  o f  e c o n o m ic  a n d  soc ia l d isp a ritie s . W h e re  ta x  p o w ers  
o f  s u b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts  a re  lim ited  a n d  so c io e c o n o m ic  d isp a rit ie s  a re
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h u g e , a s  is th e  c ase  in  m o s t o f  L a tin  A m e ric a , tra n s fe r s  d e m a n d  a  s izab le  
p a r t  o f  th e  fisca l p ie  a n d  a re  o f  g re a t s ign ificance  fo r  s u b n a t io n a l fin an ces.
H o w ev e r, th e re  is n o  u n iv e rsa l ru le  fo r  se ttin g  u p  a n  id ea l size fo r a n  
in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l tr a n s fe r  reg im e. E v en  th o u g h  e c o n o m ic  g lo b a liz a tio n  
a n d  th e  in c o rp o ra t io n  o f  n ew  tech n o lo g ie s  in to  th e  p ro d u c t io n  p ro c e ss  
h a v e  g iven  u n p re c e d e n te d  m o b ili ty  to  th e  ta x  b a se  t r a d it io n a l ly  e x p lo ite d  
by  su b n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts , in h ib it in g  th e ir  u se , th e y  a lso  o p e n  n ew  
p o ss ib ilitie s  fo r  a p p ly in g  u se r  ch a rg e s  to  th e  u ti l iz a tio n  o f  u rb a n  in f ra ­
s tru c tu re  a n d  h e a lth  fac ilities , fo r e x a m p le .16 A n o th e r  p o ss ib il ity  is to  
g ive lo ca l ta x p a y e rs  th e  r ig h t to  d e d u c t som e o f  th e ir  p ro p e r ty  ta x  f ro m  
th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t in c o m e  ta x  liab ilitie s . E le c tro n ic a lly  in te g ra te d  
reg is te rs  a n d  a d m in is tr a t io n  c a n  a lso  p ro v id e  g re a te r  o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  
re g io n a l a n d  fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n ts  in  la rg e  c o u n tr ie s  to  sh a re  a  h a rm o n iz e d  
c o n su m p tio n  tax .
T h e  size o f  a  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  th a t  a d h e re s  to  th e  p r in c ip le s  a n d  o b jec tiv es  
h e re  s ta te d  m u s t a lso  ta k e  in to  a c c o u n t th e  fo llo w in g  a sp ec ts :
1. th e  d eg ree  to  w h ic h  p u b lic  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  a re  d e c e n tra liz e d  a n d  th e  
ru le s  a p p lie d  to  e a c h  case;
2. th e  ex is tin g  so c io e c o n o m ic  d isp a ritie s ; a n d
3. th e  n a t io n a l  s ta n d a rd s  to  b e  ach ie v ed  w ith  re g a rd  to  c itiz e n s’ access  to  
b as ic  needs.
A  h ig h  a n d  sy m m etrica l level o f  p u b lic  re s p o n s ib ili ty  d e c e n tra liz a tio n  w ill 
re q u ire  a  g re a te r  a m o u n t  o f  re so u rc e s  to  fulfill th e i r  o b jec tiv es  c o m p a re d  
to  a s im ila r o n e  in  w h ich  a sy m m e tr ic  ru le s  th a t  ta k e  d u e  a c c o u n t o f  d is tin c t 
so c io e c o n o m ic  a n d  a d m in is tra t iv e  c o n d it io n s  w ith in  th e  n a t io n  ap p ly . 
T h ese  d iffe rences rise  w ith  in c re a s in g  re g io n a l d is p a r it ie s  a n d  w h en  th e  
n a tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  fo r  p ro v id in g  access to  b a s ic  n eed s  a re  h igh .
A n  exp lic it c o n s id e ra t io n  in  efficiency in  th e  m a n a g e m e n t o f  re so u rce s  
e a rm a rk e d  fo r  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  b as ic  n eed s  m a y  re d u c e  th e  tr a n s fe r  b ill. 
T h is  c a n  be  ac h ie v e d  i f  th ese  tr a n s fe r s  a t ta c h  sp ec ia l c o m m itm e n ts  to  th e  
a tta in m e n t o f  specific  ta rg e ts  id en tif ied  in  s tra te g ic  p la n s . In  th a t  case , 
tra n s fe rs  sh o u ld  ta k e  th e  fo rm  o f  m a tc h in g  g ra n ts , in  w h ich  th e  c e n tra l 
g o v e rn m e n t m a tc h  m ig h t v a ry  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  f in a n c ia l c a p a b ilit ie s  o f  
th e  re c ip ie n t u n it .
A n o th e r  im p o r ta n t  c o n d it io n  re fe rs  to  th e  n eed  fo r  th e  tr a n s fe r  reg im e  
to  a d a p t  to  a  c h a n g in g  so c io e c o n o m ic  e n v iro n m e n t a n d  its  im p a c t o n  th e  
lo c a t io n  o f  e c o n o m ic  a c tiv itie s  a n d  th e  p o p u la t io n  w ith in  th e  n a t io n a l  te r ­
r i to ry . T o  th a t  e n d , spec ia l p ro v is io n s  sh o u ld  ca ll fo r  a  p e rio d ic  rev is io n  
o f  th e  ru le s  th a t  g o v e rn  th e  reg im e  so as to  p re v e n t a  d r i f t  a w a y  f ro m  the  
o rig in a l e q u ilib r iu m  a n d  th e  o b jec tiv es  dev ised .
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T h e  p re c e d in g  p a ra g r a p h s  p o in t  to  issues th a t  s h o u ld  be  in c lu d e d  in  a  
re fo rm  a g e n d a  th a t  m ig h t seek  an sw ers  to  th e  fo llo w in g  q u e s tio n s :
1. T o  w h a t e x te n t m ig h t th e  c o n s o lid a t io n  o f  a  p u b lic  re sp o n s ib ility  
d e c e n tra liz a tio n  p ro c e ss  be  je o p a rd iz e d  b y  a  h ig h  v u ln e ra b il ity  o f  
tra n s fe rs  to  th e  e c o n o m ic  cycle , th e  p o li tic a l e n v iro n m e n t o r  th e  fluc­
tu a t io n  in  in te rn a t io n a l  p rices?
2. W h a t fa c to rs  s h o u ld  be  c o n s id e re d  in  th e  d e s ig n  o f  c r i te r ia  fo r  d is tr ib ­
u t in g  tr a n s fe r  re so u rc e s  a m o n g  d is tin c t s u b n a t io n a l u n its  in  o rd e r  to  
a ch iev e  b e tte r  re s u lts  f ro m  th e  v ie w p o in t o f  re d u c in g  fisca l d isp a ritie s  
a n d  fo cu s in g  o n  th e  o b jec tiv e  o f  leve ling  th e  fie ld  so  th a t  every  c itizen  
h a s  s im ila r o p p o r tu n it ie s  to  c lim b  th e  so c ia l lad d e r?
T h e  sea rch  fo r  a n sw e rs  to  th e se  q u e s tio n s  s h o u ld  in v o lv e  th e  a sp ec ts  
th a t  in flu en ce  th e  q u a li ty  o f  a  t r a n s fe r  reg im e  d e a lt w ith  in  th e  p re v io u s  
sec tio n . A  sm a lle r, o r  h ig h ly  sen s itiv e  tr a n s fe r  b a se , ra ise s  th e  v u ln e ra b ility  
o f  s u b n a t io n a l f in an ces  to  a  c h a n g in g  e c o n o m ic  a n d  p o li tic a l e n v iro n m e n t, 
d o in g  g re a t h a rm  to  so c ia l sec to rs  th a t  d e m a n d  a  s tab le  flow  o f  re so u rce s  
to  ach iev e  th e  ex p e c te d  re su lts . A  b ro a d  tr a n s fe r  b a se  to  w h ic h  a u to m a tic  
d is tr ib u tio n  ru le s  a p p ly  is less v u ln e ra b le  c o m p a re d  to  a  s im ila r o n e  in  
w h ic h  th e  c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t ex erc ises so m e  d eg ree  o f  c o n tro l  o v e r th e  
de liv e ry  o f  tr a n s fe r  re so u rc e s . In  a n y  case , th e  v u ln e ra b il ity  o f  su b n a tio n a l 
fin an ces  m a y  b e  m itig a te d  i f  p ro v is io n s  fo r  a  p e rio d ic  rev is io n  o f  th e  ru le s  
a re  in  p lace .
T ra n s fe rs  th a t  a re  d es ig n ed  to  a d d re s s  th e  specific  n eed s  o f  so c ia l se rv ­
ices m a y  ach iev e  b e tte r  re su lts  w h en  th e y  o p e ra te  in  ta n d e m  w ith  a  fiscal 
e q u a liz a tio n  reg im e, since th is  p a r t ic u la r  a r ra n g e m e n t a llo w s m o re  flex ­
ib ility  to  m a tc h  th e  te r r i to r ia l  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  th e  fiscal re so u rc e s  to  th e  
c o rre sp o n d in g  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  d e m a n d s  fo r  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  su ch  serv ices, 
th u s  e n h a n c in g  th e  efficiency a n d  efficacy in  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  th e se  serv ices.
NOTES
1. Direct cash apportionm ent to families with incomes below the poverty line has also 
been added to the list. Brazil championed this initiative.
2. A Supreme Court mandate for the states to put up new rules in 2012 is already causing 
serious concern.
3. From  2017, General Participation System (SGP) resources will rise in line with the 
average growth of the national current revenues in the previous four years.
4. Two exceptions are transfers specifically designed to finance infrastructure projects in 
poor urban areas.
5. Almost all federal taxes together comprise the transfer base (Recaudación Federal 
Participable (assignable taxes): RFP), as well as non-tax revenue from the oil business.
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6. D ata for 2007 show that non-tax revenues accounted for three-quarters of total 
transfers.
7. Education gets the lion’s share -  more than half o f that allocated to these three sectors.
8 . Less than 10% of SGP resources is distributed without specific strings attached,
9. There are six canons comprising revenues from oil, gas, other minerals, fishing, hydro­
electricity and forestry.
10. Distinct rules apply to the canon and sobrecanon petrolero in which the amounts allo­
cated to regional and local governments differ (see Appendix 8 A for details).
11. In fact the above percentage applies to the net coparticipation base, since the federal 
government retains 15% of the gross value.
12. Some 20% of the income and m anufacturing taxes were shared through specific consti­
tutional funds on a formula basis.
13. The percentages were increased during the transition to a democratic regime in the 
1980s.
14. For local governments, the coefficient defines the amount to be transferred to all 
municipalities o f a given state, the individual quota varying according to their respec­
tive populations.
15. Basically, FU N D EB collects 20% of states’ and municipalities’ own and transfer rev­
enues and allocates these resources on the basis o f enrollment numbers. Depending on 
the location of education facilities, some subnational units are net contributors to this 
fund whereas others are net recipients.
16. Urban tolls and electronic cards are useful for that purpose.
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Table 8A. 1 (continued)
Country Subnational Main transfer Transfer base 
government1 regimes (% total (composition 
transfers) 2 and level)
Brazil States State Participation •  M anufac­
(Federative •  26+1 Fund -  FPE turing and
State) jurisdictions (41.3%) income
•  2 2 .8 % state Fund for the federal taxes
revenues Development o f •  Social contri­
•  38.9% transfer Basic Education butions
system - FUNDEB 
(23.1%) 
Integrated Health 






•  Specified in 
law
Municipalities Municipal •  M anufac­
•  5,566 Participation turing and
jurisdictions Fund -  FPM income
•  63.1% of (28.4%) federal taxes
municipal Participation in •  States VAT
revenues the states’ VAT •  Social contri­
•  61.1% of (26.0%) butions
transfer Fund for the earmarked to
system Development of education








Established Fixed •  55% general Pros: well-
in the 1988 coefficients •  2 0 % block defined rules
Constitution for the FPE (education, make it easy
Enrollment in health) to predict
public •  19% specific the inflow
schools (programs of resources
(education); of transport whereas a  low
population infrastructure, vulnerability
and location expenditure o f the transfer
of health on social base to external
facilities assistance, shocks provides




•  6 % no info. norms and
Established Population for •  63% general huge horizontal
in the 1988 the share •  2 1 % block disparities
Constitution each (education, do not
municipality health) contribute to
gets on their •  14% specific equilibrium in
states’ FPM (transport the distribution
quotas infrastructure, o f funds and
Mainly origin expenditure on to adapt the









•  15 for Regional
jurisdictions Development -
•  99.9% FN D R  (40.5%)
regional National subsidy
revenues to public







•  346 Common Fund
jurisdictions • -  FCM  (59.9%)
•  51.3% Participation in
municipal Land Tax
revenue (21.5%)





•  Specified in 
law
•  The national 
budget





•  Property and 
vehicle taxes
•  Specified in 
law
state VAT assistance, changing












•  2 % no info.
circumstances
Established Based on •  5% general Pros: a fiscal
in the 1980 submission •  1 % block equalization
Constitution of projects (investment) approach to
but set •  94% specific FCM , a high
mainly in (basic public degree of












Partially Population, •  75% general; governments
established number o f •  3% block Cons:
in the 1980 buildings (education, FN D R  lacks
Constitution, exempt from health, transparency,
and partially land tax, development depends on
in infra­ per capita works) budgetary
constitutional income and •  2 2 % specific decisions and
laws own local tax (decentrali- is subject to
collections zation, central
254
Table 8A. 1 (continued)
Country Subnational Main transfer Transfer base 
government1 regimes (% total (composition 
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Notes:
1 Percentages may vary each year: 2008 data for Argentina, Bolivia (Plur. St. oí), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, and 2009 data for 
Peru.
2 Percentages may vary each year: 2008 data for Argentina, Bolivia (Plur. St. of), Brazil, Chilean municipalities, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, 
2009 data for Peru and 2010 for Chilean regions.
3 Percentages may vary each year: 2007 data for Colombia, 2008 data for Argentina, Bolivia (Plur. St. of), Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, and 
2009 data for Peru.
4 Fondo del Conurbano in Spanish.
Sources: Political Database of the Americas/Georgetown University (2005); Cetràngolo (2007); Chauvin and Pérez (2007); Z apata (2007); Castro 
(2008); Casas (2009); Cetràngolo et al. (2009); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos -  IN D EC (Argentina); Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
-  IN E (Bolivia (Plur. St. oí)); Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística -  IBGE (Brazil); Chile (1995, 2010), Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
de Chile -  INE (Chile); Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística -  D A NE (Colombia); Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos -  
INEC (Ecuador); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía -  INEGI (Mexico); Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática -  INEI (Peru).
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1 INTRODUCTION
A  number o f  Latin Am erican countries have now  accum ulated several 
decades o f  experience with fiscal decentralization reforms. A lthough  
considerable progress has been m ade on m any fronts, that experience has 
not helped to avoid som e serious com m on pitfalls in the assignm ent o f  
revenue sources to subnational governm ents in the region .1 Subnational 
finances in Latin Am erica are generally characterized by relatively small 
shares o f  own-revenue collections and non-existing or -  with some rare 
exceptions -  poorly designed equalization transfer program s.2 In this 
chapter we argue that the use (and abuse) o f  revenue-sharing schemes in 
the region has prevented the developm ent o f  sound financial structures at 
the subnational level.
The com parative advantages o f  subnational governm ents with respect 
to the central governm ent are usually concentrated on the expenditure side 
o f  the budget. Because o f  this, expenditure decentralization is usually more 
pervasive than revenue decentralization, and intergovernm ental transfers 
play a crucial role in the fiscal balance o f  alm ost all fiscally decentralized  
systems. The m ain challenge for an intergovernm ental transfer system  is 
the com puting and timely delivery o f  the right am ount o f  transfers to each 
subnational governm ent. Failing to do this well can result in sending out 
the wrong signals regarding the efficient level o f  public expenditures at 
the subnational level, thus eroding the efficiency gains expected from the 
decentralization process itself. These are, in our opinion, som e o f  the risks 
currently faced by m any Latin American countries. Their heavy reliance 
on revenue-sharing schemes and the lack o f  clarity about the role and 
proper com position  o f  the transfer system has in m any cases led to an inef­
ficient distribution o f  revenues com bined with significant horizontal fiscal 
imbalances.
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The situation has not been helped by the fact that the academ ic litera­
ture does not provide definite advice about the optim al com position  o f  
subnational revenues. In particular, the current academ ic literature does 
not provide concrete guidance on how  revenue-sharing schemes should be 
com bined with other transfer programs to achieve m ore optim al revenue 
assignm ents.
In this chapter we address these topics. One o f  our m ain conclusions 
is that revenue-sharing schemes should be lim ited to finance only those 
expenditure functions where subnational governm ents do not enjoy any 
significant degree o f  discretion. In contrast, those functions where subna­
tional governm ents do enjoy a significant degree o f  discretion should be 
financed primarily by own revenues and carefully designed equalization  
transfers.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview o f  
the m ain principles to be considered in the design o f  subnational financial 
structure, paying particular attention to revenue-sharing schemes. In 
Section 3 we review the characteristics o f  Latin American transfer systems; 
we highlight the m ost com m on patterns in the region and evaluate their 
performance. In Section 4 we propose a simple framework for the redesign  
o f  the system  o f  intergovernmental transfers in the region. The last section  
concludes.
2 THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
TRANSFERS IN FISCALLY DECENTRALIZED 
SYSTEMS
The classic econom ic justification for fiscal decentralization is due to Oates 
(1972), and focuses on the comparative advantages o f  subnational gov­
ernments to determine the optim al provision o f  public goods within their 
jurisdiction. He argued that if  preferences are not hom ogeneous across juris­
dictions and subnational governments are capable o f  providing goods and 
services efficiently, then allowing for the expenditure decisions to be made 
‘closer to the people’ would result in a better fit o f  each jurisdiction’s prefer­
ences and therefore in welfare gains for society.3 This argument translates 
into the so-called ‘subsidiarity principle’, by which an expenditure respon­
sibility should be assigned to the lowest level o f  government capable o f  effi­
ciently providing that function. Those services with spillover benefits beyond  
single jurisdictions should be provided by higher levels o f  government. In 
general, there seems to be agreement about what expenditure responsi­
bilities should be assigned to subnational governments, and in practice m ost 
countries around the world decentralize similar expenditure functions.4
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On the revenue side o f  the budget, however, both the debate and the 
practice o f  fiscal decentralization reforms are far from  having reached  
consensus. In order to devolve effective decision-m aking powers and 
prom ote efficient expenditure choices at the subnational level, it is gen­
erally accepted that it is necessary to ensure som e degree o f  revenue 
autonom y. R evenue autonom y is also im portant because it enhances the 
accountability o f  governm ent officials and citizens’ participation. The 
problem  is that revenue autonom y is also related to im portant efficiency 
costs. The presence o f  econom ies o f  scale in tax adm inistration, collec­
tions and enforcem ent usually implies that the subnational governm ents 
are less effective than the central governm ent in raising a given am ount 
o f  revenues for m ost tax instruments. After weighting benefits and costs 
o f  own-revenue collections, it is generally efficient to provide less than  
full budgetary autonom y at the subnational level, thus decentralizing  
revenue sources in am ounts that are insufficient to cover all subnational 
expenditures.5
The overall asym m etric decentralization o f  expenditure responsibili­
ties and revenue sources leads to fiscal disparities, roughly defined as the 
difference between the costs o f  providing the goods and services that a 
governm ent is responsible for and the revenue that the sam e governm ent 
is able to gather from  its assigned revenue sources. The m agnitude o f  
fiscal disparities varies across different levels o f  governm ent and am ong  
governm ents at the same level, creating what are know n as ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ im balances, respectively. In terms o f  vertical im balance the 
central governm ent typically exhibits a negative fiscal disparity, whose  
absolute value is (by definition) equal to the sum o f  all fiscal dispari­
ties at the subnational level. In addition, horizontal im balances are also 
com m on because governm ents o f  the same level norm ally face dissimilar 
econom ic conditions, including the costs o f  public service delivery, the 
needs o f  different population  groups, the size and elasticity o f  tax bases, 
and so on. R educing vertical and horizontal im balances necessarily 
requires the use o f  intergovernm ental transfers, which thus becom e a fun­
damental com ponent o f  any w ell-functioning fiscally decentralized system  
o f  governm ent.
A lthough there is wide consensus am ong scholars and policy makers 
that own-source revenues and intergovernmental transfers are both indis­
pensable sources o f  subnational finance, there are no clear guidelines 
regarding their optim al com bination.6 The academ ic literature stresses the 
im portance o f  own-revenue collections at the subnational level, but the 
exact extent o f  own-revenue collections is not precisely defined.7 In the fo l­
low ing discussion we provide som e principles to be considered for the 
design o f  an efficient structure o f  subnational revenues.
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Towards a Normative Prescription for Optim al (Subnational) Revenue 
Structure
A  widely accepted principle o f  fiscal decentralization design states that 
‘finance follow s function’. This principle em phasizes that both the am ount 
o f  revenues required by a governm ent as well as the adequate choice o f  
its revenue sources depend on the specific characteristics o f  the assigned  
expenditure responsibilities and the cost o f  financing them (see, for 
exam ple, Bahl, 1999). A lthough there are m any ways to categorize 
expenditure assignm ents to subnational governm ents, an essential d istinc­
tion is whether: (i) the assignm ents correspond to own subnational respon­
sibilities, which explicitly call or rely on discretionary decisions m ade by 
subnational governments; or (ii) they correspond to responsibilities that 
have been delegated to the subnational governm ents by the central gov­
ernment, which fundam entally involve non-discretionary decisions by 
subnational governm ents. N o te  that, strictly speaking, subnational auton­
om y is required if  and only if  an expenditure function has been assigned  
as an exclusive or ow n responsibility to the subnational level. In contrast, 
even though delegated functions are im plem ented by subnational govern­
m ents, the ultimate responsibility over these functions m ay be interpreted 
as falling upon the central governm ent. So discretion, if  allowed, could  
only be exerted within certain lim its and controls. Frequent exam ples o f  
delegated expenditure responsibilities are education and health services. 
Service delivery in these sectors is norm ally assigned to subnational gov­
ernm ents, and regardless o f  whether or not the distinction is m ade in the 
law between own and delegated, significant shares o f  the subnational edu­
cation and health budgets are devoted to meet national standards regard­
ing quality and coverage. In contrast, service delivery, for exam ple, for 
street cleaning and lighting, whether or not the laws m ake the distinction  
between own and delegated responsibilities, generally are associated with  
decisions that are fully discretionary at the subnational level.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the ideal correspondence between subnational 
expenditures, divided into discretionary and non-discretionary categories, 
and subnational revenues. A ssum ing for expositional purposes and con ­
venience that there are no savings, subnational revenues m ust be equal to 
subnational expenditures. The presence o f  a vertical im balance typically 
implies that subnational expenditures are larger than subnational own- 
revenue collections, and in order to elim inate this vertical im balance the 
central governm ent m ust provide additional resources in the form o f  
intergovernmental transfers.8
Non-discretionary (delegated) expenditure responsibilities should be 
primarily financed, as it is conventionally accepted, by conditional




















Figure 9.1 Basic structure o f  subnational governments’ budget
intergovernmental transfers. If the central governm ent is com m itted to 
achieving certain national standards then it should provide the 
funds required to ensure that those standards are met nationwide. 
Intergovernmental transfers are also necessary to finance own subnational 
responsibilities, but this financing m ust be unconditional in order to allow  
for discretionary subnational decisions.
Revenue sharing is a particular type o f  intergovernm ental transfer 
in which a predetermined proportion o f  central governm ent collections 
from one or m ore tax instruments is set aside and distributed either on 
a derivation basis or by form ula am ong subnational governm ents. This 
arrangement exploits the central governm ent’s advantage in tax collection  
while allowing subnational governm ents to gain access to buoyant revenue 
sources and m inim izing distortions due to uncoordinated tax administra­
tion and tax com petition (R ao, 2007). Revenue-sharing schemes are widely  
used in the world and represent a significant share o f  intergovernmental 
transfers in m ost Latin Am erican countries. In part, this is because they 
are considered an adequate means o f  providing greater revenue autonom y  
to subnational governm ents. Sometim es, due to a certain perception o f  
entitlement, revenues shared on a derivation basis are (wrongly) labeled as 
subnational ‘ow n ’ revenues.9
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Even though revenue sharing and other intergovernm ental transfers are 
an im portant source o f  subnational revenues in m any countries, unfor­
tunately the literature has not yet provided clear norm ative prescriptions 
regarding the extent to  which subnational finances should rely on these 
revenue sources. The conventional decentralization theory states only that 
subnational governm ents should be able to control the level o f  revenues a t 
the margin  (M cLure, 2000); but autonom y at the margin refers only to the 
ability to alter the am ount o f  own-revenue collections and says nothing  
about the revenue structure.
In particular, the existing literature has not properly em phasized the 
fact that intergovernm ental transfers are costless from  the recipient gov­
ernm ents’ perspective, which means that they m ay not provide adequate 
inform ation about the marginal cost o f  public funds. Such costs include 
the marginal costs o f  administering and collecting additional revenues as 
well as their social welfare costs, and they indicate the (minim um) level 
o f marginal benefits required for the last unit o f  public expenditures to 
be econom ically desirable. Intergovernm ental transfers substitute away 
own-tax revenues (and financial debt), and since the m arginal cost o f  
public funds usually increases with the am ount o f  own revenues, then the 
m arginal cost perceived by the subnational governm ents can be expected  
to decrease with the level o f  intergovernm ental transfers, and at any rate 
not to m atch the actual marginal co st.10
Efficient autonom ous decisions in both public expenditures and own- 
revenue collections require that a governm ent has a correct measure (or 
at least a close approxim ation) o f  the marginal costs o f  public funds, and 
aligning the marginal cost o f  funds is one o f  the m ain objectives o f  the inter­
governm ental transfers.11 A s Bird and Smart (2002: 899) put it, ‘(t)he basic 
task in transfer design is to get prices “right” in the public sector’.
A lthough not readily obvious, the objective o f  aligning the prices faced  
by subnational governm ents is entirely com patible with the traditional 
objectives reserved for an equalization transfer program. Equalization  
transfer programs are meant to reduce differences in the ability o f  sub­
national governm ents o f  the same level to  cover the cost o f  providing a 
standard package o f  public goods and services.12 In this context, the ‘right’ 
marginal cost o f  public funds corresponds to that level at which subna­
tional governm ents collect the revenues required to finance the standard  
package o f  public goods and services. Thus, an equalization transfer 
program can serve to provide the subnational governm ents with the con ­
ditions required to m ake efficient autonom ous decisions. O f course, the 
greater the equalization transfer fund, the greater the room  to effectively 
equalize subnational fiscal conditions.
N ote that besides the equalization transfers there is no need for
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additional transfer program s aimed at fostering decision-m aking auton­
om y at the subnational levels o f  governm ent. M oreover, in order to ensure 
that the equalization transfer program can effectively reach its objective, 
it would be desirable not to allow the sum o f  conditional transfers and  
revenues shared on a derivation basis to exceed the am ount o f  expendi­
tures needed for delegated or non-discretionary functions. This condition  
should hold  n ot only for each level o f  subnational governm ent taken as a 
whole, but also for each subnational government. Likewise, discretionary 
expenditure responsibilities should be financed primarily via own-revenue 
collections and equalization transfers, which can jo intly inform  subna­
tional policy makers about the correct level o f  the marginal cost o f  public 
funds.
3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN LATIN 
AMERICA
Even though m ost Latin American countries have been engaged in lengthy 
fiscal decentralization processes, subnational revenue autonom y is still 
limited. Revenues collected by regional and local governm ents in the 
region frequently represent a small fraction o f  their revenues and in the few  
cases where they represent a sizable share o f  local budgets, generally they 
are not especially im portant in the national context. Table 9.1 shows the 
share o f  own-tax collections over total revenues at the local and regional 
levels in a group o f  Latin American countries, as well as the relative im por­
tance o f  the two levels o f  government in terms o f  the distribution o f  rev­
enues in the public sector. A ll local governm ents in the sample collect less 
than 50 percent o f  their own revenues. Chilean municipalities display the 
greatest share o f  own-tax collections, but in that case revenue autonom y is 
tempered by the limited extent o f  the fiscal decentralization process in that 
country. A t the regional level the experience is mixed. The Argentine prov­
inces collect a significant share o f  their revenues through turnover, stamp 
and property taxes, and the Colom bian departments are able to raise som e 
revenues from excise taxes. In other countries such as Bolivia, M exico, 
Paraguay and Peru, however, regional governm ents collect few or no taxes.
This evidence suggests that m ost countries in the region suffer from  
significant vertical im balances and a high level o f  dependency on inter­
governm ental transfers from  the central governm ent.13 In order to address 
these problem s, all countries in the region are currently im plem enting a 
variety o f  intergovernm ental transfer programs. In the follow ing discus­
sion we provide an overview o f  transfer systems, and then we exam ine the 
possible equalizing and efficiency effects o f  the main transfer programs.
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Table 9.1 Share o f  own taxes and fees  on local revenues in 10 Latin  
American countries
Country (year) Local governments Regional governments

















Argentina 2.0% 8.4% 68.9% 16.6%a
(2004) (2004) (2004) (2008)
Bolivia*3 17.2% 23.3% 0.0% 21.0%
(2007) (2007) (2007) (2007)
Brazil 20.1%° 9.0%° - 34.8%d
(2007) (2007) (2008)
Chile 48.1% 9.6% - -
(2006) (2006)
Colombia 34.8%e 22.9% 27.7%e 17.6%
(2008) (2003) (2008) (2003)
Costa Rica 36.2% 5.9% - -
(2006) (2006)
Ecuador0 34.6% 12.0% - -
(2007) (2007)
Mexico 15.6%° 6.0%c 2.7%f 40.6%f
(2007) (2007) (2006) (2006)
Paraguay 41.3% 6.2% 0.0% 2.1%
(2006) (2006) (2006) (2006)
Peru 10.8% 13.7% 0.0% 19.0%
(2005) (2005) (2005) (2005)
Sources: Government Finance Statistics (September 2010); “Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Censos, Argentina (considers only tax revenues); bZapata (2007); “Martinez- 
Vazquez (2010); dNational Treasury of Brazil; “Dirección Nacional de Planificación 
(Colombia); in stitu to  Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Mexico, 2009).
Current Practices in Transfer Design14
G iven the great diversity o f  intergovernmental transfer programs 
observed in Latin A m erica it is difficult to describe com m on strategies and 
approaches to address the problem  o f  vertical im balances. Programs vary 
widely in terms o f  their funding rules, the distribution m echanism s and the 
conditions im posed on their use. In part, these variations respond to the 
different objective to be accom plished, but it is also com m on in the region
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to observe program s where there is no clear correspondence between  
design and objective, or where there are two or m ore rather incom patible 
objectives.
Exam ples o f  well-designed and effective transfer program s can be found  
am ong the num erous conditional transfer program s im plem ented in the 
region. The use o f  this type o f  transfer in Latin America is not as extensive 
as in other regions o f  the world, but nevertheless a significant share o f  
subnational revenues is subject to one or m ore conditions. In general, they 
are especially effective in facilitating the fulfillment o f  (minimum ) national 
standards o f  services and in increasing the delivery o f  services with positive  
externalities. M ost countries have sizable transfer program s earmarked 
for either capital expenditures or im portant subnational functions such as 
education and health. For exam ple, Bolivia, G uatem ala, N icaragua and 
Paraguay provide exam ples o f  capital transfers to local governm ents; El 
Salvador and Peru are cases where the m unicipal governm ents com pete  
for the capital transfers through project proposals. In Brazil, conditional 
transfers for education and health are directed first to the states, which 
are primarily responsible for these functions; in Chile, the transfers for 
these functions are distributed directly to the local governm ents. There are 
also several exam ples o f  conditional transfer program s directed to vulner­
able groups. In Bolivia, for exam ple, there is a program (Seguro M aterno  
Infantil) aim ed to finance health services for infants and m others, and in 
Peru a similar program  (Vaso de Leche) covers basic nutrition needs o f  
poor children, pregnant w om en and mothers.
The m echanism s for the funding o f  transfer program s can be defined  
independently from the conditions im posed on the use o f  the transfers. 
One o f the m ost com m on ways to finance transfer program s in the region  
is by defining revenue-sharing schemes, and several major conditional 
transfer program s use this alternative.15 In C olom bia and G uatem ala  
revenue-sharing funding for local governments is conditional on  being  
used for basic education, health, and infrastructure; and 25 percent o f  rev­
enues from  hydrocarbons and m ining m ust be spent in roughly the same 
sectors in Venezuela. In addition, N icaragua and Paraguay set a m inim um  
proportion o f  the revenue-sharing transfers received at the local level to  
be spent on capital infrastructure, and in Peru a similar rule applies to the 
funds received by regional governm ents, part o f  which can only be spent 
on capital investm ents and infrastructure m aintenance.
Given a certain am ount o f  revenues collected from  the shared sources, 
the m ost im portant effect o f  revenue-sharing schemes is that they set, 
usually unam biguously, the size o f  the transfer funds. This characteristic 
m akes such schemes useful in providing subnational governm ents with 
buoyant and predictable revenues, and for the same reasons they seem
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to be very attractive in ensuring a certain degree o f  budgetary autonom y. 
This likely explains the popularity o f  revenue-sharing schemes, and why  
the countries in the region often prefer to im pose no conditions on the use 
o f  the m ost im portant transfer programs.
Virtually all Latin Am erican countries use som e form  o f  revenue­
sharing scheme defined on the basis o f  central governm ent general rev­
enues or a group o f  their m ost im portant taxes, such as personal incom e 
tax, value added tax (VA T) and other taxes on corporate profits or sales. 
In principle, this approach can be harmless, but serious problem s can arise 
when: (i) the bases are volatile; (ii) the criteria to distribute them  am ong  
subnational governm ents are not related to relative expenditure needs; 
and (iii) they represent a significant share o f  subnational revenues.
A n im portant exam ple o f  volatile transfers is given by those cases where 
the sharing bases are taxes on  extractive industries, a som ewhat com m on  
situation am ong countries with abundant natural resources. In M exico, 
one-fifth o f  the revenues collected by the states m ust be shared with their 
municipalities; tax-sharing revenues for m unicipalities in Bolivia and 
N icaragua are also defined in terms o f  natural resources; and in Peru 50 
percent o f  the revenues collected from the corporate incom e tax on extrac­
tive industries are shared with regional and local governm ents. In all these 
exam ples, the size o f  the transfer pool has been subject to wide fluctuations 
associated with changes in the international prices o f  natural resources.
Revenues from  taxes on extractive industries can be especially distor- 
tionary when shared on  a derivation or origin basis. For exam ple, the 
subnational share o f  the corporate incom e tax on gas, oil and m inerals’ 
extractive industries in Peru, the canon and sobrecanon, is distributed 
exclusively am ong the regions, provinces and m unicipalities where the 
extraction o f  the natural resources has taken place. A  similar allocation  
arrangement is found in Bolivia, where m ost o f  the revenues shared go to 
the regions in which they are collected, but a small fraction (less than 10 
percent) is reserved for regions with no natural resources. Ecuador and 
Venezuela are other exam ples o f  countries where the revenues from extrac­
tive industries are shared on a derivation basis. The presence o f  natural 
resources is unlikely to  be correlated with the public expenditure needs in 
each jurisdiction; therefore, this allocation criterion can create severe eco­
nom ic distortions at the subnational levels o f  governm ent, as well as a per­
ception o f  unfairness regarding the way public funds are being distributed 
across the country. A n  additional problem  related to this type o f  revenue 
is that it m ight provide a strong sense o f  entitlem ent to the beneficiaries, 
w ho perceive it as a legitim ate right that cannot be taken away. In Peru, 
for instance, discussions about how  to solve the existing horizontal fiscal 
disparities have only led to proposals requiring new funds to com pensate
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the losers, and any reform to the distribution m echanism  o f  the (already 
excessive) available funds is currently considered as politically unviable.
Less detrimental, but not harmless, forms o f  sharing revenues on a 
derivation basis are defined over bases m ore hom ogeneously distributed  
across the national or regional territory. The Brazilian states, for instance, 
have a tax-sharing scheme funded with 25 percent o f  their regional V A T  
revenues. From  this fund, 75 percent is distributed am ong m unicipalities 
on a derivation basis, and the rest by a form ula that considers population, 
land area and other variables.
A  m uch better (if  n ot the best) w ay to allocate unconditional shares 
o f  revenues consists in using form ulas that contain  som e equaliza­
tion  features. This is a quite com m on approach in Latin A m erica, 
although each country seem s to ch oose different equalizing objectives 
and im plem ents its own com binations o f  funding m echanism s and  
distribution criteria. In Brazil the am ount o f  the Federal D istrict and 
State Participation Fund (FPE) and the M unicipalities Participation  
Fund (FPM ) are defined, respectively, as 21.5 and 22.5 percent o f  the 
revenues collected  from  the three m ost im portant federal taxes (personal 
incom e tax, corporate incom e tax and V A T). The FPE is distributed in 
fixed proportions am ong the five m acro regions, w ith the objective o f  
reducing historical disparities. The poorest m acro region, the northeast, 
receives 52.46 percent o f  the fund; an additional 25.37 percent is a llo ­
cated to the north, and the rest to the center-west, southeast and south. 
The FPM  is distributed m ainly in proportion  to the population  o f  each  
m unicipality, but for large m unicipalities an adjustm ent by per capita  
incom e is introduced.
Equalization transfers in the region are m ost com m only financed by 
the central governm ents and distributed across subnational govern­
m ents in accordance with some proxy for poverty or (expenditure) needs. 
Exam ples o f  these program s can be found in virtually all Latin American  
countries, although they broadly differ in their design and im portance in 
subnational public finances. O f course, equalization transfer programs do  
not need to be financed exclusively by the center. A n  alternative approach  
in the region is given by the Chilean Com m on M unicipal Fund, which is 
financed by ow n revenues from  the richest governm ents and distributed  
am ong the rest o f  the m unicipalities with a formula that considers popula­
tion, poverty and other variables. This financing m ethod is known in the 
literature as a ‘fraternal’ system, in contrast to the traditional ‘paternal’ 
system in which the central governm ent provides all the funds o f  the 
program. A nother distinctive experience is the H IPC (heavily indebted  
poor countries initiative) transfer program im plem ented in Bolivia, where 
the funds are provided by international organizations such as the W orld
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Bank and the IM F, and distributed am ong local governm ents in accord­
ance with their relative population and poverty levels.
Equalization transfers are usually unconditional, but there are some 
interesting exem ptions to this rule. The Peruvian R egional Com pensation  
Fund (Fondo de Compensación Regional) and the Chilean N ational Fund  
for R egional D evelopm ent (Fondo Nacional de D esarrollo Regional) 
provide funds conditioned exclusively on capital expenditures at the 
regional level, and their distribution is based on equalizing objectives with  
explicit consideration o f  poverty indicators.
However, addressing horizontal disparities with a sizable transfer 
program exclusively devoted to the objective o f  equalization is not fre­
quent in the region. Revenue-sharing schemes can easily incorporate 
proxies for relative expenditure needs -  such as population and poverty 
ratios -  but it is m uch m ore difficult to correct for differences in fiscal 
capacity.15 In reality, the equalizing m echanism s used in the region do 
not provide explicit estimates o f  expenditure needs, and the equalization  
o f  fiscal capacity is usually not considered in the distribution formulas. 
The problem  in this case is that one m onetary unit that cannot be co l­
lected is exactly equivalent to one m onetary unit that is not available to  
cover expenditure needs. Thus, when fiscal capacity is disregarded it may 
sim ply not be possible to equalize the ability to provide com parable public 
services across the country.
Critical Assessment of Transfer Systems
Certain com m on characteristics o f  the intergovernmental transfer systems 
in Latin Am erican countries are peculiar in the international context. 
In particular, the heavy reliance on revenue-sharing schemes and their 
distribution in accordance with som e equalizing criteria are distinctive 
features o f Latin Am erican subnational finances (M artinez-Vazquez, 
2010). Instead o f  adequate adaptations to the regional reality, however, 
these arrangements suggest som e degree o f  confusion regarding the role 
and consequences o f  this revenue source in a fiscally decentralized system  
o f  government.
R evenue-sharing schem es provide subnational governm ents w ith pre­
dictable and usually buoyant revenues, but they m ight also be associated  
with im portant costs to the public sector and the econom y as a whole. 
If the revenues shared represent a significant proportion o f  the public 
budget then they can be expected to reduce the ability o f  the central 
governm ent to im plem ent desirable tax and expenditures policies. One 
exam ple o f  this situation is observed in Peru, where the revenues shared 
increased their relative im portance due to greater international prices
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Source: Ministry o f Economy and Finance, Peru.
Figure 9.2 Revenues shared over central government tax  collections in 
Peru
paid for Peruvian natural resources. Figure 9.2 presents the evolution  
o f  the ratio o f  revenues shared with subnational governm ent over total 
central governm ent tax collections. A t the beginning o f  the period, in 
2004, the revenues shared with regional and local governm ents repre­
sented only 2 percent o f  the total taxes collected by the central govern­
m ent. W hen international prices reached their peak in 2007, however, 
the transfers to subnational governm ents explained by revenue-sharing 
schemes represented m ore than 12 percent o f  central governm ent tax 
collections. Even though these transfers are conditional on  being spent 
on capital investm ents, they have been quite effective in boosting subna­
tional expenditures and, as a consequence, the central governm ent has 
seen its ability to control the growth o f  the public sector in the margin  
diminished.
Revenue-sharing transfers to local governm ents have also reduced the 
effectiveness o f  the F O N C O M U N  (Fondo de C om pensación M unicipal), 
the only equalization transfer program im plem ented at that level in Peru. 
Figure 9.3 shows the im portance o f  the equalization transfer program  
and the revenues shared in the transfers received by local governm ents. In 
2004 the equalization transfer program represented h a lf o f  the transfers 
received by local governm ents, but its im portance was reduced during 
the 2007-09 period, m ainly due to the increase in revenue sharing. Shared 
revenues were especially significant during 2007, and they remain the m ost
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Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Peru.
Figure 9.3 Composition o f  intergovernmental transfers to local 
governments in Peru
im portant transfer program  for both local and regional governm ents in 
the country.
A  peculiar characteristic o f  som e revenue-sharing schemes in Latin 
A m erica is their m ulti-purpose design, which in som e cases includes the 
equalization objective. This practice m ight help not only to avoid the 
creation o f  new horizontal inequalities, but also to reduce, to som e extent, 
the disparities already encountered in the region. This is a particularly 
relevant topic in Latin America, where individual and regional disparities 
are relatively large by international standards.17 Table 9.2 presents two  
simple measures o f  regional disparities in G D P  per capita for five Latin 
Am erican countries. M exico has the greatest regional disparities. The ratio 
o f  per capita G D P  between the richest state (Cam peche) and the poorest 
state (either Oaxaca or Chiapas) is m ore than 14-fold and does not show  
any decreasing tendency. On the other hand, the coefficient o f  variation  
o f  per capita G D P  for the sample o f  M exican states is greater than 1 for 
the w hole period and reaches a peak o f  1.57 in 2006.18 Other countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Peru display smaller disparities but they 
are still large com pared to those found in other econom ies in the world. 
R odriguez-Pose and Gill (2004), for instance, com pute the coefficient o f  
variation for several developed countries, all o f  which are smaller than 
0.30 in 2000, while other developing countries, such as China and India, 
display a coefficient o f  variation o f  0.58 and 0.44, respectively. Bolivia is
274 D ecentralization  and reform  in L atin  A m erica
Table 9.2 Disparities in regional per capita GDP in five  Latin American 
countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 
max / min 7.89 8.10 8.79 8.14 7.94 7.84
coefficient of 0.70 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.76 0.77 - -
variation 
Bolivia 
max / min 2.69 2.81 2.64 2.69 3.06 4.14 3.51 4.02
coefficient of 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.55
variation 
Brazil 
max / min 8.45 9.60 9.51 9.45 9.06 9.05
coefficient of - - 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53
variation 
Mexico 
max /  min 14.66 15.07 14.35 15.09 17.05 17.26 19.28 18.48
coefficient of 1.14 1.17 1.16 1.24 1.40 1.40 1.57 1.40
variation
Peru
max / min 10.89 11.29 12.25 11.37
coefficient of - - - - 0.60 0.61 0.69 0.65
variation
Source: ECLAC, based on national official statistics.
the country with the lowest fiscal disparities in the sam ple, but this result is 
partially explained by the high poverty rates present throughout the w hole  
country.
Per capita G D P  can be expected to be negatively correlated with needs 
but positively with tax collection capacity. In that context, a sizable and 
well-designed equalization transfer program is particularly im portant to 
ensure that similar standards o f  quality and quantity in the provision o f  
public goods are m et nationally. In Latin America, however, the equalizing  
objective does not always play a significant role in the financing o f  subna­
tional governm ents. Table 9.3 presents the correlation between per capita 
G D P  and per capita transfers received from  revenue-sharing schemes and 
other transfer program s for the same group o f  countries. In Argentina, 
virtually all transfers to the intermediate level o f  governm ent are provided  
through revenue-sharing mechanisms; the positive correlation between  
this revenue source and regional G D P  suggests that the overall transfer 
system  has an unequalizing outcom e. In Brazil, revenue-sharing transfers
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Table 9.3 Correlation between regional per capita GDP and transfers to 
the regions in five  Latin American countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina
G DP -  revenue 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.23
sharing 
Bolivia 
GDP -  revenue 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.68 0.71
sharing 
Brazil 
G D P -  revenue 0.03 -0.22 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.31
sharing 
GDP -  other -0.17 0.06 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.40
transfers
Mexico
GDP -  revenue 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.57
sharing 
GDP -  other 0.23 0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.18 0.20
transfers
Peru 
GDP -  revenue 0.19 0.72 0.79 0.80
sharing 
GDP -  other 0.31 0.50 0.38 0.07
transfers
Notes: For Argentina all transfers to provincial governments are considered as shared
revenues. Revenues shared in Bolivia consist of royalties and taxes applied on the 
exploitation of natural resources. Brazilian revenue-sharing transfers are computed as the 
participation on the federal revenues plus the compensation for the exploitation of natural 
resources. In the case o f Mexico, the revenues shared are given by the participaciones and 
the other transfers by the aportaciones, which are generally defined as conditional transfers. 
Revenue-sharing transfers in Peru consist o f canon, sobrecanon and mining royalties, all of 
them defined as corporate income tax on extractive industries.
Source: Own computations based on ECLAC data.
have displayed a negative sign since 2003, im plying that they are benefiting 
m ore those states with low  per capita G D P. That is the intended role o f  
those transfers in Brazil, which, as we saw above, are set as fixed propor­
tions favoring the poorer m acro regions o f  the country. In contrast, other 
transfers in that country appear to be positively correlated with per capita 
G D P , suggesting poor equalizing effects in terms o f  per capita G D P. In 
M exico and Peru, the two transfer aggregates also show a positive and  
high correlation, although the transfers that are different from revenue
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Table 9.4 Variability o f  per capita revenues in Peruvian municipalities,



















Simple 14.6 125.8 140.5 46.3 186.7
average
Weighted 31.4 64.0 95.3 28.5 123.9
average
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 19.9
Maximum 930.3 8,520.3 9,158.1 448.1 9,184.4
Standard 48.8 350.4 370.0 42.9 374.5
deviation
Coefficient of 1.6 5.5 3.9 1.5 3.0
variation**
Count 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834
Note: * 1 US dollar = 2.87885 nuevos soles. ** The coefficient of variation is computed as 
the ratio between the standard deviation and the weighted average.
Source: Own computations based on data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance,
Peru.
sharing -  those with equalization criteria -  display a low er unequalizing  
effect.
The results in Table 9.3 are suggestive, but much m ore data-based evi­
dence would be necessary in order to assess the overall equalizing effects 
o f  intergovernmental transfer program s currently im plem ented in Latin  
America. Per capita G D P  m ight be related to the fiscal capacity o f  sub­
national governm ents, but that is not necessarily the case nor is it entirely 
clear how per capita G D P  might be related to the needs o f  subnational 
public services.
W ith the lim ited data available, a com plem entary w ay to  evaluate the 
equalizing effects o f  the intergovernmental transfer program s is to verify 
whether they have served to reduce the variability o f  per capita subna­
tional revenues. In Table 9.4 we present a set o f  basic statistics about 
per capita revenues at the m unicipal level in Peru during 2008. Som e 
m unicipalities collect no revenues, but there is one (Santa M aria del Mar, 
in Lima) that collects U S$930.3 per capita. The simple and weighted aver­
ages for the 1,834 m unicipalities are U S$14.6 and U S$31.4, respectively,
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and the coefficient o f  variation is 1.6, which suggests that the variability 
o f  own-revenue collections am ong Peruvian m unicipalities in rather high. 
The second colum n describes the distribution o f  transfers different from  
the equalization program , including those from  revenue-sharing schemes. 
The total am ount o f  these transfers is m ore than twice the am ount o f  own  
revenues, and with the simple average larger than the weighted average, it 
is im plied that less populated m unicipalities tend to receive higher trans­
fers per capita. A gain, som e m unicipalities receive no transfers, but others 
receive substantial am ounts, m ainly from the canon, sobrecanon and 
m ining royalties which, as explained above, are distributed on a derivation  
basis. N o te  that the greatest am ount o f  per capita transfers received by a 
m unicipality, U S$8,520.3 -  transferred to the m unicipality o f  Uabaya in 
Tacna, is 68 times greater than average per capita (total) revenues in the 
country, equal to U S$123.9. The coefficient o f  variation for these trans­
fers is 5.5, indicating huge differences in the allocation o f  transfers across 
municipalities.
Even though we are not considering local expenditure needs in these cal­
culations, it is safe to conclude that transfers (other than those for equali­
zation) are creating major horizontal im balances at the local level in Peru. 
The total am ount o f  m unicipal revenues m inus the equalization transfer 
has a coefficient o f  variation equal to 3.9, which is very large under any 
standard. On the other hand, equalization transfers (distributed through  
the F O N C O M U N  program) also display a relevant degree o f  variability, 
but that variability seems to be helping to reduce horizontal disparities, 
given that the coefficient o f  variation is falling from  3.9 to 3.0. In any case, 
because o f  either its lim ited size or problem s with its design (distribu­
tion criteria, and so on), horizontal disparities remain very large and the 
equalization program  has had a lim ited equalizing effect in that country. 
N ote that the m inim um  am ount o f  per capita equalization transfers is 
greater than zero, which im plies that even those m unicipalities receiving 
disproportionate am ounts o f  resources from  the revenue-sharing scheme 
are defined as beneficiaries o f  the equalization transfer program .19
The case o f  Peru is not representative o f  all countries in the region, 
but there are som e com m on aspects that deserve to be em phasized. Latin  
A m erican countries often understand the fiscal decentralization system  
itself simply as the sharing o f  central governm ent revenues, w ithout 
requiring the additional revenues to be properly linked to the level and 
type o f  subnational public expenditures (M artinez-Vazquez, 2010).
In general, the excessive reliance on revenue sharing and the correspond­
ing small share o f  ow n subnational revenue collections have led to limited 
accountability and to a soft-budget constraint problem  in the region 
(Ahm ad and Brosio, 2008). In order to solve this problem  we suggest
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strengthening the link between revenues and expenditure by im plem enting  
equalization transfer program s that are capable o f  correcting the marginal 
cost o f  funds faced by the subnational governm ents. This solution must 
be accom panied by the introduction o f  adequate m easures o f  expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity, as well as by initiatives to im prove own-revenue 
collections in the region (M artinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2012).20 In 
addition, revenues shared on a derivation basis should be reduced to a 
m agnitude at which they do not prevent the equalization transfer system  
o f  correcting the marginal cost o f  public funds faced by the subnational 
governments.
4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN IDEAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER SYSTEM
A  sound financial structure at the subnational level is essential for the 
success o f  the fiscal decentralization process. U nfortunately, despite exten­
sive international practice and academ ic research on  this issue, it is still 
unclear what the ideal structure o f  the intergovernmental transfer system  
should be. In this section we review the basic principles for structuring the 
intergovernmental transfer system and take a look  at very simple alterna­
tives to im plem ent an efficient and fair subnational fiscal structure.
Different types o f  intergovernmental transfers are available to policy  
makers, but the proper choice is necessarily linked to the specific objec­
tives that are being pursued. The literature distinguishes several possible 
objectives, am ong which the follow ing m ay be the m ost im portant:21
•  reducing vertical imbalances;
•  ensuring national standards o f  certain public goods and services;
•  financing developm ent programs;
•  correcting for positive and negative externalities;
•  reducing horizontal imbalances; and
•  enhancing fiscal autonom y.
Provided that subnational governm ents are generally not able to collect 
by themselves all the funds required to fulfill their expenditure responsibil­
ities, any transfer from  the central governm ent to the subnational govern­
m ents helps reduce any existing vertical im balance. The m ain questions in 
this regard are: (i) what is the size o f  the vertical imbalance; and (ii) to what 
extent is the country willing and able to reduce that imbalance?22 Once the 
total am ount o f  funds available for intergovernmental transfers has been  
determined, the specific allocation criteria can be chosen in accordance
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with the other objectives that are going to be pursued. Each policy objec­
tive can better be served with certain types o f  intergovernm ental transfers, 
and it is usually preferable to use a separate transfer program to pursue 
each single objective. This allows for clarity o f  purpose and design and 
facilitates the evaluation o f  particular transfer programs.
One o f  the m ost im portant objectives o f  intergovernm ental transfer 
programs is to ensure that minimum quantity and/or quality stand­
ards are met across the national territory. This objective is very broad  
and it im plies that subnational governm ents may not be given full 
discretion over expenditure decisions. In this sense, we can think o f  
m inim um  standard requirements as a way to define delegated or non- 
discretionary responsibilities -  or non-discretionary com ponents within  
certain responsibilities -  as opposed to ow n responsibilities where the sub­
national governm ents enjoy full autonom y or discretion over expenditure 
decisions.23 In other words, these transfers m ay be conditional in nature. 
There are m any possible exam ples, but two especially im portant cases are 
transfers for education and health, where the central governm ent usually 
sets national standards and retains a great deal o f control over subna­
tional expenditure decisions. Other exam ples are the transfer program s for 
supporting pregnant wom en, children at risk, and the elderly.
D evelopm ent program s can have national or subnational scope, 
depending on the design o f  the developm ent strategy. Transfers in support 
o f  this objective are usually conditional on being spent on capital expen­
ditures, but can plausibly be given for current expenditures as well.24 The 
theoretical literature gives especial im portance to  the role o f  correcting 
externalities. A dditional transfers, plausibly determined through m atch­
ing schemes, can help to encourage greater expenditures o f  subnational 
governm ents in those functions with positive externalities outside the 
borders o f  subnational jurisdictions.
Once all revenue sources have been determined and the central govern­
m ent has transferred the resources necessary to attain national standards 
and developm ent goals, then governm ents o f  the same level will display sig­
nificant differences in financing abilities. These differences are referred to 
as ‘horizontal im balances’, and are addressed through equalization trans­
fer programs. Presum ing that the central government has provided the 
funds necessary to fund all delegated functions, the need for equalization  
is fundam entally related to the financing o f  own-expenditure functions. As 
a consequence, equalization transfers should serve to enhance subnational 
fiscal autonom y, and thus they usually are defined as unconditional. Fiscal 
autonom y is a necessary condition for efficient subnational decisions, and 
therefore it is by itself considered as an objective o f  the transfer program. 
Provided that there is som e degree o f  tax autonom y, with a sizable
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unconditional equalization program in place, however, there is no need 
for any other transfer program to pursue the objective o f  fiscal autonom y.
A ll in all, the design o f  the transfer system  can roughly be organized  
into four types o f  transfers to be applied sequentially. First, the central 
governm ent should attem pt to provide conditional transfers in am ounts 
close to the cost o f  delegated functions, such that national standards o f  
quality and quantity can be m et by all subnational governm ents. Second, 
a different program  o f  conditional transfers could be set in order to  
finance developm ent programs, either o f  regional scope or as a part o f  
local developm ent initiatives. Third, m atching grants, w hich are essen­
tially conditional, could  be provided in order to foster expenditures in 
socially desirable and sensitive services, including those with positive  
externalities.25 Fourth, the equalization transfer program  based on dif­
ferences in expenditure needs and fiscal capacity acts as the balancing  
instrument for the w hole system  o f  subnational revenues. If defined as 
unconditional it allow s for adjusting the am ounts o f  discretionary expen­
ditures, while the precise am ount given to  each subnational governm ent 
also helps to bring the cost o f  public funds faced by each jurisdiction  
closer to the optim al level.
These transfers can be defined separately for any level o f  subnational 
governm ent and for both  current and capital expenditures. O f course, lim ­
iting the use o f  transfers to capital purposes m akes them conditional, but 
such a broad lim itation m ight still leave room  for autonom ous choices as 
well as for additional conditions in terms o f  specific functions and services 
(Herrero-Alcalde et al., 2010). N ote that from a theoretical viewpoint, 
revenue-sharing schemes are simply not necessary, and that the only key 
com ponents o f  the transfer system  are the conditional transfers and the 
equalization program. Indeed, absent externalities it is possible to think 
o f a situation where only these two types o f  program provide all the funds 
that subnational governm ents require in addition to their own-revenue 
collections.
The Architecture of Equalization Transfer Program s
Bahl and Bird (2008) argue that an intergovernmental transfer system  
capable o f  offsetting the dis-equalizing effects o f  subnational taxation is 
a precondition for a successful decentralization o f  significant revenue- 
raising powers. This is largely a non-controversial issue in the design  
o f  decentralized systems; however, m ost countries in Latin Am erica do  
not have an equalization program  in place, and the existing equalization  
m echanism s usually have very limited equalizing power. In the follow ing  
discussion we briefly describe som e o f  the m ost im portant concepts related
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to the design and  im plem entation o f an effective equalization transfer 
program .
Equalization transfers are intended to  provide subnational govern­
ments o f the same level with similar opportunities to deliver public goods 
and services of com parable quality in spite of their dissimilar conditions. 
O n the one hand, some o f the dissimilar conditions can be observed on 
the expenditure side o f  the budget. Different governm ents are faced with 
different costs and even production  functions, as well as with different 
needs of the population  arising, for example, from  age com position. The 
concept sum m arizing these factors is called ‘expenditure needs’, defined as 
the cost o f providing a standard  am ount and quantity  o f public goods and 
services to the local com m unity. On the o ther hand, on the revenue side o f 
the budget governm ents are faced with different adm inistration capacity, 
tax bases, compliance culture and behavioral responses to  taxation. These 
factors determine th a t jurisdictions can differ in their ability to  collect 
revenues to cover their expenditure needs. In  this context, fiscal capacity 
can be defined as the ability o f a governm ent to  collect revenues from  the 
assigned sources at a given m arginal cost and level o f fiscal effort.
The difference between expenditure needs (.EN) and fiscal capacity (FC) 
is equal to  w hat in the literature has been called ‘fiscal disparity’ (FD):
FIf = EN, FC,
where the subscript i denotes any jurisdiction.26 If  the fiscal disparity of 
jurisdiction i is positive (negative) then its governm ent has, under standard 
conditions, less (more) funds than  required in order to cover its expendi­
ture needs. In this context, horizontal im balances m ight be defined as 
the differences in per capita fiscal disparities across jurisdictions, and the 
objective o f  the equalization transfer problem  is the reduction of those 
differences.27 In practice, however, equalization transfer program s around 
the world vary in term s o f w hat their objective is (see Table 9.5). In some 
cases the equalization is based only on expenditure needs; in others only 
on fiscal capacity; and  there are also m any examples where bo th  factors 
are considered.
By considering exclusively either expenditure needs or fiscal capacity 
one would implicitly assume tha t the o ther factor does no t significantly 
vary across jurisdictions. This could plausibly be true; but it does no t seem 
to be the case in Latin  Am erican countries where regional inequalities are 
pronounced and in m ost cases arising (to different extents) from  both  sides 
o f the budget. M oreover, since one additional m onetary unit o f expendi­
ture needs is equivalent to  one m onetary unit loss o f  fiscal capacity, then it 
is correct to  consider bo th  factors as equally im portant.
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Table 9.5 E qualization goals, allocation fa c to rs  and  international practice
Goals Factors Country examples
Enable similar levels of 
service affordability
Enable similar levels 
of fiscal resource 
availability 
Enable similar levels of 
service at similar 
levels of taxation
Expenditure needs 
indicators, or national 
expenditure standards
Fiscal capacity indicators
Fiscal disparity = 
Expenditure needs -  Fiscal 
capacity, or some other 
combination of need and 
capacity
India, Italy, Nigeria’s 
Federation Account, 
South Africa’s Equitable 






Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands’ Municipal 
Fund, Russia, Uganda’s 
Equalization Grant, 
United Kingdom
Source: Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
The im plem entation o f an  equalization transfer program  can be struc­
tured in three steps. F irst, it is necessary to  determ ine the size o f  the 
transfer fund. The total am ount o f equalization transfers should be, in 
principle, related to  the excess o f expenditure needs over potential rev­
enues different from  the equalization transfer itself. In  practice, however, 
the size o f the transfer fund depends m ore generally on the chosen 
funding system,28 the availability o f  financial resources at the national 
level, and on political constraints. A lthough some countries a ttem pt to 
alm ost fully equalize horizontal disparities (for example, G erm any), typi­
cally the overall funds m ade available are insufficient to fully eliminate 
existing fiscal disparities.
The second step consists in estim ating relative fiscal disparities. It is 
usually not possible to  accurately com pute the actual fiscal disparity of 
each subnational governm ent. Instead, and depending on the quality of 
the inform ation available, a country can rely on a num ber o f m ethodolo­
gies to estim ate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity in relative term s for 
all subnational governm ents.29 In general, it is not recom m ended to base 
the estim ation o f fiscal disparities on historical da ta  related to  actual 
spending and  revenues. On the one hand, historical budgets m ight have 
been poorly assigned, and thus not associated with efficient fiscal deci­
sions. On the other hand, doing this would provide perverse incentives
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because subnational authorities would easily learn to  spend m ore and 
collect less in order to  increase transfers in the future.
There are several m ethodologies available for estim ating expendi­
ture needs; unfortunately, the m ost attractive options are also the m ost 
inform ation intensive and require da ta  tha t are usually unavailable in 
developing countries. A  feasible and effective option m ay be the com puta­
tion o f per client expenditure norm s adjusted for cost differences across 
jurisdictions. U nder this m ethodology we only need to  determ ine the total 
am ount o f  resources to  be spent in the m ost im portan t subnational func­
tions or program s, and then com pute the norm  by dividing this am ount 
by the to tal num ber o f clients tha t are intended to receive the benefits of 
the program . The expenditure norm  m ight be adjusted to  reflect cost dif­
ferences across jurisdictions, and it corresponds to  a nationw ide per client 
expenditure need. The client-based expenditure norm  m ay have a p re­
scriptive or suggestive character, but in any case it facilitates the national 
debate about fiscal policy reforms.
The estim ation o f fiscal capacity determines how m uch revenue each 
governm ent can raise from  its own sources w ith a standard  level o f tax 
effort (and allowing for all other transfers received different from  equali­
zation). W hen subnational governm ents have some degree o f discretion 
over tax sources, the standard  level o f effort is sometimes represented by 
the effective tax rate, defined as the ratio o f revenue collections over the 
tax  base. In  general, however, w hat m atters in no t only the tax  rate  but 
also the m arginal collection costs faced by each local government. F rom  
an optim al taxation perspective, and in order to  minimize the costs o f the 
tax system, the m arginal cost o f  public funds collected m ust be equalized 
across all governm ents o f the same level. M oreover, since the resultant 
m easure o f fiscal capacity is based on equal conditions for all subnational 
governm ents o f the same level, then it can be considered as both  fair and 
efficient.
In practice, however, the estim ation o f fiscal capacity in developing 
countries is challenging due to  lim ited data  availability. There are m eth­
odologies, such as the representative tax system, tha t provide appropriate 
approxim ations o f fiscal capacity, but the data  requirem ents may be out 
o f reach for m ost L atin  Am erican countries.30 M ore practical solutions 
m ight be to  consider, a t least tem porarily while the inform ation systems 
are developed, either averages of historical collections, or proxies for the 
size o f  the tax bases assigned to the subnational governments. The first 
o f these alternatives is not ideal because historical revenues might no t be 
obtained under fairly equal and efficient conditions, but at least the use o f 
an average o f several years would reduce the perverse incentives on rev­
enues and expenditure decisions. The second m ethodology is preferable,
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but good proxies such as the G D P in the jurisdiction are usually unavail­
able. The im plem entation of this m ethodology m ight be m ore feasible in 
a second stage o f  the reform , when m ore and better da ta  are available to 
subnational governm ents.
The th ird  step in the im plem entation o f an equalization  transfer 
p rogram  is to  com pute the am ount o f  transfers to  be assigned to  each 
subnational governm ent. I f  the fiscal d isparity  o f a governm ent is posi­
tive then its expenditure needs exceed its fiscal capacity  and  a transfer 
will be necessary in o rder to  im prove its fiscal situation. O n the con­
trary , if  the result is negative then the m unicipality will have m ore 
resources than  it needs (according to  the established standards) and no 
transfer will be justified. Excluding those subnational governm ents w ith 
negative fiscal disparities from  the benefits o f the equalization  transfer 
p rogram  is a simple and  effective way to  im prove the equalizing pow er 
o f  the equalization transfer p rog ram .31 E qualization  transfers can be 
assigned simply in p ro p o rtio n  to the size o f the positive fiscal disparities, 
o r  by prioritizing the governm ents w ith the greatest fiscal disparity  per 
capita.
Finally, it is im portan t to note that equalization transfers are no t neces­
sarily restricted to  current expenditures. The expenditure responsibilities 
assigned to subnational governm ent require both current and  capital 
expenditures, and  as such autonom ous efficient decisions over a flow of 
capital financing m ight also result in economic gains from  greater alloca­
tion efficiency. This is a ra ther unexplored topic in the literature, and one 
where in ternational experience is still no t developed. A  good example 
is given by the Regional Com pensation Fund, the equalization transfer 
program  for capital expenditures at the regional level in Peru. In reality, 
however, the im plem entation o f this program  is m ore an attem pt to  con­
strain the use o f  the equalization funds than  an innovative solution to 
the problem s o f im proving equity and efficiency. Indeed, in Peru regional 
governments do no t receive unconditional equalization transfers, and at 
the local level the governm ents are not given equalization transfers for 
capital spending.
In a recent paper, H errero-Alcalde et al. (2010) suggest a m ethodology 
for a new capital transfer program  for Spanish autonom ous communities, 
where a portion  o f  the transfer is given with the objective o f equalizing the 
ability of governm ents to  regularly improve and m aintain  their stock of 
capital, and another portion  is intended to offset historical differences in 
the accum ulated stock o f capital. This is a new area of research th a t offers 
alternatives to  decentralized countries to  improve the allocation o f the 
available funds am ong subnational governm ents for capital investment 
purposes.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Latin  Am erican countries have long been involved in fiscal decentrali­
zation reforms, but in general they have not yet come up with efficient 
arrangem ents for subnational governm ent financing. Some of the m ain 
problem s in the region are the excessive dependency on revenue-sharing 
arrangem ents, poor revenue collection perform ance at the subnational 
levels, and inadequate or un im portan t equalization schemes. This situa­
tion has weakened the accountability mechanisms and the perceived link­
ages between tax  and expenditure decisions.
The fiscal decentralization literature describes some o f the necessary 
conditions for a well-functioning subnational fiscal structure, but it is 
ra ther am biguous regarding its com position and the extent to which 
revenue-sharing schemes m ight be used w ithout distorting the incentives 
faced by subnational governments. In  this chapter we provide a novel 
analysis o f the problem  and conclude tha t revenue sharing should be used, 
if  a t all, to  finance only non-discretionary (or delegated) expenditure func­
tions. Own (discretionary) expenditure functions, in contrast, should be 
associated with an efficient (positive) m arginal cost of public funds, which 
can plausibly be set in a com bination of own-revenue collections and  a 
well-designed equalization transfer program .
O ur analysis suggests that Latin Am erican countries m ight signifi­
cantly improve their decentralization systems by reducing their reliance 
on revenue-sharing schemes and expanding and  im proving the design of 
sizable equalization transfer program s. These program s can help reduce 
horizontal imbalances and, when com bined with significant own-revenue 
autonom y, provide subnational governm ents with the right incentives to 
spend efficiently and develop their own tax  collection capacity.
This chapter also provides general guidelines on how to proceed with 
the design and im plem entation o f equalization transfer systems in Latin 
Am erican countries. Sophisticated m ethodologies for the com putation  of 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity m ight no t be feasible due to limited 
d a ta  availability, bu t useful good alternatives exist th a t can be readily 
im plem ented in the region.
NOTES
* We are grateful to ECLAC for financial support and to Giorgio Brosio and Juan Pablo 
Jiménez for helpful comments. We are also indebted to Andrea Podestà, Janet Porras, 
Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza and Gabriel Leonardo for useful research assistance.
1. We follow a common practice in the literature and use the term ‘subnational’ to refer 
to all government units under the central (or national) level. We distinguish two
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subnational levels o f government: the intermediate or regional level, which in Latin 
America may also be said to consist o f states, departments or provinces; and the local 
or municipal level.
2. The minor importance o f own revenues and the absence of equalization transfers might 
have a common origin. In particular, heavier reliance on own revenues typically comes 
together with great disparities in the economic base and thus makes the introduction of 
an equalization transfer program  much more necessary.
3. Oates (1999, 2006) offers updated discussions about the gains and challenges o f fiscal 
decentralization reforms.
4. McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) and Shah (2004) provide overviews on the inter­
national practices in expenditure assignments.
5. Another im portant aspect to be considered is the decentralization of tax administra­
tion. Local government accountability may be enhanced when local governments 
administer and enforce their own taxes (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2010).
6. Subnational borrowings are an additional financial source for subnational govern­
ments, but in practice few countries, most of them developed, have been able to extend 
successfully the use o f financial debt among subnational governments. In developing 
countries it is common to observe that only the capital and a few other large municipali­
ties have gained access to private credit markets.
7. Some general rules o f thumb have been provided. One is that autonom ous revenues 
should be sufficient to finance the expenditure responsibilities o f the richest subnational 
governments. In the following discussion we shall see that even though this can be a 
good approximation, it can fall short of typifying an optimal assignment o f revenues.
8. Estimating the size o f the vertical imbalance is a complex task. As argued in Canavire- 
Bacarreza et al. (2010), any estimation of the vertical imbalances requires, among other 
things, an explicit methodology for estimating expenditure needs (corresponding to the 
current expenditure assignments) and estimates of own-revenue capacity and all types of 
transfers. In practice, the decision about the actual amount o f  intergovernmental transfers 
tends to rest more on political than on technical considerations (Bird and Tarasov, 2004).
9. Strictly speaking, the label ‘own’ revenues should be reserved for those taxes for which 
subnational governments have some control over the rates or the tax base; or at least 
over the final am ount o f revenue collections. By definition, all forms o f revenue sharing 
are excluded from that category.
10. Similarly, Smart (1998) argues that (equalization) transfers reduce the marginal cost of 
funds for subnational governments.
11. According to optimal taxation theory, subnational revenues should be assigned in such 
a way that the marginal cost of public funds is equalized across levels of government 
and governments o f the same level. See, for instance, Dahlby and Wilson (1994).
12. In Section 4 we shall discuss the objectives and design of equalization transfer programs 
in more detail.
13. Although the presence of vertical imbalances is rather obvious, their actual extent is 
unknown due to the lack of estimates o f the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity o f the 
different levels of government in each country.
14. This section draws partially on Martinez-Vazquez (2010), who offers an exhaustive 
review of government financing practices at the local level in Latin American countries.
15. Jiménez and Podestá (2009) provide a comprehensive overview of intergovernmental 
transfer systems in Latin America and emphasize the volatility of the central taxes 
shared with subnational governments.
16. Higher fiscal capacity calls for fewer transfers, but implementing a downward adjust­
ment of the transfer amounts can be technically challenging or politically difficult. 
Theoretically, there would not be any problem if the proxies used to account for 
expenditure needs are negatively (and perfectly) correlated with fiscal capacity, but that 
would rarely be the case.
17. Goñi et al. (2008) describe the extent of individual inequalities in the region and discuss 
the causes of the poor performance of redistributive policies.
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18. The coefficient of variation is computed as the ratio between the standard deviation and 
the simple average of per capita GDP.
19. Of course, the equalizing effect o f the program could easily be increased by excluding 
these municipalities from its benefits, but this has not been done yet.
20. A natural consequence of incorporating fiscal capacity into the equalization formula 
would be that those subnational governments better able to cover their expenditure 
needs would be excluded from the benefits o f the program. This means that the avail­
able funds can reduce horizontal imbalances more effectively because more resources 
would be available to the jurisdictions with greater fiscal disparities.
21. The literature on intergovernmental transfers is extensive. Introductory expositions can 
be found, for instance, in Bahl and Linn (1994), Bird and Smart (2002), Schroeder and 
Smoke (2003), Boadway (2007) and Martinez-Vazquez and Searle (2007).
22. There is no single best way to measure vertical imbalance, but most of the measures 
used look at what share of subnational government responsibilities cannot be financed 
with own revenues. Clearly, how well the vertical imbalance is reduced depends on 
how the expenditure needs of subnational governments are defined. For a given set of 
expenditure standards, the country may be willing or able to satisfy only a  part or all of 
those expenditure needs. The lower the standards defined for the expenditure needs the 
easier it becomes to reduce the vertical imbalance. Thus the existence and measurement 
of vertical imbalance depend critically on the quantification o f expenditure needs and 
the extent o f revenue autonomy at the subnational level.
23. In some countries the minimum standards are notional (as opposed to compulsory) and 
they are only employed for budgetary computations. For instance, minimum standards 
can be implicitly defined in the estimation of expenditure needs in an equalization 
formula, and subnational governments can employ the received funds without any con­
ditionality. This is the practice, for example, in Ukraine (Martinez-Vazquez and Thirsk, 
2011).
24. Searle and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) offer an extensive discussion on conditional or tied 
grants.
25. Creating disincentives for certain expenditures with negative externalities would require 
economic sanctions, which might be implemented, for instance, as a reduction of 
equalization transfers.
26. Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) and Dafflon (2007) provide surveys of alterna­
tive definitions o f fiscal disparity, most o f which are directly related to the concept of 
expenditure needs, fiscal capacity, or their combination.
27. Fiscal disparities are more easily defined in per capita terms for comparability purposes.
28. The funding rule could be a revenue-sharing scheme or left as an ad hoc decision to be 
determined in the annual national budget. Predictable and stable sources of revenues 
are preferable because they provide more certainty for subnational budgets.
29. A revision o f the methodologies described in the literature can be found in Boex and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2007). See also US ACIR (1986, 1990, 1993) for more detailed dis­
cussions on fiscal capacity estimations.
30. A description of this methodology can be found, for instance, in US ACIR (1993).
31. Under a ‘fraternal’ (or Robin Hood) system like the one used in Chile, the pool o f funds 
would be fed with contributions from those jurisdictions with negative fiscal disparities. 
This is a way to  perform faster equalization across jurisdictions but is not always politi­
cally acceptable.
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10. The intergovernmental allocation 
of revenue from natural resources: 
finding a balance between 
centripetal and centrifugal pressure
Giorgio Brosio and Juan Pablo Jimenez
1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the allocation o f rents from  non-renew able natural 
resources, hydrocarbons and m inerals, am ong levels o f governm ent in 
Latin  America. This is a crucial issue no t only from  the po in t o f  view 
o f ensuring good governance a t the subnational level, bu t also from  the 
necessity o f avoiding political conflict and  strains on national unity. 
Latin  Am erican countries have accom m odated fairly well regional claims 
on natu ral resources. However, things could change for the worse as 
a few countries, notably  Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and  possibly 
Brazil in the future, experience acute conflicts over assignm ent o f natural 
resources.
Rents from  natu ral resources reach substantial levels in m any Latin 
Am erican countries (Table 10.1, below). Some o f these countries are 
am ong the w orld’s m ost im portan t producers of hydrocarbons and m in­
erals. M ore precisely, non-renewable natural resources in Latin  America 
contribute to  m ore than  20 per cent o f to tal exports in a large set o f 
countries including Bolivia (P lurinational State of), Chile, Colom bia, and 
Mexico. In Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) oil accounts for alm ost 
80 per cent o f to tal exports. T rinidad and Tobago follows closely, with 
alm ost tw o-thirds o f exports coming from  oil. As a consequence o f this 
economic role, rents appropriated  by governm ent represent an im portant 
share o f public revenue.
Similar to  other parts o f the world, a salient characteristic o f non ­
renewable resources production  in Latin America is the huge geographical 
concentration o f p roduction .1 Oil and m ineral resources are frequently 
discovered and exploited in sparsely populated areas, creating potentially
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huge horizontal imbalances, if rents were assigned exclusively, or mostly, 
to  subnational governments.
Obviously, large imbalances across subnational jurisdictions stimulate 
political pressures and  provide theoretical grounds for national equali­
zation o f these resources. A t the same time, sparsely populated regions 
exercise little weight in national politics, particularly in weak dem ocra­
cies with poor m echanisms for checks and balances. This increases their 
perceived risks o f having to  bear the costs o f exploitation w ithout reaping 
the benefits, if entitlem ents to national resource revenues are transferred 
to  the national governm ent. In general, when local jurisdictions have little 
power at the central level, they increase their dem ands for decentralization 
o f powers and resources.
As we shall see, the Latin  Am erican case is o f notable interest from  the 
po in t o f view o f the fiscal and institutional mechanisms tha t are used for 
sharing the rents between levels o f governm ent and  for controlling their 
expenditure. Recent decentralization trends have expanded the institu­
tional role of subnational governm ents and made them  m ore vocal in 
dem anding a share o f the revenues generated within their jurisdiction. 
Increasing dem ands to share the benefits o f natu ral resource exploitation 
are also coming from  territories whose population has distinct ethnic char­
acteristics, such as the A ndean highlands. A t the same time, local and indi- 
geneous com m unities fear the negative im pact on their environm ent that 
could derive from  exploration and exploitation activities. Latin  Am erican 
countries are also characterized by huge regional economic gaps. W hen 
no t adequately m anaged and allocated -  tha t is, where national gov­
ernm ents prove incapable o f harm onizing com peting claims between 
themselves and their regions -  natural resources could increase political 
tensions and  exacerbate regional disparities.
This chapter raises some issues and tries to answer the following ques­
tions: w hat are the m erits and the risks involved by sharing the rents from  
natural resources w ith subnational governments? Are there principles or 
analytical argum ents in favor o f it? W hat are the peculiarities o f Latin 
Am erican systems for rent sharing? W hat is the equity im pact o f sharing 
on the Latin A m erican continent? W hat are the m ain ways for im prov­
ing sharing systems? How can production  expansion and environm ental 
concerns be harm onized?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is analytical, but policy 
oriented. It explores the issues connected to  the sharing o f rents from  
natural resources am ong levels o f governm ent and gives some policy indi­
cations on how to perform  the rent sharing based on the economic theory 
of the rem uneration o f production factors. It also considers the interplay 
between intergovernm ental allocation o f the rent, on the one hand, and
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assignment o f environm ental responsibilities, on the other. Essentially, 
the policy indications stress the consideration that policy m akers have 
to  give, when bargaining over shares, to the effective responsibilities 
carried out by various levels o f governm ent, while argum ents o f principle 
or a priori should be given very little weight. Section 3 is empirical and 
analyzes the issue o f intergovernm ental sharing in eight Latin  American 
countries endowed with oil, gas and minerals with particu lar emphasis on 
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colom bia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Chile. In the last case, however, no sharing has been introduced up to  the 
present time. Section 4 concludes.
2 THE ANALYTICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
SHARING
To simplify the problem , no distinction is m ade in the text tha t follows 
between the level o f governm ent that taxes the ren t and  the level that 
receives the revenue, tha t is, sharing of taxing powers equals the sharing 
o f revenue. We consider tw o levels o f government: federal/central and 
regional. There are hence three alternative solutions: federal/central taxa­
tion, taxation o f natural resources by producing regions, and  taxation of 
rents by regions where the owners are resident. This last alternative is, 
however, m ostly theoretical with almost no im plem entation in the real 
world. Therefore it will no t be explored here.
Legal/Constitutional Discipline: Ownership versus Taxation and 
Regulatory Powers
One could naively imagine tha t the intergovernm ental sharing issue 
could be settled for good by legal and especially constitutional m andates. 
Elowever, this is no t the case in the real world. C onstitutions are frequently 
silent on the issue. In other cases they leave it unsettled by assigning own­
ership to the people, as in the constitution o f Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of)- M ost im portantly, ownership is not a decisive factor for the alloca­
tion o f the rents. Ownership defines the entitlem ent to  receive rent and, at 
the same time, it defines the competence to manage, contro l and m onitor 
the use o f the resources essentially through the granting o f concessions 
to exploiting firms. As a consequence, the entitlem ent to  receive the rent 
can be thw arted by constitutional m andates referring to taxation  and 
other policies. M ore specifically, the assignm ent o f taxing powers to a 
level o f governm ent tha t does no t own the natural resources allows this 
government to extract to  its benefit part or all o f the rent. This can also
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be done through tax instrum ents tha t are no t directly related to natural 
resources (such as corporate income tax). A similar result, appropriation 
o f the rent w ithout ownership, can derive from  the assignment to  a level o f 
governm ent -  or even from  simple use, even w ithout explicit assignment -  
o f  other, in particular regulatory, policies, such as for example the regula­
tion o f the domestic m arkets and/or external exchanges. The rent can also 
be assigned to  consumers through ceilings on domestic prices, quotas on 
exports and, as we shall see for Argentina, export taxes.
A rgentina, as will be explained in m ore detail later in this chapter, p ro ­
vides a convenient example in support o f the assertion tha t it is no t own­
ership, bu t rather taxation tha t determines effective rent sharing. Article 
124 o f the 1994 Argentine C onstitution stipulates tha t the provinces have 
the original dom inion over the natu ral resources existing in their territory. 
U sing this constitutional recognition of their rights, the provinces are pres­
ently negotiating and  signing contracts with firms. However, the federal 
governm ent retains the power, derived from  an ordinary law, to regulate 
the sector. M ore im portantly, it has also, by constitutional m andate, the 
pow er to  regulate the domestic m arket and internal prices, in addition to 
the exclusive pow er on im port and  export taxes and the secured access 
to com pany profit taxation  (although it does not use it specifically for 
extracting rent from  oil and gas). As a result, the federal governm ent is 
able to extract to  its benefit a share o f the rent from  natu ral resources that 
is m uch larger than  th a t going to the provinces.
Consequently, one has to  look for other argum ents to find guidance 
concerning the sharing o f the rent.
Economic Theory
There is quite a substantial branch o f economic literature dealing with the 
allocation o f rent am ong levels o f governm ent.2 M ost o f this literature has 
a prevailing norm ative flavor and stresses the im portance o f considering 
both  the m icroeconom ic and the m acroeconom ic im pact o f the assign­
m ent. In general, the conclusions arrived at in this literature derive from 
the consideration o f  how the rent is likely to be spent by the beneficiary 
government.
The theory m aintains tha t under reasonable assum ptions about the 
expenditure o f the rent, central taxation and appropriation  is superior on 
efficiency grounds to other solutions. This is because the com bination of 
federal taxing and  spending policies is m ore likely to  introduce geographi­
cal neutrality in the allocation o f production  factors. Furtherm ore, with 
regional taxation and appropriation  o f the rent by regional governments, 
fluctuations in in ternational prices and in volumes may place excessive
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strains on essential public spending during dow nturns, and  waste and 
unsustainable spending during periods o f rising prices and  volumes.
This literature is silent about the to tal share tha t should accrue to  the 
governm ent, be it central or regional, and concentrates on suggestions on 
the relative shares o f  the two levels o f government.
Mobility of Factors
This is the m ain efficiency-based argum ent used against the assignm ent of 
economic rent to subnational governments. A simple illustration (drawn 
from  Boadway and  Flatters, 1982, 1993) refers to inefficient m igration of 
labor. A  country has two local jurisdictions: A and  B. The population 
o f the country is fixed and, for the sake o f simplicity, it comprises persons 
o f working age, hom ogeneous in skills and preferences and perfectly 
mobile between A  and B. M obility is induced only by economic consid­
erations. M ore specifically, people maximize their com prehensive income, 
which is salary, minus the taxes paid to  the local jurisdiction, plus the 
value o f the goods and  services provided locally. Individuals will m igrate 
to  the jurisdiction where comprehensive income, for any reason, is higher.
Initially, no rent from  natural resources is collected. Local jurisdictions 
provide goods and finance them  with benefit taxes. The net fiscal benefit, 
equal to  the difference between the value o f the locally provided good and 
the taxes paid to  finance them, does not vary across jurisdictions. In  this 
situation, there is no fiscal inducem ent to  m igrate and the location o f indi­
viduals is determ ined only by the wage they receive. In  tu rn , the wage is 
determ ined by the value o f the m arginal p roduct o f labor. Individuals will 
thus distribute themselves between the two jurisdictions so as to  equalize 
the m arginal value o f product.
N ow  consider natu ral resources. These are discovered and exploited 
in A, which collects them. The am ount o f the taxed ren t can be used to 
enhance the quality o f the publicly provided goods, or to  reduce the taxes 
paid for them. Individuals will move from  B to A attracted  by a higher 
net fiscal benefit. U nder the pressure o f new m igrants, wages will diminish 
until equality is restored between comprehensive incomes. However, this 
leads to  an inefficient distribution of labor, since the m arginal p roduct is 
lower in A than in B. In fact, to  accom m odate m ore m igrants, jobs with 
lower m arginal p roduct have been provided.
This means tha t redistributing individuals from  A  to  B could increase 
the total national product o f labor. This could be obtained, for example, 
by centralizing the collection o f the rent and by using it for the financing 
o f national public goods, or for distributing it in equal per capita am ounts 
between A  and B, as suggested by the theory. In practice, resource-rich
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regions could be tem pted to start inefficient industry a ttraction  policies, 
by using their rent.
There are very few estim ates o f  the efficiency losses associated with 
m ovem ents o f  individuals and  capital tow ards those jurisd ictions tha t 
are m ost advantaged w ith regard  to n a tu ra l resources. M ieszkowsky 
and  T oder (1983) have calculated for the seven A m erican states w ith 
significant revenue from  n a tu ra l resources, the  welfare loss th a t could 
derive from  m isallocation  o f  labor and cap ita l if  their entire energy 
revenue were used fo r subsidizing alternatively labor and  capital. 
A ccording to their evaluation  the ‘efficiency losses associated w ith 
m igration o f capital and labou r to  energy producing states m ay, on 
balance, be sm all’ (p. 89).
The m agnitude of the loss depends on m igration elasticities,3 which 
depend on region-specific factors. F o r example, m igration elasticities in 
Alaska are m uch lower than  in the other Am erican states, and also in 
C anada they seem to be quite low, according to recent studies.4
The relevance o f the factor m obility argum ent should be even lower for 
Latin  Am erican countries, where m ost natu ral resources are located in 
very rem ote, and sometimes even inhospitable, areas.
The Theory of Factor Prices and Distribution
The standard economic theory on factor prices and distribution is, as m en­
tioned above, possibly the economic argum ent with the highest potential 
value in terms o f policy indications (see Scott, 1975 for an  illum inating 
exploration). To analyze the issue it is useful to tu rn  briefly to  the basics of 
rent definition and form ation and to explore the implications.
R ent is the retu rn  on a resource whose to ta l supply is fixed and it is 
m easured as the difference between the revenue derived from  the sale of 
the resource and all the economic costs needed for its production. W hen 
to tal costs do not add  up to the value o f the production, a rent is gener­
ated. R ent is in fact a surplus value. It accrues to the owner o f  the resource, 
unless governm ents use their sovereign pow er to extract for themselves 
all, o r part, of the rent. A nother way o f defining it is to  say tha t the rent is 
the paym ent to  the owner of a factor of production that does no t alter its 
economic behavior.
P roduction involves bo th  exploration and exploitation activities. Costs 
consist o f rem unerations to all production  factors needed for the produc­
tion. They include typically labor, m aterial and non-m aterial inputs and 
capital. The cost o f capital also includes a prem ium  for risk that in the 
case o f m ining and  oil production  can be substantially high, due to the 
uncertainties about the effective size of mines and oil fields, about trends in
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costs and, m ost o f all, abou t fluctuations in the price o f the commodities. 
Figure 10.1 (below) lists the m ain categories of these costs.
Costs are opportunity  costs, meaning tha t rem unerations o f production 
factors are determ ined in the same way as if  they were used in the best 
available alternative. This is why the rent cannot alter economic behavior 
whatever happens to  it, that is, however it is appropriated.
I f  the governm ent-provided services contributed effectively to the p ro ­
duction, they have to  be considered as additional production  factors, or 
as inputs. Examples are roads and com m unications, schools and health 
services for those employed in the oil fields and mines, and their families. 
In other words, all services that oil firms would have to provide (also 
through higher wages) if  governm ent activities were no t to be considered. 
Their cost has to  be subtracted from  the final price. G overnm ents are 
entitled to a share o f the final price not because they have a sovereign right 
to  the rent, bu t because they are partners in the production. Paym ents to 
them  can be calculated very precisely on the basis o f  the value o f  these 
services. This will also determ ine the individual shares o f  the central and 
the regional governm ents. The relative im portance o f the costs refunded 
to  the central or to the regional governments will depend on the extent of 
responsibilities assigned to  them. A m uch decentralized regional govern­
m ent with extensive expenditure responsibilities will receive a large part o f 
the value o f  the production, independently o f  its claims to receive a large 
part o f the rent.
Calculation o f  the costs is no t easy. The difficulties also derive from  the 
short duration  o f  natural resource exploitation. F irst comes the depletion 
problem: when oil fields or mines are exhausted, the specific infrastruc­
tures built for them  by governm ents will have no m ore use and thus no 
m ore value. They are just sunk costs. These costs have to be added to the 
o ther costs already listed and  refunded to  the level o f governm ent tha t 
has provided the infrastructure. The second problem  applies to  general 
infrastructure, such as schools and health centers, and derives from  the 
depopulation th a t occurs when resources are depleted: w orkers move with 
their families to  other areas. These workers no longer contribute to the 
dem and for public services or, m ost o f  all, to  finance them. By moving, 
they may create new costs to their destination governm ents by dem anding 
services and thus creating a dem and for new infrastructure. The rem ain­
ing population cannot be held responsible for assum ing these costs. The 
conclusion is th a t also in this case the cost of infrastructure for providing 
services to  the population  tha t has m igrated to an  oil field o r mine area 
does not form  part o f the rent, has to be added to  other costs and has to 
be funded to the governm ent level tha t has actually provided the services 
and borne the costs.
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The larger the level and  the area o f governm ent th a t provides the service 
and  the infrastructure, the easier would be the problem  o f refunding the 
costs, because com pensation between em igrating and im m igrating areas 
w ould be easier and alternative uses of the infrastructure are m ore likely 
to be found.
Lastly comes the use of, or the dam age done to, the environm ent. 
Exploitation of na tu ra l resources involves, in addition to  the depletion o f 
the resources, the use o f  the environm ent.
We have to distinguish between two polar cases and see their im pli­
cations concerning the rent. In the first case, the situation that should 
prevail, at least in principle, the property rights are perfectly defined and 
the exploiting firms have to comply with governm ent policies. The govern­
m ent (whose level has still to  be defined) sets the standards (regulatory 
approach), or determines and levies the environm ental tax, or, and m ore 
unlikely, determines and  pays a subsidy to  the com panies th a t are exploit­
ing the natural resources. In this case, if the companies comply with the 
standards or pay the tax, they will have an additional cost to  be added to 
the costs strictly related to  the production  and to  be recognized by them. 
The use o f the environm ent becomes just another production factor and 
another cost for the firms since they do no t own the environment.
In the second case, the property rights are no t defined and  the standards 
are no t issued, or no t enforced. Firm s use, o r ra ther dam age, the environ­
ment and the cost will be borne by society at large. This is the notorious 
case o f the D elta river in N igeria or o f A m azonian regions o f Ecuador, 
where the environm ent has been dam aged by oil spills, and  leakages of gas 
from  the pipelines.
In  this case, society has to be refunded the cost it has to  bear because 
of the environm ental damage. The com pensation, which is paid out o f the 
rent, will not correspond to the expenditure th a t would have been necessary 
to comply with the standards or, alternatively, to  the forgone tax revenue, 
but should be related to  the am ount o f  dam age.5 But, who is entitled to  this 
com pensation? M ore precisely, which entity, be it individuals or levels of 
governm ent, is entitled to  receive the payment? In principle, it should be 
the individuals, who a t the end bear the burden o f environm ental damage 
-  m ost likely, those locally affected by the environm ental im pact o f m ining 
and  other natural resource exploitation. However, since com pensation is 
in principle targeted to  repair the dam age, this implies collective action 
and  hence the choice o f  the level o f governm ent, be it national, regional, or 
local, th a t will effectively undertake the reparation  w ork.6
This is not the end o f  the story, since the am ount o f the environm ental 
costs and  o f their refund depends on the interaction between the assign­
m ent o f responsibility for setting the environm ental standards (or for
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Table 10.1 Combinations between the assignment o f  environmental
responsibility and the assignment o f  the environmental rent
Responsibility for defining and 
enforcing standards
Central Local








setting the tax, or the subsidy) on the one hand and  on the assignment 
o f the natural resources-related rent, on the other. There are four pos­
sible cases, shown in Table 10.1, tha t combine the assignment o f the 
responsibility for defining and enforcing standards and  the assignment 
o f the environm ental-related rent am ong the central and the local level o f 
government.
In Case 1 (upper left) rent is allocated to  the central governm ent tha t 
is also responsible for the determ ination o f the environm ental standards. 
In this case, since m ost o f the environm ental im pact is felt a t the local 
level, the central governm ent will have few incentives to  impose strict 
standards and/or to  enforce them. The dam age to  the environm ent could 
be substantial, since the incentive for the central governm ent is to  receive 
a large rent.
In Case 2, the determ ination o f environm ental standards is the respon­
sibility o f the local governm ent, while the allocation o f  rent is totally 
centralized. Here, the local governm ent is likely to  impose strict limits on 
natural resource exploitation, since it has every incentive to  keep the envi­
ronm ent clean and no interest in the rent, because it has no access to it.7
In Case 3, the allocation o f rent is decentralized, while the determ ina­
tion o f the environm ental standards is centralized. In  this case, the central 
government may have incentives to apply strict standards, if  there is 
national awareness regarding the need for a clean environm ent.
In Case 4, bo th  the standards and the allocation o f  rent are determ ined 
by the local governm ent, which will have to face a trade-off between a 
cleaner environm ent and a larger rent.
Summing up, the cost o f m aintaining a cleaner environm ent and its 
absorption o f  the surplus depends on the level o f  standards. In turn, the 
level o f standards is determ ined by the intergovernm ental assignm ent of 
the rent, in addition  to  the environm ental preferences o f the responsible 
government. Figure 10.1 summarizes the results o f  the factor use, or dis­
tribution, theory. Both rectangles show the total value o f natural resource 
production. The rectangles are divided in slices, each o f them  referring
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________ Other rent_________
______ Differential rent______
Use of environment 
Central government services 
Regional government services
_______ Capital costs________




Use of environment 
Central government services 
Regional government services
_______ Capital costs________
Wages and salaries 
  Material costs
Figure 10.1 The process o f  determination o f  the rent fro m  natural non­
renewable resources
to one o f the various categories o f costs tha t have been singled out. It is 
possible, bu t unlikely under the prevailing circumstances, th a t the sum of 
these costs will be big enough to absorb all the value o f the production and 
tha t no rent will be created.
The m ost likely case is th a t the absorption  o f value by costs is no t com ­
plete, leaving a rent to  appropriate. In both  cases the use o f the factor 
theory allows considerable progress to be m ade on the issue of the alloca­
tion o f the rent by clarifying the entitlem ents o f governments. M ore p re­
cisely, it makes a clear case, based on sound economic theory, for paying 
part o f the value o f the production  to governm ents for the services they 
provide and not on the basis o f a sovereign right to the rent, or o f  other 
abstract principles.
We can continue w ith the allocation o f the ‘true’ rent -  th a t is, the share 
of revenue exceeding the production  cost. The ren t has two com ponents. 
The first is the differential rent tha t is created by all non-m arginal p ro ­
ducers.8 The second is the o ther rent, which mainly originates from  the 
fluctuations o f the price o f the resource (it could in principle also originate 
from  fluctuations in costs).
Both rents have to  be appropriated  by someone, be it the private owner 
(when he/she exists), o r by the governm ent, giving rise to  the problem  
discussed in the norm ative literature of the appropriate level o f rent th a t 
has to be extracted by governm ent and o f the sharing between levels of 
government.
Arguments Advanced by the Normative Theory against Assignment of Rent 
to Subnational Governments
As m entioned before, the m ain argum ents against assignm ent to  subna­
tional governm ent po in t to the difficulties tha t subnational governm ents 
have to  face when managing, and  m ore specifically, when spending the
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rent. While surely im portant, these argum ents are no t general enough to 
m ake a strong, decisive po in t against assignment to  subnational govern­
ments, especially when the la tter are large in terms o f  population  and have 
capacity.
Volatility of Revenue
The first and one o f the strongest argum ents against assignm ent o f natural 
resource revenue to subnational governments is volatility. The reason is 
th a t the central governm ent is better equipped than its subnational units to 
face revenue fluctuations, considering its access to a wider range o f finan­
cial instrum ents. W hen revenue diminishes abruptly, subnational units 
have to  resort to  expenditure cuts, thus endangering even the provision of 
m inim um  levels o f essential services, such as education and  health, when 
these are decentralized. D uring upturns in prices, subnational jurisdictions 
would be literally aw ash with money they are unable to  spend efficiently, 
or have to enter into spending com m itm ents tha t m ight no t be sustainable 
in the longer term.
A nother, som ewhat m ore elaborated, way of arguing about volatility is 
th a t price fluctuations m ake non-renewable resource rents a ‘non-reliable’ 
source o f revenue. The consequence is tha t funding ‘reliable’ expenditure, 
such as salaries and other current expenditures, with volatile revenues 
carries higher risk for which local governm ents are no t equipped, implying 
higher cost.
However, the argum ent loses much o f its strength when rent is used 
for investment, or debt redem ption. Reliability would not m atter in these 
cases. Hence, and  de facto, the argum ent depends on the size o f rent, and 
on its regional distribution: a small region cannot spend huge rents only 
on investment, bu t a large region may be able to. M ore generally, large 
regions could, in principle, solve the risk problem , as well as the central 
government. The obvious example is that o f A lberta and A laska. They 
are subnational governments, but with a large and sophisticated enough 
economy to allow them  to develop financial institutions sufficiently spe­
cialized to m anage risk with a capacity not inferior to  tha t available at 
the federal level. The same would apply to the big cities o f Latin  America.
Misspending of Rent
Substantial efficiency losses can also derive from  misspending. In turn , 
m isspending can derive from  insufficient absorption capacity and/or from 
corruption. The geographical concentration o f rent can m ake its am ount 
d isproportionate to the absorption capacity for subnational governm ent
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units (sometimes, it is even disproportionate to  the absorption  capacity of 
the national government). N on-econom ic investments can be made, sub­
national bureaucracies may indulge in slack and  the capacity for control­
ling costs may decline. While these problem s are usually context specific, 
tha t is, the central governm ent is no t inherently superior in adm inistering 
funds, the sheer size o f  revenue may constitute a greater challenge for 
smaller governments. This is especially true in developing countries with 
generally weak or incipient traditions o f local adm inistration.9 Again, 
insufficient absorp tion  capacity is not an argum ent tha t can be used in 
general terms against subnational assignment, because it depends on 
context-specific factors.
Corruption
Similar argum ents can be m ade concerning the evaluation o f  the likely 
im pact o f corruption. Prevalence o f corruption  at either the national or 
the local level is context specific. It depends, am ong other things, on the 
level o f inform ation, the peculiarities o f the political system, adm inistra­
tive traditions, the hom ogeneity o f local jurisdictions, and the sectoral 
com position o f expenditure at the national and local levels.
However, concentration of resources w ithin a small jurisdiction may 
endanger rent-seeking or co rrup t behavior. Again the argum ent depends 
on the size o f  local governm ent and on the size o f  the rent.
Nationwide Equalization of Revenue from Natural Resources
N one o f the previous argum ents offers a compelling reason against the 
assignment of natural resource rent to subnational governments. A t the 
same time, the prevalent concentration o f  these resources in only a few 
areas produces an overall inequality in the distribution o f revenue to  sub­
national governm ents that m odern governm ents find difficult to accept. 
As a consequence, m ost countries try  to  reduce the disparities in local 
revenues created by local assignment o f natural resource revenues.
There are two m ain alternative systems for equalization (see Brosio, 
2003): (i) bringing natu ra l resource revenue within the general equaliza­
tion  fram ework, as in  A ustralia and C anada; and (ii) using a distinct 
equalization system fo r natural resources, as in Colombia.
General Equalization Systems
These consist of a system o f general grants financed from  all revenue 
sources. In principle (and, in practice, if there are enough resources), general
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equalization systems could entirely com pensate for the vagaries o f the geo­
graphical distribution o f natural resources. However, when they are hugely 
concentrated: (i) full com pensation may be no longer sustainable, because 
either it exerts an excessive strain on central governm ent resources, or it has 
to  bring in such a severe reversal o f the pre-equalization agreed subnational 
shares as to  render it politically unacceptable; and (ii) the im plem entation 
o f  the system has to solve a few difficult technical problems.
W ith open-ended systems, such as in C anada, where there is no upper 
lim it to  the to ta l am ount disbursed by the federal governm ent, the 
finances o f the la tte r may be subm itted to  severe strain  when the system 
is called on to  equalize huge disparities in revenues (Courchene, 1979 and 
1998).
If, following a huge increase in the price of natu ral resources they 
exploit, the difference between the richest provinces and  the poorest ones 
were to  increase, the central governm ent would have to  expand the to tal 
am ount paid for equalization. This is exactly w hat happened in C anada 
in the 1970s with the first oil shock. The huge increase in oil prices at that 
time bloated the am ount o f  revenues in A lberta, where practically all oil 
p roduction was concentrated. Since the federal governm ent had access to 
only 10 percent o f oil revenues, sticking to  the form ula would have implied 
financing equalization paym ents with its own tax revenues, thus having 
to  face the choice o f either incurring into deficit, or squeezing its own 
expenditure. Furtherm ore, the gap between A lberta and other provinces 
became so large tha t even the rich provinces, such as O ntario , became ben­
eficiaries o f equalization transfers, although in the end they were financed 
through the use, by the federal governm ent, o f the tax base located in their 
jurisdiction.
O ver the years, the C anad ian  governm ents m ade basic corrections 
to  the form ula such as: (a) the exclusion o f A lberta ’s tax base from  
the equalization  standard; (b) the ou trigh t exclusion from  equaliza­
tion  paym ents o f those provinces, such as O ntario , th a t have a non-oil 
tax base above the national average; (c) the exclusion o f  a share o f the 
oil tax base from  the equalization system; and (d) the in troduction  
o f  a ceiling to  the to ta l am ount paid  for equalization. Obviously, all 
these corrections im plied a curtailm ent o f  the equalizing im pact o f  the 
m echanism .10
Separate Equalization Systems
These systems are generally funded only by natural resource revenues and 
do not consider other sources o f revenue. They am ount to  reserving a share 
o f  to tal national revenue from  natu ral resources to the non-producing, or
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little-producing, jurisdictions and to  distribute them  according to  either 
the distance o f their resource revenue from  the national average, or other 
need- or revenue capacity-related indicators. In Colom bia, for example, 
the Fondo Nacional de Regalias (N ational Royalties Fund) is allocated on 
the basis o f developm ent projects presented by subnational jurisdictions 
(see below). The idea behind its distribution in Colom bia is to  allow non­
producing jurisdictions to share some o f the growth opportunities created 
by the exploitation o f natural resources.
The equalizing im pact o f separate mechanisms derives, as in the case 
o f the general equalization systems, from  the relative share o f natural 
resource revenue granted to  the producing and  non-producing ju ris­
dictions and their relative share of total population. The effectiveness 
o f equalization is imperilled by the non-consideration o f non-natural 
resource sources o f  revenue. Thus, a rich (with high non-natural resource 
tax revenue) departm ent can receive the same am ount o f resources as a 
poor departm ent, if  the difference between natural resource revenue and 
the national average happens to be the same in both  departm ents.
The m ain advantage o f these systems is the fact tha t they are closed- 
ended; tha t is, the to ta l am ount o f the pool to be redistributed is restricted 
to  natu ral resource revenues and thus does no t affect other government 
revenues.
Separate equalization systems are also used to equalize revenue am ong 
indigenous com m unities. F o r example, in A ustralia, the Federal govern­
m ent pays into the Aboriginal Benefit A ccount11 an am ount o f money 
equal to the royalties paid to the N orthern  Territory and the Federal 
governm ent from  m ining on Aboriginal land.
3 SHARING OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN LATIN 
AMERICA
Importance of Production and Public Revenue
A n im portant po in t is that Latin  America has traditionally been a key 
source o f natural resources for the world and thus, com m odities represent 
a significant share o f  to tal exports for the region.
The im portance o f natu ral resources in the econom y is reflected in 
their contribu tion  to  the revenue side o f  the public sector, as shown in 
Table 10.2. In Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), revenues from  oil 
account for m ore th an  50 percent o f to tal revenue. A large share is also 
found in E cuador, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and T rin idad and 
Tobago.
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Table 10.2 Government revenue from  hydrocarbons and minerals






Middle East 20.0 57.2
Latin America 8.3 34.1
Ecuador 7.4 29.1
Mexico 6.8 32.3
Trinidad and Tobago 9.4 33.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 10.9 50.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 6.8 25.4
Minerals
Latin America 1.4 6.15
Chile 1.9 8.3
Peru 0.9 4.0
Note: ECLAC data for Latin America and IM F data for the other countries. IM F data 
refer to the 1992-2005 period and ECLAC data to 1992-2009.
Sources: Velâsquez-Donaldson (2007), IM F (2007) and ECLAC.
Tax Instruments
In terms o f  actual revenue, the main tax instrum ent fo r assigning rent to 
subnational governm ents, at least in part, is specific taxes, such as royalties 
-  which are used in all countries except Ecuador -  and  export taxes. The 
latter has been introduced since 2002 in Argentina. The adm inistration 
o f specific taxes is done by the central governm ent in all but the federal 
countries (CEPA L, 2006; Carbajo Vasco and P o rpo ra tto , 2009).
The corporate profit tax is the second tax instrum ent for extracting 
rent. It is used exclusively by the central governm ent. In Latin  America 
the collections are lower than  their potential, due to extended allowances 
and preferential treatm ents o f  oil and minerals extraction (see O tto et al., 
2006). This is not exceptional com pared with other regions of the world.
There is a prevalence o f centralization o f taxes, which is in line with the 
prevailing centralization o f tax instrum ents in Latin  Am erica. In other 
words, since m ost tax instrum ents are centralized it m akes sense tha t tax 
levies on natural resources are also centralized. Collections are then shared
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and  centralization o f tax instrum ents does not ham per access to the rent 
by subnational governm ents. (Table 10.3.)
Sharing Systems
Latin  Am erican countries show a variety o f solutions for sharing rents 
from  natural resources that are in part associated with the different in ter­
governm ental arrangem ents, ranging from  classical federations, such as 
A rgentina, to typical unitary states, such as Chile.
In  contrast to  old constitutions that were silent on the issue, recent con­
stitutions frequently address the issue of rent sharing, although no t always 
directly, because the sharing o f rents from  natu ral resources has become 
an  inevitable com ponent o f the constitutional pact (Table 10.4). As stated 
in the previous section, only in A rgentina does the constitution explicitly 
assign ownership to  the provinces. In all the other countries ownership 
is assigned to the central government, or is left unsettled by assigning 
ownership to the people (Bolivia (P lurinational State of)), or to the nation 
(Peru). However, like in ternational practice, rent sharing is determ ined 
no t by the assignm ent o f ownership, but rather by the sharing o f tax bases, 
as in A rgentina, and  by the sharing of tax revenue.
W ith only two exceptions, Chile and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of), all countries recognize the sharing o f the rent in favor o f subnational 
governments. N ote tha t although the form er has always been a unitary 
and  centralized country and the latter has always been a federation, rent 
centralization has always prevailed.
The A ndean countries represent an interesting example regarding the 
sharing issue. Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colom bia, Ecuador and 
Peru are all unitary  states that have em barked on a decentralization 
process leading to the creation o f regional systems. These same countries 
allocate a substantial share o f their resources from  natu ral resources to 
their subnational governm ents. These countries provide evidence to  the 
argum ent tha t the com bination o f decentralization processes and endow ­
m ent o f natural resources is a factor that renders centralization o f natural 
resource rents politically impossible.
The degree o f sharing is also increasing over time, due not only to  the 
discovery of the resources, bu t also to the relative youth o f m ost Latin 
Am erican constitutions. Box 10.1 examines the case o f A rgentina.
Excluding A rgentina -  a classical federal system -  and Ecuador, subna­
tional governm ents situated in the non-producing areas have direct access 
to  a portion  o f the rents. This is a notable feature o f  Latin  A m erica that 
clearly has merits, once the principle o f  sharing rents with subnational 
governm ents is accepted and  pu t into practice. In classical federal systems
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Table 10.3 L a tin  A m erica  (eight countries): characteristics o f  ta x  regim es fo r  non-renewable resources
Country (commodity) Royalties 
(rates)
















tax (IDH): 32% 
on hydrocarbon 
production




(IUE) of 25% and 
12.5% for remittances 
abroad 
Excess profits surtax of 
25%
Additional tax on profits 
remittances: 35% 
and 4% on interest 
remittances 
For public enterprises: 
special 40% profits tax 
7%
Profits distributed: 25% 
Profits reinvested in 
machinery and new 
equipment: 15%




Special tax (fixed margin)
Special tax on operating 





Tax on extraordinary 
revenue of companies 













Oil revenue tax of 
PEMEX: 30%
Royalties
10% on onshore sales and 
12.5% on offshore sales.
Additional tax on sales of 
crude oil (rate varies with 
oil price)
30% Oil income tax
(ISLR): 50%
7.7%
Company profit tax 
(in practice amounts 
to a royalty of 25% of 
production)
Oil profits tax: 35 42% 
on profits from oil 
production 
Unemployment tax:
5% of profits from oil 
production
Special tax on production 
and services (IEPS)
Source: Own compilation based on Jiménez and Tromben (2006) and countries’ legislation.
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Unitary state State Extraordinary
with regions profit tax
Unitary state The Nation Royalties and 
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income tax
De facto State Royalties and
unitary direct taxes
Source: Compilation by the authors.
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BOX 10.1 ARGENTINA: SHARING OF OIL RENTS 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND 
CONSUMERS
Argentina represents a very interesting case for analyzing 
the sharing of rents on natural resources among levels 
of government and consumers. Provincial governments 
have traditionally attained a substantial share of these rents 
through various forms of access to royalties on gas and oil. 
Specifically, direct levying on the rents by the provinces has 
alternated with federal government administration and transfer 
of collections to provinces. The federal government share has 
traditionally derived from its access to the corporation income 
tax.
Very recently, however, there have been substantial changes 
in the whole discipline, following the new constitution.
Management of oil and gas exploration and exploitation activi­
ties has been returned to the provinces that are responsible for 
establishing contracts with firms and collecting royalties. This 
has expanded their power to control prices and the measure­
ment of production. At the same time, the federal government 
has expanded its access to the rent through the levying of 
export taxes on oil and gas, taking advantage of the increase 
in their international price. The share of rents going to domestic 
consumers has also been safeguarded because of the introduc­
tion of an export tax. Since oil and gas are sold on competitive 
domestic and international markets the export tax has put a 
ceiling on the domestic price of oil and gas, which is basically 
equal to the difference between the international price and the 
export tax.
Thus, everybody seems to take advantage of the present dis­
cipline, although the producing provinces have expressed vocal 
complaints about the federal taxation of exports and about its 
depressing impact on production. The stall in production has also 
somewhat contributed to reducing disparities among producing 
and non-producing provinces and has attenuated the fluctuations 
of royalty revenues. Clearly, oil- and gas-producing companies 
are the net losers, having had to relinquish all the increase of the 
(absolute) rent deriving from the increase in this decade of the 
international price of oil and gas.
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The case of Argentina shows that the federal government can 
counteract rent concentration of rents on producing subnational 
governments by using fiscal instruments that are in its panoply, 
even in the presence of a constitutional mandate that assigns 
ownership of natural resources to subnational governments.
across the world only the subnational governm ents situated in the p ro ­
ducing areas have direct access to  the rents, while the inequalities deriv­
ing from  the system o f allocation are corrected by general equalization 
systems. In  Latin Am erican countries general equalization systems do not 
exist and the inequalities created by the allocations o f rents from  natural 
resources to the producing areas are, partially, corrected by expanding 
rent access to non-producing areas, through natu ral resource tax-sharing 
systems. This is the case o f Bolivia (P lurinational State of), Brazil, and 
Peru.
Consequently, the im pact produced by the use o f the origin principle 
for allocation is com pensated by the concom itant use o f  the derivation 
principle. In C olom bia a specific equalization transfer system -  where only 
royalties contribute to  its pool -  is used to provide non-producing areas 
access to  the rent.
A n attem pt to expand the range of beneficiary subnational govern­
ments, and thus to alleviate disparities in ren t allocation has been achieved 
by m aking the eligibility to  rents dependent no t only on production, but 
also on transport and  transform ation  of prim ary products into final goods 
(such as fuel and gasoline).
In  A rgentina and Bolivia (P lurinational State of) the concom itant 
claims to  the resources by the central governm ent and the producing areas 
have been accom m odated through a recent increase in the level of taxa­
tion, prom pting fears from  producers and sometimes from  international 
organizations tha t excessive taxation  could stop production, and more 
worryingly, investments. There is indeed evidence th a t oil production  
and exports has stalled in Argentina. However, this is no t necessarily a 
calamity, because it spreads oil and gas exploitation over a longer tim e­
frame, allowing future generations to  also benefit from  it. O f course a 
delicate balance has to  be found between the level o f taxation  and the 
correct incentives for firms to  proceed steadily tow ards exploration and 
production.
Obviously, while n a tu ra l resource rent sharing expands the revenue 
sources o f  subnational governm ents, it also m akes them  subject to
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the vagaries o f  price and production  fluctuations, w hich they are no t 
particularly  well equipped to  face. Box 10.2 exam ines the case of 
Colom bia.
W hen shared only, o r predom inantly , w ith the producing  areas, 
na tu ra l resources contribu te  to an increase in horizon ta l im balances. 
This is clearly the case o f Bolivian departm ents, although the gov­
ernm ent has recently taken  a num ber o f  steps to  spread the alloca­
tion  to  non-producing  areas, by increasing the ren t share going to  all 
m unicipalities.
The huge in terdepartm ental inequalities o f Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), shown in Table 10.5, are to  be attribu ted  to  the unique characteristics 
o f  the country, where royalties on natural resources are the only source o f 
revenue for departm ents. As a consequence, non-producing departm ents 
are completely dependent on central governm ent reallocation. Since no 
general equalization transfer system exists in Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of) and since the non-producing departm ents have access to  only a share 
o f  the rent on oil and  gas, the distribution o f departm ental revenues is 
highly unequal. W hile the big departm ent o f La Paz has a m inim um  per 
capita allocation o f US$24.1, Tarija, the richest departm ent, has m ore 
than  20 times th a t am ount; namely US$462.7.
The case o f Bolivia (P lurinational State of) shows the huge negative 
im pact on equity deriving from  m aking subnational governm ent revenues 
only dependent on natural resource rents. A rgentina provides evidence 
o f a better practice. As m entioned before, in A rgentina only the p ro ­
ducing provinces have direct access to  the rents th rough their royalties. 
However, provinces have access to  their own taxes and to a share o f a 
pool o f  national taxes. Consequently, while oil-producing provinces have 
extremely high per capita  revenue, no province is left with an unbearably 
low revenue level (Table 10.6).
A similar system o f distribution prevails in C olom bia (Table 10.7). 
Producing departm ents have very high levels o f revenue, bu t royalties 
introduce random ness in the distribution and  do no t determ ine it com ­
pletely. This is also due to  the fact that, in m ost cases, royalties are going 
to relatively small departm ents, where oil and  m ining sectors are the m ain 
determ inant o f G DP.
N o m ention has been m ade o f  the im pact on equity deriving from  
giving m unicipalities access to  the rent. There is no easily m anageable 
inform ation a t this governm ent level. However, there is some evidence 
showing, as expected, th a t the concentration and random ness o f  the 
allocation o f  royalties is m uch higher for m unicipalities. In some cases, 
royalties can reach quite understandably  astronom ically high per capita 
am ounts.
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BOX 10.2 COLOMBIA: INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
SHARING OF RENTS
Colombia uses three main instruments to promote intergovern­
mental rent sharing; namely: (a) the corporation income tax that 
is levied by the central government; (b) the royalties that are col­
lected by the central government and allocated to local govern­
ments; and (c) the transport tax.
Part of the corporation tax is returned to local governments via 
the transfer system (Sistema general de participaciones).
Royalties are levied on the value of production. The tax rates 
vary according to the different resources. For instance, for oil 
they range from 8 to 25 percent, with a progressive schedule, 
whereby the tax rate increases according to the daily volume of 
the production.
Royalties are distributed between producing and transport­
ing local government units, and the remaining ones through the 
National Royalties Fund (Fondo Nacional de Regalías), following 
sharing rates that decrease with the increase in daily production.
In addition to royalties, oil and mining companies have to pay 
compensations (compensaciones). These are payments agreed 
with companies aimed at compensating the additional costs for 
local government generated by the exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources, with specific reference to transport, environ­
mental, and social and cultural impact.
Finally, non-producing municipalities, whose territory is crossed 
by oil and gas pipelines, receive the collections of the transport 
tax that has been ceded to them by the central government.
Indigenous communities are entitled to receive a share of the 
royalties levied on oil fields and mines situated no further than 
5 km from their settlements. The share amounts to 5 percent of 
royalties accruing to departments and to 20 percent of royalties 
accruing to municipalities.
The National Royalty Fund (Fondo Nacional de Regalías) has 
been set up to attenuate rent concentration. The proceeds of 
this fund derive from specific sharing rates (ranging from 8 to 32 
percent) and from the excess of royalties on established ceilings.
The allocation is made on the basis of specific projects by the 
National Planning Department. There is no formula but a complex 
web of governmental decrees, laws and court decisions.





















Share o f gas 
production 
(2006) (%)
Chuquisaca 531,522 3.8 30.4 44.3 9.9 88.4 938.40 5.8
La Paz 2,349,885 1.2 2.7 18.8 4.1 24.1 1,142.37 0.0
Cochabamba 1,455,711 1.2 21 36.8 4.1 42.1 1,234.75 11.8
Oruro 392,451 1.9 33.3 50.2 3.6 89.0 1,362.25 0.0
Potosi 709,013 0.6 72 25.6 1.0 99.2 780.63 0.0
Tarija 391,226 4.1 402.7 54.5 1.4 462.7 3,683.50 60.1
Santacruz 2,029,471 0.9 19.3 33.9 6.5 41.3 1,593.00 22.3
Beni 362,521 0.3 46.4 92.8 9.8 102.9 938.63 0.0
Pando 52,525 0.0 121.5 378.4 4.3 382.7 1,822.00 0.0
Source: Bolivian Ministry of Finance.
Table 10.6 Argentina: structure o f  provincial revenue p er capita, 2009
Province Population
2010
Provincial tax revenues 







Other revenues per 
capita (USS) 2009
Total revenue per 
capita (US$) 2009
Ciudad de Buenos Aires 2,891,082 1,165 152 0 82 1,400
Buenos Aires 15,594,498 363 345 0 49 758
Catamarca 367,820 169 1,491 52 291 2,005
Cordoba 3,304,825 313 625 0 110 1,047
Corrientes 993,338 105 810 5 6 926
Chaco 1,053,466 134 1,124 0 220 1,478
Chubut 506,668 353 709 719 425 2,205
Entre Ríos 1,236,300 229 915 45 135 1,324
Formosa 527,895 89 1,423 8 245 1,765
Jujuy 672,260 115 1,127 1 185 1,428
La Pampa 316,940 388 1,270 68 333 2,059
La Rioja 331,847 105 1,626 0 359 2,090
Mendoza 1,741,610 245 539 115 124 1,023
Misiones 1,097,829 169 738 24 135 1,066
Neuquén 550,344 480 716 922 913 3,031
Río Negro 633,374 280 841 149 205 1,475
Salta 1,215,207 169 697 87 127 1,080
San Juan 680,427 177 1,013 24 224 1,438
San Luis 431,588 278 1,112 0 100 1,490
Santa Cruz 272,524 521 1,825 1,006 1,757 5,109
Santa Fe 3,200,736 284 624 0 64 972
Sgo Del Estero 896,461 108 980 1 241 1,330
Tucumán 1,448,200 246 713 0 177 1,137
Tierra del Fuego 126,190 657 2,308 533 661 4,159
Source: Compilation by authors from data from the Argentine Ministry o f Finance.
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Table 10.7 Colombia: basic characteristics o f  departments





Per capital total 
revenues (US$)
Antioquia 5,601,507 3789.08 0.06 210.74
Atlántico 2,112,001 2884.50 0.00 11.71
Bogotá 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bolívar 1,836,640 2550.51 16.16 161.21
Boyaca 1,210,982 2479.10 47.01 291.00
Caldas 89,849 2740.29 0.17 206.21
Caqueta 337,932 1682.54 0.00 270.06
Cauca 1,182,022 1843.63 2.35 200.79
Cesar 878,437 2635.18 10.21 306.65
Córdoba 1,462,909 2551.46 13.00 168.79
Cundinam arca 2,228,682 3337.87 2.31 31.88
Choco 388,476 1299.71 1.40 266.14
Huila 1,001,476 2651.10 130.67 310.20
Guajira 655,943 3614.83 196.65 387.45
M agdalena 1,136,819 1539.10 0.00 154.62
M eta 713,772 3434.42 35.73 582.83
N ariño 1,498,234 1465.48 0.40 171.10
N  De Santander 1,208,336 1644.51 9.50 181.55
Quindio 518,691 1992.75 0.00 15.83
R isaralda 859,666 2493.46 0.00 121.64
Santander 1,913,444 4417.12 48.80 259.49
Sucre 762,263 1315.74 7.54 189.46
Tolima 1,312,304 2501.48 52.24 237.66
Valle 4,052,535 3446.71 0.01 131.74
Arauca 153,028 1423.91 649.81 1181.28
Casanare 281,294 3534.50 982.76 1402.11
Putum ayo 237,197 10916.63 131.62 529.40
San Andrés 59,573 1153.69 0.67 870.21
Amazonas 4,695 1451.51 0.00 872.32
Guainia 18,797 1022.77 30.83 1638.21
Guaviare 56,758 4359.74 0.00 844.73
Vaupes 19,943 1984.54 0.00 1184.50
Vichada 44,592 1823.89 0.00 846.53
Source: Compilation by authors from data from the Colombian Ministry of Finance.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an exploration o f the issues deriving from  the sharing 
o f rent from  natu ral resources in Latin  America. W ith decentralization
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gaining strength, subnational governments have become m ore vocal in 
their dem ands for access to  these rents and central governm ents have 
found it increasingly difficult to resist these demands.
There are no established constitutional, or equity principles tha t can 
provide a sure guidance on rent sharing. The idea suggested in this chapter 
is tha t in the allocation o f the rent, governm ents should consider very care­
fully the costs associated with exploration and  production  o f the resources 
and consequently the tasks perform ed by various levels o f  government. 
Hence, the allocation should take into prim ary consideration the respon­
sibilities assigned to the different levels o f governm ent. F o r example, if the 
subnational governm ents o f a given country have substantial expenditure 
responsibilities in the sectors affected by natural resource exploitation, 
then there is firm ground for their recognition, as a cost, o f part o f the 
value o f the production. The am ount o f the ren t will be reduced accord­
ingly. This will ease the problems/conflicts generated by the sharing o f the 
pure rent.
Section 3 shows th a t m ost Latin Am erican countries endowed with 
natural resources share rents with their subnational governments. 
C ountries share benefits no t only w ith the producing areas, bu t also with 
the non-producing areas o f the country. Efforts have recently been made 
to  expand the share going to  the non-producing areas.
To satisfy the concom itant claims to the rent com ing from  the national 
and  the subnational governm ents, the level o f  taxation  o f the ren t has 
been increased, particularly  in A rgentina and  Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of). This policy has a clear im pact on production, particularly  in 
A rgentina.
The m ain instrum ent for sharing the rent from  natural resources is the 
allocation o f revenue com ing from  central governm ent taxes. In  Latin 
Am erica most taxes are centralized and taxation  o f natural resources is not 
an exception to this rule. W hile centralization o f natural resource taxation 
is no t a bad practice, overall centralization o f taxes m akes subnational 
governm ents completely dependent on transfers from  the center. A t the 
same time, the central governm ents provide only limited equalization of 
subnational governm ent revenues. As a result, subnational sharing o f  rent 
increases the already huge disparities o f revenue am ong local governm ent 
units. In particular, the allocation o f the rent to  the producing areas makes 
the overall d istribution of revenue quite random .
The allocation also to non-producing areas and the assignm ent to 
subnational governm ents of a variety of revenue instrum ents -  ranging 
from  own taxes to  general equalization systems -  would a ttenuate  the 
existing inequalities. Latin  Am erican countries, particularly  Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Colom bia and Peru, have m ade substantial
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progress in spreading the allocation to non-producing areas. Proceeding 
further on this p a th  requires the im plem entation o f general equalization 
systems.
NOTES
1. M ost o f the oil production in Colombia is located in only two departments. In 
Argentina a single province, Neuquen, produces more than one-third o f the total. 
In Bolivia, a relatively small department, Tarija, produces 60% of total national gas. In 
Peru, production o f oil is hugely concentrated in a couple o f  provinces.
2. See McKenzie (2006) for an excellent summary. See also the works o f McLure (1983, 
2003) and Ahmad and M ottu (2003).
3. More specifically, the welfare loss stemming from using energy resources to subsidize 
capital would amount to slightly under 9% of energy revenue, while the percentage loss 
deriving from entirely subsidizing labor would decrease to no more than 2%, because of 
the lower migration elasticity of labor.
4. In a recent study, Day and Winer (2001) provide evidence for Canada about the impact 
from public policies on migration flows. They conclude that: ‘The average impact of 
the public policies considered here on the volume of m igration . . .  is small . . . Even 
the simultaneous elimination of regional variation in all the policy variables included 
in the analysis (unemployment insurance, personal income taxes, social assistance and 
provincial and federal spending on goods and services) is predicted to raise the volume 
of migration by at most 5%, or by less than half a percentage point’ (p. 38). The main 
determinant o f migration seems to be the moving costs.
5. The evaluation of these costs is extremely difficult, although in principle the criterion 
of the opportunity costs should inform the calculation. The use o f a rocky and totally 
inhospitable desert has an environmental impact and thus a cost that is much lower 
than the use of densely populated agricultural land.
6. Clearly in the case o f the Delta River area in Nigeria, compensating directly the citizens 
who are affected would seem to be the best solution, given the corruption and the sheer 
inefficiency of the government.
7. This is, possibly, the case o f Bolivia, where the new constitution assigns to indigenous 
communities the evaluation of the environmental impact o f natural resource projects. 
In a number o f recent cases these communities have opposed exploration and exploita­
tion projects, thus generating huge conflicts with the central government.
8. There are two categories o f rent: absolute and differential. Absolute rent derives from 
fixity o f production.
9. A World Bank study on Casanare, one of the two Colombian oil-producing depart­
ments, illustrates the risk of wasting fiscal funds when they reach huge levels in a short 
period. Casanare is one of the newest departments in Colombia, created in 1991. Oil 
royalties were negligible until 1994, then came to represent 73% of the department’s 
total income by 1997. According to the law, local governments must invest 100% of 
royalties in high priority projects in the sectors of education, public health, sewage 
systems and water supply. However, in 1996 expenditure in these sectors financed out of 
oil royalty income amounted to less than 40% (Davy et al., 1999).
10. These measures can be and have been variously combined and they do not exhaust the 
range of instruments needed to dampen the impact of exceptional circumstances on the 
sustainability of equalization mechanisms.
11. The ABA is a trust account under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 
1997. It is administered by an ABA secretariat with the advice of the ABA Advisory 
Committee. The Advisory Committee comprises 14 members selected by the Land 
Councils and a chairperson selected by the Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.
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11. Macroeconomic challenges o f fiscal 
decentralization
Juan Pablo Jiménez and 
Teresa Ter-Minassian
1 OVERVIEW
In Latin  Am erica (LA), as in other parts of the world, decentralization 
has increased in recent decades, reflecting prim arily political pressures, 
partly  linked to the dem ocratization process. As a result, subnational 
governm ents (SNGs) now account for substantial shares o f  public expen­
ditures, in particular social and investment ones. This in tu rn  has created 
growing challenges for macro-fiscal m anagem ent. On the one hand, it has 
become m ore im portant, as well as m ore difficult, to  ensure that SNGs 
do no t accum ulate unsustainable debts and/or contingent liabilities, ulti­
m ately requiring either bailouts from  the central governm ent (CG), or 
ab rup t and socially disruptive adjustm ent program s. O n the other hand, 
the traditional view tha t short-term  m acroeconom ic stabilization should 
be the exclusive purview o f the C G  is becoming increasingly unrealistic. 
This chapter seeks to  contribute to  a reflection on how fiscal decentrali­
zation affects m acroeconom ic m anagem ent in the m ain Latin  Am erican 
countries; and on which reform s in the existing intergovernm ental fiscal 
systems o f those countries could help strengthen their fiscal sustainability, 
minimize the risk o f  pro-cyclicality a t all levels o f governm ent, and create 
‘fiscal space’ for active countercyclical responses to  economic shocks.
LA  w eathered the 2008 global financial crisis better than  m ost other 
regions, and m uch better than  had  been the case in previous crisis epi­
sodes. F o r the first time in recent decades m ost countries in the region 
were able to  avoid a pro-cyclical fiscal response to  a m ajor external shock. 
Indeed, they were able not only to  accom m odate the cyclical declines in 
revenue, bu t also to  expand spending, including on the social safety-net 
and  public investment. This was due in large part to the margins for 
m aneuver accum ulated in the preceding five years and was reflected in 
significant prim ary surpluses, reduced levels and im proved structures
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o f public debt, and developm ent o f non-inflationary dom estic financing 
sources. The crisis affected the subnational finances, bu t significantly less 
than  in previous similar episodes. This, however, reflected mainly a m ore 
active role o f the CGs in supporting their SNGs. Given the high depend­
ence o f  SNGs on transfers from  the CG, their ability to sustain spend­
ing during crises largely depends on the C G  support, either through a 
tem porary m odification o f  the revenue-sharing arrangem ents or through 
discretionary transfers, frequently linked to public investm ent program s.
Looking ahead, the fact tha t many countries in the region are now 
experiencing rapid growth, and are expected to  continue to do so in the 
near term, adds urgency to  a debate o f options for reform s in their in ter­
governm ental fiscal arrangem ents tha t could help create fiscal space for a 
countercyclical response to a future dow nturn.
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a theoretical discus­
sion in Section 2 o f  the growing im pact o f  SN G s’ operations on short-term  
fiscal stabilization and m edium -term  fiscal sustainability; and o f some 
policy and institutional reform  options in this area. Section 3 reviews 
how different countries in LA attem pted to  ensure sustainable fiscal posi­
tions at the SN G  level, with varying degrees o f success, and  how SNGs 
in the region were affected by, and  reacted to, favorable and unfavorable 
economic shocks. Section 4 examines how the recent global crisis and 
the subsequent recovery affected the subnational finances in a num ber of 
Latin  Am erican countries, and the respective roles o f CGs and SNGs in 
responding to  the crisis, attem pting to identify the factors tha t contrib­
uted to differences in the im pact of, and the policy responses to, the crisis. 
Based on this analysis, the last section discusses institutional and policy 
reform s that could enable SNGs in the m ain countries o f  the region better 
to  w ithstand the im pact o f future economic shocks.
2 MACROECONOMIC CHALLENGES OF FISCAL 
DECENTRALIZATION: THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
As is well know n, the traditional (norm ative) literature on fiscal decen­
tralization (for example, T iebout, 1956; M usgrave, 1959; and  Oates, 1972) 
emphasized economic efficiency argum ents, in particu lar the potential 
welfare gains from  ‘bringing economic decision-m aking closer to  the 
people’, as the m ain rationale for decentralization. Subsequent (second- 
generation, positive) contributions to the literature (for example, Q ian and 
W eingast, 1997; Tanzi, 2002; and A hm ad and Brosio, 2006) stressed that 
such gains do no t autom atically follow decentralization, and focused on
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the political drivers of, and the institutional conditions for success in, the 
devolution of responsibilities to  lower levels o f governm ent. In  contrast, 
less attention  has been devoted in the fiscal federalism literature, a t least 
until recent years, to the challenges tha t decentralization can pose for 
m acroeconom ic m anagem ent, despite the fact that such challenges have 
become quite evident in practice, particularly in large federations and 
during periods o f fiscal stress.
These challenges relate to the distinct, bu t closely interrelated, roles of 
fiscal policy in short-term  m acroeconom ic m anagem ent and  in ensuring 
public debt sustainability over the m edium  to long term. Historically, 
policy makers have focused m ore on ensuring that SN G s’ policies and 
operations do no t create significant risks for debt sustainability than  on 
prom oting their consistency with the C G ’s stabilization policies. This 
reflected a num ber o f factors: (i) the received wisdom tha t the C G  alone 
should be responsible for m acroeconom ic m anagem ent; (ii) the relatively 
small shares o f spending (and even m ore so o f revenue-raising) respon­
sibilities typically allocated to  SN G s in the early stages o f decentraliza­
tion in m any countries; and also (iii) the focus on fiscal consolidation, as 
opposed to fiscal activism, prevailing in m ost countries in recent decades. 
These factors are increasingly out o f line w ith current realities, a fact 
tha t requires some rethinking o f the appropriate role o f SN G s in short­
term  m acroeconom ic m anagem ent, its linkages with fiscal sustainability, 
and  the types of intergovernm ental fiscal arrangem ents th a t can m ost 
effectively prom ote both.
The traditional view tha t fiscal stabilization is best perform ed by the 
C G  (first pu t forw ard by M usgrave in his seminal textbook o f 1959, and 
subsequently echoed in m any papers on intergovernm ental fiscal relations) 
reflects a num ber o f  considerations:
•  first, the need to  coordinate fiscal stabilization with other m acro­
economic policies, notably m onetary and exchange rate ones, that 
are a prerogative o f CGs;
•  second, the risk that SNGs engage in countercyclical fiscal expan­
sions even if they do no t have adequate fiscal space for such poli­
cies, a risk heightened by the ‘com m on poo l’ problem , and by any 
perceived likelihood o f eventual bailouts by the CG;
•  third, the likelihood o f significant leakages in the effects of subna­
tional countercyclical policies in an economic space (the nation) 
that is typically characterized by high m obility o f goods and factors 
o f production;
•  fourth, the risks o f adverse spillovers o f individual SN G s’ actions 
on other jurisdictions. For example, during a recession, some SNGs
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could engage in p redatory  tax com petition, to  b id  away dwindling 
investment and  jo b  creation opportunities from  other SNGs. Also, 
excessive borrow ing, especially by large SNGs, to  finance counter­
cyclical spending could pu t upw ard pressure on domestic interest 
rates, or lead to a generalized deterioration o f spreads for the whole 
country;
•  fifth, the fact th a t typically CGs have greater access to  financing, 
and at better terms, than  their SNGs, and  therefore are better placed 
to finance countercyclical fiscal expansions during dow nturns; and
•  finally, the fact th a t CGs can redistribute budgetary  resources 
across their SNGs, to counteract asymmetries in  exogenous shocks 
affecting lower-level governments.
While these considerations are very significant, there are also counter­
argum ents tha t are acquiring increasing im portance as decentralization 
progresses around  the world:
•  first, with decentralization reducing the C G s’ shares in to tal public 
spending, and concentrating them  in the less-flexible expenditure 
categories, such as pensions and interest paym ents, C G s’ scope 
for conducting countercyclical expenditure policies on their own is 
being progressively eroded;
•  second, the im pact o f  countercyclical policies o f  CGs can be sig­
nificantly offset by pro-cyclical policies o f SNGs. There is significant 
empirical evidence (including in LA, as discussed in Section 3) that 
SN G s’ revenues (in particular at the regional/provincial level1) 
are highly sensitive to  changes in ou tput (w hether induced by the 
cycle or by other exogenous shocks). W ith borrow ing possibilities 
frequently constrained by m arket conditions o r by institutional 
factors, such as deficit or debt rules or other controls, SNGs are 
forced to react to  cyclical dow nturns by cutting  spending. A t the 
same time, such rules or controls are not adequate to prevent p ro ­
cyclical spending sprees during periods of boom;
•  third, an approach th a t places the whole burden o f economic stabi­
lization on C G s’ budgets undermines incentives fo r SNGs to  build 
both fiscal space and institutional capacity to respond to  cyclical 
developments and exogenous shocks; and
•  finally, subnational fiscal responses to regionally asym m etric shocks 
(such as a decline in com m odity prices) may be appropriate if the 
C G ’s response to the shocks does no t properly take into account such 
asymmetries. Political economy considerations p o in t to a risk that, 
in deciding the regional distribution o f discretionary countercyclical
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spending, a C G  may be unduly influenced by factors such as the 
political alignm ent o f  individual subnational jurisdictions with the 
center. Even if  the C G ’s countercyclical response takes the form  of 
an increase in non-discretionary transfers, the allocation form ula 
for such transfers across jurisdictions may not take adequately into 
account asymmetric effects o f the shock.
Given the considerations above, we would argue th a t a more balanced 
view o f the respective roles o f CGs and  SNGs in fiscal m acro-m anagem ent 
is called for, especially in federal countries and in those unitary countries 
th a t are characterized by relatively high degrees o f fiscal decentralization. 
Such a view would center on the following m ain principles.
F irst, it is increasingly crucial to minimize pro-cyclicality in subnational 
budgetary policies. This would require SNGs to accom m odate the opera­
tions o f autom atic revenue stabilizers, by saving the fiscal dividends of 
boom s and sustaining expenditure levels in the face o f cyclical revenue 
dow nturns. The case for such ‘passive’ countercyclical policies rests on 
economic, as well as social, reasons:
•  Allowing autom atic stabilizers to operate prevents fiscal policy from  
aggravating cyclical fluctuations.
•  There is substantial empirical evidence (albeit mainly at the CG 
level; see, for example, Balassone and  K um ar, 2007) tha t p ro ­
cyclicality tends to be stronger during upswings than  during dow n­
swings, with upw ard ratchet effects on deficits and the public debt. 
Thus, minimizing pro-cyclicality also helps prom ote m ore sustain­
able fiscal positions over the longer term.
•  M oreover, sharp  fluctuations in public expenditure program s have 
efficiency costs. This is evident in the losses generated by delays or 
cancellation o f  already initiated subnational investm ent projects; 
b u t efficiency costs of ab ru p t changes in funding levels can also 
be significant for current expenditure program s, fo r example, in 
education  and  health , w hich are increasingly a responsibility of 
SNGs.
•  Finally, sharp retrenchm ents in socially sensitive subnational spend­
ing program s during cyclical dow nturns can carry substantial social 
and political costs, as dem onstrated by experiences in countries 
strongly affected by the recent global financial crisis (Fedelino and 
Ter-M inassian, 2010).
Second, there m ay be a case for ‘active’ (discretionary) countercycli­
cal subnational fiscal measures to  respond to regionally differentiated
326 Decentralization and reform in Latin America
shocks across a national territory, especially if the C G  response does not 
adequately take into account such asymmetries.
Third, it is essential to  ensure that subnational countercyclical policies, 
w hether active or passive:
•  are consistent with longer-term  debt sustainability (see further 
below);
•  are symmetric over the cycle (that is, equally restrictive during 
boom s as accom m odative during downturns);
•  do no t conflict with the fiscal stance o f the CG; and
•  do not impose significant adverse externalities on o ther subnational 
jurisdictions.
Fourth , it is im portan t tha t SNGs build up their capacity to design and 
implement active countercyclical measures, when appropriate, in a trans­
parent, relatively rapid, and reasonably efficient m anner, for instance by 
im proving the targeting o f their social safety-nets, as well as their systems 
to  select and execute public investments. This is the case also for coun­
tercyclical measures executed by SNGs on behalf of, and  funded by, the 
CG. SN G s’ capacity weaknesses in this respect have often hindered the 
timeliness and effectiveness o f  C G s’ countercyclical fiscal policies in m any 
countries.
D ecentralization is affecting no t only short-term  macro-fiscal m anage­
m ent but also medium- to  long-term  fiscal sustainability, and the app ro ­
priate policies and institutions to  prom ote such sustainability. SNGs can 
pose threats to  fiscal sustainability in a num ber o f ways:
•  by running up explicit debt in excess o f their ability to service it in a 
plausible range o f economic environments;
•  by accum ulating arrears to suppliers; and
•  by incurring large contingent liabilities with significant probabilities 
o f realization.
If  unchecked, such behaviors eventually lead to debt-servicing difficul­
ties and to  hard-to-resist pressures on CGs to bail ou t the SNGs facing 
such difficulties. These pressures become m ore powerful the greater is 
the devolution to  SNGs o f responsibility for essential public services and 
socially sensitive expenditure program s.
A num ber o f institutional arrangem ents have been pu t in place around 
the world to ensure that SNGs conform  to intertem poral budget con­
straints, so as to  avoid unsustainable debt accum ulation. These range 
from  prim ary reliance on m arket discipline, to  adm inistrative borrow ing
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controls, and various com binations thereof, such as mechanisms for coor­
dination  o f  budgetary policies across governm ent levels and  the enactm ent 
o f fiscal rules for SNGs (Ter-M inassian and Craig, 1997).
The preconditions for an effective operation o f m arket discipline are 
quite dem anding, including: a history o f no significant bailouts o f SNGs 
by the CG; well-developed financial m arkets; no privileged access o f SNGs 
to  financing; and the availability of timely, reliable and adequately tran s­
parent inform ation on subnational finances. Since these requirem ents are 
rarely fully met in practice, virtually no country relies on m arket discipline 
alone to impose a ‘hard  budget constrain t’ on SNGs.
A t the other end o f the spectrum, reliance on adm inistrative borrow ing 
controls by the C G  is also becom ing infrequent, as SNGs, especially a t the 
interm ediate (regional) level, have acquired (or are acquiring) increasing, 
and in some countries constitutionally sanctioned, autonom y; and their 
officials are elected by popular vote,2 and sometimes belong to  a different 
party  from  the one ruling at the C G  level. In m any countries, controls by 
the C G  apply currently only to  external borrowing.
In contrast, cooperative intergovernm ental arrangem ents are becoming 
m ore frequent around the world, as decentralization and dem ocratization 
advance, bu t their effectiveness in securing well-functioning decision­
m aking processes, and adherence by all participants to  agreed fiscal 
targets, also varies significantly across countries. In general, such arrange­
m ents have proven m ost successful in countries where there is an estab­
lished culture o f  fiscal responsibility, regional disparities are no t too acute, 
and the C G  has a recognized leadership role (for example, in A ustralia and 
in the N ordic countries).
Reflecting the lim itations o f the alternative approaches, the use of 
num erical fiscal rules to  prom ote fiscal discipline at the subnational level 
has been growing around  the w orld.3 These rules typically stipulate limits 
on subnational deficits (for example, in US states; and in a num ber o f  EU  
countries, under the so-called domestic stability pacts), o r targets for the 
prim ary balance (for example, in Brazil), in relation to each jurisdiction’s 
output, or to  its revenues. Some rules envisage limits on the debt or the 
debt service o f SNGs (for example, in Brazil, Colom bia and  Hungary). In 
some cases (for example, some US states, M exico, and  Brazil), subnational 
fiscal rules also include expenditure or revenue limits.
As with fiscal rules a t the C G  level, a num ber o f factors affect the effec­
tiveness of subnational rules in prom oting fiscal sustainability.
One factor is the robustness o f the legal foundation o f  the rule. 
Specifically, in some countries the C G  is constitutionally em powered to 
enact legislation stipulating binding fiscal rules for its SNGs. In others, 
especially federal ones, such rules can only be enacted by each subnational
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jurisdiction. In a num ber o f these countries, SNGs have adopted fiscal 
rules (mostly balanced-budget ones), often by including them  in state 
constitutions. In  such countries, the CG, although unable to  unilaterally 
legislate binding fiscal rules for its SNGs, can in m any instances act as a 
role model for them , by adopting for itself a sound fiscal rule, exerting 
m oral suasion, and, if  appropriate, providing incentives to  the SN G s to 
introduce similar ones. A t least it should endeavor to  ensure tha t the rules 
adopted by its SN G s are m utually consistent, minimizing the risk of free­
riding behaviors.
A  second factor is the soundness of the rule’s design, specifically:
•  the comprehensiveness o f its coverage;4
•  its clarity and transparency, which facilitate the m onitoring o f its 
im plem entation; and
•  the appropriateness o f the target to  the initial conditions o f the 
relevant subnational jurisdiction. The larger the initial imbalances 
of the latter, and the lower its access to  sustainable financing, the 
tighter need to  be the deficit or debt limits stipulated by the rule. 
Also im portan t are the level and variability o f an SN G ’s own and 
shared revenues, as they provide an indication o f its ability to service 
additional debt, and its vulnerability to exogenous shocks.5
A  third factor concerns the capacity o f  the SNGs to im plem ent the 
rule, which in tu rn  largely depends on the state o f their public financial 
m anagem ent systems. In this respect, SNGs typically (albeit no t always) 
lag behind their respective CGs. The C G  has an im portan t role to  play 
in m any countries in prom oting and supporting the strengthening and 
m odernization o f  budgeting, budget execution, accounting and reporting 
systems at the subnational level. W henever feasible in the light o f possible 
constitutional constraints, the C G  should ensure that com m on accounting 
and  reporting standards are enacted for all levels o f governm ent (possibly 
with simplified regimes for small local governments), to facilitate adequate 
transparency o f SN G s’ operations, as well as a timely m onitoring o f the 
observance of any existing fiscal rule for these governm ents.6
A  fourth  factor is the existence o f adequate enforcem ent mechanisms, 
which should: (i) have a solid legal basis; (ii) be non-discretionary in their 
application; and  (iii) stipulate penalties severe enough to act as deterrent 
to  non-com pliance, bu t no t unrealistic (which could ultim ately lead to 
their non-application7). The effectiveness o f  enforcem ent mechanisms is 
likely to  be greatly enhanced if  they are supported by explicit requirem ents 
to correct deviations from  the rule within a reasonable pre-specified time 
period.
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Existing subnational fiscal rules typically privilege the objective o f 
p rom oting  fiscal discipline and  sustainability. However, for the reasons 
indicated above, an increased focus on the stabilizing properties o f 
subnational fiscal rules would also be desirable. The question is how  to 
design rules tha t avoid pro-cyclical fiscal behaviors by SNGs, while safe­
guarding sustainability, and th a t can be effectively im plem ented a t the 
subnational level; and  how to support such rules with appropria te  insti­
tu tional mechanisms (such as countercyclical funds) and  other reform s in 
intergovernm ental fiscal arrangem ents. The last section discusses some 
policy options in this respect, particularly  relevant to the L atin  Am erican 
context.
3 DECENTRALIZATION AND MACROECONOMIC 
MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
A Macroeconomic Context of High Volatility
The region has been characterized for several decades by a high degree of 
m acroeconom ic volatility. Figure 11.1 shows tha t volatility (as m easured 
by the variance over time o f grow th rates o f per capita G D P) in LA  has
3.0
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Source: Jiménez and Kacef (2011).
Figure 11.1 Volatility o f  per capita gdp growth (1961-2009) (percent
change)
330 Decentralization and reform in Latin America
Table 11.1 Trade shocks and sudden stops in capital in selected countries 
(1980-2004)
Countries Trade shocks Sudden stops
Argentina 1986-1987; 1993; 1980-1984; 1994-1996;
2002-2003 1998-2004
Brazil 1986; 1999-2003 1981-1985; 1998
Chile 1985-1986; 2002-2003 1981-1986; 1998-2000
Mexico 1986; 1992-1994; 2003 1982-1985; 1994-1997
Colombia 1983; 1985; 2002-2004 1998-2002
Peru 2001-2004 1981-1986; 1997-1999
Venezuela (Bolivarian 1986-1988; 1998; 1980-1986
Republic of) 2002-2003
Source: Fanelli and Jiménez (2009).
significantly exceeded volatility no t only in developed countries, but also 
in other developing ones during m ost o f the 1961-2009 period. Volatility 
has been largely the result o f  external shocks, which have affected not 
only G D P growth, bu t also fiscal and balance o f  paym ents sustainabil­
ity, and the health  of national financial systems over prolonged periods 
(Heym ann, 2007; Fanelli, 2008; and  ECLAC, 2009).
As shown in Table 11.1, external shocks have been related to trade or 
capital flows, and have affected countries in the region either separately or 
simultaneously (in the la tter case with added devastating effects).
D epending on their economic and financial structures, as well as various 
institutional characteristics, different countries have been m ore or less 
vulnerable to, and im pacted by, either type o f shock. Specifically, trade- 
related shocks have affected com paratively m ore countries with: high 
degrees o f export concentration; vulnerability to  changes in the terms 
o f trade; and dependence on tourism , em igrant rem ittances, and foreign 
direct investm ent (FD I). In contrast, sudden stops in capital flows have 
tended to im pact m ore frequently and strongly countries relatively m ore 
dependent on external financing (that is, with large current account or 
fiscal deficits; or large external debt refinancing needs) tha t are more dol­
larized, with inflexible exchange rate regimes, and with weaker financial 
systems (Fanelli and Jiménez, 2009).
O n average, the effects o f  trade-related shocks on G D P  growth have 
tended to be less disruptive, but m ore lasting than  those o f sudden 
capital stops. It should also be noted tha t some term s-of-trade-related 
shocks have affected countries in the region asymmetrically. F o r instance, 
the substantial rise in com m odity prices in 2006 to mid-2008 affected
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Figure 11.2 Proportion o f  years with growth o f  GDP per capita lower 
than the average world growth rate by at least one standard 
deviation (1960-2009) in selected countries (% )
positively countries such as A rgentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Colom bia, Ecuador and Venezuela that are net com m odity exporters, 
bu t negatively the countries in Central Am erica tha t are net im porters. 
Figure 11.2 shows that, reflecting varying degrees o f vulnerability to 
shocks (as well as different policy responses to  them), different countries 
in the region have suffered m arkedly different durations o f below-average 
grow th during the last five decades.
Mostly Pro-cyclical National Fiscal Policy Responses
The scope for, and effectiveness of, national policy responses to  m acr­
oeconomic shocks have also varied across countries and  over time in the 
region, reflecting b o th  the nature o f the shock, and a range o f  economic 
and institutional factors (level of development; political conditions; dis­
tributional and social tensions; exchange rate regime; m onetary policy 
fram ework; am ong others). Specifically, during m ost o f  the last decades, 
fiscal policy responses have tended to  be shaped prim arily by short-term  
financing constraints and longer-term  debt sustainability concerns, albeit 
with an im proving trend  in the years preceding the 2008-09 global finan­
cial crisis.
The traditionally pro-cyclical nature o f fiscal policy in m ost Latin 
Am erican countries reflects a num ber o f factors:
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•  the relative scarcity and high volatility o f tax revenues. M ost coun­
tries in the region (Brazil and, to a lesser extent, A rgentina and 
U ruguay being exceptions) are characterized by relatively low tax 
ratios, frequently with high concentration on natural resource- 
related ̂ revenues. M oreover and partly reflecting such concentra­
tion, tax revenues tend to  be highly sensitive to fluctuations in 
output and  in the prices o f key com m odities (Góm ez Sabaini and 
Jiménez, 2009);
•  the pervasive rigidities in public expenditures (Cetràngolo et al., 
2010), which have led to  a concentration o f fiscal adjustm ents on 
public investments, w ith adverse effects on the longer-term  growth 
potential; and m ost im portantly,
•  the fact tha t the public sector’s access to  dom estic and especially 
external financing has tended to  be also highly pro-cyclical, particu­
larly during sudden stops, but also in conjunction with trade-related 
shocks.
As a result, during the last decades, m ost countries in the region were 
forced to tighten fiscal policy during episodes of sudden stops or adverse 
trade shocks, and  took  advantage o f com m odity price boom s, or o f  other 
factors inducing a relaxation of financing constraints, to  boost public 
spending, particularly on politically or socially sensitive program s, fre­
quently of a recurrent nature.
To be sure, there were exceptions to  these trends, in particu lar Chile, 
which from  the beginning o f the last decade adopted  a structural 
balance-based rule, aimed at avoiding fiscal pro-cyclicality. M oreover, 
m ost countries o f the region conducted a less pro-cyclical (in some cases, 
a broadly cyclically neutral) fiscal policy during the years preceding the 
recent global financial crisis, utilizing part or m ost o f the com m odity- 
induced revenue boom  to im prove their overall fiscal balances; reduce 
their public debt, and  im prove its structure and com position;8 and  accu­
m ulate external assets (K acef and Jiménez, 2009; D aude et al., 2010; 
and  IM F, 2010). As a result, they were in a distinctly better position to 
face the 2008-09 crisis shock than  had  been the case for lesser shocks in 
previous decades.
Trends in Subnational Fiscal Stabilization and Sustainability
Trends in subnational finances in LA during the last few decades were 
characterized by a rapid devolution o f  spending responsibilities, but con­
tinued revenue centralization. As docum ented in the relevant literature 
(summarized in Fedelino and  Ter-M inassian, 2010), this asymmetric
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trend  in decentralization is quite com m on around the world, and reflects 
a num ber of factors:
•  First, political econom y incentives for both  the C G  and m ost SNGs 
tend to  w ork in favor of revenue centralization. To increase their 
leverage over lower levels o f governm ent, as well as to  facilitate 
macro-fiscal m anagem ent, CGs prefer to  m aintain control o f  m ost 
revenue bases, and to  provide resources to  SNGs through transfers, 
especially discretionary ones. F or their part, SNGs tend to  prefer 
avoiding the political costs o f raising resources from  their own con­
stituents, and blam ing the C G  for any shortfall o f such resources 
vis-à-vis spending demands. This is especially the case for the eco­
nomically w eaker SNGs, whose own revenues would m ost clearly 
fall short o f needs.
•  Second, the scope for decentralization o f taxing powers is also 
constrained by econom ic factors, m ost notably the higher m obility 
o f goods and  factors o f production  w ithin and  outside a national 
territory (Ter-M inassian, 1997). This tends to  limit subnational tax 
handles mainly to  property taxes, retail sales taxes, and  personal 
income taxes (PITs) (typically in the form  of surcharges on the 
national PITs). In  LA, with national P IT  bases being eroded by 
overly generous thresholds and deductions, SNGs typically raise 
little or no m oney from  this potential tax base.
•  Third, w ith taxing capacities typically being unequally distributed 
across the national territory (especially so in resource-rich coun­
tries), significant vertical imbalances need to be m aintained between 
levels o f governm ent, to facilitate horizontal redistribution through 
equalization-type transfers.
•  Finally, subnational tax adm inistrations generally (albeit not 
always) are less effective than  national ones. This is especially 
evident in LA  in the adm inistration of local property taxes, with 
outdated  cadastres (property registers) and  infrequent reassessments 
o f property values. As a result, the ratios o f property taxes to G D P 
in LA are equivalent to 10-20 percent o f corresponding ratios in 
O ECD  countries.
Table 11.2 presents the distribution o f subnational tax bases in the m ajor 
countries in LA. It shows that all o f them  include real estate and other types 
o f real property (in particular, autom otive vehicles); a few (mainly Brazil, 
Argentina, and Colom bia) include sales, or the consum ption o f  specific 
(generally non-m erit) goods or services; and even fewer include incomes 
or wages (Mexico). W ith the exception of Chile, m ost countries tha t are
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Table 11.2 Current bases o f  subnational own revenues in selected 
countries
Countries Tax base of own revenue Revenue from 
natural resourcesProperty Sales or consumption Other






Colombia X X X
Ecuador X X
Mexico X X X X
Peru X X
Source: Jiménez and Podestâ (2009).
natural resource producers allow some form  of participation by the origi­
nating regions or localities in the revenues (royalties o r taxes) generated by 
such resources (Table 11.3). Albeit understandable on political economy 
grounds, and as a com pensation for possible local environm ental costs 
o f the resource exploitation, this assignment tends to  exacerbate regional 
disparities, and to increase the volatility o f subnational own revenues.9
The vertical gaps created by the asymmetry in decentralization o f expen­
ditures and revenues are filled by a variety o f intergovernm ental transfers. 
These have shown a rising trend in recent years, especially in Argentina, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Mexico. They also vary widely in m ag­
nitude across the region, ranging from  over 8 percent o f G D P  in A rgentina 
to  under 1 percent in m ore centralized countries such as Chile, C osta Rica, 
and  Ecuador. The m ost im portan t type o f  intergovernm ental transfers is 
revenue sharing, which is generally form ula based, as a percentage o f to tal 
national revenues, or o f a subset o f such revenues. Table 11.4 shows the 
basis o f sharing o f  national revenues across levels o f  governm ent in m ajor 
countries in the region.
The recurrent m acroeconom ic shocks im pacting the region have affected 
subnational finances through a num ber of channels:
•  significant fluctuations in own and shared revenues, given the above­
m entioned cyclical sensitivity of such revenues (Figure 11.3);
•  sharp and abrup t changes in the availability o f  m arket financing; 
and
Table 11.3 Current intergovernmental distribution o f  revenues fro m  non­
renewable resources in selected countries
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Countries Distribution of non-renewable resource revenues
Argentina Royalties: to producer provinces
Bolivia Patents: to producer departments and municipalities
(Plurinational Royalties (18%): 11% to producer department, 1% to Beni
State of) and Pando departments, and 6% to the General Treasury o f the
Nation. Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH): 24.36% to prefectures, 
66.99% to municipalities and 8.65% to universities 
Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and Derivatives (IEHD): 25% to 
departments, and the remainder to General Treasury of the Nation 
(GTN)
Colombia Royalties are distributed to non-producer and producer state
and local governments. In the latter case, allocation is done following 
the quantities o f hydrocarbon production. Am ounts range between 
47.5 and 52% to producer departments; 12.5 and 32% to producer 
municipalities; 8 to ports; and 8 and 32% to the National Royalties 
Fund
Ecuador Oil revenues are pooled with other central government revenues
for sharing with provincial and municipal councils. Royalties: the 
provinces Esmeraldas, Napo and Sucumbios receive US$0.005 per 
barrel of oil
Mexico The transfers from the federal government to state and local
authorities regarding oil extraction and mining are:
i) included in the Fondo General de Participaciones, which is financed 
by 20% of most federal revenues, including the rights on oil and 
mining extraction
ii) 9/11 of the sales tax of petrol and diesel are transferred to state 
and local governments in relation to their consumption and 2/11 
finance a Compensation Fund that assigns transfers to the 10 state 
governments with the lowest G D P excluding oil and mining
iii) 0.6% of the oil exploration and production rights paid by PEM EX 
are transferred to the Fondo de Extracción de Hidrocarburos, 
(FEXHI), to be transferred among producer states. (Fiscal 
Coordination Law latest reform dated 06-24-2009)
Peru The mining canon distributes revenues from non-renewable
resources only among the subnational levels of government that 
participate in their extraction:
10% for municipal local governments
25% for district and provincial local governments
40% for state local governments
25% for the regional governments. (Canon Law No. 28322 o f 2004)
Note: In Colombia a recent constitutional reform includes changes in the distribution of 
royalties aimed at increasing equity, and at reducing the pro-cyclicality o f such revenues 
through the creation of a Stabilization and Savings Fund.
Source: Jiménez and Podestà (2009).
Table 11.4 Distribution o f  central government taxes
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Country As percentage o f total 
collection
As percentage of individual tax Fixed
am ount
Argentina VAT (89%), earnings (64%), 
credit and debit on current 
account (30%), internal taxes 
(100%), minimum presum ed 
income (100%), interest 
payments and other taxes (100%)
Bolivia 25% (20% for
(Plurinational municipalities and 5%
State of) for public universities)
Brazil States: 21.5% of IR  (tax on 
income and earnings) and IPI 
(tax on industrialized products). 
Municipalities: 22.5% o f  the IPI 
and IR , 70% of the IO F  (tax on 
credit, exchange and insurance 
operations o r on operations 
related to  securities or real 






Ecuador 15% (of which 70% 
goes to municipalities 
and 30% for 
provincial councils)
Mexico States: 20% o f the 
General Participation 
Fund (G FP) (from 
which 4% m ust 
be transferred to 
m unicipal level 
o f government) 
Municipalities: 1% of 
the G FP
Peru Municipalities: 2% o f operations 
affected by the VAT, the 
gasoline-powered vehicles tax 
and the tax on recreational boats
Source: Jiménez and Podestà (2009).
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Figure 11.3 Revenue volatility by level o f  government in selected countries 
(1995-2008) (standard deviation, in constant price terms)
•  modifications in the systems of intergovernm ental fiscal arrange­
ments (changes in revenue-sharing form ulas and/or in subnational 
fiscal rules (Table 11.5) or o ther borrow ing controls). These changes 
often reflected the distributive intergovernm ental tensions and con­
flicts generated by the shocks, with CGs trying to  ensure that SNGs 
share in the burden o f adjustm ent to the shocks through  a reduction 
o f their spending. As a result, subnational fiscal policies were largely 
pro-cyclical during m ost o f  the last decades.
Borrowing controls or rules enacted by the C G  succeeded in keeping 
subnational debts relatively low (well under 5 percent o f G D P) in m ost 
countries, with the exception o f A rgentina and Brazil, where SN G s’ debt 
peaked at 22 and 20 percent o f G D P, respectively, in 2002 (Figure 11.4).
Subnational finances im proved significantly in the m ajor countries of 
the region during the last decade largely reflecting a rapid grow th in rev­
enues (mainly shared revenues and other transfers from  the C G , since, as 
m entioned above, own revenues were broadly stable in relation to  G D P 
in m ost countries). W hile the m ain factors behind this grow th in revenues 
were the sustained acceleration in econom ic grow th and the com m odity 
price boom  experienced by the region in the early to  mid-2000s, a role 
was also played by changes in the transfer system introduced by countries 
such as A rgen tina ,10 Bolivia (P lurinational State o f),11 and  C olom bia12
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Table 11.5 Current fisc a l rules in selected countries
Country Year of Content of rule Coverage Legal basis
enactment
Income or Expenditure Rules
Argentina 2004 Nominal growth of primary expenditure must not exceed nominal GDP Federal and Law
growth subnational
Brazil 2000 Limits are set by law on the ratios of payroll expenditures to net Federal and Law
revenues of individual governments subnational
Ecuador 2003 Real growth of CG’s current expenditure must not exceed 3.5% Central Law
Ecuador 2003 Real growth of current operational expenditures of the non-financial Federal and Law
public sector must not exceed 2.5% subnational
Mexico 2006 Revenue excesses over budgeted amounts are used first to compensate Federal and Law
for expenditure overruns. Any remainder is allocated to four different subnational
funds in percentages established by law
Peru 2000 Real growth of current expenditure must not exceed 3% Federal and Law
subnational
Balance Rules
Argentina 2004 Budgets o f individual governments must be presented and executed in Federal and Law
equilibrium subnational
Brazil 2000 Budget balance target established by the government Federal and Law
subnational
Colombia 2011 The CG must limit its structural deficit to 1.5% of GDP, effective as Central Law
from 2015
Colombia 2001 Operational expenditures of SNGs must be financed by their current Subnational Law
revenues
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Chile 2006 Each new administration must announce, and adhere to, a structural 
balance target
Central Law
Ecuador 2003 The deficit -  excluding oil activities -  must be reduced yearly by 0.2% of 




Mexico 2006 Budgets must be presented in balance, and subsequent new spending 










Peru 2000 NFPS deficit must not exceed 1% of GDP Federal and 
subnational
Law





Argentina 2004 Annual borrowing limits to ensure that debt servicing does not exceed 
15% of shared revenues FRL
Subnational Law
Brazil 2001 Debt limits set by the FRL, and annual borrowing limits set by the CG Federal and 
subnational
Law
Panama 2002 Reduction of public debt to below 40% of GDP by 2017 Federal and 
subnational
Law
Sources: Countries’ fiscal responsibility laws, and Budget Departm ent for Chile.
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Figure 11.4 Evolution o f  subnational public debt in selected countries 
(1996-2010) (% o f  GDP)
w ith a view to facilitating an orderly adjustm ent in  their subnational 
finances.
As shown in Figure 11.5, subnational expenditures also rose in rela­
tion to G D P during the boom  period, but at a slower pace than  revenues, 
resulting in the achievement o f significant prim ary surpluses on average 
in the region throughout 2000-08. The im provem ent in  the prim ary sur­
pluses, as well as a m oderation  in borrow ing costs, led to  a steady decline 
in subnational debt levels, m ost pronounced in A rgentina and Brazil. In 
these two countries, bilateral debt restructuring agreem ents by the C G  
with individual SNGs, together with a tightening o f control on new bor­
rowing, were instrum ental in ensuring that a significant portion  of the 
fiscal dividends o f the boom  was saved by the SNGs.
4 IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON THE 
SUBNATIONAL FINANCES IN LATIN AMERICA
The 2008-09 global crisis propagated  quickly to em erging and developing 
countries through both  trade and financial channels. F o r LA as a whole, 
the trough o f the crisis was reached in the first quarter o f  2009, with activ­
ity beginning to pick up in m ost countries in the second quarter o f the 
year. LA ’s G D P  (PPP weighted) declined on average by about 1.7 percent
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Note: The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru.
Sources: ECLAC until 2008 and own estimates for 2009.
Figure 11.5 Subnational revenues, expenditures and primary balances 
in selected countries (1996-2009) ( simple average in % o f  
GDP)
in 2009, albeit w ith significant differences across countries. The decline in 
com m odity prices and  the emergence of significant ou tpu t gaps helped, 
however, m oderate inflationary pressures, which had built up steadily in 
the preceding years.
The crisis took a significant toll on the public finances o f the region. 
The overall ( P P P G D P  weighted) public sector deficit increased by the 
equivalent of m ore than  three percentage points o f G D P in 2009, reaching 
4 percent o f G DP.
The crisis affected significantly the subnational finances. Table 11.6 
shows th a t the unweighted average o f  the prim ary balances o f SNGs in 
eight m ajor countries o f the region deteriorated from  a surplus equivalent 
to abou t 0.8 percent o f G D P  in 2007 to one o f 0.2 percent in 2008, and 
further to  an estim ated deficit o f 0.3 percent in 2009, reflecting both  a 
decline in overall revenues and an increase in prim ary spending, relative 
to  G D P. The deterioration was m ost pronounced in some resource-rich 
countries (Ecuador, Bolivia (P lurinational State of), A rgentina and  Peru). 
Despite a partial reversal in 2010, fiscal balances have not returned to 
pre-crisis levels.
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Table 11.6 Evolution o f  subnational prim ary balances in selected 
countries (2007-2010) (%> o f  GDP)







2 0 1 0 ­
2009
A rg en tin a 0 . 2 2 -0 .2 8 -0 .7 0 0 . 1 0 -0 .5 0 -0 .4 2 1 . 2 0
Bolivia 1.30 0 . 6 6 -0 .6 2 -0 .3 9 -0 .6 4 -1 .2 7 0.23
(P lu rin a tio n a l 
S ta te  of) 
B razil 0.92 0.91 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 1 - 0 . 0 1 -0 .6 9 - 0 . 1 1
C hile 0.14 0.04 0 . 1 1 0.23 - 0 . 1 0 0.07 0 . 1 2
C o lo m b ia -0 .3 5 0.50 0.36 0 . 2 0 0.85 -0 .1 4 -0 .1 6
E c u a d o r 2.57 - 0 . 6 6 -1 .6 2 -1 .4 3 -3 .2 3 -0 .9 7 0 . 2 0
M exico 0.23 0.57 0.07 0.41 0.34 -0 .5 0 0.35
P eru 1.08 0 . 0 1 -0 .3 6 -0 .2 5 -1 .0 7 -0 .3 7 0 . 1 1
L a tin  A m erica  -  8 0.76 0 . 2 2 -0 .3 2 -0 .1 3 -0 .5 4 -0 .5 4 0.24
Source: ECLAC.
The evolution  o f  S N G  revenues was shaped prim arily by develop­
m ents in C G  transfers to them  (including revenue sharing), given the 
weight o f  such transfers, especially in countries such as Argentina, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, Ecuador and M exico. The absence 
o f  sm oothing or countercyclical m echanism s in the existing revenue­
sharing arrangem ents resulted in a rapid propagation o f  the crisis- 
induced decline in C G s’ revenues to the subnational budgets. Figure 11.6 
shows that, in four countries13 for which the relevant data are available 
through the fourth quarter o f  2010, C G  transfers broadly mirrored the 
developm ent o f  C G  revenues with a one-quarter lag, beginning to decline 
in the second quarter o f  2009, and only recovering (except in Bolivia  
(Plurinational State o f)14) in the first quarter o f  2010. The figure also  
shows the im pact o f  a one-off transfer to SN G s enacted by Peru in the 
third quarter o f  2009, to (more than) offset the decline in the ordinary  
transfers. It also suggests that a m easure taken by A rgentina in 2009 
(devolution to the provinces o f  30 percent o f  the tax on  export o f  soy­
beans) helped avoid  a significant decline in overall C G  transfers to the 
provinces in that country.
CGs in a number o f  the countries in the region took  steps to m itigate 
the im pact o f  the downturn in revenues on subnational spending. In 
addition to the above-m entioned measures taken by Argentina and Peru, 
Chile, M exico, and Paraguay announced significant additional spending
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Note: Bolivia (Plurinational State of): Includes Renta Dignidad (the Universal Old Age 
Income provision is a non-contributory payment for life program that the Bolivian state 
grants to all its beneficiaries). Peru: Does not include the Canon, royalties, and transfers 
that began in 2009, and does not include the one-off grant in 2010.
Sources: ECLAC and national databases.
Figure 11.6 Evolution o f  intergovernmental transfers in real terms in 
selected countries (2008-2010) ( change tlt-4 )
on public works, to be executed by SN G s with C G  funding. In som e cases 
(for exam ple, in Argentina and Brazil) subnational budgetary targets for 
2009 set by existing fiscal rules were eased, and/or additional financing was 
arranged for S N G s through public banks.
In Argentina, provinces that did n ot have sufficient financial m eans 
to m eet the m aturities o f  their debts received loans from  the national 
governm ent during 2009, through the im plem entation o f  the Financial 
A ssistance Program, which benefited 13 jurisdictions for a total am ount 
equivalent to 69 percent o f  their capital repayments. In April o f  that 
year, the governm ent set up the Federal Solidarity Fund, stipulating that 
30 percent o f  effective revenue from the soybean export tax w ould go to 
a fund to be shared with SN G s. During 2010 the Programa Federal de 
Desendeudamiento was enacted which m ade it possible to reduce the pro­
vincial debt stock through the application o f  the C ontributions’ Fund o f  
the N ational Treasury (A T N ), totaling over Arg$9.6 billion. The am ounts 
to  be allocated to each province were determined based on the respective 
share in the debt stock.
In Brazil, the subnational finances were affected on average relatively
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lightly by the short-lived crisis. The consolidated primary surplus o f  the 
states declined by about 0.3 percent o f  G D P , to 0.6 percent, and that o f  the 
m unicipalities was nearly unchanged from  the previous year, at around 0.1 
percent o f  G D P, in 2009. M oreover, for the first tim e in m any years, SN G s  
recorded a small (about 0.1 percent o f  G D P) overall surplus. A lso, and in 
contrast to the federal debt, the S N G s’ net debt continued its declining  
trend in 2009, to just b elow l3  percent o f  G D P  by year-end. The stronger 
fiscal perform ance o f  the SN G s, com pared with the federal government, 
m ainly reflected the tight lim its on subnational indebtedness im posed by 
the F R L  and by the existing S N G s’ debt restructuring agreements with the 
federal governm ent. H owever, the primary surplus o f  the SN G s deterio­
rated slightly in relation to G D P  in 2010, despite the pronounced recovery 
in activity. This suggests that subnational fiscal policies remained largely 
pro-cyclical in Brazil during the current cycle.
In Peru, the C G  authorized SN G s (through an emergency decree) to  
adopt measures to reduce current expenditures. In Colom bia, taxes on cig­
arettes and alcoholic beverages, which in C olom bia are assigned to SNG s, 
were raised to create fiscal space to sustain expenditures. A lso, a new law  
was proposed to increase the subnational share o f royalty revenues, intro­
duce new horizontal sharing coefficients, and create a savings and stabili­
zation fund to reduce the volatility o f  subnational spending. In M exico, 
transfers increased further in 2010, reflecting the im pact o f  tax measures 
(increases in the VAT, PIT and other taxes) that strengthened the base o f  
the revenue-sharing arrangement (Recaudación Federal Participable: RFP).
5 REFORM OPTIONS TO FACILITATE 
SUSTAINABLE AND LESS PRO-CYCLICAL 
SUBNATIONAL FISCAL POLICIES IN LATIN 
AMERICA
The analysis o f  subnational fiscal performances in the preceding two sec­
tions suggests that the links between fiscal decentralization and m acroeco­
nom ic m anagem ent vary significantly across the region.
First, in a number o f  unitary countries (for exam ple, Chile, Uruguay, 
and the Central Am erican countries) decentralization is still lim ited, and 
does not pose significant m acroeconom ic risks.
Second, in others (for exam ple, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), M exico, 
Peru), growing decentralization has not significantly affected fiscal sus­
tainability so far, due to relatively tight limits on subnational borrowing, 
and, in som e cases, past bailouts by the CG.
Third, in other countries (Brazil, Colom bia) substantial progress has
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been m ade since the m id-1990s in tightening controls on subnational debt 
and reducing it.
Fourth, progress has also been m ade in reducing subnational debt in 
Argentina, m ainly reflecting support operations by the C G , as well as the 
buoyancy o f  the provinces’ ow n and shared revenues.
Fifth, in m ost countries, however, subnational fiscal responses to shocks 
have tended to be pro-cyclical, albeit less so in the m ore recent years.
Sixth, pro-cyclicality has reflected (to different degrees in the various 
countries) a m ix o f  factors:
•  fiscal rules or other borrowing controls with targets unrelated to 
the cycle; and even in the absence o f  such rules, pro-cyclical fluctua­
tions in the availability o f  financing for m ost SN G s throughout the 
region;
•  the lack o f  significant subnational revenue-raising autonom y in 
m ost countries (with the notable exception o f  Brazil, and to a lesser 
extent, Argentina) especially at the state/regional level, which has 
severely constrained the scope to sustain subnational spending 
during recessions;
•  the (full or partial) assignm ent to S N G s o f  som e highly cycli­
cal revenues, especially from  non-renewable resources, in som e 
countries (for exam ple, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, 
Peru);
•  intergovernm ental transfer systems based on revenue-sharing for­
m ulas invariant over the cycle, which propagate quickly to  the 
subnational finances cyclical fluctuations in the C G ’s revenues 
(C olom bia being an exception in this respect); and finally
•  pervasive rigidities (including earmarking o f  revenues and/or trans­
fers to certain categories o f  expenditure) which reduce the scope 
for reassignment o f  subnational resources to changing expenditure 
needs/priorities over the cycle.
These considerations point to a number o f  possible options for reforms 
in the intergovernmental systems o f  the region that could facilitate fewer 
pro-cyclical subnational fiscal policies, while safeguarding debt sustain­
ability, in the future.
Reforms in Rules and Borrowing Controls
Specifying subnational rules in terms o f  cyclically adjusted budget bal­
ances should, in principle, help avoid pro-cyclicality in subnational 
fiscal policies, while safeguarding fiscal sustainability (provided o f  course
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that the rules’ targets are chosen on the basis o f  appropriately cautious 
debt dynamics scenarios). There are, however, practical considerations 
that would lim it the effectiveness o f  such an approach, especially in less 
advanced countries, including in the Latin Am erican region.
First, the difficulties o f  estim ating cyclically adjusted fiscal aggregates 
are even m ore significant at the subnational than at the national level. 
M ost countries do not have reliable and timely estim ates o f  regional or 
local output, even less o f  output gaps. U sing national indicators o f  the 
cycle as a proxy can be appropriate when the cyclical shocks are evenly 
distributed across the national territory, but, as evidenced by the recent 
global financial crisis, this is not always the case.
A n  alternative approach m ight be to use changes in labor market indi­
cators (such as the unem ploym ent rate, for which timely subnational-level 
measures are generally available) as triggers for allow ing deviations from  
the fiscal rule’s target up to a pre-specified limit. H owever, this approach  
is clearly m ore suitable for advanced countries, characterized by high 
degrees o f  labor market form ality, than for em erging or developing ones, 
as is the case in Latin Am erican countries, where labor market adjust­
m ents to cyclical shocks m ostly occur in the inform al sector and therefore 
are inadequately captured by changes in the official unem ploym ent sta­
tistics. M oreover, such an approach would be m ore effective in avoiding  
a pro-cyclical fiscal tightening during a large negative output shock, than  
in avoiding a pro-cyclical fiscal expansion by resource-rich regions during 
a com m odity price boom . For the latter, an alternative approach would  
be to require adjustm ents o f  the target balance for deviations in com m od­
ity prices from  their m edium -term  trend (as is done in C hile15). H owever, 
given the above-m entioned difficulties o f  obtaining reliable estim ates 
o f the m edium -term  trend o f  com m odity (especially oil) prices, it may 
be preferable to utilize subnational rules that target the budget balance 
excluding resource revenues.
Second, since financing constraints tend to be tighter at the subnational 
than at the national level, the use o f  a subnational fiscal rule allowing  
cycle-related deviations from  a balanced-budget (or other sustainable 
balance) target should be accom panied by a requirement that SN G s use 
their budget surpluses during boom s to accum ulate liquid assets to be 
drawn down during dow nturns.16 T o avoid that the use o f  such funds 
is affected by political expediency considerations, it is im portant that 
arrangements for their governance be very transparent, and that their 
utilization be guided by clear criteria, specified in advance o f  the crisis, 
leaving little room  for discretion, for exam ple in the decision to start 
drawing on the fund, and the speed o f  its drawdown.
In the light o f  the difficulties o f  using subnational structural balance-
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based rules, consideration should be given to an increased use o f  expendi­
ture rules. Such rules, while not necessarily avoiding pro-cyclicality during 
downturns (since they set ceilings, not floors, for public expenditures) help  
m oderate it during upswings and, by prom oting subnational savings and 
asset accum ulation during such periods, can help cushion the im pact o f  
subsequent recessions on spending. It w ould be im portant to ensure that 
such rules are com prehensive (at least with regard to primary expendi­
tures) to minimize the scope for creative accounting, and that they include 
adequate flexibility m echanism s (such as escape clauses for unforeseeable 
large exogenous shocks).17 Exam ples o f  subnational expenditure rules can 
be found in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, but typically such rules only cover 
a portion o f  subnational spending, a fact that lim its their effectiveness as a 
countercyclical mechanism .
M ore generally, the objectives o f  reducing to a m inim um  fiscal pro­
cyclicality and preferably creating fiscal space for active countercyclical 
policies at all levels o f  governm ent, while safeguarding fiscal sustain­
ability, require a significant strengthening o f  existing m echanism s o f  
fiscal coordination betw een the CG  and the SN G s. M ost countries in 
the region lack form al forum s for policy dialogue across governm ent 
levels (even when such forum s are envisaged by existing legislation, such 
as the F R L  in Brazil); the form ulation o f  subnational budgets is often  
carried out w ithout tim ely inputs by the C G  (for exam ple, as concerns 
the level o f  intergovernm ental transfers); and reporting by the S N G s on  
their budget execution  is subject to long delays and based on  different 
accounting rules. A s a result, not only are e x  ante  policy stances not 
coordinated, but also often ex  p o s t  they counteract each other (as in 
som e instances during the recent crisis, when pro-cyclical fiscal behaviors 
at the subnational level partly offset countercyclical fiscal expansions 
at the CG  level). Intergovernm ental coordination  forum s in Australia  
and in som e European countries could provide useful exam ples in this 
respect.
Reforms in Subnational Revenue Assignments
Strengthening subnational ow n revenues in the region w ould not only  
have efficiency benefits (by prom oting a greater correspondence between  
local spending and revenues, and increasing political accountability in 
the use o f  public resources), but also help create additional fiscal space to 
attend to expenditure needs, including during cyclical downturns.
Reform  priorities and instruments in this area vary significantly 
across the region, reflecting different initial econom ic, institutional and  
sociopolitical conditions, in particular:
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•  the current level o f  the subnational and overall tax ratios which, as 
indicated in Section 3 above, show a substantial dispersion across LA;
•  the current com position  o f  subnational taxes, which is often the 
result o f  piecem eal past reform efforts, is shaped by political reali­
ties, rather than by sound econom ic considerations;
•  the extent and dynam ics o f  regional disparities in incom e, wealth 
and natural resources, which condition individual S N G s’ ability to 
raise own revenues, and which tend to be relatively pronounced in 
m ost countries o f  the region; and
•  the capacity o f  subnational tax adm inistrations, frequently albeit 
not always linked to the S N G ’s size and econom ic base, which also  
varies widely both across and within countries in the region.
Thus, appropriate reform strategies for subnational taxation in LA  
need to be carefully tailored to individual countries’ circum stances. In 
m ost countries, the objective o f  additional revenue m obilization is likely to 
have a major weight. H owever, in a country such as Brazil where state and 
especially m unicipalities are already assigned major sources o f  revenue, 
such as the ICM S and the IS S ,18 respectively, and the overall tax burden 
is already relatively high, the focus o f  tax reform efforts w ould need to be 
m ainly on the rationalization o f  existing taxes, elim ination o f  distortions, 
sim plification and harm onization o f  the tax bases, as well as continued  
im provem ent o f  subnational tax adm inistrations’ capacity.19 These objec­
tives would also need to play significant roles in the other countries, 
since subnational taxes in L A  are frequently riddled with distortions (for 
exam ple, cascading features as in the transaction tax in Argentina; per­
vasive exem ptions and special treatments in m ost countries) and suffer 
from well-know n weaknesses in tax administration (for exam ple, outdated  
cadastres for local property taxes; high com pliance costs for taxpayers; 
lim ited or non-existent cooperation between national and subnational tax 
administrations).
Possible reform options w ould include:
•  the introduction o f  subnational surcharges on national incom e
taxes, preferably within a narrow rate band to avoid excessive
vertical and horizontal com petition. The revenue potential o f  such 
surcharges in the Latin American context is lim ited, however, by 
the high thresholds and large deductions that typically characterize 
national incom e taxes in the region;
•  the replacement o f  cascading transaction taxes with regional
subtraction-based Y A Ts o f  the type utilized, for exam ple, in Italy
(IRAP) and Germ any (gew erbesteuer), or with retail sales taxes;
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•  the introduction (or increase in existing) regional or local excises (in 
particular on energy products or selected services);
•  im provem ents in the design and especially the adm inistration o f  
taxes on m ovable (vehicles) or im m ovable (real estate) items;
•  increased levying o f  user fees for local services; and
•  strengthened efforts to m odernize subnational tax adm inistra­
tions, increase cooperation  w ithin and across governm ent levels, 
including by som e pooling o f  resources in neighboring local 
adm inistrations.
In the various countries that are characterized by a concentration o f  
non-renewable resources in a few subnational jurisdictions (for exam ple, 
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), C olom bia, Ecuador and Peru), 
econom ic (in particular reduction o f  volatility) as well as equity considera­
tions argue for the assignm ent o f  the bulk o f  resource revenues to the CG. 
R eform s in this direction, which inevitably run into strong opposition  
from the often politically powerful resource-rich regions, m ay be facili­
tated by concurrent reforms o f  the intergovernm ental transfer systems 
that w ould ensure to such regions a steadier flow  o f  transfers com m ensu­
rate with their spending needs.
M ore generally, appropriate reforms in existing transfer systems (for 
example, to equalize revenue-raising capacities, rather than revenue 
performances, so as n ot to discourage subnational tax efforts) m ay be 
required to overcom e the political econom y obstacles to own-revenue 
m obilization.
Reforms in Intergovernmental Transfer Systems
A s indicated above, by their very nature, existing revenue-sharing  
m echanism s in Latin A m erican countries tend to transm it to S N G s  
the considerable volatility  experienced by national revenues. From  this 
standpoint, it w ould  be desirable to isolate the evolution  o f  in tergov­
ernm ental transfers from  the evolution  o f  C G  revenues. This is n ot easy  
because the intergovernm ental transfers are m ostly revenue sharing. 
One way is to exclude especially volatile sources o f  national revenues 
(in particular resource revenues) from  the sharing base. H ow ever, it 
m ust be recognized that the exclusion  o f  certain national revenues (for 
exam ple, the so-called  ‘social contributions’ in  Brazil, or the export and  
financial transaction taxes in A rgentina), or even their inclusion  w ith  
low er sharing coefficients, can create incentives for the central govern­
m ent to privilege those form s o f  taxation , even when they are relatively  
distortive.
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A  m ore prom ising approach may therefore be to build explicitly som e 
countercyclical features or sm oothing m echanism s in the vertical sharing 
form ula, but using as a base the totality o f  national revenues. Possible 
options in this respect include:
•  using m oving averages o f  national revenues as a base for the sharing. 
This w ould provide a longer period to SN G s to  adjust their spending  
to fluctuations in national revenues. Some countries (for exam ple, 
Argentina) have utilized such m echanism s in the past;
•  basing transfers on estim ates o f  structural (cyclically adjusted and  
corrected for com m odity price fluctuations) national revenues. 
This w ould require reliable estim ates o f  such revenues, a non-trivial 
requirement given the above-m entioned technical difficulties o f  
estim ating output gaps, revenue elasticities, and trend com m odity  
prices, even at the national level.20 The creation o f  independent fiscal 
councils responsible for such calculation or at least for vetting them, 
if  prepared by the CG, would likely increase their reliability and 
acceptability by SNG s;
•  changing sym metrically the vertical sharing coefficients over the 
cycle (that is, increasing the C G ’s share during expansion periods 
and symmetrically reducing it during recessions). This m ethod is 
m ore likely than the previous one to raise concerns o f  m anipula­
tions regarding the forecast o f  the length o f  the cycle (especially 
i f  left to the CG ), and would require guarantees to the SN G s o f  
e x  p o s t adjustm ents in the event o f  deviations o f  outturns from  
the forecast. In both this and the previous option , acceptability to  
the SN G s might be enhanced by a stipulation that reductions in 
transfers (com pared with those based on an unadjusted formula) 
during boom  periods would be saved by the C G  in a special account 
(with individual sub-accounts for each S N G ) and autom atically  
distributed to the S N G s during downturns; and
•  requiring symmetric adjustments in the revenue shares o f  SN G s for 
countercyclical tax measures by the C G .21
In addition, CG s could in principle vary the level o f  discretionary 
transfers in a countercyclical fashion. There may be, however, significant 
institutional and political econom y lim itation to this approach, especially  
if  such transfers finance socially sensitive program s or if  econom ic cycles 
do not coincide with electoral ones.
A ll the above options w ould have the effect o f  safeguarding (to a greater 
or lesser extent) SN G s from  the budgetary im pact o f  cyclical fluctuations, 
concentrating such im pact on the CG. This w ould increase the onus on
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the latter to create its ow n fiscal space to conduct adequate countercyclical 
policies.
Reforms in Subnational Spending
Subnational spending in Latin American countries is fraught with sub­
stantial and pervasive weaknesses which not only undermine the efficiency 
gains expected from  decentralization, but also som etim es aggravate ver­
tical and horizontal inequalities. They also contribute to m aking m ore 
difficult the adjustm ent o f  subnational budgets to exogenous shocks and 
cyclical fluctuations, and in som e cases can threaten longer-term  fiscal 
sustainability. These weaknesses include:
•  lack o f  clarity in the assignm ent o f  expenditure responsibilities to 
different levels o f  governm ent, which frequently leads to duplica­
tion o f  functions and bloated civil services, and reduces political 
accountability for the quality and efficiency o f  provision o f  public 
goods and services;
•  rigidities in public em ploym ent and wage and benefits policies;
•  excessive generosity in certain entitlem ent programs (for exam ple, in 
health), coupled with unequal access to the same;
•  untargeted subsidization o f  public services;
•  extensive earm arking o f  revenues;
•  weak procurem ent and other expenditure m anagem ent systems; and
•  poor selection, preparation, and m onitoring o f  im plem entation o f  
public investm ents.
R eform  efforts in  the above areas are proceeding at different speeds 
am ong the countries o f  the region, and also within countries, reflect­
ing dissim ilar capacities at the subnational level, different degrees o f  
support by the CG , varying types o f  legal and even constitutional 
constraints, am ong others. Som e regional governm ents and som e large 
(B ogota, Lima, M exico City, Sao Paulo, Santiago, to cite just a few) and  
m edium -sized cities have m ade substantial progress in recent years in 
im proving the quality o f  their public services and infrastructure, better 
targeting their social program s, m oderating their personnel spending, 
and increasing the transparency and strengthening the m anagem ent o f  
their budgets.22 M uch m ore lim ited progress has been m ade, however, 
in clarifying spending responsibilities and reducing earmarking. In m any 
countries, the subnational spending reform  agenda remains a daunting  
one.
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NOTES
1. Local governments, which typically rely on (less cyclically sensitive) property taxes, 
tend to be less vulnerable to cyclical developments and other exogenous shocks than 
regional governments, whose main sources of own revenues tend to be sales (and in 
some cases income) taxes. Nevertheless, the budgets of local governments in countries 
such as the US, the UK, and Spain among others, which suffered major losses in prop­
erty values during the recent global financial crisis, have been substantially affected by 
the crisis in 2008-09.
2. According to Treisman (2002), LA has one of the highest levels of electoral decentrali­
zation. Most heads of SNGs are selected by popular vote.
3. The following discussion of subnational fiscal rules draws extensively on a paper pre­
pared by Ter-Minassian for a forthcoming book by the Inter-American Development 
Bank on structural fiscal rules for LA (Ter-Minassian, 2010).
4. Deficit or spending limits can prove ineffective if SNGs are allowed to maintain extra­
budgetary accounts, or to inappropriately classify transfers to their enterprises as 
‘below the line’ operations. Debt limits might be circumvented through resort to pur­
chasing power parities (PPPs) not justifiable on grounds of economic efficiency.
5. Accordingly, deficit or debt limits are best specified in relation to revenues; and the 
target should be lower the larger the historical variance of such revenues, or the more 
discretionary are the transfers received from the CG.
6. Brazil provides an excellent example in this respect, as its Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(FRL) requires all state and local governments to maintain and report standardized 
accounts of their operations, with a four-monthly frequency. The FRL, enacted in 
2000, envisaged a relatively short transition period for its implementation, during which 
the federal government provided significant technical and financial assistance to state 
and local governments that needed it, to enable them to meet the requirements of the 
law by the time it came into full effect.
7. Penalties are typically of a financial nature, for example, in the form of withholding of 
CG transfers to non-complying jurisdictions, but occasionally also entail the personal 
responsibility of the relevant officials (for example, in Brazil).
8. Many countries in the region increased the average duration of their debt, and/or the 
share of the debt denominated in local currency (redemption from the ‘original sin’).
9. For more details about the assignment of natural resources between levels of govern­
ment in countries in LA, see Brosio and Jiménez (ch. 10 in this volume).
10. Following the exit from convertibility, the Federal Agreement of February 2002 
stipulated a series changes in the intergovernmental arrangements: a return to automa- 
ticity of transfers; the renegotiation of provincial debts, converted into pesos; the estab­
lishment of a ceiling (equivalent to 15% of shared revenues) on the service of the 
restructured debts; and limits on overall borrowing by the provinces. In addition, the 
Federal government concluded bilateral agreements with several provinces (Programas 
de Financiamento Ordenado) providing for additional financing to those provinces, in 
exchange for measures by the latter to increase their revenues and contain spending.
11. Introduction of the Impuesto Directo sobre Hidrocarburos y  Derivados in 2008, distrib­
uted by two-thirds to the municipalities, 24.4% to the prefectures and the remainder to 
universities.
12. Colombian regional governments restructured their debt in the early part of the last 
decade, utilizing CG guarantees and resources derived from transfers and royalties.
13. Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, and Peru.
14. The 2010 budget in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) included a 16% cut in shared
revenues from petroleum royalties and taxes (IDH: direct tax on hydrocarbons and 
derivatives).
15. See Marcel (2010) for a detailed analysis of the Chilean structural fiscal rule.
16. This is, for example, the case in the US where a number of state constitutions require
the accumulation of so-called ‘rainy day funds’ (see Balassone et al., 2007, for details).
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17. See Ljungman (2008) and Ter-Minassian (2010) for more detailed discussions of 
various issues in the design of expenditure rules.
18. ICMS is the abbreviation for Imposto sobre Operagoes Relativas a Circulagdo de 
Mercadorias e sobre Servigos de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de 
Comunicagáo, ainda que as Operagoes se Iniciem no Exterior: Tax on the circulation of 
goods, interstate and intercity transportation and communication services, even when 
the operation is initiated abroad). The ISS (Imposto Sobre Servigos) is a tax on services 
that must be paid to the local authority (Prefeitura) of residence, or in some cases (in 
the construction sector) to the local authority where the service took place, by the 
self-employed.
19. The federal government in Brazil has provided significant support, over the last decade 
or so, to the modernization of subnational tax administrations, notably through a 
series of programs financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which 
have already resulted in a number of important innovations, such as the introduction 
of nationwide electronic invoices for the state VAT credits, and harmonized taxpayer 
registries across the nation.
20. See Ter-Minassian (2010) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
21. This was not always done (or was done only partially) during the recent crisis in 
countries (such as Brazil) that enacted countercyclical tax cuts.
22. See IDB (2010) for an up-to-date overview of performances in this area.
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12. Fiscal rules for subnational 
governments? Evidence from  L atin  
America*
Veronica Grembi and Alvaro Manoel
1 INTRODUCTION
R ecently, decentralization has characterized the policy decisions o f  m any 
countries both developed and developing.
In this fram ework m any countries perceived the im plem entation o f  
fiscal rules for subnational governm ents (SN G s) as the solution for 
som etim es weakly defined institutional arrangements. In this context, the 
analysis o f  prerequisites for S N G  fiscal rules is an essential com ponent in 
order to evaluate the potential outcom es and their realistic effectiveness.
This chapter will exam ine the institutional prerequisites o f  subnational 
fiscal rules and evaluate their effects with regard to a sample o f  Latin  
Am erican countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colom bia, and M exico. W e select 
this set o f  developing countries because they have experienced decentral­
izing issues in terms o f  both weakly defined com petences and responsi­
bilities, and lack o f  credibility o f  the central governm ent’s com m itm ent 
to fiscal discipline. For instance, several o f  them experienced systematic 
bailouts, particularly in the 1990s. Their central governm ents attempted  
to tighten the budget constraints especially via a contractual approach, 
that is, through a special agreement between the highest debt subnational 
entities and the central governm ent.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the evidence on the 
institutional fram ework addressing two issues: (a) the characteristics o f  
decentralization in both unitary-but-decentralized and federal countries; 
and (b) the m ain elem ents o f  the fiscal rules for SN G s. W ith regard to the 
latter we grouped the characteristics into three categories: (i) institutional 
(top down versus b ottom  up, one or m ore fiscal rules); (ii) main targets 
(budget balances, borrowing constraints, lim its on tax rates or relief, 
and expenditure increase limits); and (iii) process rules and rule im ple­
m entation (transparency obligations, m onitoring activities, sanctions,
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juridical constraints). For the countries adopting a bottom -up approach  
(Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007), we collected inform ation at the state level 
on the degree o f  adherence to the national legislation as well as on their 
independent legislations.
Section 3 presents the empirical evidence on the selected countries. For 
each o f  them we collected data on the main fiscal m easures at the state 
level, plus additional inform ation on som e econom ic and dem ographic 
characteristics (for exam ple, population age range and G D P  at the local 
level).
Section 4 presents the main conclusions. A lthough our analysis is not 
able to address the causal link between the application o f  fiscal rules and 
the main fiscal outcom es, som e simple tests on the descriptive statistics 
show im portant differences which deserve attention.
2 FISCAL RULES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN 
A DECENTRALIZED CONTEXT
Main Empirical Evidence on Fiscal Rule Effectiveness
H ow  fiscal (policy) rules are defined is important. M ost o f  the literature 
defines them as an incentive scheme or m echanism  that introduces for a 
certain period (medium  to  long term) constraints on the m ain fiscal vari­
ables (revenues, expenditures, new indebtedness) using quantitative limits. 
Therefore a fiscal policy rule to be considered as such m ust fulfill at least 
three conditions:
1. a quantitative (numerical) target or ceiling which is translated into a 
fiscal indicator, for exam ple, ‘a m aximum  d eb t-to-G D P  rate o f  X ’;
2. a clear procedure to m onitor or enforce the im plem entation o f  the 
rule; and
3. an explicit cost to be incurred by the policy maker if  the target is not 
achieved.
W hy are fiscal policy rules (and fiscal institutions) needed? In reality 
there is a strong risk that a ‘no fiscal rules w orld’ (unconstrained fiscal 
policy) w ould system atically deviate from desirable policies. R easons for 
this can be found in several m odels, am ong them, coordination failures 
in fiscal federalism, the com m on p ool problem , tim e inconsistency, and 
m yopia in politics. This chapter does not intend to discuss how  fiscal rules 
should be designed; K opits and Symanski (1998) indicated that a fiscal 
rule should be simple, transparent, coherent with the objective, but also
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m indful o f  other public policy goals such as not discouraging structural 
reforms, allow ing for cyclical adjustm ent and avoiding ‘bad’ adjustments, 
for exam ple, undue tax hikes and large cuts in quality spending.
On the subnational level, the literature on fiscal rules is richer on 
the prerequisite and incentive side than on that o f  empirical evidence. 
Furtherm ore, in a decentralized context fiscal rules need a clear definition 
o f  intergovernm ental relationships (K opits, 2001; Sutherland et al. 2005; 
Ter-M inassian, 2007) and are supposed to be needed m ore when higher 
vertical im balances are in place (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 1996).
Soft-budget constraint, moral hazard and vertical imbalance
The need for a sound decentralization process is linked to the m ore general 
problem  o f  the soft-budget constraint and, consequently, to the central 
governm ent’s credibility to com m it (higher-level, governm ent broadly 
speaking). The m oral hazard problem  in intergovernm ental relations is 
rooted in the expectation that the higher levels o f  governm ent would inter­
vene to address local deficits by using special transfers or taking over their 
liabilities (for exam ple, last resort insurer) (Dafflon, 2002; R odden, 2002; 
Breuille et al., 2007). However, if  the central governm ent is not able to 
harden the budget it seems unlikely that adoption o f  fiscal rules for SN G s  
will be effective. M ost o f  the recent bailouts o f  S N G  finances by the central 
governm ent have com e with strong conditionalities such as ‘no m ore bail­
ou ts’ encrypted in the law or prohibition o f  new borrowing by SN G s until 
certain conditions are m et.1
Other literature has stressed the im portance o f  fiscal rules not as a cred­
ibility issue but in terms o f  the dependency o f  the local adm inistration  
from  the center. Therefore it has been shown that the greater the verti­
cal im balance o f  S N G s, that is, the greater their dependence on central 
governm ent transfers, the higher is the need for fiscal rules. Eichengreen  
and von  H agen (1996) exam ined data for a cross-section o f  federal states 
and found an association between fiscal restraints and the share o f  the tax 
base under the control o f  subnational authorities. Restraints are prevalent 
where sub-central governm ents finance a relatively small share o f  spend­
ing with their own taxes; furthermore, because SN G s lack control o f  the 
tax base (or they are too  small), they do not resort to increased taxation to 
deal with debt crises. In a vertical im balance arrangement, the argument 
for fiscal rules is straightforward: when there is risk o f  default and the 
central governm ent cannot refuse a bailout, there may be a need for fiscal 
restraints on SN G s.
S N G  bailouts and m oral hazard are closely related. The negative impact 
on fiscal sustainability is even higher when there is a lack o f  effective 
control on borrowing. This seems to be the case o f  the Brazilian experience
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in the 1990s: Bevilaqua (2002) shows that reputational effects originating  
from  the repeated bailout operations reduced fiscal discipline and created 
an explosive accum ulation o f  debt at the state level.2 H e also concludes 
that ‘as successive bailouts were extended w ithout being follow ed by insti­
tutional changes that w ould reduce the states’ incentives to m isbehave, a 
perverse fiscal regime was introduced’ (p. 46). Institutional arrangements 
also play an im portant role: in the Brazilian environm ent in the 1990s, 
prospects o f  federal governm ent bailouts induced private institutions to  
overextend credit to state governm ents in anticipation o f  higher returns.
Types of fiscal rules
Subnational fiscal rules can be listed as follows: rules on  budget balances, 
expenditure caps, ceilings on the own revenue o f  subnational entities, 
limits on the stock o f  debt or on the issuance o f  new debt, restrictions on 
the type o f  expenditure that can be financed with debt, and limits on the 
debt linked to the cost o f  debt service or indicators o f  the ability to service 
the debt (see, am ong others, G iuriato and Gastaldi, 2009). AH these m eas­
ures are usually introduced in different com binations in order to more 
effectively limit both the com m on p ool (W eingast et al., 1981) and m oral 
hazard issues faced by the local authorities.
Several countries, however, pursued the im plem entation o f  fiscal rules 
for SN G s as the solution for som etim es weakly defined institutional 
arrangements with SN G s, A s a consequence, as noted  by M ilesi-Ferretti 
(2004), an ‘ugly outcom e’ can be generated, as the use o f  ‘creative account­
ing’ and w indow  dressing rather than fiscal adjustment can reduce the 
degree o f  transparency in the governm ent budget and the desirability 
and effectiveness o f  rules. M ore stringent fiscal rules can generate worse 
outcom es.3
Neither the im pact o f  different rules nor the number o f  ugly outcom es 
(if  any) has been deeply investigated in the literature. Empirical evidence 
at the subnational level is scant. The papers on the effectiveness o f  the rules 
in U S  states (Poterba, 1995, 1996, and 1997; Bohn and Inman, 1996) link 
the introduction o f  rules (mainly constitutional lim itations) to the states’ 
fiscal performances. The endogenity problem  is circum vented by the fact 
that constitutions are m ore than 100 years old and so they can be assumed  
as exogenous to the 1990s data. These works use the differences in strin­
gency am ong the rules to assess their different impact.
One im portant conclusion is that states under deficit lim itations tend to 
save more, and any budget balance rule is able to affect deficit behavior 
com pared to a situation with no rule. Debrun et al. (2008), do not control 
for the endogeneity problem , and have com m ented on  the ineffective­
ness o f  fiscal rules at the subnational level. A  very recent work, using a
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diff-in-discontinuities design, and therefore robust to endogeneity issues, 
finds exactly the reverse: it is generally better to have subnational fiscal 
rules than not to have any, because they can help to curb subnational 
fiscal outcom es even in an institutional context with soft rule enforcem ent 
(Grembi et al., 2011).
Evidence and synthetic indices
One way to solve the problem  o f  scarcity o f  inform ation is to construct 
synthetic (com posite) indices, which summarize inform ation on all the 
numerical rules in force. M ethodological problem s, however, remain: 
results obtained using synthetic indices (von Hagen, 1991) w ould not be 
able to cope with om itted variable problem s such as m ore stringent rules 
adopted by m ore fiscal conservative countries.
W hile budgetary stringency indices could  be extrem ely useful to 
com pare international fiscal performance, they have their ow n lim ita­
tions (Poterba, 1995). For exam ple, m any o f  them are constructed by 
adding together a set o f  categorical variables, which assum es that various 
indicators (fiscal rules) are perfect substitutes, but this does not hold true 
in m ost cases. A nother shortcom ing is that if  the analysis shows that the 
indices are relevant in explaining fiscal perform ance, it is later im possible 
to  identify which particular indicator o f  budgetary rules or fiscal institu­
tions really matters. Therefore, fiscal indices cannot be translated into  
policy actions.
One issue addressed in the literature is how  the institutional framework  
can m ake one rule preferable to another. U sing com posite indicators, 
Sutherland et al. (2005) rank different rules to targets, which are typical 
targets in a decentralized context (for exam ple, prom oting allocative 
efficiency, restraining the size o f  the public sector, ensuring debt sustain­
ability, and so on). The index that tries to measure whether debt sustain­
ability is assured, com prises three subindices: deficit control, debt control, 
and deficit and debt m onitoring. The conclusion is that indices m ay be 
analytically useful because they can help to identify both sets o f  fiscal 
rules that generally have favorable characteristics and types o f  trade-off's 
and side-effects that they engender (for instance, how  to cope with cyclical 
developm ents).4
A  recent study uses m easures o f  the stringency o f  fiscal rules to test 
whether m ore stringent rules are m ore effective than weaker ones in 
producing desired outcom es (Broyles et al., 2009). Based on 17 O E C D  
countries, the study analyzed three fiscal rule performances: expenditure 
lim its, tax autonom y, and debt control. The results indicate that there 
is no empirical support for the assum ption about the im pacts o f  m ore­
stringent fiscal rules on  fiscal outcom es. The authors recognize, however,
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that the data lim itations, lack o f  detailed inform ation about when the 
rules were im plem ented and endogeneity issues m ay explain the unex­
pected results.
One application o f  com posite indices in Latin A m erica found that the 
nature o f  budget procedures strongly influences fiscal outcom es (Alesina  
et al., 1999). This study aim ed to explain cross-country differences in 
fiscal positions and concluded that budget procedures which include 
constraints on the deficits and are (a) m ore hierarchical (procedures 
that limit the role o f  legislature in expanding the size o f  the budget) 
and (b) transparent (stringent fiscal legislation can be circum vented if  
non-transparent procedures m ake budget docum ents unintelligible), 
lead to lower primary deficits. The m ain results are consistent with  
evidence drawn from  U S  states which shows that the stringency o f  bal­
anced budget laws determines fiscal outcom es (Poterba, 1994). In the 
case o f  Latin Am erica, although there are still no balanced budget laws, 
nevertheless there are som e fiscal rules: som e countries require that the 
budget result be consistent with predefined fiscal targets; debt ceilings 
established pre-budget will im pede the budget balance. Tom m asi and 
Braun (2004) note that this study does not deal with the endogeneity  
issues, and conclude that countries with better budget institutions and  
fiscal outcom es m ay be countries in which voters prefer fiscal prudence or 
where the structure o f  political conflict surrounding the budget process 
is m ore flexible.
3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND FISCAL 
RULES FOR SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Decentralization and Subnational Government Public Finances
The fiscal decentralization process in Latin Am erica is a fact: m ore and  
m ore revenues and expenditures are collected and spent at the local level.5 
Public finances at the subnational level have becom e a hot issue because 
o f  recurrent fiscal im balances, which has had a negative im pact at the 
m acroeconom ic level. A s a consequence, the am ount and com plexity o f  
public debt, which has to be m anaged, registered, accounted for, paid and 
reported at a subnational level, has increased in recent years.
In order to analyze the effectiveness o f  fiscal rules in Latin America, 
this study exam ines a sample o f  countries (Colom bia, M exico, Brazil, and 
Argentina) where (a) the im portance and level o f  independence o f  SN G s  
have been relevant when com pared with other countries; and (b) data at 
the subnational level are publicly available and basically reliable.
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Fiscal Rules Applied to Subnational Governments in Selected Countries
There are a vast num ber o f  fiscal rules currently in place in Latin America. 
W e selected the m ost significant, classifying them into three categories: 
lim its on expenses, lim its on public debt, and lim its on fiscal balance and/ 
or primary results. Table 12A.1 in Appendix 12A details the m ain char­
acteristics o f  fiscal rules in the countries in our sample such as types o f  
restrictions, enforcem ent procedures, and sanctions.
Limits of operating expenses
In Argentina, Law 25.917 (August 2004) established that nom inal increases 
in primary expenditures o f  central and provincial governm ents approved  
in the annual budgets could not be higher than the nom inal increase o f  
G D P  projected in the medium -term  macro framework. In Brazil, since 
2000, a Fiscal R esponsibility Law (FR L ) has included certain spend­
ing item  limits. The law  sets out a number o f  numerical fiscal indicators 
and the governm ent sets numerical m ultiyear targets for expenditures, 
including the wage bill (as a percentage o f  total expenditures). In the 
event o f  non-com pliance, corrective measures are taken and can result in 
sanctions. Escape clauses exist for shocks. In Colom bia, Law 617 (2000) 
established a limit to the operating expenses o f  subnational entities to  a 
certain percentage o f  their freely disposable revenue, that is, excluding  
earmarked transfers.6 Based on several indicators o f  population and fiscal 
performance, the law classified departments (states) into five categories 
and m unicipalities into six.
Public debt limits
In A rgentina, the 2002 ‘A greem ents’ betw een the central governm ent 
and provinces im posed  the requirem ent that new  public debt incurred  
by the provinces should  be authorized by the central governm ent. In 
addition, Law 25.917 (2004) established annual lim its to public debt -  
the debt service m ust n ot be greater than the current revenues. In Brazil, 
the F R L  determ ines that all levels o f  governm ent establish annual lim its 
for public debt. In C olom bia, Law 358 (1997) tried to curb excessive  
debt levels o f  S N G s by linking their ability to  contract debt to liquid­
ity and solvency indicators. Penalties for n ot adhering to the indicators 
w ould  include the need to im plem ent a fiscal adjustm ent and to subm it 
to  central governm ent oversight. These arrangem ents did n ot achieve 
the objectives since the subnational debt grew m ore than expected and 
fiscal adjustm ent plans did n ot address underlying and m edium -term  
fiscal im balances.
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Limits of fiscal balance (and/or primary results)
In Argentina, Law 25.453 (July 2001) tried to im pose a zero fiscal deficit 
target. The law established that budgetary expenditure com m itm ents 
could not be higher than tax collected. In this case, the fiscal adjustment 
w ould be ‘autom atic’ because when the revenues were not enough the gov­
ernment (central and provincial) m ust reduce expenditures to balance the 
fiscal accounts. The political and econom ic crisis which involved Argentina 
in late 2001 created an institutional environm ent where it was infeasible to 
im plem ent the fiscal rule.7 In 2002 the central governm ent started im ple­
m enting the Agreem ents with m ost o f  the provinces, with quantitative 
targets for fiscal deficits: to reduce the fiscal deficit in 2002 by 60 percent 
com pared with 2001, and achieve balance in 2003. In Colom bia, Law 819 
(2003) requires both the central governm ent and SN G s to  present each  
year a consistent 10-year m acroeconom ic framework. One additional rule 
was established: the primary surplus has to be equal to or higher than the 
debt service. In Brazil, the FR L  sets out a number o f  numerical fiscal indi­
cators and the governm ent sets numerical multiyear targets for the budget 
balance and debt. In the event o f  non-com pliance, corrective measures are 
taken and can result in sanctions. Escape clauses exist for shocks.
Dealing with Subnational Public Finance Crises: The ‘Contractual 
Approach’
In several countries, political and legal difficulties in im plem enting fiscal 
rules that apply to all levels o f  governm ent and the need to reestablish  
m acroeconom ic stability have given birth to what we call the ‘contractual 
approach’. Argentina, Brazil and M exico are good  exam ples. The script is 
the same in all situations and Box 12.1 summarizes the five m ost com m on  
steps involved.
The contractual approach8 seems to be very effective in terms o f  
achievem ent o f  fiscal adjustm ent or com pliance with the fiscal rules (and 
targets). Table 12A.2 in Appendix 12A summarizes three relevant cases in 
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and M exico.
Historical cases have shown that the contractual approach is useful 
when the goal is to  establish collective credibility for overall m acroeco­
nom ic policy creating conditions for a sound fiscal policy at the subna­
tional level (Guardia and M essenberg, 2002). For exam ple, the Brazilian 
bailout scheme o f  1997-98 enabled the states and m unicipalities to 
reverse their fiscal deficits. A s indicated in Table 12A.2, the consolidated  
fiscal primary result o f  states in Brazil decreased from  1995 to 1998 and 
then began im proving substantially until 2000 when for the first time 
the states started generating a primary surplus which lasted until 2010.
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BOX 12.1 SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS 
AND THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Step 1: Debt Crisis
Usually the initial situation is a serious debt crisis at subnational 
level. The trigger for the crisis can be a lack of fiscal control at 
subnational level, low level of intergovernmental transfers, high 
interest rates, and so on. The debt crisis at subnational level jeop­
ardizes debt sustainability, macroeconomic stability (given the high 
level of public deficit) and/or provision of basic services which are 
allocated to subnational level in the fiscal federalism arrangement.
Step 2: Pressure Mounts for a Fiscal Adjustment and Bailout
The macroeconomic Impact of subnational public finance distress 
and the pressing need for a fiscal adjustment drives the central 
government to set up a bailout scheme.
Step 3: Debt Rescheduling Becomes an Option
In the bailout scheme, the SNGs are allowed and/or encouraged 
to benefit from a debt rescheduling. This process is achieved 
through a formal contract or approving a local law in which the 
SNG agrees with the terms and conditions of the federal law.
Step 4: Conditionality Implies a Fiscal Adjustment Program
The adherence to the rescheduling is (in most cases) conditional 
on a medium- to long-term fiscal adjustment program, which 
always has a combination of (a) reduction of expenditures; (b) 
increase of tax revenues and efficiency in tax collection; (c) 
selling of financial and physical government assets (privatiza­
tion); and (d) establishment of formal fiscal rules such as limits to 
future indebtedness and for certain items of expenditures (debt 
service, wage bill, and so on).
Step 5: Agreement (Contract) is Signed
Finally, an agreement or contract is signed between the central 
government and the SNG, in which several conditions are imposed 
such as: no more central government guarantees; reduce or stop 
intergovernmental transfers if the fiscal adjustment program is not 
implemented; prohibition of new borrowing for a certain period of 
time; and so on. Therefore, the implementation of the fiscal adjust­
ment or achieving of the fiscal targets becomes ‘contractual’.
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C olom bia also achieved good  fiscal results at the subnational level with the 
contractual approach (IM F, 2009).
M elam ud (2010) reviews the m ain agreements and coordination process 
between central governm ent and provinces in Argentina after 2001 and 
showed by the fiscal results achieved that the contractual approach gen­
erated positive results. In the case o f  Argentina it was evident that the 
Agreem ents signed between the central governm ent and the provinces in 
20029 aimed mainly to send favorable signals to external creditors, and did 
not address m ain structural issues especially related to the fiscal vertical 
imbalance, which still remains critical in the country.
The contractual approach seems to  be able to provide m ore-flexible 
tools at the local level, taking into account the specificities o f  the SN G s as 
well as their weaknesses. A s such it could be considered as an alternative 
to the introduction o f  fiscal rules in the process o f  enhancing the reputa­
tion o f  the central governm ent where the econom ic conditions o f  the S N G  
and its dim ension w ould jeopardize the use o f  fiscal rules and trigger soft­
budget constraint problems.
If the preconditions for the effectiveness o f  fiscal rules are not m et, the 
use o f  a contractual approach is a way o f  coping with the rules’ shortcom ­
ings. In reviewing several cases o f  contractual approach we also conclude 
that enforcem ent o f  the rules becam e m ore stringent and perhaps in such 
cases the fiscal rules at subnational level work better.
Subnational Government Fiscal Rules
In this study particular attention is given to four countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Colom bia, and M exico (see Table 12A.3 in A ppendix 12A). These 
countries (a) account for a significant am ount o f  subnational public 
finance in Latin America; (b) they represent both bottom -up and top- 
down approaches; and (c) data at subnational level are available.
B oth Argentina and M exico adopted a bottom -up approach, that is, 
their states could  decide whether to adhere to the national fiscal rule 
framework. W e shall review these decisions. C olom bia is o f  interest 
because it adopted a system that classifies the states according to param ­
eters established in the national law. Each state category is assigned a set 
o f  m ain fiscal targets. Both the framework and the results for the 2002-09  
period are presented. F inally Brazil is an exam ple o f  a national top-dow n  
approach, im posing on its states fiscal rules that are decided at the central 
level.
W e constructed a set o f  indices to describe both the fiscal framework  
and the intergovernm ental relationships. The objective was to take into 
account the intergovernm ental relationship controlling for the following:
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Table 12.1 Subnational public finances: index definition
In d ex N am e
C u rre n t e x p en d itu re /G D P ou t_ l
P ub lic  d e b t/G D P out_2
C u rre n t tax  rev en u e /G D P out_3
C a p ita l ex p en d itu re  in v es tm e n t/G D P o u t j l
F in a n c ia l lo an s /G D P out_5
P riv a tiz a tio n  rev en u es/G D P out_6
C u rre n t tran s fe rs /c u rren t to ta l revenues dependency
P a y ro ll/c u rre n t to ta l  revenues budget rig id ity
C u rre n t taxes rev en u es/cu rren t ex p en d itu res vertical imbalance
•  Dependency  Provides a m easure o f  the reliance o f  the S N G  on  
the central governm ent transfers. The higher this indicator, the 
low er is the S N G  fiscal responsibility expected on the expenditures 
side;
•  Budget rigidity  Tries to investigate the S N G ’s margin o f  adjust­
ment, that is, the higher the part o f  the current expenditures 
absorbed by the payrolls the lower is the ability o f  the S N G  to 
reduce its expenditures, except by firing its stalf, which is recognized  
to be infeasible; and
•  Vertical imbalance Provides a m easure o f  which portion  o f  
the current expenditures is covered by the S N G ’s own rev­
enues. A  higher proportion o f  current expenditures covered by 
central governm ent transfers w ould indicate a situation o f  vertical 
im balance.
Finally, we used several indices as measures o f  the m ain fiscal indicators 
as a share o f  the S N G ’s GDP: current expenditures; current tax revenue; 
current own-tax revenue, capital expenditure; and so on (variables ou t_ l 
to out_5  in Table 12.1). Table 12.1 shows the indices, that are used in this 
analysis. U nfortunately, we could not build every index for each country  
because o f problem s with data availability. Therefore, the indices are 
com piled according to  the availability o f  the data (see Table 12A.4 data 
description for further inform ation).
The purpose o f  the set o f  indices defined in Table 12.1 is to  assess som e 
main correlations due to the introduction o f  fiscal rules.10 W e start by 
focusing specifically on  those countries that show som e differentiation  
am ong their SN G s, such as M exico and Argentina. We present the data 
in four steps:
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•  first, the descriptive statistics for the available indices;
•  second, the descriptive statistics concerning the rules;
•  third, the correlations am ong the fiscal outcom es and the decentrali­
zation characteristics; and
•  fourth, the results o f  a test for the difference o f  m eans o f  the available 
indices between states that apply the rules and those with no rule.
C olom bia and Brazil need a different approach given their top-dow n  
framework. In addition to the descriptive statistics, we can produce 
further differentiations only for Colom bia.
Country cases: Argentina
From  1999, A rgentine states took  in itiatives to adopt fiscal rules fo l­
low ing the enactm ent o f  the national F iscal Solvency Law. By 2000, 
14 out o f  23 states had adopted som e kind o f  fiscal rule (Tom m asi and  
Braun, 2004). A m on g the 14 states: (a) all adopted deficits limits; (b) 
only seven adopted  public debt and current expenditure lim itations; (c) 
only two adopted  public debt lim its but n ot a cap on  current expen­
ditures; and (d) only two adopted current expenditure lim its. In addi­
tion, only six out o f  the 14 ‘active’ states initiated m easures o f  fiscal 
transparency (ibid.).
A s a consequence o f  the first national fiscal ruling, a remarkable number 
o f states seem to have ignored the national guidelines and even when the 
guidelines were considered, the national rule was generally m odified. A  
different scenario follow ed the adoption o f  the national 2004 FR L  25.917: 
21 o f  the 24 states had adhered fully (19) or with m odification (2) to the 
national legislation (see Figure 12.1 and Table 12A.5).
The indices’ descriptive statistics draw a picture o f  states with a large 
part o f  their current expenditures absorbed by the payroll (budget rigidity 
equal to 0.59), with a huge vertical im balance and a high level o f  depend­
ency (Table 12.2).
Analysis o f  the Spearman correlation coefficients11 shows that in the 
states, wherever budget rigidity is higher dependency is lower, given that 
the correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant (Table 
12.3). Higher levels o f  current expenditure to G D P  ratio (o u t_ l) are then 
associated with a higher level o f  public debt (out_2).
W e construct dum m y variables to capture the adoption o f  different 
fiscal rules by the states. Follow ing the history o f  im plem entation o f  fiscal 
rules in the subnational context:
•  reg_l equals 1 i f  the states adopted the Fiscal Solvency Law and 0 
otherwise;
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Source: Elaboration by authors based on data from Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad 
Fiscal (2010).
Figure 12.1 Argentina: sta tes adhering to the 2004 FRL
Table 12.2 Argentina: descriptive sta tistics
V ariab le M ean S td  dev. M in M ax
out 1 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.49
out 2 0 . 0 1 0.04 0 . 0 0 0.30
out 3 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.49
out 4 0.03 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 2
budget rigidity 0.59 0.06 0.40 0.79
vertical imbalance 0.92 0 . 2 1 0.46 1.75
dependency 0 . 6 8 0 . 2 0 0.07 0.97
•  reg_2 equals 1 if the states adopted the Fiscal R esponsibility Law  
and 0 otherwise; and
•  both rules equals 1 when both reg_ l and re g j?  are equal to 1.
A dditional dum m ies were used to control for further characteristics o f  
the Fiscal Solvency Law (deficit_reg_l, pu bdeb t_reg_ l, and curexp_reg_l) 
and the Fiscal Transparency Law. Finally, we also construct dum mies for 
the transparency requirements o f  the first fiscal rule ( transp_reg_l) and 
the second fiscal rule ( transp_reg_2). Table 12.4 shows the m ain results. 
Only 9 percent o f  the states adopted both rules, and am ong the 22 percent 
adopting the first rule, only 20 percent adopted a limit on the deficit and
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Table 12.3 Argentina: Spearman correlation coefficients






out_3 0.8810* 0.2470* 1
out_4 0.6046* 0 . 0 0 2 2 0.6044* 1
vertical
*SO00r-3 -0.2147* 0.2520* 0.0387 1
imbalance
dependency 0.7991* 0.2694* 0.9212* 0.5113* 0.3025* 1
budget 0.1447* 0.0985 0.1960* 0,1734* 0.0419 -0.2087* 1
rigidity
Note: * Significant at 5%.
T a b le  1 2 .4 A rg e n tin a :  f i s c a l  ru le s  a d o p te d  b y  the s ta te s
R ules M ean S td  dev. M in M ax
reg_ l 0 . 2 2 0.41 0 1
regJ2 0.19 0.39 0 1
both_rules 0.09 0.29 0 1
deficit_reg_l 0 . 2 0 0.40 0 1
pubdebt_reg_l 0.16 0.37 0 1
curexp_reg_l 0.14 0.35 0 1
transp_reg_l 0 . 1 0 0.30 0 1
transp_reg_2 0.06 0.23 0 1
14 percent included a cap on the current expenditures. The rates o f  adop­
tion o f  transparency legislation are very low  with only 6 percent o f  the 
states opting for a transparency law associated with the national Fiscal 
Transparency Law.
D ata availability problem s especially after 2005 precluded a further 
analysis o f  the 2004 legislation and a proper com parison between the 
two rules. H ence, we present evidence m ainly for the first rule, although  
references to the second are also included.
M oving from the characteristics o f  re g _ l: the difference in m eans when  
the deficit_reg_l is statistically significant for ou t_ l to 3. Only for out__2 
(public debt) did we find that the m ean o f  states with the rules is lower than  
that o f  states with no rules. The same result was found for pubdebt_reg__l 
or curexp_reg__l. The link with the other indices is the opposite: states with 
no rule have lower values than those that adopted the rule. A s indicated
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Table 12.5 Argentina: differences in mean according to the adopted fisca l 
rule
R u le V ariab le R u le  yes 
O bs M ean
R u le  no  
O bs M ean
M ean  diff 
(ru le  n o ­
ru le  yes)
¿-test
deficit_reg_l o u t_ l 63 0.215 262 0.186 -0 .0 2 9 -2 .3 9
out_2 63 0.004 187 0.017 0 . 0 1 2 2.30
out_3 63 0.206 262 0.162 -0 .0 4 3 -3 .8 8
out_4 63 0.027 262 0.027 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 1 1
pubdeb t_reg_ l o u t_ l 51 0.223 274 0.186 -0 .0 3 7 -2 .7 5
out_2 51 0.003 199 0.016 0.013 2.30
out_3 51 0 . 2 2 0 274 0.162 -0 .0 5 8 -4 .8 4
out_4 51 0.034 274 0.026 -0 .0 0 9 -3 .0 4
curexp_reg_l o u t_ l 46 0.217 279 0.188 -0 .0 2 9 - 2 . 1 1
out_2 46 0.005 204 0.016 0 . 0 1 1 1.76
out_3 46 0 . 2 2 0 279 0.163 -0 .0 5 7 -4 .5 3
out_4 46 0.034 279 0.026 -0 .0 0 8 -2 .7 9
r e g j o u t_ l 70 0.207 255 0.188 - 0 . 0 2 0 -1 .6 5
out_2 70 0.004 180 0.017 0.014 2.60
out_3 70 0.203 255 0.162 -0 .041 -3 .8 0
out_4 70 0.030 255 0.026 -0 .0 0 4 -1 .4 3
reg_2 o u t_ l 29 0.217 296 0.189 -0 .0 2 8 -1 .6 3
out_2 29 0.015 2 2 1 0.013 - 0 . 0 0 2 -0 .2 4
out_3 29 0.229 296 0.165 -0 .0 6 4 -4 .1 6
out_4 29 0.044 296 0.025 -0 .0 1 8 -5 .11
both_rules o u t_ l 13 0.225 312 0.190 -0 .0 3 5 -1 .4 1
out_2 13 0.003 237 0.014 0 . 0 1 1 1.04
out_3 13 0.256 312 0.167 -0 .0 8 9 -3 .9 2
out_4 13 0.047 312 0.026 - 0 . 0 2 1 -3 .9 2
transparency_ o u t_ l 32 0.229 293 0.188 -0 .041 -2 .5 1
r e g j out_2 32 0.003 218 0.015 0.013 1.81
out_3 32 0.228 293 0.165 -0 .0 6 3 -4 .2 8
out_4 32 0.040 293 0.026 -0 .0 1 4 -4 .11
transparency_ o u t_ l 9 0.172 316 0.192 0 . 0 2 1 0.69
reg_2 out_2 9 0 . 0 1 1 241 0.014 0.003 0.24
out_3 9 0.177 316 0.171 -0 .0 0 7 -0 .2 4
out_4 9 0.024 316 0.027 0.003 0.52
by Table 12.5, the sam e pattern is true for transparency rules. Thus states 
adopting fiscal rules were probably those m ost in need o f  som e sort o f  
regulation. H owever, their outcom es seem to address a problem  o f  rule 
ineffectiveness at least until 2005.
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Table 12.6 Brazil: descriptive sta tistics
V ariab le M ean S td  dev. M in M ax
o u t_ l 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.38
out_2 13.72 53.08 0.00 338.44
out_3 0.08 0.03 0 . 0 1 0.25
out_4 0 . 0 2 0.03 0.00 0.35
out_5 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0.00 0.33
out_6 0.00 0 . 0 1 0.00 0.17
dependency 0.39 0 . 2 1 0.06 0.90
budget rigidity 0.54 0.09 0 . 2 1 0 . 8 6
vertical imbalance 0.57 0.19 0.09 1.04
Country cases: Brazil
In the case o f  Brazil we have a series o f  data before and after the rule intro­
duction and we use the same indices defined in Table 12.1. The descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 12.6. For the Brazilian states we could con ­
struct two m ore indices: credit-to-G D P and privatization revenue-to-G D P  
ratios, identified in Table 12.6 as variables out_5  and o u tjS ,  respectively.
Som e initial conclusions based on the descriptive statistics o f  Table 12.6 
indicate that for the Brazilian states:
•  Budget rigidity, that is, the proportion o f  current expenditures 
absorbed by the payroll in the Brazilian states, tends to be high with 
an average value o f  54 percent for the entire period, which is lower 
than Argentina (59 percent) but higher than C olom bia (48 percent) 
and M exico (23 percent) as presented below. A lthough  we are aware 
o f the risks im plied in these com parisons because the definitions and 
coverage o f  payroll m ay differ in several countries, one conclusion  
is straightforward: when a significant part o f  spending is com m itted  
by payroll, any fiscal adjustment that implies expenditure cuts will 
be m ore difficult.
•  Dependency o f  states on central governm ent transfers seems to be 
smaller in Brazil (39 percent) than other countries in the region such 
as C olom bia (67 percent), Argentina (68 percent), and M exico (81 
percent) as presented below. Therefore, we could  expect a stronger 
engagem ent o f  the states in terms o f  fiscal responsibility.
One im portant trend is shown by the positive slope o f  current expendi­
ture as a proportion o f  G D P  during 1995-2010 (Figure 12.2). The indica­
tor increases during the period o f  observation even though the pattern is
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Source: E laboration by authors based on data from National Treasury of Brazil.
Figure 12.2 Brazil: current expenditures -  sta tes average ( a s % o f  sta te  
GDP, 1995-2010)
n ot sm ooth. The low  level o f  current expenditures in the years im mediately  
before 1999 captures the serious fiscal crisis that the country (and the 
states) experienced.
The fiscal crisis o f  1997-98 and the contractual agreements signed with  
the central governm ent im plied a strong fiscal adjustment, which reduced 
investm ent at state level.12 Figure 12.3 shows the trend o f  the average 
value o f  the capital expenditures index (out_4), which indicates a posi­
tive trend from  1995 until 1999 (first year in which the agreements were 
im plem ented) and a clear turning point after that period.
A s with Argentina, we derive the Spearman correlation coefficients 
(Table 12.7) at the 5 percent significance level. One o f  the highest correla­
tions is between the current expenditures-to-G D P ratio (o u t_ l) and the 
indicator, which proved the reliance o f  Brazilian states on central govern­
ment transfers (dependency). F or Brazil we also have the level o f  privatiza­
tion revenues (out_6), which is positively correlated with the am ount o f  
current tax revenues as well as that o f  financial loans.
In Brazil, states with a higher dependency level tend to have a higher 
current expenditure-to-G D P ratio (owi_7) (Figure 12.4). One explana­
tion for this result could  be that a higher level o f  current expenditures is 
related to a higher level o f  central governm ent transfers, due to com m on  
p ool problems. S N G s are more accountable when they spend revenues 
collected at the local level.
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Source: E laboration by authors based on data from N ational Treasury o f Brazil.
Figure 12.3 Brazil: capital expenditures -  sta tes average (a s %  o f  sta te  
GDP, 1995-2010)
A s stated before, we cannot run specifications according to the adopted  
rule; therefore, we ran a /-test on the m ean differences on  three periods:
•  first period (1995-97): the years before the states-central govern­
ment agreements;
•  the second period (1998-2000): when the agreements started but 
before the enforcem ent o f  the FRL; and
•  third period (2001-2003): after the introduction o f  the fiscal rule.
In Tables 12.8 and 12.9 we report the test on credit to G D P  (out__5) 
and privatization revenues to G D P  (out_6). The results from  both tables 
indicate that while the average values o f  the indices before and after the 
adoption o f  the central governm ent-states agreement are not statistically 
different (Table 12.9), the difference is statistically significant after the 
adoption o f  the FR L  (Table 12.8). Therefore, one conclusion  is that after 
the introduction o f  the F R L  limits, the average incidence o f  both the loans 
outcom e and privatization revenues decreased.
The first result is consistent with the overall fiscal performance o f  the 
states after signing the fiscal adjustment agreement with the central gov ­
ernment in 1997/98 -  which implied borrowing less. The second result on 
privatization m ay be due to the fact that in the fiscal adjustm ent programs
T a b le  1 2 .7  B ra z il:  S p e a rm a n  c o rre la tio n  co effic ien ts




o u t_ l 1 . 0
out_2 0.0098 1 . 0
out_3 0.2080* 0 . 0 1 . 0
out_4 0.6475* - 0 . 1 0.1556* 1 . 0
out_5 0.0542 0.1844* - 0 . 0 0 1 0.2659* 1
out_6 -0 .1 5 2 0 * 0.0697 0.2115* 0.0287 0.2049* 1
dependency 0.6456* -0 .0 5 0 3 -0 .3 8 0 0 * 0.4700* -0 .0 1 1 8 -0 .2 9 2 5 * 1
budget rigidity 0.1746* 0.0745 -0 .2 6 6 7 * - 0 . 0 2 1 2 0.0979 -0 .1 1 0 6 * 0.3130* 1
vertical imbalance -0 .6 6 1 7 * - 0 . 0 1 1 0.4811* -0 .4 1 9 9 * -0 .0 5 5 0.2571* -0 .9 0 0 0 * -0 .4 1 0 4 * 1
Note: *Significant at 5%.
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Current expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
Source: E laboration by authors based on data from National Treasury of Brazil.
Figure 12.4 Brazil: dependency and current expenditures relationship
Table 12.8 Brazil: differences in means; credit to G D P and  priva tiza tion  
revenues to G D P before and a fter the F R L  adoption
V ariab le 2 0 0 1 --2003 1998-2000 M e a n  diff /-te st
O bs M ean O bs M ean
(2001/03-1998/00)
out_5  (credit) 81 0.003 81 0.017 -0 .0 1 3 -5 .1 0
out_6  (p riv a tiza tio n s) 81 0 . 0 0 1 81 0.008 -0 .0 0 7 -4 .1 3
Table 12.9 Brazil: differences in means; credit to G D P and privatiza tion  
revenues to G D P before and a fter the sta tes-cen tra l 
governm ent agreem ent adoption
V ariab le 1998-2000 1995-1997 M e a n  diff /-test
O bs M ean O bs M ean
(1995/97-1998/00)
out_5  (credit) 





- 0 . 0 0 2
- 0 . 0 0 2
-0 .7 0
-0 .9 8
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Table 12.10 Colombia: f isca l indicators, Traffic L ight Law  35811997
In d ic a to r A u to n o m o u s In te rm ed ia te C ritical
in d eb ted n ess in d eb tedness indeb ted n ess
G re en  ligh t Y ellow  ligh t R e d  ligh t
L iq u id ity  in d ic a to r <40% 40%  < 60% >60%
Solvency in d ic a to r < 80% <80% >80%
Effect S N G  is (a) S N G  can  c o n tra c t A u th o riz a tio n
a llow ed  to au to n o m o u sly ; (b) is req u ired  to
c o n tra c t requ ires ind eb ted n ess p e rfo rm  cred it
new  c red it a u th o r iz a tio n  fro m  the o p e ra tio n s , th u s
au to n o m o u s ly M in istry  o f  F in an ce  o r 
the  d e p a rtm e n t, w hich 
will be  co n d itio n ed  
o n  th e  sign ing  o f 
a  P e rfo rm an ce  
A g reem en t w ith  the 
financia l en tities
a  P e rfo rm an ce  
A g reem en t w ith  
the  financia l 
en tities sh o u ld  
be signed
Source: Echavarria et al. (2000).
signed in the late 1990s, the states (especially the larger ones) com m itted  
to  privatize som e o f  the states’ ow n enterprises, which occurred in the first 
years after the program s were im plem ented. After a first round o f  priva­
tization, the revenue generated by selling state assets naturally decreased.
Country cases: Colombia
In 1997 C olom bia adopted the Traffic Light Law, which classifies the fiscal 
behavior o f  the S N G s according to two m ain indicators: (a) a liquidity 
indicator, given by the ratio between the debt interest and the ‘operational’ 
savings (for exam ple, current revenue minus current expenditure exclud­
ing interest payments), and (b) a solvency indicator, which represents the 
ratio between the debt balance and the current revenue (Echavarria et al., 
2000). The thresholds defined by the law are shown in Table 12.10.
Table 12.11 indicates that during the period from  2002 to 2009, m ost 
states (more than 85 percent),13 were in the green light category and there­
fore they can contract new debt autonom ously. I f  the Traffic Light Law  
was intended to be a m eans to control the indebtedness level o f  SN G , its 
inconclusive outcom e is probably due to a low  level o f  stringency o f  the 
green category constraints.
C olom bian states went through another classification with Law  
617/2000, which defined five categories based on a com bination o f  resident
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Table 12.11 Colombia: sta tes classified according to the Traffic L ight 
Law
T raffic light 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 T o ta l
G reen 2 1 19 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 24 2 0 167
R ed 1 1 13 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 8 1 2 89
T o ta l 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 256
Source: Authors’ calculations based on M HCP (2002-2009) data.
Table 12.12 Colombia: sta te  categories classified by population and 
revenue
C ateg o ry P o p u la tio n R evenues
Special >  2 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 O w n revenues a re  h ig h er th a n  600,000 
m in im u m  legal m o n th ly  w age
1 700,001 <  p o p u la tio n 170,001 <  ow n revenue  <  600,000
< 2 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 m in im u m  legal m o n th ly  w age
2 390,001 <  p o p u la tio n 122,001 <  ow n rev en u e  <  170,000
<  700,000 m in im u m  legal m o n th ly  w age
3 1 0 0 , 0 0 1  <  p o p u la tio n 60,000 <  ow n revenue <  1 2 2 , 0 0 0  m in im u m
< 390,000 legal m o n th ly  wage
4 p o p u la tio n  <  1 0 0 , 0 0 0 O w n revenue < 60,000 m in im u m  legal 
m o n th ly  w age
Source: Law 617/2000.
population and state revenue threshold. As shown in Table 12.12, m oving  
from  the fourth to the special category, the number o f  residents increases 
as does the ratio between state revenues and the m inim um  legal m onthly  
payroll expenditure.
From  2001 to 2009, m ost states were included in categories 2 to 4 
(Table 12.13). N ote  that categories 3 and 4 are subject to the same limits on  
the ratio between administrative expenditures and ow n current revenues.14
The expenditure lim its are more stringent from the bottom  to the top o f  
the rank, as shown in Table 12.14. The basic intuition behind the classifi­
cation constraint is that a higher margin o f  discretion needs to be allowed  
to smaller states, since they are expected to have a lower level o f  ow n­
generated revenues, although such equivalence m ight not be true in the 
case o f  small richer states (that is, states that have natural resources have 
a higher G D P  even if  the population is smaller).
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Table 12.13 Colombia: sta tes classified according to L aw  617/2000
C ateg o ry 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 T o ta l
0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 27
1 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 3 3 36
2 8 9 7 7 6 6 6 7 7 63
3 8 6 8 6 7 8 8 8 8 67
4 9 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 95
T o ta l 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 288
Note: The series started from the first year for which information is available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on M HCP (2002-2009) data.
Table 12.14 Colombia: lim its on current expenditures ratio (a s %  o f  own 
current revenues)




3 a n d  4 70
Source: Article 4, Law 617/2000.
Table 12.15 Colombia: lim its on current expenditures ratio, 2001-2004  
(a s %  o f  own current revenues)
C ateg o ry 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004
Special 65 60 55 50
1 70 65 60 55
2 75 70 65 60
3 a n d  4 85 80 75 70
Source: Article 5, Law 617/2000.
During the 2001-04  period, Law 617 provided transitional rules as far 
as the expenditure lim it was concerned. For exam ple, the three states 
in the Special Category (Antioquia, Cundinamarca, and Valle) were 
expected to reduce the targeted ratio from  65 to 50 percent in 3 years 
(Table 12.15). Even though such lim its as defined in the table seem quite
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
□  Non-compliers ■  Compilers
Source: E laboration by authors based on data from Viabilidad Fiscal Department, 
2002-2009.
Figure 12.5 Colombia: com pilers versus non-compliers ( Law  61712000 
requisites)  (number o f  sta tes)
ambitious, only a few states were found to be n ot com plying with the 
rule’s requirements (Figure 12.5). This appears to be a paradox: if  the 
limits were really am bitious one would expect that a large number o f  
states would not be com plying. One conclusion could  be that either the 
rule was quite effective or the thresholds previously defined were not suf­
ficiently dem anding considering the starting point o f  the m ajority o f  the 
states.
When a m ore accurate investigation is carried out, it is apparent that the 
best com pliers belong to the special and third categories, while m ost n on ­
achievers belong to the fourth category (Figure 12.6).
It is apparent that states do not have any incentive to be non-achievers 
according to the Traffic Light Law classification, because red lighters15 
need authorization to perform credit operations and they have to agree to  
and im plem ent an ad hoc fiscal program. In other words their bargaining 
power is neutralized once they have to deal with the private sector and it 
can be used only with the central governm ent. The special category states 
(category 0) cam e under the red light classification m ost o f  the tim e during 
2002 to 2009 (Figure 12.7). The bigger states are m ore under the control o f
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Source: E laboration by authors based on data from Viabilidad Fiscal Department,
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Figure 12.7  Colombia: red lights per  year and category
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Figure 12.8 Colombia: ow n-tax shares by category, 2002-2009
the central governm ent, consistently with the fact that they are those m ost 
likely to generate fiscal imbalances.
Som e o f  the characteristics o f  the intergovernmental relationships based 
on the available data are as follows:
•  first, in terms o f  own-tax shares, there are apparent differences 
am ong categories (see Figure 12.8);
•  second, in spite o f  these differences, the index is stable during the 
2002-09 period; and
•  third, consistently with the rationale o f  the categories, the own-tax  
share is highest for the special category states, and low est for the 
fourth category states.
The debt ratio16 shows a downward trend until 2006 and an unusual 
increase from  2007 to 2009 especially for categories 4 and 2, and par­
tially for category 3 (Figure 12.9). The constraints for the categories 
vary, which reflects the position  o f  the categories according to the debt 
ratio.
Finally, we produce descriptive statistics for the m ain reference indices 
defined in Table 12.1, using C olom bian data from  2002 to 2009. Table 
12.16 summarizes the descriptive statistics. On average we verified a 
low  level o f  current tax revenues. A dditionally the intergovernmental
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Source: E laboration by authors based on data from Viabilidad Fiscal Department, 
2002-2009.
Figure 12.9 Colombia: debt to to ta l revenue by category, 2002-2009
Table 12.16 Colombia: m ain descriptive sta tistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max
out 1 0.03 0.03 0.003 0.20
out 2 0.02 0.03 0 0.13
out 3 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.06
out 4 0.05 0.06 0 0.29
dependency 0.67 0.20 0.15 0.96
budget rigidity 0.48 0.21 0.06 0.96
vertical imbalance 0.58 0.27 0.07 1.00
relationship can be better understood when we control by som e indices 
indicating dependency, budget rigidity and vertical imbalance:
•  in terms o f  dependency from central governm ent, states rely heavily  
on transfers (o f  about 67 percent);
•  in terms o f  rigidity o f  the budget it is about 48 percent that is, the 
payroll bill is a large com ponent o f  the current expenditures; and
•  in terms o f  vertical im balance, the local current revenues cover 
about 58 percent o f  the current expenditures.
382 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
Table 12.17 Colombia: Spearm an correlation coefficients






out_l 1 . 0
out_2 - 0 . 2 1 . 0
out_3 0.5991* 0.1174 1
out_4 0.2636* -0.5915* 0.0935 1
dependency 0.2038 -0.3408* 0.2606 0.0636 1
budget 0.2275 0.0495 0.1448 -0.0935 0.1114 1
rigidity
debt_ratio -0.2842* 0.6999* 0.0229 -0.4176* -0.3397* -0.1096 1
categories 0.2626* -0.3006* 0.0004 0.4216* 0.4180* 0.1365 -0.2855* 1
Note: *Significant at 5%.
Once the main fiscal outcom es are correlated with the decentralization  
characteristics o f  the C olom bian states, as shown in Table 12.17, some 
expected results are confirmed. For instance higher levels o f  dependency  
are associated with a lower level o f  public debt as a percentage o f  G D P, 
the coefficient being negative and statistically significant. Budget rigidity 
does not have any significant correlation with the fiscal outcom es, with 
regard to the data and the correlation coefficient. In terms o f  the relation­
ship between current expenditures and public debt, there is a negative cor­
relation coefficient (-0 .2 ) and the same sign characterizes the correlation  
between public debt and capital expenditures, which is also significant 
(-0 .59).
Since the introduction o f  fiscal rules in C olom bia concerned all the 
states sim ultaneously and data are not available for the entire period, 
sophisticated econom etrics is infeasible. Therefore we present results o f  a 
statistical test to check the m ean differences between different categories o f  
states, such as com pliers and non-com pliers. Through this analysis, which  
does not resolve the endogeneity problem  addressed by the literature on  
fiscal rules, we can at least draw som e preliminary conclusions.17
For C olom bia, we address the differences between red and green light 
states and between com pliers and non-com pliers o f  the limit im posed by 
Law 617/2000. The results as shown in Tables 12.18 and 12.19 can be 
summarized as follows:
•  The difference between red and green light indices is in som e 
cases statistically different. For instance, on average green states 
present debt ratio as well as percentage o f  public debt to G D P  sig­
nificantly lower than those o f  red states. However, the m ean current
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Table 12.18 Colom bia: differences in m ean: red  light versus green light 
sta tes
Variable Red light states Green light states Mean diff /-test
Obs Mean Obs Mean (green-red)
debt 91 0.321 177 0.121 -0.200 -9.12
out 1 68 0.018 154 0.014 -0.004 -1.46
out 2 70 0.019 162 0.010 -0.010 -3.92
out_4 68 0.017 139 0.023 0.007 1.25
Table 12.19 Colombia: differences in m ean: compliers versus
non -compliers
Variable Non-compliers Compliers Mean diff /-test
Obs Mean Obs Mean (Compliers-
Non-compliers)
debt 62 0.205 206 0.184 0.021 0.75
out 1 48 0.020 142 0.014 0.006 1.61
out 2 50 0.014 148 0.010 0.004 1.47
out_4 47 0.027 131 0.023 0.004 0.60
expenditure-to-G D P index is no different between red and green 
light states. This is quite consistent with the traffic light index defini­
tion, where the level o f  current expenditures is never targeted alone.
•  On the contrary, there is a lack o f  statistical significance between  
average m easures o f  the fiscal indicators o f  com pliers and non- 
com pliers o f  the 617/2000 targets: debt ratio, current expenditures 
to G D P, public debt to G D P  and capital expenditures to G D P. 
This m ight in  part confirm the feeling o f  ineffectiveness o f  these 
provisions, as addressed in the first place by the high incidence o f  
com pliance.
In summary, we could conclude that for C olom bia while the Traffic 
Light Law provision18 seems to be linked to som e effective im plications in 
econom ic terms, those o f  Law 617/2000 are n ot related to any significant 
differences.
Country cases: Mexico
M exican intergovernm ental relationships have been judged as highly inef­
ficient (Joumard, 2005). States have no revenue autonom y, but they are
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2007).
Figure 12.10 M exico: sta tes adopting transparency laws, 2002-07
in charge o f  expenditures.19 The M exican states have been slow  to m ove 
towards an institutional liability framework.
N otw ithstanding the constitutional prescription o f  Article 117, it has 
been only as a consequence o f  the 1994-95 Tequila  crises that som e states 
took  the initiative to adopt som e form al limit o f  indebtedness: 14 out o f  32 
states in 2003 (Secretaría de H acienda y Crédito Público, 2003). By 2007, 
the number o f  those adopting a limit to the debt rises to 16, 13 o f  which 
have only a law concerning debt lim itation w ithout quantitative limits or 
targets (see Table 12A.6).
Starting in 2002, the introduction o f  transparency laws by the states 
was seen to be the tool to m ake inform ation on public finance data avail­
able. Furthermore, the laws should provide m ore and better inform ation  
to m onitor the efforts and decisions o f  each state in terms o f  fiscal policy  
im plem entation. During the 2002-07 period, all M exican states adopted  
a fiscal transparency law (Figure 12.10). In addition, follow ing the 2006 
Budget and Fiscal R esponsibility Law, states adopted m ost o f  the budg­
etary execution procedures stem ming from  the national legislation as a 
consequence o f  agreements with the central governm ent.
A  distinctive trait o f  the M exican case is the structure o f  the transfers. 
The states’ balance sheets distinguish the earmarked grants (aporta­
ciones) from the revenue-sharing grants (participaciones). U ntil 1998 the 
distribution o f  the earmarked grants was totally based upon discretion, 
but in that year a form ula was introduced. L ooking at the earmarked 
grants-to-revenue-sharing ratio it is apparent that until 1998, transfers
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Table 12.20 M exico: descriptive variables
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Variables M ean Std dev. M in M ax
out_m x 0 . 2 1 0.14 0.04 0.87
out_2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0.15
out__3 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03
out_4 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0.06
dependency 0.81 0.16 0 . 2 0 0.98
bud_rigidity 0.23 0.14 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 8
vert_im b 0.03 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 2 1
from the central governm ent to the states were m ainly represented by the 
revenue-sharing com ponent, while after that year the ratio was inverted. 
The central governm ent seems to be attem pting to reduce the S N G s’ dis­
cretionary powers.
Even if  this attem pt underm ines a balanced intergovernm ental rela­
tionship , it is needed to im pose a lim it on  S N G  expenditure choices (that 
is, borrow ing). M exico, therefore, represents a special case o f  partial 
decentralization (Devarajan et al., 2007): states can freely m anage p o liti­
cally sensitive expenditures that the central governm ent will provide. 
The pitfalls o f  the decentralization design are also significant according  
to the accountability  standard o f  local politicians, given that the no 
re-election rule for local governors is in place (Joum ard, 2005). Such  
a rule can decrease the accountability  o f  expenditure choices o f  local 
politicians.
Because we do not have data that distinguish between current and 
capital expenditures in the case o f  M exico, we use the aggregate measure 
o f  expenditures to G D P  (ou t_m x ).20 Table 12.20 presents the descriptive 
statistics o f  the m ain indices. O u t jn x  has a m ean value o f  21 percent, 
but the m ost striking result is given by out_3, which represents the G D P  
ratio o f  current tax revenue, which has extremely low  values. Overall 
data confirm the high dependency o f  M exican states on the central 
governm ent.
A s for the Argentine case study, we constructed dum m y variables for 
the rules adopted by the states; therefore each variable can assume either 
the value o f  0, if  the rule was not adopted, or 1, if  the rule was adopted. In 
Table 12.21 we report the descriptive statistics for these rules. In particular 
three dum mies need further explanation:
•  lim _debt_ l takes value 1 if  the state had som e form al limit on  debt 
by 2002 and 0 otherwise;
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Table 12.21 M exico: fisca l rules adopted by the sta tes
Variables M ean Std dev. M in M ax
transparency 0 . 2 0 0.40 0 1
amount ex ante 0 . 1 2 0.33 0 1
state_approy 0.03 0.17 0 1
golden rule 0 . 1 2 0.33 0 1
lim _debt_l 0.43 0.50 0 1
lim_debt_2 0.15 0.36 0 1
both_lim_debt 0.06 0.24 0 1
Table 12.22 M exico: Spearm an correlation coefficients




o u tjn x 1
out_2 0.1592* 1
out_3 0.5026* 0.2338* 1
out_4 0.1058 0.1429* 0.0614 1
dependency 0.4177* - •0.1517* -0.1873* -0 .0739 1
transfers 0.7102* 0.0428 0.2852* -0 .0798 0.5832* 1
ratio
budget --0.2868* - •0.1028* -0 .0237 0.0756 -0.1742* -0.3597* 1
rigidity
Note: *Significant at 5%.
•  lim_debt_2  takes value 1 if  there are limits on debt by 2007 and 0 
otherwise; and
•  b o th jim d e b t  takes value 1 when both lim _debt_ l and lim_debt_2  
equal 1 and 0 otherwise. This m eans that b o th jim d e b t  equals 1 for 
those states that have had a longer experience w ith the adoption o f  
rules.
The Spearman correlation coefficients (Table 12.22), show a positive 
significant correlation between dependency and expenditures, while 
dependency is related negatively to the incidence o f  public debt.
W hen the proportion o f  earmarked to revenue-sharing grants increases 
(,transfjra tio ) we have a significant increase in the expenditure index, as 
plotted also in Figure 12.11. This could be positive in the measure to which 
m ore expenditures stand for m ore services for the resident population, 
given the nature o f  the earmarked grants (aportaciones).







Source: Elaboration by authors based on data from Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas 
Públicas de la Cámara de Diputados.
Figure 12.11 M exico: transfers to G D P and expenditures to G D P
The next step was to consider the link between rules adoption and the 
average value o f  the main available indices,21 with a focus on the im pact o f  
debt limits, the presence o f  both constraints (lim _ l and lim_2), the adop­
tion o f  a transparency law, and the enforcem ent o f  a golden rule. Different 
results are associated with the different rules. Table 12.23 presents the 
usual ¿-statistics tests results, which can be summarized as follows:
•  A  significant difference is associated with limits on  debt on  the 
outcom e o f  interest as we w ould expect or, better, we w ould like. 
For instance, the value o f  o u t j n x  seems to be system atically higher 
for states that did not adopt a limit on debt, and the same is true for 
out_2  (public debt) and out_4  (investments).
•  W hen the sam e state adopted both limits on debt, again we have 
a positive effect on the indices but here the difference is no longer 
statistically significant except for the effect on out_m x.
•  Surprisingly, the adoption o f  a transparency law in the M exican  
case seems to  have had a reverse effect: it appears that the average 
value o f  o u t j n x  and out_2  is lower in states that did not adopt the 
rule com pared with those that did adopt the law .22 A  better under­
standing o f  such a counterintuitive result would require a further 
decom position o f  the phenom enon.
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Table 12.23 M exico: differences in mean o f  the m ain indices according to 
the rules
R ule V ariab le R ule  yes R u le  n o M e a n  diff 
(R u le  n o -R u le  
Y es)
t-test
O bs M ean O bs M ean
L im _ d eb t_ l o u t jn x 70 0.167 387 0.217 0.051 2.78
out_2 70 0.003 383 0.007 0.004 2.33
out_4 48 0 . 0 0 0 284 0.003 0.003 2.44
Both D ebt o u t jn x 28 0.161 429 0.213 0.052 1.87
out_2 28 0.003 425 0.007 0.004 1.48
out_4 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 312 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 1.56
Transparency o u t jn x 96 0.316 361 0.181 -0 .1 3 5 -8 .9 8
out_2 96 0.008 357 0.006 -0 .0 0 3 - 1 .8 0
o u t j t 96 0 . 0 0 2 236 0.003 0 . 0 0 1 1.35
G_rule o u t jn x 56 0 . 2 1 0 401 0 . 2 1 0 - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 .0 4
out_2 55 0.003 398 0.007 0.004 2 . 2 1
out_4 40 0.004 292 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 2 -1 .8 4
•  The results related to the golden rule are consistent with what we 
would expect, as far as out_4  is concerned (m ore investm ent expen­
ditures once the rule is in place), and it appears that higher public 
debt levels characterize the lack o f  such a rule.
Overall, the unexpected results associated with the introduction o f  the 
transparency laws m ight be due to the lack o f  a disclosure culture which  
has characterized the M exican states’ public finance quality level.
4 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Our work presents a critical review o f  fiscal rules im plem ented at the 
subnational level in four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
C olom bia, and M exico. W e have stressed two aspects: on  the one hand the 
im portance o f  intergovernm ental relations within a decentralized context 
in order to  design ‘feasible’ and successful fiscal rules im posed on (top  
down) or chosen by (bottom  up) the SNG s; on the other, collecting data 
at the subnational level, we provide descriptive em pirical evidence o f  the 
m ain trends which have characterized local finances before and/or after
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the introduction o f  fiscal rules. W e performed this task by building fiscal 
outcom e indicators with the available data.
A  m ore sophisticated empirical analysis w ould require a com parison  
before and after the introduction o f  the subnational fiscal rules, since the 
goal w ould be to identify and assess the change in the local adm inistra­
tion’s behavior triggered by the rules themselves. U nfortunately com plete 
data are n ot always available and their drawbacks include lack o f  time 
consistency and narrow coverage.
A lthough it is n ot possible to evaluate the causal impact o f  the introduc­
tion  o f  fiscal rules at a subnational level in the countries in our sample, the 
analysis o f  descriptive statistics shows that a unique indicator o f  com pli­
ance m ight be a m isleading indicator o f  fiscal rules at the subnational level.
W e expected that the targets o f  the rules, including the golden rule and  
expenditure caps w ould  be affected by the rule im position. H owever, a 
first review o f  the empirical evidence o f  the SN G s in our sample does not 
always confirm this expectation a priori. This might be due to the fact 
that the rules are n ot effective even when the com pliance level, such as in 
C olom bia, is quite high. A dditionally we were expecting that rules which  
target the budget balance would respect the S N G  autonom y m ore than 
rules targeting the expenditure decisions. Such legitimate expectation also 
relies on  a clear definition o f  the decentralized institutional context within  
which the central governm ent has several options to deal with the SN G s.
W e recognize that our analysis is not sufficient to affirm that the sub­
national rules adopted by the states in our sample are ineffective, because 
we were not able to cope with the endogeneity problem. Therefore, our 
m ethodology had to be confined to correlations and first significant dif­
ference in means. According to these rough measures there is not always a 
difference in adopting fiscal rules.
Looking at the experiences o f  several Latin American countries we real­
ized that in general the fiscal crises at subnational level are follow ed by a 
kind o f  bailout by the federal governm ent which has been im plem ented  
through a debt rescheduling agreement with conditionalities aim ing to 
achieve fiscal consolidation: the ‘contractual approach’. This approach  
can provide m ore-flexible tools at the local level, taking into account the 
specificities o f  the S N G s as well as their weakness. A s such it could be 
considered as an alternative to the introduction o f  fiscal rules in enhancing  
the reputation o f  the central governm ent where the econom ic conditions 
o f the S N G  and its dim ension w ould jeopardize the use o f  fiscal rules and 
trigger soft-budget constraint problems. Where the preconditions for the 
effectiveness o f  fiscal rules are not met, the use o f  a contractual approach is 
a m eans o f  coping with the rules’ shortcom ings. In reviewing several cases 
using a contractual approach we also conclude that under this scheme,
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enforcem ent o f  the rules becam e m ore stringent and perhaps this is where 
the fiscal rules at subnational level work better.
NOTES
* This chapter benefited from the stimulating environment o f the Economic Policy 
and Debt Departm ent (PRM ED ), World Bank, W ashington, DC, where D r Grembi 
worked as a consultant during July-September 2010. The views expressed herein 
are those o f the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank 
Group.
1. The Brazilian experience is a good example: the 1997/98 bailout o f subnational finance 
implied a legal agreement that states and municipalities would not borrow. In 2000, the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law prohibited new bailouts.
2. Brazilian states were bailed out by the federal government in 1989, 1993 and 1997/98. 
The 1990s was a decade o f a clear deterioration in the state’s fiscal performance.
3. Yet it might be difficult to assess the measure o f ugly outcomes. An attempt to link the 
introduction o f fiscal rules at the subnational level and window-dressing behavior can 
be found in Balduzzi and Grembi (2011).
4. The study also indicates that a more general composite indicator measuring the pre­
ferred properties of a set o f fiscal rules in all dimensions of fiscal policy may be difficult 
to interpret given the random  weighting schemes used.
5. This trend has been noted in several studies, including Jiménez and Ter-Minassian (ch. 
1 1  in this volume).
6 . For earmarked transfers in Colombia, see Law 715 (2001): broadly 96% of total 
transfers are earmarked for education, health and ‘general-purpose’ categories; 4% is 
earmarked for ‘specific purposes’.
7. In 2002 the Supreme C ourt declared Law 25.543 unconstitutional.
8 . The contractual approach could also be characterized as a ‘coordinated approach’. See 
Kopits (2001) and Guardia and Messenberg (2002).
9. Law 25.570 enacted on April 10, 2002 ratified the ‘Central Government-Provinces 
Agreement on Financial Relations and Basic Terms of a System of Federal 
Coparticipation Provisions’.
10. It is well known in the literature that higher levels o f public expenditure are associated 
with higher levels of GDP. Therefore, the G D P normalization used in the indices of 
Table 12.1 can provide a balanced measure for the countries.
11. We use Spearman correlation coefficients because they correlate variable ranks. 
Hereafter tables with Spearman coefficients report the significance level at 5%.
12. The control o f subnational borrowing in the form of debt renegotiation agreements 
imposed strict rules on financial and fiscal management and ensured its adherence to 
the guidelines set by the federal government for the conduct o f macroeconomic policy. 
See Manoel et al. (2011).
13. From  the available data, no state was classified as yellow.
14. Ingresos Corrientes de Libre Destinación (ICLD) as defined by Law 617/2000.
15. Those states that declare the liquidity indicator to be higher than 60% and the solvency 
indicator to be higher than 80%.
16. We also use this index (debt/total revenues) since it is often used in official Colombian 
documents.
17. OLS coefficients would be biased given the endogeneity o f the category (as well as the 
fiscal rule implementation), which is why we calculate the difference in means. The 
reader should be aware that such a difference, when significant, could be due to system­
atic differences among the various states.
18. Note that Law 358/1997 was a constitutional law, which was reaffirmed in 2003.
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19. The main shortcoming of the Mexican case is often the poor quality o f the data and the 
scarce availability o f information.
20. Out_4 is based on expenditures for investments, which are otherwise specified.
21. We ran the same statistical test on all the rules, but in the table we report only the most 
significant. Results for the excluded rules are available upon request.
22. Since all the states ultimately adopted a transparency law the difference can also be 
interpreted in terms of before and after the adoption.
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APPENDIX 12A
Table 12A. 1 Fiscal rules grouped characteristics
Country Fiscal rules
Institutional characteristics Targets Process rules and rule implementation
Bottom-up Top-down One fiscal Budget Borrowing Limits Expend- Obligation Moni- Sanctions Constitu- Escape
approach approach rule (X) or balance con- on tax iture to produce toring tional clause
(FRLs are (FRLs are more than require- straints rates or increase financial (ex ante/ binding
approved national laws one (XX) ments relief limits accounts ex post)
for national which also (transpar-
government apply ency)




Argentina X XX X X X X
Brazil X XX X X X X X X X
Colombia X XX X X X X X X X
Mexico X XX X X X X
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Table 12A.2 Contractual approach o f  SNG bailouts: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
Country,
coverage
Main conditions M ain results
Argentina Subnational public finances deteriorated in 2001
- 0 2  because of economic recession which started in 
2002 and 2004 1998. Restructuring o f subnational public debt became
imperative
Law 25.570 February 2002: provinces signed an agreement with
enacted April central government which allowed restructuring of
10, 2002 ratified subnational debt (Agreement ratified by Law 25.570
the central enacted April 10, 2002). Through the Financial
government- Assistance Program (PAF), and the Programa de
provinces Financiamiento Ordenado (PFO), provinces had access
‘Agreements’ to subsidized funding for long-term debt
on ‘Financial In order to have access to the long-term funding
Relations and the provinces committed to
Basic Terms /  (a) achieve fiscal targets in order to reduce the fiscal
of a System of deficit and the total debt
Federal Co- /  (b) stop issuing bonds and
participation </ (c) publish timely and detailed fiscal reports
Provisions’ The main objectives were to fill the financial gap of
SNG and implement a control/monitor mechanism to 
Law 25.917 improve public finances at subnational level (reduce
(August 2004), public deficit and debt)
emphasized the Subnational debt was converted into central
coordination government bonds; total central government transfers
approach to provinces were increased by 30% of financial
transaction tax collection
Fiscal imbalances a t provincial level, 1996-2002. On 
average, 33% of total fiscal deficit was explained by the 
provinces’ deficit during this period. M ain determinants o f these 
deficits were (a) increase o f central governed revenues on total 
tax collection, (b) expanding o f social expenditures a t provincial 
level due to the increase in the decentralization process (more 
social spending shifted to provinces). Public debt a t provincial 
level increased at 19% per year during 1996-2001. Between 2001 
and 2 0 0 2  the debt increased by 130% due to the devaluation of 
the peso on the credits denominated in dollars (see Melamud, 
2 0 1 0 )
The fiscal results of provinces which presented a deficit 
each year during 1996-2001 started showing a  surplus in 2002 
until 2006. However, the increase in the stock o f the debt was 
still positive during the same period because of the impact of 
the C ER index (CER -  coeficiente de estabilización de referencia 
-  was an index utilized to adjust ‘pesified’ debts according 
to inflation in the prices o f goods and services). (See data, 
especially Table 5 in Melamud, 2010)
As a result o f the Agreement, the provincial public debt 
suffered a  colossal change from 1996 to 2006: participation of 
debt against the central government in the total composition 
increased from 18 to 6 8 %
The economic crisis with the fall in G D P starting in 1999 
engendered a reduction in tax revenues while spending was kept 
almost constant. The total deficit o f provinces reached a  peak




The program continued towards the end of the 
decade. Provinces should comply with quarterly 
fiscal targets aiming to reducing the deficit in 2 0 0 2  
and achieving balance in 2003-07 with progressive 
reduction in public debt 
In August 2004, Law 25.917 (FRL) aimed to 
reform the coparticipation system between central 
government and provinces and emphasized the 
coordination in terms of fiscal policy in the country 
SNG debt refinanced for 30 years a t 6 % interest 
rate. Federal government issued securities to redeem 
the existing state’s debt and became its creditor. The 
bailout was conditional on an explicit obligation for 
the states to commit to a consented fiscal adjustment 
General rule: stabilize the debt to net revenue at 
one
Fiscal adjustment agreed established targets for 
expenditures, revenues (including payroll limits and 
investments), and the debt consistent with this general 
rule. Utilization o f privatization revenues to pay debt 
was also a condition and included the privatization of 
the state-owned banks, eliminating them as a source of 
debt financing 
Effective guarantees: to receive the benefits of the 
debt restructuring agreement, the states offered their 
own revenue and the constitutional transfer from the
Brazil
1997-98: 25 out 
of 27 states. 
State o f Sào 
Paulo, the first, 
signed in Dec. 
1997. The last 
state signed in 
May 2000







in 2001: 2.4% of G D P (representing 41% of total consolidated 
deficit o f the public sector)
The fiscal adjustment implemented through the Agreement 
implied a  reduction in the deficit to near zero by 2002. In 2003­
04, helped by the economic recovery, the provinces generated 
fiscal surplus for the first time since 1996
On Dec. 2001 the total restructured debt amounted to 
US$100 billion 
Introduced major structural change in the state’s financing, 
imposing an expressive fiscal adjustment effort at the state level 
Explained the observed change in the SN G’s fiscal 
performance since 1998. Consolidated fiscal primary result of 
states decreased from 1995 to 1998 and improved substantially 
until 2 0 0 0  when the states started to generate a primary surplus 
It also had an impact on reducing payroll payments at 
state level
The guarantee given proved to be very effective 
The measures were very comprehensive and covered the 
main channels for fiscal discipline 
In 2000, the government approved the FRL: more fiscal 
transparency, more limits and additional reinforcement to 






central government as guarantee (in case of defaults, the 
contracts authorized the central government to retain the 
legal transfers)
States failing to comply can be denied federal 
guarantee on new borrowing; violations would incur 
interest penalties on the rescheduled debt and increase on 
debt ceilings
Expenditure rule: each state had the obligation o f a 
minimum debt payment to the federal government o f 13% 
of the state net revenue 
The Federal Senate approved each contract 
General economic and debt crisis o f 1995 also 
affected the states 
Central government rescheduled states’ debt into 
long-term inflation-indexed debt at positive but 
subsidized interest rates and 4 years o f assistance 
payments
Banks were forced to accept indexed debt 
Funding came primarily from the president’s 
discretionary fund and regular transfers 
To avoid recurrence, each state had to agree to a
fiscal adjustment program designed by the Secretariat 
o f Finance (SHCP)
SHCP monitored compliance prior to disbursement 
o f the annual tranches o f assistance 
The government ended its policy of guaranteeing
subnational debt, although as a transition it agreed to 
accept and execute contractual mandates by which the 
borrowers pledged their revenue-sharing transfers as 
collateral for the debt service
The arrangement set a precedent o f fiscal consequences and 
brought most states to a  good financial situation by the end of 
the 1990s
However, politically favored states had to adjust less 
The indexed debt that banks were forced to accept helped 
them to avert total ruin and collapse o f the system, but 
illiquidity of the assets and low return inflicted some penalty on 
the borrowers as well 
By 1999 the government could no longer get the president’s 
discretionary fund through the opposition-dominated congress. 
W ithout such incentives, could not dictate fiscal prudence to the 
states in return for assistance with debt rescheduling 
In 2000, a whole new system was implemented (a)
eliminating discretionary transfers for the federal government; 
(b) ending SHCP’s role as fideicomiso for collateralizing debt 
with participaciones, (c) giving banks ex ante signals about 
riskiness o f state debt; and (d) giving strong incentives for 
borrowers to publish their fiscal and financial information
Table 12A. 3 Fiscal rules: characteristics by country




















2000 Fiscal 2002 All levels of
Responsi- government
bility Law*
Kind of restriction Enforcement Sanctions
Deficit target and fiscal balance Judicial
convergence path; pluriannual 
budget formulation; limits on current 
expenditure growth; transparency 
Limits on the public 
expenditures rate o f growth (not more 
than the expected nominal G D P rate 
o f growth); and on the debt service 
(rate debt to  current revenues net of 
transfers to municipalities not higher 
than 15%). The same limit is applied to 
the possibility of getting new credit 
Ex ante control over Judicial
subnational debt. Senate approval 
is required for all subnational 
government borrowing operations, 
prohibiting the issue of bonds and 
borrowing from state-owned banks 
Annual limit to the debt (ratio Legislative
net public debt to net revenues not -  own state
higher than 2 %); current balance legislature
budget; expenditure cap (ratio payroll 
expenditures to net revenues not 
















Colombia 1997 Law 358: SNGs
Traffic 
Light Law




2003 Law 819 Public sector
Mexico 1917 SNGs
Borrowing constraints and Judicial
supply-side regulation (fully 
provisioned for red light territories).
Indicators o f liquidity (interest 
payment/operational savings) and 
solvency (debt/current revenue)
Limits and restrictions on: Judicial
current expenditures (ceilings in terms 
o f a  percentage of their disposable 
revenues); municipalities’ creation; 
transparency (current balance budget)
Primary balance: budgets
are required to be balanced over a 
10-year period. An extra medium­
term  target is established. It sets the 
obligation for each department with 
population greater than 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
inhabitants to get a  credit risk 
rating by a rating agency. Limits 
on expenditures hold as well as the 
indicators previously introduced 
Art. 117, item VIII: States may not Judicial
in any case: Issue bonds o f public 
debt payable in foreign currency or 
outside the national territory; contract 
loans directly or indirectly with the 
governments o f other nations, or 
contract obligations in favor o f foreign 
companies or individuals, when the 
bonds or securities are payable to bearer 









Table 12 A. 3 (continued)
Country Year Law Implemen- Level o f Kind of restriction Enforcement Sanctions
tation year government
States and municipalities may 
not negotiate loans except for the 
construction of works intended to 
produce directly an increase in their 
revenues 
C urrent balance budget 
2000 SNGs M arket discipline for
subnational borrowing (no discretional 
transfers to states; no securing debt 
with payments from the revenue­
sharing agreement; subnational debt 
subjected to normal credit exposure 
ceilings; bank’s capital risk weighting 
linked to the international rating of 
the SNG)




Note: * Electoral Year Constraints. No consequences are established in case o f non-compliance-low level o f compliance.
Sources: Tommasi and Braun (2004); IM F (2005, 2009); Ahm ad and García-Escribano (2006); Corbacho and Schwartz (2007); M elamud (2010); 
Gómez Sabaini and Jiménez (2011).
M arket
Judicial Personal
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C ountry Tiers o f 
governm ent
Type o f 
governm ent
N um ber 
o f  states
Fiscal da ta P opulation G D P
A rgentina 3 Federal 23 1990-2008 1990-2008 1993-2005
Brazil 3 Federal 27 1995-2009 1995-2009
C olom bia 3 U nitary 32 2002-2007 1985-2009 1990-2007





402 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
T a b le  12  A . 5  A rg e n tin e a n  s ta te s  f i s c a l  ru les








Y 2005 Modifications 
to national law 
25.917
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Court o f Debt stock equal
Accounts of the or lower at the
Province end of each
administration
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Procedural Coordi- Fiscal Restric- Personal Other Previous
rules nator transpar- tions on sanction rule*
institution ency electoral (1999/
































Table 12 A. 5 (continued)
404 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica





Neuquén Y 2006 Adhere to
N ational law
25.917
Rio Negro Y 2004 Adhere to Ministry of
National law Finance of the
25.917 Province
Salta Y 2007 Adhere to
National law
25.917
San Juan Y 2004 Adhere to Ministry of Freezing of
National law Treasury and political and






Santa Cruz Y 2004 Adhere to
National law
25.917
Santa Fe Y 2005 Adhere to Ministry of
National law Treasury and
25.917 Finance of the
Province
Santiago del Y 2004 Adhere to
Estero National law 
25.917
Tierra del Y 2006 Adhere to
Fuego National law 
25.917
Tucuman Y 2004 Adhere to 
National law 
25.917
Note: *Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad Fiscal (2010).
Fiscal rules f o r  subnational governments? 405
Procedural Coordi­ Fiscal Restric­ Personal Other Previous
rules nator transpar­ tions on sanction rule*
institution ency electoral (1999/





























T a b le  12  A .6  M e x ic a n  s ta te s  f i s c a l  ru les
By 2002 Limits A law Golden
formal to public but not rule













































Other limits on debt
Y
Y
2 0 0 2
2005 New debt limited
y Y 2005
to 1 0 % o f revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2 0 0 2 )






to 1 0 % of revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2005)
Y 2006 New debt a t the
Y Y 2005
end o f fiscal year 
must be lower that 
15% of the sum of 
‘participaciones’ 
and own-revenue 


















New debt limited 
to 1 0 % of revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2 0 0 2 )
New debt limited 
to 1 0 % of revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2005)
New debt limited 
to 1 0 % of revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2 0 0 2 ) 








Total debt service 
can not be higher 

















San Luis Potosí Y
Limits A law Golden


















Ex ante Transparency Transparency Other limits on debt
indication law and access law year





Y 2004 New debt limited 
to 15% of revenue 
approved in the 




Y 2 0 0 2
Y Y 2004
Y 2003 New debt limited 
to 2 0 % of revenue 
approved in the 
budget (2 0 0 2 )
Y 2 0 0 2 M aturity no

























Y 2004 New debt limits 
3% of total revenue 
approved in the 
budget and must 
be paid in the 
following fiscal year 
(2 0 0 2 )
2004 No limits for 
new debt but the 
maturity should be 
lower or equal to 5 
years (2 0 0 2 )
Y 2004
Y 2004 New debt a t the end 
of fiscal year must 
be lower that 15% 
of total revenue 
(transfers and own- 
revenue), 2 0 0 2
13. Intergovernmental reforms in 
Latin America, ‘Asian transplants’ 




In a number o f  countries in Latin America, and other parts o f  the develop­
ing world, there is pressure from  a wide spectrum o f  political parties that 
see the issue o f  social spending, especially for education and health care 
and social protection, as part o f  subnational responsibility, influenced to 
a large extent by the N orth  American m odel. But will such major reform  
work effectively and ensure higher living standards for all the people in all 
subnational jurisdictions? Are there other preconditions that m ust also be 
met? In this regard, international experience plays a valuable role in point­
ing out pitfalls and options for consideration.
Bilateral and m ultilateral agencies have been quite active in advising 
on decentralization processes. The m ultilateral banks have done so partly 
because o f  the belief that decentralized service provision can provide 
better for the poorer sections o f  society by utilizing the inform ation that 
may be available at the local level in tailoring the services to m atch the 
preferences o f  the population, and m aking access easier. Their views have 
evolved, as the difficulties with a decentralized approach have been better 
understood. Bilateral agencies have m ore explicit geo-political objectives, 
and som etim es these translate into trying to create societies and political 
structures that resemble their own in the expectation that this will lead to 
a congruence o f  interests. But quite often, the support has been given to 
those governm ents that tend to  agree with the donor countries, especially 
in times o f  crisis, and under these circumstances the support can often go 
to centralizers, as was seen in P inochet’s Chile, Suharto’s Indonesia, and 
Z ia’s and M usharraf s Pakistan.
In this section we exam ine developm ents in theoretical understanding
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in tergovernm ental reforms, ‘transplants' and international agencies 411
in addressing the steps that m ight be needed to  ensure that the objectives 
o f  the decentralization reforms are met in an efficient manner. Sections 2 
and 3 focus on som e recent exam ples from  Latin America and A sia, for 
both unitary and federal states. Section 4 assesses the role o f  international 
agencies with regard to decentralization, and Section 5 concludes.
Developments in Theory
The post-Second W orld W ar norm ative literature on fiscal decentraliza­
tion  has been m uch influenced by the experience o f  the U nited States, and 
the work inter alia o f  M usgrave (1959) and M ancur O lson (1969). This was 
based on  the presum ption that governm ents are benevolent, it reflected the 
views o f  M ontesquieu, and o f  Alexander H am ilton and James M adison  
in The Federalist Papers, that governm ent should be small, and the func­
tions should be separated with the center responsible for issues that affect 
all lower levels o f  governm ent, such as defense and m onetary policy. The 
presum ption has been, particularly on the part o f  som e bilateral and m ul­
tilateral agencies, that decentralization will lead to m ore efficient service 
delivery, higher growth and poverty reduction.
Experiences outside the U nited  States, particularly in the European  
U nion, and especially in developing countries, have led to a questioning o f  
the norm ative approach, spawning a surge in the ‘political econom y’, lit­
erature (see surveys in A hm ad and Brosio, 2006; Oates, 2008; Lockw ood, 
2009). This reflects an earlier debate, associated with D e Tocqueville and  
John Stuart Mill, which focused on the actual workings o f  governm ent and 
an evaluation o f  the pros and cons o f  ‘decentralized’ operations. The main  
difference is that the assum ption o f  ‘benevolent’ governm ent is dropped, 
and incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats becom e im portant, as do 
the role o f  institutions and inform ation flows. Bardhan and M ookherjee 
(2000),1 write about the possibility o f  ‘capture’ by vested interests. Besley 
and Case (1995) introduce the concept o f  ‘yardstick com petition’, in which  
voters evaluate the performance o f  their local governm ents in relation to  
the results achieved in neighboring jurisdictions. G iven increasing m obil­
ity and inform ation flow, the yardstick com petition idea has recently been 
extended to relate to countries, as citizens in one country exam ine what 
results are achieved in other countries with which they are quite familiar 
(Salm on, 2011).
The building blocks o f  both norm ative and political econom y traditions 
are similar -  spending and taxation assignm ents, design o f  transfers, debt 
m anagem ent and inform ation flows and instruments for im plem enta­
tion. H owever, the sequencing and mix o f  the instruments m ight vary, 
as we discuss below . The situation becom es a little m ore com plex when
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it com es to exam ination o f  the spending assignm ents. The U S  federalist 
tradition recom m ended a separation o f  powers, and this is indeed needed  
for increased accountability. The critique o f  the norm ative approaches, 
however, com es from  the European collaborative tradition that also lends 
itself to centralization or assum ption o f  powers by the center.
Decentralization Trends
The im petus to decentralize has differed in many cases. In Latin America  
the shift from one party or military rule has led to a resurgence o f  interest 
in decentralization as a m eans o f  consolidating political gains, whereas 
a large, one-party, unitary state such as China has actually been quite 
decentralized. A nd in Pakistan, the M usharraf governm ent tried to 
‘decentralize’ using the norm ative precepts with strong support from the 
developm ent agencies, but in political econom y terms the actions were 
calculated to bypass the provinces and the power o f  the political parties 
that tended to have a provincial focus. International agencies tended to 
support the norm ative approach to decentralization on the grounds that 
this would lead to better service delivery and poverty reduction -  but the 
evidence on this is at best m ixed.2 Table 13.1 lists the m ain traits o f  recent 
intergovernmental reforms in selected countries.
M ost Latin Am erican countries have experienced som e m ovem ent 
towards decentralization that has been m ore m arked on the spending  
than on the revenue side. W ith respect to the latter, the trend has been in 
the opposite direction, as countries have set up m ore or less centralized 
V A T systems, som etim es with the help o f  the international agencies, and 
particularly the IM F, often replacing a myriad o f  subnational taxes at the 
state and local levels.
On the spending side, despite the rhetoric, the approach particularly 
in the Latin Am erican countries has been one where there are m ixed and 
overlapping responsibilities. These partly reflect the centralized tendencies 
o f  the past, together with a paternalistic approach (including by donors) 
which do not trust the subnational governm ents to m ake the right choices 
for their citizens in their area o f  com petence (including education and 
social policy in general), or feel that the lower levels lack the capabilities 
to m anage their affairs effectively. In m any cases, these concerns are prob­
ably quite valid, and we shall discuss the experiences o f  som e federal and 
unitary countries, and the approaches taken by som e o f  the donors in this 
regard.
It is hard to ascribe the trends relating to decentralization to interna­
tional agencies, particularly in the federal countries o f  Latin Am erica, 
M exico, Brazil and Argentina, and in the unitary states, particularly
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T a b le  1 3 .1  M a in  t r a i ts  o f  re c e n t in te r g o v e rn m e n ta l re fo rm s  in s e le c te d
co u n tr ie s
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VAT administration by center 
on behalf o f the states, reforms 
introduced in early 2000s 
Transformed from unitary to federal 
state
Powers of municipalities have been 
considerably increased. Election 
of governors of departments, 
some demanding substantial but 
asymmetrical powers -  associated 
with natural resources 
National reform and coordination of 
VAT is an urgent priority, although 
proposals for reform since the late 
1990s have not been acted on 
Asymmetric federation (special 
treatment for Quebec) 
Recentralization of taxing power 
(1994)
Extensive devolution of resources to 
provinces (departments) movement 
towards a quasi-federation 
Recentralization of higher education 
and health since 2006
Regulatory, fiscal and political 
decentralization initiated 
Reforms to the federal structure 
initiated in a wide-ranging set of 
issues, but little change was effected 
as a result of two commissions 
Extensive decentralization of 
spending powers to district-level 
administrations after the fall of the 
Suharto administration, accompanied 
by a new revenue-sharing arrangement
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constitution 
Fiscal and regulatory 
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with devolution to states o f basic 
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(1996), although revenues have 
remained centralized since the early 
1980s
Déconcentration to districts in the 
early 2000s by M usharraf 
Overlapping responsibilities on the 
spending side unwound in 2010 
with the 18th Amendment to the 
Constitution -  most spending powers 
fully assigned to province. Relatively 
little subnational reliance on own- 
source revenues
Election of governors of regions -  
sharing of natural resource revenues. 
Overlapping responsibilities with 
relatively limited spending or revenue 
devolution
Political and fiscal decentralization 
with emphasis on the local level 
Devolution of extensive 
responsibilities for education and 
health to provinces
Transition toward a federal system
Equalization transfers from 
federation to cantons 
Introduction of regional government 
in Scotland and Wales
Source: Adapted from Ahmad and Brosio (2009).
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Colom bia, in which fairly pathbreaking work in the 1980s led to what can 
only be described as ‘inter-country’ yardstick com petition (see Besley and 
Case, 1995; Salm on, 2011). There was a rush by individual countries to  
copy this experience, in m any cases egged on  by the bilateral and m ultilat­
eral agencies, which m ay or m ay not have had great influence in particular 
cases.
In m ost cases, the advice given has been consistent with the ‘traditional’ 
or norm ative approaches to decentralization -  which provides advice on 
specific com ponents and has a particular sequencing in mind: decide first 
on the spending assignm ents, and the financing follows; the m ix between  
the taxes and transfers depends on  adm inistrative ease; attention needs 
to be paid to m acroeconom ic concerns; and debt m anagem ent can cause 
problem s and m ust be addressed through subnational fiscal rules or 
administrative m eans.
Over the past tw o decades, the literature on federalism and decen­
tralization has m ade considerable strides, with the greater em phasis on 
the positive or political econom y aspects o f  intergovernmental relations 
(see Ahm ad and Brosio, 2006), as opposed to the standard literature 
that permeated the subject as well as the policy advice from som e o f  
the international and bilateral donors. Indeed, the differences between  
the approaches lie rather in sequencing and design o f  im plem entation  
strategies, than in the instruments that are com m on to all approaches. 
In this chapter, we refer to the interactions by IM F staff in the early 
1990s with China, which was influential in appreciating the relevance o f  
the positive or political econom y approaches well before these becam e 
standard.3
W ith the unclear responsibilities for spending, poor inform ation flows, 
and absence o f  own-source revenues, there is often little incentive for the 
lower levels o f  governm ent to provide services effectively (Ahm ad et al., 
2008). Indeed, the more recent work done in the W orld Bank points to 
the pitfalls o f  ‘partial or incom plete decentralization’ (see Devarajan et 
al., 2009). The access to credit m arkets by subnational entities under these 
‘weak political econom y conditions’ and poor incentive structures has led 
to difficulties for local governm ents as well as full-blown m acroeconom ic 
crises in several cases, leading to countervailing pressures for fiscal rules, 
subnational debt lim its, and generation o f  standardized inform ation flows, 
as dictated by the norm ative theory. U nfortunately, the presence o f  all the 
instruments does n ot provide sufficient conditions that these will be used, 
as has becom e quite clear with the deliberate obfuscation in the European  
U nion, and the repeated subnational debt crises in countries such as 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (described below), despite the presence o f  
subnational debt lim its or other constraints.
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We try to identify the m ain trends regarding decentralization in the 
recent past in federal and unitary states in Latin A m erica, while focusing  
on the strategies, and specific policy tools, and the interrelationships with  
the international agencies. W e shall argue that this has been an interac­
tive process, with both countries and international agencies learning from  
experiences and developm ents in m ethod. This process m ay help the inter­
national agencies to better support what is in effect a com plex and difficult 
process o f  im proved governance not only in Latin Am erica, but also in 
other parts o f  the world.
2 LATIN AMERICA -  RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC 
RULE AND DECENTRALIZATION
There was an intensification o f  the dem ocratic process in the 1990s in 
Latin America. In som e cases, this involved the end o f  military or one- 
party rule (for exam ple, in the unitary states such as Colom bia, and 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Peru, as well as in the federal countries 
o f  the region -  Argentina, Brazil and M exico). W hile a distinction could  
usefully be m ade between the group o f  federal countries, and those with  
unitary constitutions, there has been a m ovem ent towards quasi-federal 
status with the establishm ent o f  elected intermediate tiers in m ost cases. 
This has led to a convergence o f  policy and approach in unitary and 
federal countries. W e retain the distinction for the purpose o f  this chapter 
-  as larger federal countries are less open to influence or ‘diktat’ from  the 
international agencies or donors.
A m ong the unitary states, we focus on C olom bia and Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of) -  and touch on Peru -  as these have all followed  
a similar route towards decentralization albeit at a different pace. Chile 
has not taken the fiscal decentralization route, in the m anner o f  its fellow  
Andean unitary states, but has focused on the efficiency o f  the spending  
process, with greater accountability o f  the actors involved in the spend­
ing chain. To som e extent this could be seen as an extrapolation o f  the 
‘Chicago doctrine’ o f  the Chilean econom ists. H ow ever, the international 
agencies have not been major players in this process, which m ay be 
described as introducing performance budgeting in a deconcentrated and 
unitary environm ent, and not ‘decentralization’ as in the other countries. 
Perhaps in a country with a relatively small and hom ogeneous population, 
this approach m ay be m ore effective and m ake more sense than the rush to 
decentralize that has gripped m any parts o f  the world.
Chile’s neighbor Peru, on the other hand, has oscillated between decen­
tralization in the 1980s, to the centralization under A lberto Fujimori.
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It is a large country with marked topological differences, and consider­
able inequality. A s the technical assistance evaluation during that period  
showed, lack o f  inform ation available to the center on local preferences 
and priorities m ade centrally administered social stabilization difficult, 
and exacerbated labor market fragm entation. Further, weaknesses in 
budget processes and oversight m echanism s, permitted members o f  the 
adm inistration to use public investment funds as a m eans to reelect 
Fujimori, or divert resources into their own pockets. Hence, the return to 
a phased-decentralized strategy during the last decade m ade a lot o f  sense 
in the Peruvian context.
The federal states o f  Latin Am erica, Argentina, Brazil and M exico, are 
large and im portant countries with distinguished econom ists o f  their own. 
They tend to be relatively im pervious to advice from  the international 




Colom bia was the one o f  the first Latin Am erican countries to explicitly 
m ove towards decentralization -  much influenced by N orth  Am erican  
exam ples. The restructuring o f  the intergovernmental fiscal system began  
in the early 1980s, with a com m ission headed by Richard Bird, and sub­
sequent proposals for im plem entation by the Wiesner Com m ission (see 
Bird, 1984; W iesner-Duran, 1992). The new constitution o f  1991 locked in 
the process and took  it further.
A s to be expected at the time, the emphasis was very much on the ‘nor­
m ative approach’. Spending responsibilities were devolved on the basis 
o f the benefit principle, in order to achieve outcom es responsive to local 
needs and achieve better targeting and efficiency. G iven that C olom bia had 
also im plem ented a V A T, the constitution put a floor on transfers from the 
center to the subnational governm ents in order to meet social spending 
needs. The Situado  Fiscal, introduced in 1968 for financing departmental 
spending on  health and education was further circumscribed by the 1991 
C onstitution, ensuring greater spending for health and education. The 
process o f  further specification o f  the use o f  the transfers was stipulated  
in Law 60, which required at least 60 percent o f  the Situado  to  be spent 
on education, 20 percent on health care, and the rem aining 20 percent on  
health care and/or education depending on the priorities o f  the entities in 
charge o f  these services. For the m unicipalities, a general-purpose transfer 
to m unicipalities (Law 33 o f  1968) was effectively replaced by earmarked  
transfers in 1991.
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W hile the process in C olom bia was clearly ‘hom e grow n’, international 
agencies were brought in on a selective basis -  with work on spending 
assignm ents coordinated with E C L A C /G IZ (the E conom ic C om m ission  
for Latin Am erica and the Caribbean and the Germ an Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusam menarbeit), and m unicipal capacity building  
with the assistance o f  the W orld Bank. C onsultations were held with  
the IM F on revenue assignm ents, transfer design and subnational debt 
m anagement.
A s pointed out in a ‘political econom y perspective’ by the 1994 IM F  
assessm ent (Ahm ad et al., 1995b), the functional ‘earm arking’ is a char­
acteristic o f  centralized states, and runs counter to the basic precepts o f  
decentralized accountability. Thus, key decisions continue to be m ade at 
the central level by the com petent authorities, and im plem ented by local 
agencies, alm ost as ‘agents’ o f  the center. The resort to earmarking is 
often defended on the grounds o f  accountability problem s, as the central 
governm ent (or donors, see below) is not sure that public m onies will be 
used for ‘appropriate’ purposes. However, the earm arking does not ensure 
that resources will actually be spent according to the centrally determined  
objective, especially in cases where im plem entation is decentralized and 
there is an absence o f  proper inform ation flows and budgetary procedures 
are inadequate to ensure effective m onitoring o f  outcom es or judging  
policy priorities correctly. Ahm ad et al. (ibid.) insisted that decentralized  
accountability could  not be ensured w ithout voters’ scrutiny o f  spending, 
with incentives generated by ow n taxes o f  the local governm ents and the 
‘untied’ transfers. (For a generalization see A m brosiano and Bordignon, 
2006). W ithout the effective scrutiny o f  the local electorate, arbitrari­
ness and corruption are possible -  termed ‘capture’ by Bardhan and 
M ookherjee (2000), as is clientelism.
Indeed, in C olom bia, even the norm ative approach ran into difficulties 
as the devolution o f  spending was m eant to accom pany the increasing 
transfers to m unicipalities and departments on account o f  decentral­
ized education and health care. However, the ‘responsibility for hiring 
and firing teachers and health-care workers remained with the center 
-  attempts to m ove these functions to m unicipalities were thwarted by 
powerful unions’ (Fedelino and Ter-M inassian, 2010, p. 12). This led to 
increasing budgetary pressures on the central governm ent, and increased  
resources for the local governm ents, which were leveraged to increase bor­
rowing for all sorts o f  spending (Sánchez and Gutiérrez, 1995). The spiral 
o f  local debt was not intended, and the governm ent then introduced a local 
debt m anagem ent and borrowing law (in the m id-1990s), as a precursor to 
fiscal responsibility legislation -  the latter also becam e very fashionable 
across Latin Am erica, especially follow ing the Brazilian experience. But
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the question remains whether these norm ative prescriptions work w ithout 
a firmer underpinning o f  the political econom y and incentives facing deci­
sion makers at all levels o f  governm ent. The experiences o f  Latin America, 
and now  the E U , suggest that caution m ight be appropriate in expecting  
fiscal responsibility laws to function.
The issue o f  sharing natural resources is intrinsically a political econom y  
problem . On the one hand, the national governm ent is better able to  
‘hedge’ against unfavorable price m ovem ents, and to engage in m acroeco­
nom ic stabilization and redistribution -  the typical norm ative functions o f  
the central governm ent. On the other hand, natural resource-producing  
regions (especially those with petroleum  and gas resources) tend to have 
sparsely populated areas that are poorer than the m ore progressive urban 
areas. This leads to dem ands for autonom y or m ore effective alloca­
tion o f  the revenues to develop these areas.4 Regardless o f  norm ative 
and m acroeconom ic considerations, the political econom y considera­
tions dom inate. The C olom bian arrangements allowed for the producing 
regions to take a large share o f  the natural resources, although the more 
recent reforms give a larger share to non-producing regions -  to lessen  
the ‘resource’ gaps, and also create a national consensus. A s these n on ­
producing regions m ay also be quite poor, the center can certainly play a 
role in the ‘redistribution’ process.
C olom bia is interesting, as it initiated a process o f  what can only be 
termed ‘international yardstick-com petition’ (Salm on, 2011), as a number 
o f  other unitary states began to copy the design and im plem entation  
strategy, including the drawbacks -  but this is not surprising as the advi­
sors remained the sam e in m ost cases, and with perhaps greater influence 
as we shall see. This was particularly marked in the Andean countries, 
especially Ecuador and Bolivia (Plurinational State of), and in Peru after 
the fall o f  the Fujim ori adm inistration, again with the support o f  the same 
international and bilateral agencies, the G IZ on spending design, together 
with the W orld Bank, the Inter-American D evelopm ent Bank (ID B) and 
ECLAC.
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
In Bolivia (Plurinational State of) in the 1990s, decentralization was held  
as an integral part o f  enhancing service delivery for the poor as part o f  
the process o f  recovering from  an econom ic crisis. The decentralization  
was strongly supported by bilateral donors, as well as the international 
agencies (ID B, GIZ, the W orld Bank as well as the IM F). The influence 
o f  donors and international agencies in the Bolivian case has been quite 
marked.
The G IZ and U S A ID  were deeply involved with the decentralization
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process, including the political aspects, and the overlapping spending 
responsibilities resembled those in Germany (that recent com m issions have 
tried unsuccessfully to reform). The ID B  and the W orld Bank supported  
the unbundling o f  these responsibilities, and the developm ent o f  the gov­
ernment financial m anagem ent inform ation system (G FM IS), or SIG M A . 
The broad assignm ents situation as o f  2004 is described in Table 13.2.
In 1997, the onset o f  subnational indebtedness prom pted action by the 
IM F, and debt lim its were im posed on m unicipalities,5 reflecting the prec­
edent from Colom bia, and IM F  technical assistance. H ow ever, the m eas­
ures failed to get to grips with the underlying political econom y difficulties, 
which generate the im balances in the first place, and the games played  
between different levels o f  government. A nother IM F m ission in 1998 was 
launched to stem the debt difficulties o f  subnational governm ents (Pérez 
et al., 1998). This infrastructure did not prevent the recurrence o f  subna­
tional debt difficulties follow ing the period o f  econom ic and political crisis 
(1999-2002).
D ebt problem s continued, given the difficulty in tracking subnational 
operations, and agreements had to be reached between the central and 
concerned local governm ents to ensure an orderly adjustm ent -  including 
changing the debt com position  (supported by C A F (D evelopm ent Bank 
o f  Latin Am erica) and the W orld Bank). A nother IM F  m ission in 2001 
focused on debt m anagem ent issues (M anoel et al., 2001). The m ission  
recomm ended that there should be a no-bailout provision and that there 
should be acceleration o f  the governm ent financial inform ation system to 
track spending, SIG M A , being rolled out by the ID B  and the W orld Bank.
By 2001, under the enhanced HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) 
arrangement, donors decided that the decentralization process was pro­
ceeding sufficiently well for the debt relief to be directed to m unicipal gov ­
ernments for health-care, education and infrastructure spending, based on  
selective evidence (Faguet, 2004). There was also sufficient reliance on the 
efficacy o f  the SIG M A  being developed to be able to effectively track the 
subnational spending, or so it was believed.
By 2004, yet another IM F m ission (Ahm ad et al., 1994c) this time taking 
a political econom y perspective, found that there were significant deficien­
cies in the design o f  the decentralization process -  particularly governing 
the allocation o f  H IPC-II funds to m unicipalities. W hile this pattern was 
very much in the tradition o f  the overlapping responsibilities and ‘ear­
m arked’ transfers, it provided funds in areas where the local governm ents 
had little or no responsibility -  particularly education and health care, as 
the departments hired the staff that were paid for directly from the central 
budget -  again reminiscent o f  C olom bia. The local governm ents were not 
particularly inclined to use funds for these purposes, and with limited
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Table 13.2 Bolivian spending assignments circa 2004
Sectors Central
governm ent


























































maintenance of school 










centers and general 
hospitals and provision 




Projects of local interest
422 D ecentralization  and reform  in Latin A m erica
T a b le  1 3 .2  ( c o n t in u e d )
Sectors Central D epartm ents M unicipal





National Projects of Projects of local
programs, norms regional interest
and technical interest
assistance
National Projects of Projects of local
programs, norms regional interest
and technical interest
assistance
National Projects of Projects of local
programs, norms regional interest
interest
Source: IM F, Technical assistance reports 2004.
own-source revenues, there were no incentives to do so efficiently. Plus, the 
transfer system  was not particularly ‘equalizing’, and the attempt to pacify 
the natural resource-producing regions through hydrocarbon revenue 
sharing was not especially effective. M oreover, the SIG M A  inform ation  
system had been poorly designed. Even if  it had been properly designed, it 
had little chance o f  providing the discipline that was m issing in the existing  
institutional framework.
A  careful empirical analysis by a Bolivian econom ist found, using suc­
cessive household-level surveys, that the use o f  the H IPC  funds by local 
governm ents had virtually no correlation with im provem ents in living 
standards (Inchauste, 2009). Even when considering infrastructure, which  
is where m uch o f  the spending took  place, there was no strong evidence 
that access to infrastructure improved significantly.
The issue with natural resources in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) is 
that the petroleum  resources are generated in regions that are ethnically  
distinct from  the m ajority indigenous population o f  the altiplano, which  
tend to be am ong the poorest. This tends to fan separatist tendencies in 
the producing regions (as was the case in Biafra in N igeria, and Aceh in 
Indonesia). There is a trade-off between m acroeconom ic m anagem ent or 
the redistributive functions o f  the central governm ent, and the political 
econom y consideration o f  keeping the country together. It is natural that 
the latter will dom inate, and the m acroeconom ic and redistributive func­
tions will need to be adapted effectively in order to accom m odate it -  to
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som e extent this has been true o f  Indonesia as well as Iraq. In Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of), in late 2007, hydrocarbon tax transfers to regions 
were cut by 60 percent, in a recentralization m ove designed to facilitate 
‘redistribution’ transfers to poorer municipalities. It was also an attempt 
to ‘reassert’ control over the regions with separatist tendencies (Fedelino  
and Ter-M inassian, 2010). Such a m ove w ould be inconceivable in 
m odern-day Iraq or Indonesia, and w ould certainly fan rather than reduce 
secessionist tendencies in these countries -  showing that there m ay not be 
a unique solution to the sharing o f  natural resource revenues, and much  
depends on the specific context, which m ay change over time.
Overall, despite the lim ited success to date with the decentralization  
in Bolivia (Plurinational State of), an attem pt has been m ade to seek a 
way to m ake it work better in a heterogeneous country, giving voice to  
the disadvantaged people w ho saw little benefit during extended periods 
o f  centralized rule. A s shown by Faguet (2004), clearly the possibility  
o f  im provem ents in living standards has been dem onstrated, even if  this 
cannot be generalized. Thus, going back to centralized rule is not a politi­
cal econom y option , and the focus, for instance o f  the 2004 IM F m ission, 
was to examine the m issing elem ents to m ake the process work better, 
particularly the own-source revenues at lower levels to enhance incentives 
for better accountability, and inform ation flows that bolster the process.
Peru
A s argued in A hm ad and García-Escribano (2011), Peru provides a labo­
ratory for exam ining the effectiveness o f  decentralization and centralized  
rule, as successive adm inistrations have oscillated between the extremes. 
M ayors were popularly elected prior to the period o f  military rule between  
1968 and 1979. The subsequent period o f  extreme centralization was char­
acterized by increasing disparities between the coast (particularly Lima) 
and the poorer regions o f  the sierra and the selva. The 1979 constitutional 
reforms reinstated m unicipalities. H owever, the attempts to decentralize 
functions during the first Garcia period in the 1980s were hampered by 
weak administrative and econom ic m anagem ent, and plagued by exten­
sive rent-seeking and diversion o f  resources at all levels o f  governm ent. 
Com bined with the chaos associated with the m acroeconom ic crisis and 
hyperinflation, there was little evidence o f  a reduction in regional dis­
parities or poverty. In contrast, the stabilization o f  Fujim ori cam e with 
considerable centralization, buttressed by the introduction o f  a V A T, with 
a central tax adm inistration. As an adjunct to the econom ic stabilization, 
the early Fujimori period was characterized by an attempt to also provide 
for social stabilization, seen as an essential elem ent in the fight against the 
Shining Path (Sendero ) guerrillas.
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IM F technical assistance at this tim e, other than for the establishm ent 
o f  S U N  A T (Superintendencia N acional de A duanas y de A dm inistración  
Tributaria) and the design o f  the VAT, focused on  the social program  
im plem entation. A  m ission in 1992 highlighted the weaknesses o f  trying 
to provide social assistance in a top-dow n manner w ithout the m eans o f  
identifying local preferences, and in a situation where deconcentrated  
local governm ents were relatively weak, and lacked ow n-source rev­
enues, or clearly defined functions. Centrally determined and financed  
program s, such as F O N C O D E S ,6 were often the m ajor source o f  activi­
ties for local governm ents. W hile these were, in principle, designed to  
reflect local priorities, there were few m echanism s to coordinate at the 
local or central levels, assess trade-offs and establish priority spending. 
The center lacked the full inform ation to m ake allocations, and there 
often was a lack o f  clarity between the spending by specialized agencies 
such as F O N C O D E S and the operations o f  line m inistries and local 
adm inistrations.
The war on the Shining Path terrorists had a negative im pact on 
activity levels, particularly in the sierra  and the selva, exacerbating the 
labor-market d istortions, and the accelerated m igration o f  the male 
w orking-age population  towards the coast and Lima. This had significant 
im plications for the types o f  interventions needed for the vulnerable in 
the sierra  and the selva  (largely fem ale-headed households, the elderly 
and children), and the sort o f  investm ent-based incom e support that was 
on offer. Indeed, there were several exam ples o f  ‘bridges in the m iddle o f  
nowhere w ithout connecting roads at either end, built by contractors from  
Lima with relatively few linkages with the local labour m arket’.7 The 1994 
m issions warned that the criteria for the allocation o f  funds, together with  
weak m onitoring m echanism s, m eant that the really poor w ould likely  
n ot benefit, and that the local governm ents w ould have an incentive to  
m aintain their rankings in the poverty map (m apa de pobreza) in order to  
continue to receive investm ent funds.8 The strong recom m endation m ade 
by the 1994 m issions to establish a transparent system  to m onitor spend­
ing, involving a Treasury Single A ccount (TSA), and a governm ent finan­
cial inform ation m anagem ent system. The Fujim ori adm inistration paid  
lip-service but despite the significant technical assistance launched by the 
ID B  and the IM F  (using the Brazilian m odel and Brazilian consultants) 
as part o f  the follow -up, the measures were effectively abandoned within a 
few years with n o  results. W ith hindsight, it is clear that greater transpar­
ency was not high on  the preference function o f  the adm inistration -  but 
this is not always apparent to agencies keen to deliver technical assistance.
Regrettably, given the weak m onitoring m echanism s, these investm ent- 
based transfers were misappropriated in the latter h alf o f  the Fujimori
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regime towards his reelection cam paign, and in outright fraud. This was 
subsequently illustrated in the trials o f  Fujim ori’s advisor, M ontesinos.
The T oledo adm inistration in 2002 revived the decentralization process. 
The second García adm inistration in 2006 also decided to m ove forward  
this decentralization process. There was a political econom y recognition  
that a dispersal o f  power am ong regional and local governm ents provides 
insurance against a centralized abuse o f  power and resources, as experi­
enced during the Fujim ori years. Ahm ad and Garcia-Escribano (2011), 
based on  insights from  an IM F m ission in 2005 (Ahm ad et al., 2005) 
using the political econom y perspective, suggested that considerable work  
is needed to develop a coordinated approach to spending and revenue 
assignm ents to ensure better governance and accountability at all levels 
-  given the political econom y constraints in Peru. This also entails an 
im provem ent in inform ation flows, and a redesign o f  transfer m echanism s 
that ‘equalize capabilities’ w ithout creating disincentives.
A s in the C olom bian (and Indonesian) context, decisions on sharing 
with regard to natural resource canons in Peru preceded the devolution  
o f  spending or other own-source revenue-raising powers, pa ri passu  creat­
ing issues relating to  b oth  m acroeconom ic stabilization and interregional 
redistribution. But perhaps this is the price to be paid in terms o f  decen­
tralizing powers and functions in a m ulti-ethnic and diverse country.
Federal Countries
The return to dem ocratic and multiparty rule in the federal countries was 
com plicated by the m ultilevel governm ent structures, especially in Brazil. 
Despite m any difficulties and challenges (faced in com m on with Argentina  
and M exico, including the international econom ic crises, as well as the 
periodic difficulties with subnational debt) the Brazilians im plem ented  
essential institutional reforms, including robust inform ation m anage­
ment systems, that have stood them in good  stead over the years, includ­
ing with the im plem entation o f  the fiscal stabilization pacts. These have 
been harder to replicate in Argentina, M exico or Peru, or Russia for that 
matter, w ith the consequence that these countries remain m uch weaker 
than Brazil in m anaging crises involving subnational governments.
A s in the unitary states, the centralizing effects o f  im plem enting a 
V A T (the Brazilian V A T  is an exception9) have been accom panied by 
the suppression o f  subnational own taxes. This goes against the spirit o f  
the dem ocratization reforms, and has been partially offset by an effort to 
establish greater spending autonom y by lower levels o f  governm ent. But 
without major ow n-source revenues at the margin, this has tended to be 
accom panied by rather less than ideal accountability, laying the seeds
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for future subnational crises. This process is com plicated with the legacy 
systems o f extensive earmarking, and overriding o f  local preferences, espe­
cially though not exclusively in Brazil.
Ironically, the centralizing effect o f  the conditional cash transfers to  
households or individuals, especially the M exican Oportunidad.es and the 
Brazilian Bolsa Familia, has gone in the opposite direction. The condi­
tional cash transfers have been strongly supported by the W orld Bank  
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), which also has been one o f  the agencies 
m ost in favor o f  decentralization -  especially in terms o f  the effective­
ness o f  service delivery as well as claims that it m ight reduce corruption  
(see Gurgur and Shah, 2002). It appears that the overlapping system  o f  
responsibilities has helped in facilitating the greater central role in social 
protection, and a case could be m ade to justify centralization o f  this func­
tion. But, as the actions relating to conditional cash transfers involve both  
primary health care and education, the case becom es quite com plex. That 
said, the role o f  the international agencies in influencing policy in the large 
federal countries in Latin Am erica, or India, m ust be open to question.10
We shall now  exam ine the contrasting cases o f  federal countries, Brazil 
and M exico.
Brazil
A s in Peru, Brazil has oscillated between centralization and decentraliza­
tion over time. H owever, the 1988 C onstitution m oved the country firmly 
towards greater decentralization, with states and m unicipalities getting  
effective controls over major revenue bases and an increasing share o f  
centrally collected revenues, as well as greater controls over expenditure 
m anagem ent and access to credit, including through banks owned by 
the subnational governm ents. A ll this occurred within the typical Latin  
American context o f  overlapping spending responsibilities (A fonso and  
de M ello, 2002). These contributed to an inevitable financial and macr­
oeconom ic crisis that had to be dealt with in a coordinated manner. In this 
subsection we describe som e o f  the key elements that have ‘rescued’ and 
strengthened Brazilian federalism, although deep-seated problem s remain 
and need to be addressed within a ‘positive’ or ‘political econom y’ context.
The 1988 C onstitution introduced a m ultilevel V A T , with states having  
access to control over rates and base (including setting o f  exem ptions) o f  a 
broad-based high-yield V A T (Im posto  sobre a Circulagao de M ercadorias  
e Prestagdo de Servigos de Transporte In terestadual e Interm unicipal e de 
Comunicagao: ICM S), the federal V A T base was lim ited to industrial 
goods, and m unicipalities were assigned a sales tax on  m unicipal transport 
and property. This disjointed VA T assignm ent has been criticized for cre­
ating distortions, im peding interstate trade (see Tanzi, 2010), and opening
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up evasion (also know n as ‘invoice tourism ’). Proposals to m ove towards 
a Canadian-style dual V A T , am ong others, have been on the agenda for at 
least 10 years, but it has proved quite difficult to introduce a change that 
involves states that are controlled by different parties, m aking coordinated  
reforms difficult. H owever, the strength o f  the current arrangement is 
that subnational governm ents have control over a major tax base at the 
margin -  this m akes it feasible to im pose hard-budget constraints on the 
subnational governm ents, as no-bailout provisions then becom e credible.
A lthough a larger share o f  federal revenues was to be transferred 
to the subnational governm ents, this was largely earmarked, accentuat­
ing the overlapping rigidities in the Brazilian assignm ents. It also reduced  
the scope for the federal governm ent to m ake macro adjustm ents -  as the 
revenue effort needed for a specified level o f  adjustment increases p: opor- 
tionately (as it is not evident that the lower levels o f  governm ent vould  
agree to m ake the same level o f  adjustment as needed by the feder; tion). 
Because o f  the sharing arrangements, the federal governm ent has re ;orted 
to raising revenues that are not shared with lower levels -  such as p ayroll 
and turnover taxes that encourage the developm ent o f  inform al labor 
markets and negatively affect com petitiveness (A fonso and de M ello, 
2002). This pattern effectively replicates the M exican pattern o f  lin; ncing  
sources for an increasingly im portant federal conditional cash transfer 
program  (the Bolsa Familia, which is m odeled on the Oportun dades 
program  -  see below).
In addition to the control over own-revenues at the state level, the s :cond 
major structural advantage that Brazil has over other Latin American  
federations is that it has an effective m echanism  to m onitor spend ng at 
federal and subnational levels. This is through the G FM IS (SIA F1) that 
was introduced soon  after the constitutional change, along with an effec­
tive TSA. This tracking o f  spending, together with credible sanction > that 
are facilitated by own-source subnational revenues, has m ade it possi ble to  
address subnational debt problem s in a coordinated manner.
D espite the increasing share in federal revenues follow ing the new con ­
stitution, im balances at the subnational level appeared quickly, aid ;d no  
doubt by the unclear spending responsibilities. Captive lending by banks 
ow ned by state governm ents added to  the problem s, as m any subnai ional 
governm ents financed their deficits by borrowing from their state b inks, 
in a period o f  high inflation, in anticipation o f  federal bailouts. A lthough  
the states and m unicipal governm ents had a small operational surp us at 
the start o f  the decentralization process (0.7 percent o f  G D P  in 1991) con ­
sistently high deficits in the follow ing years led to a tripling o f  the stc ck o f  
subnational debt through the decade (to over 21 percent o f  G D P  by the 
late 1990s). Federal assum ption o f  the subnational debt was accom panied
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by the agreement leading to the Fiscal R esponsibility Law (FR L ), and  
restoration o f  hard-budget constraints at the subnational level. This 
also involved elim ination o f  borrowing from and privatization o f  state- 
ow ned banks, and strictly enforced restrictions on additional borrowing, 
including im position o f  ceilings for borrowing for investm ent (the ‘golden  
rule’) .11
The success o f  the F R L  in Brazil has led to a response by international 
agencies to replicate this in other countries, including in Latin Am erica, 
as well as in countries such as Pakistan and Nigeria. In the absence o f  the 
basic preconditions, including subnational own-source revenues, and full 
inform ation flows on  subnational operations, the success o f  Brazil has not 
been so easily replicated, as seen in the Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and 
Pakistan contexts.
International agencies have tried to replicate som e Brazilian (and  
M exican, see below ) success stories in the area o f  socia l protection  -  
particularly con d itional cash transfers. In the post-decentralized world, 
prosperous states b locked federal spending in poorer states for fear o f  
losing federal funds. This shifted the focus to p oor areas w ithin states, 
so that poor areas in rich states w ould  benefit from  greater financing  
than poorer areas in p oor states, accentuating overall inequalities. 
H ow ever, given the overlapping responsibilities on  the spending side, 
the federal governm ent was able to enter into jo int ventures in the social 
area, including preventive health care, primary and secondary educa­
tion  and incom e support. Since 2003, during the period o f  the Lula  
adm inistration, the federal and subnational in itiatives have been rolled  
in to the B olsa  F am ilia .12 In effect, overlapping and ineffective social 
benefit program s at the subnational level have been rolled into a federal 
program . W hile this addresses the issue o f  uniform ity o f  treatm ent 
across the country -  a deficiency pointed out by A fon so  and de M ello  
(ibid.) it com es at the cost o f  a recentralization effort in areas o f  basic 
subnational com petence and responsibility, as it effectively supplanted  
state- or local-level program s.
W hile Brazil appropriately learnt from the M exican exam ple with 
Oportunidades, it is not clear that this was specifically recom m ended by 
the international agencies (although both the W orld Bank and the IM F  
are now instrumental in spreading the gospel concerning O portunidades- 
type conditional cash transfers).13 The critique o f  the effective financing  
arrangements for the O portunidades program (see below ) will also apply 
to the Bolsa Familia. A  reform o f  the financing arrangement remains 
contingent on political econom y constraints, will involve the V A T and 
revenue-sharing arrangements, and also the redesign o f  equalization and 
earmarked transfers.
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Mexico
In the M exican context, the underpinnings o f  the decentralization re forms 
were not as strong as in Brazil. This involved centralization on  the re renue 
side in the early 1980s involving VAT, and inadequate inform ation  
systems to m onitor and evaluate spending at the federal and subna :ional 
levels. The subnational debt crises in M exico also affected macroeco; lomic 
stability, as in Brazil, but did not lead to  the same level o f  institu ional 
reforms as in the Brazilian case.
The M exican introduction in the early 1980s o f  VA T led to the rem oval 
o f  30 federal excises and turnover taxes as well as 300+ state and local 
taxes (G il-D iaz, 1987). A s in Argentina and Brazil, the tax reforms 
were accom panied by the introduction o f  fairly com plicated and n on ­
transparent revenue-sharing m echanism s. The loss o f  effective controls 
over revenues at the margin from  the states was not appreciated in terms 
o f policy or theory, and remains problem atic in terms o f  the accountability  
o f  subnational governm ents. G il-D iaz noted early on that the form ula for 
sharing should be revised so that it ‘does not pit states against each other, 
the form ula m ust be one that does not generate a pie that m ust be divided  
so that som ebody’s gain is som eone else’s loss’ (p. 348). H owever, the 
greater reliance on shared revenues had the effect o f  ‘sharing up a pie’ and  
the ensuing interstate conflict began to be reflected alm ost im m ediately in 
a tussle over relative shares. G il-D iaz also noted the reduced incentives 
for state governm ents to  m aintain efficient tax adm inistrations. In a sense, 
although the political econom y literature o f  fiscal federalism had not 
gained much currency, policy makers were often quite aware o f  the politi­
cal econom y consequences o f  their actions.
The M exican V A T was also problem atic in its inadequate revenue- 
raising aspect, as it tried to m eet distributional objectives through a series 
o f  exem ptions and zero ratings, as well as lower rates for border regions 
(som e which occurred several hundred miles away from any border). This 
im pacted on its efficiency, resulting in one o f  the worst V ATs in Latin 
America. However, when G il-D iaz becam e Secretary o f  H acienda in the 
late 1990s (in the F ox  adm inistration), he was unable to reform the VAT, 
given the interlocking set o f  vested interests in the exem ptions and zero 
ratings, as well as those resulting from  the design o f  the revenue-sharing 
system. A t this stage, it becam e clear that the V A T reform is effectively an 
exercise in intergovernmental political econom y, especially as one-party  
PR I-dom inated rule was replaced by a m ultiparty arrangement with PRI 
(Partido R evolucionario Institucional) in opposition  and different parties 
controlling different states.
In the M exican context, overlapping responsibilities further obfus­
cated responsibilities, and this was exacerbated by the econom ic crisis
430 D ecentralization  and reform  in L atin  A m erica
in the m id-1990s, where borrowing by state investm ent projects, w ithout 
federal guarantees, led to a worsening o f  a banking crisis, precipitating the 
need for a federal bailout. Subnational debt limits were im posed, but the 
absence o f  a standardized budgeting and reporting fram ework at all levels 
o f  governm ent remains a major constraint.
Institutional arrangements remain weak. In 1996, M exico tried to  
introduce a Brazilian-style G FM IS (governm ent financial m anagem ent 
inform ation system) -  SIA F -  for which Brazilian experts were engaged  
through the IM F. The design also called for a TSA. By 2001, the system  
had failed, and even to this day after considerable additional support from  
the IM F and the W orld Bank, a proper G FM IS has not been im plem ented  
at the federal level. A  jo int IM F- Secretaría de H acienda y  Crédito Público  
(SHCP) report (with W orld Bank participation) in 2007 (Ahm ad et al., 
2007b) called for standardized reporting and inform ation flows (as well 
as a clarification o f  spending responsibilities and greater own-source rev­
enues). This was predicated on a com pletion o f  the reforms within SHCP  
and the Treasury, including a com m on budget classification to be used by 
all agencies o f  the SH C P (M inistry o f  Finance and Public Credit: M O F) 
and the federal governm ent, before attem pting to persuade states and 
local governm ents to adopt the same standards. D espite yet another tech­
nical assistance m ission later in 2007 (Ahm ad et al., 2007a), attem pts to 
com plete the 1996 reforms appear to have been abandoned and along with 
this the likelihood o f  achieving the standardization o f  inform ation flows 
and controls needed for effective m anagem ent (in the Brazilian m ode). It 
is clear that there is significant opposition to the greater clarity that com es 
about with the Brazilian expenditure m anagem ent m odel, and successive 
M exican finance ministers since 1996 have tried but failed to im plem ent 
this basic reform.
Ahm ad et al. (2007b) had stressed the im portance o f  political econom y  
considerations in suggesting greater clarity on the spending assignm ents, 
as well as tangible own-source revenue handle for the states. Follow ing  
the Chinese exam ple, they stressed that any tax reform that im pacted  
on state transfers would have to indem nify the states from  losses, and  
provide them with a share in the benefits to ensure political support for the 
reforms. A  proposal for a dual V AT, or an IR A P style (Im posta  Regionale  
sulle A ttiv ità  Produttive-, R egional tax on Productive Activities) state tax 
handle, was to have been accom panied by a reform o f  the revenue sharing 
and sim plification o f  the transfer system. However, the governm ent was 
m ore interested in bolstering federal revenues, and used the principle o f  
joint tax and transfer reforms to introduce a federal Im puesto  Em presarial 
a Tasa Unica (IET U), at the same time sim plifying and adjusting federal 
revenue shares to ensure that no state lost revenues from the reform.
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This subnational stop-loss provision was critical in the Chinese 1994 tax 
reforms, and was effectively copied by M exico in 2007. H owever, the 
subnational tax handles and intergovernmental reforms agenda remain  
substantially unaddressed.
A n  effective cash transfer system, Oportunidades (initially called 
Progresa) was introduced to replace tortilla and gas subsidies. It is a federal 
program  linked to nutritional, educational and health-care outcom es, has 
been reportedly very successful (Coady and Parker, 2002), and has been  
the basis for the W orld Bank’s strong advocacy o f  such program s in Latin  
Am erica and elsewhere (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). H owever, the financ­
ing o f  this program  by a distorting payroll tax in an econom y rife with 
evasion and avoidance, and the presence o f  inform al labor markets have 
led to significant disincentive effects that m ight hamper growth potential 
(see Levy, 2008). The m agnitude o f  the benefit has risen over time, as suc­
cessive ministers have sought to put com pensatory measures for all sorts 
o f interventions on the shoulders o f  this scheme, increasing the disincen­
tives associated with the ‘kink’ as the benefit is withdrawn. Finally, state 
governm ents are aggrieved as they see this program  as cutting across their 
areas o f  responsibility in education and health care -  further obfuscating  
the overlapping and murky spending responsibilities. Thus, there are a 
number o f  contradictions that need to  be addressed in order to  ensure that 
the program continues to provide effective social assistance in a sustain­
able manner that does not distort incentives and limit growth potential. 
The strength o f  the O portunidades approach is the categorical targeting 
that is based on use o f  clinics or schools.
R eplication o f  this type o f  conditional cash transfer in other institu­
tional contexts, particularly based on asset tests (as in Pakistan), opens 
up political econom y difficulties that could be addressed with a more 
judicious design and linkage with financing instruments that enhance 
accountability.
3 SOME ASIAN CONTRASTS
Attem pts to ‘transplant’ the norm ative Latin Am erican m odels to the 
A sian context have had limited success. In the Pakistan case, described 
below , the form  o f  transplant o f  decentralization, during the early years 
o f  the M usharraf adm inistration was successful, but m anipulated by the 
administration to bypass the political process and ‘m anage the process’ 
centrally. The Chinese adm inistration, on the other hand, devised a unique 
solution that clearly reflected their political econom y considerations. We 
consider both cases here.
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Pakistan
In the 1960s, the Pakistan adm inistration o f  Field M arshal Ayub Khan  
had experimented with a system o f  basic dem ocracies -  setting up an 
electoral college at the local level that also formed the basis o f  develop­
ment activities in their regions. This effort at political ‘deconcentration’, 
or m anaged dem ocracy was abandoned after country-wide protests forced  
the resignation o f  K han as President. The system was form ally abolished  
under the 1973 C onstitution which restored the rights and functions o f  
the provinces, which had been the m ain subnational unit o f  governance 
under the 1935 Governm ent o f  India Act, and had form ed the basis for the 
constitutions in both India and Pakistan after independence.
The M usharraf adm inistration also prom oted a form  o f so-called  
‘decentralization’ in the p ost-9 /11 period. W hile this was ostensibly a 
m echanism  to get services closer to the people, and elected local officials, 
overlapping responsibilities were not addressed. W hile the process was 
clearly an attem pt to bypass the established political parties and the 
power centers in the provinces, the bilateral donors and m ultilateral banks 
rushed to support the process, along with the institutional reforms o f  the 
Federal Bureau o f  Revenue, and the governm ent financial inform ation  
systems (G FM ISs) at all levels o f  governm ent. Each o f  these reforms had 
failed, or was in significant difficulty, by the time that M usharraf was 
ousted from  power in 2008. The president captured the ‘decentralization’ 
process, facilitated by the unclear responsibilities, lack o f  own-source 
financing and opaque inform ation on governm ent operations.
The post-M usharraf parliam ent pushed through a reform  o f the consti­
tution, with the 18th Am endm ent during 2010. This elim inated the con­
current lists o f  the constitution, giving provinces sole powers in a number 
o f  areas, including health and education. This reform was preceded by the 
award o f  the N ational Finance Com m ission which increased the provin­
cial share in federally collected revenues, predicated on  an increase in the 
tax/G D P ratio given a proposed reform o f  the G ST (goods and services 
tax) and other taxes. The 18th A m endm ent reiterated the right o f  the prov­
inces to administer the G ST on services, if  they so desired -  the revenues 
belong to the provinces in any case. A n inadequate financing framework  
for the devolved spending remains a problem  in the Pakistan context. 
N ew ly em powered provinces consider ‘adm inistration o f  revenues’ as the 
hallmark o f  autonom y -  whereas the m echanism s at hand (particularly the 
split operations o f  the G ST on services) are alm ost im possible to adm in­
ister at the subnational level and could lead to interprovincial tax wars.
A nother M exican transplant in Pakistan is the local variant o f  the con ­
ditional cash transfer, Oportunidades. Again, this is a centrally operated
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program , with support from  the m ultilateral banks and som e bilateral 
donors, but based on a com plex asset test rather than the simpler cat­
egorical criteria that are also possible. This com plexity again opens up the 
arena for ‘capture’ and m anipulation.
Transplanting m odels, w ithout adequate attention to institutional and 
political differences m ay lead to unforeseen consequences.
China
In the early 1990s Chinese context o f  murky spending responsibilities (a 
lot o f  social spending was performed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
belonging to different levels o f  government) in a legal unitary state, with  
no central tax collection  other than custom s, the center had no ability 
to administer taxation. The Chinese econom ic reforms o f  the 1980s had  
m oved from a system o f  100 percent profits taxation o f  largely SOEs (col­
lected by local governm ents on behalf o f  the center) to a m ore m oderate 
level. However, this had the consequence that the tax-to-G D P ratio fell 
from  m ore than 22 percent to about 12 percent by 1993, and m ore alarm ­
ingly, the central governm ent share o f  collections fell from just under 60 
percent in the early 1980s, to less than 30 percent by 1993. This severely 
constrained the center in pursuing m acroeconom ic and redistributive 
policy goals.
The debate at the time was whether the norm ative m odel o f  federal 
reforms should be followed: clarify spending responsibilities, and then 
adjust tax assignm ents accordingly was the ‘big bang’ m odel recom ­
m ended by the Bank (as in Russia). IM F technical assistance (Ahm ad et 
al., 1995a) at the time supported a view from the Chinese administration  
that it w ould be preferable to bolster central finances with the establish­
m ent o f  a state adm inistration o f  taxation (for the first time in Chinese 
history), responsible for the collection o f  m odern taxes, particularly VA T. 
This view was accepted by the leadership, which was keen to avoid the dif­
ficulties that were apparent by then in Russia follow ing the collapse o f  the 
Soviet U n ion  -  another exam ple o f  international yardstick com petition.
The new tax system  was im plem ented in 1994, and the spending assign­
m ents were unraveled over tim e as the SOEs were reform ed gradually 
(see A hm ad et al., 1994d, 1994e and a joint report with the M inistry o f  
Finance, Ahm ad et al., 1995a; see also A hm ad et al., 1993, 2002, 2003; 
Ahm ad, 1997; Jiwei, 1997). The interests o f  the local governm ents were 
protected by a ‘stop-loss’ provision that ensured that all local governm ents 
w ould get the am ounts that they received in 1993, and the new system  
w ould be phased in.
A  new equalization transfer system  was established similar to  the m ost
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advanced in the world (Ahm ad et al., 1994e and A hm ad, 1997), but its 
operations were phased in over time, and a declining ‘revenue transfers’ 
system  was constituted in order to protect the em ploym ent and growth  
potential o f  the coastal regions (Jiwei, 1997). R eform s o f  the budget, 
treasury and reporting system s were also set in m otion  in the late 1990s, 
in a sequence o f  measures to prepare for the operation o f  a m odern  
econom y. A  second phase o f  the reforms is now  needed, to clarify the 
spending responsibilities o f  the lower levels o f  governm ent, and also  
exam ine own-source revenues and debt in a way to optim ize land and 
local resource use.
The Chinese reforms during 1993-94 were an excellent exam ple o f  the 
positive approach to intergovernmental issues in action, and provided a 
lot o f  the insight used subsequently by IM F staff, often  in conjunction  
with W orld Bank staff (som e o f  the joint work was in Indonesia, 1999, 
Nigeria, 2000, China 2003, and M exico, 2006).
4 ASSESSMENTS
What is the Evidence on Decentralization?
The evidence on the effects o f  decentralization regarding im provem ents 
in service delivery in the O E C D  countries is m ixed at best, as reviewed by 
A hm ad et al. (2008). Furthermore, the evidence for developing countries is 
not much m ore conclusive, as reviewed in Ahm ad and Brosio (2009). The 
links between decentralization and preference m atching and with growth  
are often exam ined together. The studies confirm that any relationship, if  
it can be established, is at best weak and tenuous. Interested readers are 
referred to the above reviews for the relevant references, to form  their own  
opinion.
Perhaps the greatest lacuna in the decentralization processes o f  develop­
ing countries, especially in Latin Am erica (with the exception o f  Brazil), 
is the lack o f  sufficient action on adequate own-source revenues at the 
subnational level. This m ay have been due to the norm ative approaches 
that suggest focusing first on the spending side, especially at the interm edi­
ate tier o f  governm ent/states/provinces/departm ents. The same pattern is 
observed from  Indonesia to Pakistan. But som etim es the ‘building b locks’ 
fail to work -  for exam ple, coordinated inform ation through the G FM ISs, 
even at the central level, as in M exico, and Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of). The political econom y approaches som etimes help to  understand why 
not, and thus help to im prove policy advice and effectiveness o f  techni­
cal assistance in the future or in other countries. The effectiveness o f  the
advice given and that o f  the decentralization process itself are entirely 
different matters.
Role of the International Advisors
It is easy to exaggerate the role played by the m ultilateral agencies and 
donors in influencing policy, particularly in the larger countries. Several, 
like the Chinese and Brazilians, listened politely to different points o f  view  
and then did their own thing, often m aking use o f  the ‘conflicting’ m es­
sages from  the international agencies. The situation is som ewhat different 
in the smaller countries using sectoral loans, or operating under adjust­
m ent programs supported by the IM F and the W orld Bank, where the 
leverage applied is generally stronger.
Bilateral donors
Bilateral donors tend to  replicate the context o f  their hom e country -  
U SA ID -funded advice tends to reflect the US-centric view o f  the world, 
where local governm ents work effectively, and the task for public policy is 
to ensure the efficient m agnitude o f  cooperation across local governm ents 
in providing widespread services and m inim izing externalities and spillo­
ver effects (for exam ple, through m ancom unidades, in the Latin American  
context).14 M oreover, local governm ent elections tend to  create stable 
dem ocracies as well as bulwarks against ‘undesirable’ forms o f  govern­
ment. However, these are issues o f  secondary im portance, as the support 
to Pinochet in C hile and M usharraf in Pakistan have illustrated over the 
years. A n additional difficulty has been that the local governm ents are not 
really responsible for basic health care or primary education as they would  
be under a U S-centric view o f  things. This m ay be partially due to  a differ­
ent set o f  institutional and historical circum stances, but also advice from  
other bilateral and m ultilateral agencies.
The G IZ has been instrumental in dissem inating the com plicated and 
overlapping system s o f  assignm ents that have been used in Germany, 
despite the fact that recent com m issions in Germ any have been trying to 
unravel these with rather limited success. Exam ples o f  the m ind-boggling  
com plexity are to be seen in several G IZ docum ents (see, for instance, 
C O N A M  GIZ, 2001; and also A ghon  and Krause-Junk, 1996). The result, 
for exam ple in Bolivia (Plurinational State of), was that the H IPC  scheme 
channeled funds to m unicipalities for functions in which they had only 
marginal com petence -  particularly, basic education or primary health 
care.
A  greater difficulty is that with the use o f  the HIPC funds, or those from  
the W orld Bank or the ID B, or GIZ or U SA ID , there are generally different
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reporting and accounting requirements. It is, thus, not surprising that local 
governm ents have difficulty in conform ing with these rather disparate and 
incom patible norms. This gives rise to what is then know n as ‘institutional 
and capacity constraints’ in the decentralization process -  although the local 
governm ents m ay be perfectly capable o f  following a sim ple and standard­
ized tracking and reporting function, if only there were one standard.
The development banks
It is also not surprising that the developm ent banks should  initially take 
the norm ative perspective -  reflecting the US-centric view  o f  the world  
(Burki and Perry, 2000). This focuses on the clarity in  spending assign­
m ents, appropriate revenue assignm ents, appropriate transfer design and 
efficient public financial and debt m anagem ent, em phasizing no-bailout 
conditions. W hile these ‘building b locks’ are relevant in any system  o f  
intergovernmental fiscal relations, whether US-centric or not, w ithout the 
positive approach it is difficult to see whether or not sensible advice on any  
o f  the blocks m ight be follow ed, and if so, whether it is com patible with  
conflicting advice in the same or other blocks. By the m id-to-late 1990s, 
the role o f  institutional variables and interactions with the building blocks 
was much better appreciated (Litvack et al., 1998).
After continuing W orld Bank work on service delivery, the positive 
and political econom y aspects cam e to the fore after the 2004 W orld  
D evelopm ent Report, as Devarajan and his colleagues began to pursue 
these aspects m ore system atically (W orld Bank, 2004; A hm ad et al., 2006; 
Devarajan et al; 2009). But at the sam e time, other parts o f  the Bank 
were continuing with the ‘norm ative’ tradition, as advice on M exico and 
Pakistan showed in the mid 2000s.
The greatest lack o f  consistency in the Bank is the jo in t advocacy o f  the 
centralized conditional cash transfers as well as decentralized operations, 
follow ing either norm ative or positive approaches. But then the Bank staff 
are fairly autonom ous, and it is hard to get a ‘Bank view ’ on particular 
issues.
The ID B , while also initially follow ing a ‘norm ative’ approach, relied 
m ore heavily on senior academ ics with policy-m aking experience from  
the region. H ence, their focus was m uch m ore closely grounded on experi­
ences o f  the countries concerned, and first-hand know ledge o f  the short­
com ings and difficulties (for example, Lopez-M urphy, 1995). By placing  
the ‘building b locks’ o f  fiscal federalism within the context o f  what might 
be feasible and what generally works, the ID B  showed greater flexibility at 
an earlier stage than its W ashington neighbors -  this possibly also reflects 
a greater responsiveness o f  the m anagem ent and staff o f  the ID B  to the 
preferences o f  the member countries.
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The IMF
The position  o f  the IM F  is m uch m ore com plex. In the early 1990s, F A D  
(Fiscal Affairs Departm ent) senior staff took  the position  that the subject 
o f  intergovernm ental fiscal relations was off-limits to its staff, largely 
because the subject is ‘essentially political’,15 and the IM F  does not inter­
fere with political issues, and that these are best left to the Bank. However, 
requests for technical assistance on the ‘building b locks’ o f  federalism  
gathered pace as the transition econom ies o f  Eastern Europe, Central and 
East A sia began their econom ic reforms, with which the IM F was closely  
involved. There was also a realization that the operations at the subna­
tional level m ight affect overall m acroeconom ic stability. Consequently, a 
number o f  m issions were launched, including in China (1993), as well as 
Peru (1994) and C olom bia (1994, 1995). A s described above, these were 
largely o f  a ‘political econom y’ nature, focusing on the art o f  the possible 
and practicable, as opposed to what m ight be recom m ended by the norm a­
tive theories (see the discussion above on China, where the Bank’s advice 
was m ore in line with the norm ative theory).
A t the same tim e, a three-year staff assessm ent was launched that exam ­
ined the ‘building b locks’ as well as summaries o f  country experiences 
-  this was published under the nam e o f  Teresa Ter-M inassian,16 w ho was 
responsible for initiating the work on fiscal federalism due to the clear 
influence that subnational operations in Latin Am erica had had on m acr­
oeconom ic stability. W hile the country-specific IM F technical advice had 
been based on an appreciation o f  political econom y considerations, the 
Ter-M inassian volum e (1997) was essentially norm ative. Perhaps this was 
designed to deflect the criticism that the work was becom ing too politi­
cal -  but it also reflected the rather rigid delineations between divisions 
in the F A D  that happen to correspond to the fiscal federalism  ‘building  
blocks’ o f  macro: tax policy and adm inistration, expenditure policy and 
public financial m anagem ent. It was often difficult to see the interrelation­
ships between these areas. Y et, the technical assistance that follow ed Ter- 
M inassian’s publication continued in the political econom y tradition. This 
included m issions on  Indonesia, N igeria, China and M exico -  all o f  which  
also had participation from  the W orld Bank.
A t the request o f  the Executive Board, and in honor o f  the retirement o f  
Vito Tanzi in 2000, another retrospective was held (see Ahm ad and Tanzi, 
2002). This was essentially based on political econom y approaches in tone  
and analysis, particularly a forceful paper by Tanzi him self (Tanzi, 2002) 
that focused on the effects o f  the decentralization process, and the incen­
tives to m isappropriate resources rather than simply focus on the building 
blocks.
Finally, a paper was presented to  the IM F Board on an assessm ent o f
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where the institution stands on fiscal federalism, m indful o f  the fact that 
the Board was not keen on an expansion o f  the m andate o f  the IM F, 
and was published in Fedelino and Ter-M inassian (2010). This paper, 
however, clearly recognizes the role o f  political econom y in an assessm ent 
o f  the decentralization process and the advice given by IM F  staff.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The influence o f  the international agencies on fiscal federal outcom es is 
probably exaggerated, as in reality countries do what is in the interest o f  
the ruling parties, politicians and bureaucrats. This m ay also explain why 
so often ‘sound’ advice given to countries that are capable o f  im plem en­
tation often falls on deaf ears. Probably, ‘yardstick com petition’ is the 
m ost effective incentive for countries to im prove public policy making  
and effectiveness o f  service delivery, as electorates are now  m ore aware o f  
options and living standards in neighboring countries in an increasingly 
interconnected world.
It is clear that the international institutions learn from  experience, 
and this has becom e m ore apparent as their boards have becom e m ore 
dem anding in terms o f  the evaluation o f  the design and effectiveness o f  the 
advice given. This could reflect an ‘international yardstick com petition’ 
driven by the results in specific cases. Y et the tendency to  transplant ‘fads’ 
or successful country experiences remains strong.
Institutional arrangements, providing arm’s-length services, such as 
the tax adm inistration, or institutional underpinnings for the provision  
o f  inform ation on  the operations o f  governm ents at all levels o f  adm in­
istration, are probably as essential as ‘depoliticized’ central banks. The 
dichotom y between this type o f  adm inistration, which could facilitate 
transparent governance, and control over policy (particularly on the 
revenue side at the margin) is critical and needs to be explored further in 
research and policy work in Latin America as well as in other parts o f  the 
world. International agencies and academ ic advisors have a role to play in 
distilling the experiences and presenting these to countries, while keeping 
in mind the specific institutional and historical context o f  the countries 
concerned, and understanding why countries undertake reforms.
NOTES
* Helpful comments from Giorgio Brosio and Pierre Salmon are acknowledged. The 
author has been associated with several o f the cases mentioned, as a representative of
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the IM F, or leading joint IM F-W orld Bank missions. The chapter reflects a blend of 
international policy advice with the academic literature -  both normative and political 
economy. The usual caveat applies.
1. See also Ahmad and Brosio (2011), for a selection of papers on this subject.
2. See Ahmad et al. (2008) for a discussion of the evidence in OECD countries.
3. In the 1990s, work by the W orld Bank on countries such as Russia: Wallich (1994); 
and Indonesia: Shah and Qureshi (1994) took the standard normative approach to 
fiscal federalism issues, followed by advice to Mexico: Guiguale and Webb (2000) and 
Pakistan: Martinez-Vazquez and Richter (2008).
4. This issue has been central in the discussions in post-Suharto Indonesia, post-Saddam 
Iraq, post-Biafra Nigeria, and under the new constitutions in Colombia and Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of).
5. Under the 1997 budget law, debt service was limited to 25% of revenues, and debt stock
had to be lower than 250% of revenues. This reflected the Colombian municipal debt 
law.
6. This was a fund for social stabilization that provided financing for education, health 
and infrastructure needs at the municipal level. See Ahmad et al. (1994a, 1994b).
7. Including one in the middle o f the Urubam ba valley -  the local mayor justified this as a 
means o f getting funds from Lima.
8. This situation is reminiscent of the current debate relating to the use o f EU Structural 
Funds (under Law 488), with weak monitoring, audit and controls (EU-OLAF), and 
with the relevant politicians having no ‘accountability’ for the effective use of these 
funds.
9. The Brazilian VAT, which is composed of federal and lower government-level VATs, 
is no role model, leading to production distortions and evasion possibilities, and suc­
cessive administrations have been trying to reform it without success over the past 10 
years.
10. Large federal countries such as Pakistan, which have been recipients of significant 
World Bank assistance over the years, have also tended to do what they want to, and 
have selectively used or distorted Bank advice to further parochial goals.
11. For details o f the FRL, see Afonso and de Mello (2002).
12. This includes the Bolsa Escola, which supplanted several municipal programs, Bolsa 
Alimentafdo, Auxilio Gas, Cartao Alimentafdo and the cash transfer component of 
Programa de Eridacapao do Trabalho Infantil (see http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia).
13. The W orld Bank case for conditional cash transfers is nicely put in Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009), and that o f the IM F in Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2010), who claim this to be 
an example of international best practice.
14. There have been major USAID-funded programs on decentralization, for instance both 
in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Peru. Similarly, G IZ  has been very active in the 
Andean countries, often in collaboration with ECLAC.
15. Quote ascribed to Milka Casanegra-Jantscher, Head of the Tax Administration 
Division.
16. As Deputy Director o f the FAD.
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H IP C  (heavily  in d eb te d  p o o r  co u n tries  
in itia tive) 235, 27 0 -7 1 , 420, 422, 
43 5 -6
H o n d u ra s
degree o f  d e ce n tra liz a tio n  61 -2  
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In te r-A m e ric an  D e v e lo p m en t B ank  
(ID B ) 3 5 3 ,4 1 9 -2 0 , 436 
in te rg o v ern m e n ta l g ra n ts  a n d  tran sfers  
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in te rn a tio n a l ad v iso rs  ro le  435 
In te rn a tio n a l M o n e ta ry  F u n d  (IM F ) 
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in te rg o v ern m en ta l tran s fe r  system s 
23 3 -4 , 242, 256-7  
pe r cap ita  incom e 144 
pu b lic  in v estm en t 118, 131, 132—4  
revenue  d is tr ib u tio n  fro m  n o n ­
renew ab le  resources 57, 335 
social p u b lic  spend ing  83 
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sep ara te  eq u a liza tio n  system s
302-3
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social p u b lic  sp en d in g  77, 7 9 -8 0 , 90, 
93, 97, 107-8 
tren d s  in  in v es tm en t 113-15 
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